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Chapter 1. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Research Context 
This thesis revolves around the relation between international trade and commercial 
diplomacy. Trade and diplomacy have gone hand in hand from the times of early 
civilisation (Edens, 1992; Murray & Englishman, 1855), continuing strongly through 
medieval times (Lloyd, 2002; Sen, 2003; Turvey, 2014) to the present day. The Dutch 
were especially prolific in combining these activities, even establishing a trade 
embassy in China in the mid-17th century (Kops, 2002).  
The painter Jan Baptist Weenix captured the conjoining of international trade and 
diplomacy in the painting in Figure 1.1. In the painting, the Dutch ambassador Joan 
Cunaeus and his secretary, Cornelis Speelman, are depicted travelling to Isfahan 
(Persia) in 1651 – 1652, while being escorted by the Sultan of Bandar Abbas (Persia). 
The purpose of the journey was to stimulate trade in horses and silk. Earlier in the 
same century, the Dutch had established an embassy in Turkey with the primary aim 
of promoting free trade between the two countries (Bulut, 2002). These events were 
not driven by a colonial mindset, but rather a commercial mindset, like the Franco-
Turkish ambassadorial trade relationship in the 16th century (Jensen, 1985). 
Figure 1.1: The Dutch ambassador on his way to Isfahan by Jan Baptist Weenix, 1653-1659
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Commercial diplomacy conducts trade promotion activities through diplomatic actors 
overseas who promote international trade (Visser & Ruël, 2014). This concept was in 
use as far back as early post-independence America (Griffiths, 1970; McClure, 1925; 
Page, 1902; Straus, 1911) as reflected in the changing roles of diplomatic envoys over 
time to increasingly focus on trade-issues (Badel, 2011; Bishop, 1915; Herbst, 1969). 
The term “commercial diplomacy” represents a change in the relationship between 
trade and diplomacy: where the earlier relationships were mostly motivated from a 
mercantilist and colonial point of view, this no longer applies to current practice. 
Within the broader economic policies known as economic diplomacy, commercial 
diplomacy plays a crucial role at the intersection of international relations and 
international business. As an integral component of economic diplomacy (Okano-
Heijmans, 2011), commercial diplomacy is key to economic success by providing 
governments and businesses with a means to interact and facilitate economic 
development (Kostecki & Naray, 2007). At its core, commercial diplomacy intends to 
alleviate information asymmetries that arise from market failures to achieve such 
benefits as increased international trade flows, increased competitiveness of home 
country firms in the host country, and increased market intelligence through 
networking (Visser & Ruël, 2014), as well as job creation and growth in the national 
economy (Kostecki & Naray, 2007). Through commercial diplomacy, a government 
can highlight and open new international markets and (inward) investment 
opportunities, thus serving the interests of both government and business (Reuvers & 
Ruël, 2012; Visser & Ruël, 2014). Governments do this through individuals with 
diplomatic status performing activities that alleviate barriers to trade arising from 
market failures (Yakop & van Bergeijk, 2011). 
Many countries have articulated policies regarding trade and diplomacy. Under the 
auspices of economic diplomacy, the Australian government's policy is to use its 
overseas diplomatic assets to promote trade, encourage growth, attract investment, and 
support business (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014). 
While commercial diplomacy is practiced by many, or even most, countries, the 
amount of conceptual and empirical literature on the subject pales in comparison. 
A summary definition of commercial diplomacy is business promotion and facilitation 
activities conducted by diplomatic actors in a host country aimed at generating 
commercial gain in the form of exports and inward investment. The business 
promotion and facilitation activities are based on supplying information to home 
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businesses about export and investment opportunities, and maintaining networks with 
key actors in relevant areas (Ruël & Visser, 2012).  
The term commercial diplomacy is often used interchangeably with economic 
diplomacy, although a distinction exists: commercial diplomacy is a subset of 
economic diplomacy, which encompasses all international economic decisions such as 
sanctions and currency agreements. In addition, commercial diplomacy is also distinct 
from export promotion which relates to all direct and indirect public policy measures 
that enhance exporting activities; export promotion refers mostly to incentivising firms 
to start exporting and is focused on the home country rather than on the activities of 
government actors in overseas offices as is the case with commercial diplomacy. In 
their capacity as network developers and utilisers, commercial diplomacy offices are 
in a position to take on an intermediary role in which they facilitate trade by lowering 
search costs and fixed costs to trade for firms. 
The available literature has so far focused on building the concept of commercial 
diplomacy in terms of its resources and activities. In-depth conceptualisations of the 
individual commercial diplomat exist (Naray, 2011; Ruël & Visser, 2012) as do 
conceptualisations of the overall term ‘commercial diplomacy’ (Naray, 2012). 
However, few studies empirically assess the effectiveness at increasing trade of 
employing commercial diplomacy at the office-level. Studies that do take this 
viewpoint focus on broadly defined resources and activities and their effect on trade 
(Kang, 2011; Kotabe, 1993; Martin, 2003; Wilkinson, 2006; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 
2000; Wilkinson, Thomas, & McNally, 2011). Two studies focus on the resources and 
activities of commercial diplomacy in relation to service quality. The first does so by 
means of a self-assessment measure by commercial diplomats (Ruël & Zuidema, 
2012). The second does so from the perspective of small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) using commercial diplomacy (Ruël & Busschers, 2012).  
In relation to trade, the empirical literature does not fully capture the range of resources 
that these offices have, the full spectrum of activities they perform and the extent to 
which they perform them, or explore the effect of these resources and activities on 
trade. 
Conceptual development and empirical assessment in the literature shows overlap 
between the operation of commercial diplomacy offices and function of 
intermediaries; intermediaries being actors that match home and host country firms 
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who might otherwise not have transacted. Intermediaries build and use networks of 
contact to match firms and provide information. 
Networking is one of the core functions that commercial diplomacy offices perform: 
creating links with key foreign players, and connecting buyers and sellers (Welch, 
Welch, Young, & Wilkinson, 1998). The intermediary perspective exists in case 
studies as well. In Canada, commercial diplomats focus on their role as relationship-
builders and knowledge-brokers (Potter, 2004). Similar observations exist in the 
Finnish (Ruël & Visser, 2012) and Malaysian (Ruël, Boer, & Haaf, 2013) contexts, as 
well as in relation to the role of commercial diplomacy offices overall (Jones–Bos, 
Raes, & Kader, 2012; O'Toole & Bowe, 2012). However, the incorporation of an 
intermediary role into the functioning of commercial diplomacy remains absent in the 
literature, let alone any empirical analyses. 
The intermediary perspective implies that commercial diplomacy offices aid in 
promoting trade in goods for which more search effort is required, that they alleviate 
barriers to trade. In the empirical literature, only the search cost and trade barrier 
alleviation elements are detailed, and only from the perspective of the effect of 
overseas diplomatic offices on trade without regard for office-level functioning in this 
intermediary role, nor the effectiveness thereof. Most of the empirical literature in this 
matter focuses on the marginally related field of export promotion, or on the more 
closely related aspect of the presence of overseas representation and its effect on trade. 
1.2. Aims and Contributions 
The existing conceptual and empirical literature on commercial diplomacy needs to be 
extended to contribute to the ongoing debate about the merits of government 
intervention in trade and the specific role that overseas offices should occupy 
(Alexander & Warwick, 2007; Copeland, 2007). The literature should consider what 
the intermediary perspective specifies the role of commercial diplomacy offices to be, 
whether they are effective tools for trade promotion in the first place, and whether they 
are effective in their role as network intermediaries. This thesis aims to fill these gaps 
and to answer the following questions: 
How effective a tool is commercial diplomacy in trade promotion? 
How effective is commercial diplomacy at performing an intermediary role? 
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What characteristics of commercial diplomacy offices positively impact their 
effectiveness? 
The principal contribution of this thesis is that it constitutes the most comprehensive 
and extensive analysis of commercial diplomacy yet, and that the intermediary 
perspective developed in the thesis provides a set of tools for measuring the 
effectiveness of commercial diplomacy from three different perspectives: 
1. An identification of whether the use of such offices affects trade outcomes that 
relate to trade and search costs. 
2. The identification of how commercial diplomacy offices alleviate barriers to 
trade.  
3. A study of office-level resources and activities, and an assessment of how 
offices' characteristics affect their function of alleviating barriers to trade. 
By assessing office-level activities and resources this study fills a gap pointed out by 
Gillespie and Riddle (2004) who indicate that research is needed that contextualises 
the input and output of these offices within the environments they operate. Moreover, 
a gap exists in terms of Welch et al.'s (1998) assertion that network outcomes of foreign 
offices should be included in these offices' performance assessments. Most of all, 
assessing commercial diplomacy as a network intermediary also extends the 
conceptualisation put forth by O'Gorman and Evers (2011) which has as yet seen no 
empirical assessment.  
From the perspective of empirical assessment, studies have so far focused on narrow 
aspects of commercial diplomacy rather an integrated view (Visser & Ruël, 2014). 
This thesis takes a broad view of commercial diplomacy, adding an integrated 
perspective to the literature. The three studies conducted by this thesis together 
investigate different aspects of how commercial diplomacy offices affect trade through 
their role as an intermediary. 
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1.3. Thesis Overview 
This thesis first establishes the commercial diplomacy concept in Chapter 2. The 
Chapter then examines the extent to which the intermediary role has been addressed 
by the empirical literature on and related to commercial diplomacy. After identifying 
specific gaps in the commercial diplomacy literature, the Chapter develops hypotheses 
that address gaps in the extant empirical research. Chapter 3 describes the adoption of 
a gravity model design for three studies that address the hypotheses, where each 
successive study dives deeper into the functioning of commercial diplomacy offices. 
The first study, in Chapter 4, addresses the gaps in the empirical literature on the effect 
of the presence of commercial diplomacy offices on the margins of trade, and on trade 
in different types of goods. If commercial diplomacy offices are effective in their role 
as intermediaries, they should alleviate transaction cost barriers to allow for matching 
of buyers and suppliers. Seeing as transaction costs are highest for more differentiated 
goods (Rauch, 1999), this Chapter will identify the extent to which commercial 
diplomacy offices affect trade in differentiated goods, reference priced goods and 
homogeneous goods. Similarly, the Chapter will identify whether the presence of 
commercial diplomacy offices is effective at reducing barriers to trade that increase 
fixed costs to entry, in which case they should increase the extensive margin of trade 
and to a lesser extent the intensive margin according to firm heterogeneity models by 
Chaney (2008) and Melitz (2003). The study uses a panel dataset that covers 100 
countries and 5-year interval data on diplomatic representation from 1985 to 2005 to 
provide a first indication of these offices as effective intermediaries. The panel dataset 
allows for an estimation strategy that accounts for simultaneity bias, and is a necessity 
to examine the margins of trade. The results robustly indicate that commercial 
diplomacy offices stimulate exports in differentiated goods (goods that require more 
search effort) and not homogeneous goods, and positively affect export variety rather 
than export intensity.  
The second study, in Chapter 5, for the first time in the literature assesses whether 
commercial diplomacy offices are more effective as formal and informal institutional 
constraints, a source of transaction costs, are more burdensome to exports. Following 
from the first empirical study, which assesses whether commercial diplomacy offices 
affect trade along the lines expected for the intermediary role, the second study focuses 
on the alleviation of the determinants of trade barriers. This will allow for an 
assessment of which source(s) of trade barriers commercial diplomacy offices are most 
 10 
 
effective at addressing. The study uses a cross sectional dataset covering 22 exporters 
and 200 importers from Rose (2007). This dataset is the only one available that 
contains information about the number of foreign missions present in a country as a 
proxy for the extent to which there is a commercial diplomacy presence. The use of 
this dataset allows for endogeneity concerns to be addressed by means of instrumental 
variables analysis, and is appropriate to use with institutional constraints due to their 
relatively time-invariant nature. Following interaction and subsample analysis, the 
findings indicate how the marginal effectiveness of commercial diplomacy offices 
changes with the extent of barriers to trade from institutional constraints, and indicates 
at what points a commercial diplomacy office is no longer effective.  
The third study, which spans Chapters 6 and 7, will rely on the identification of causal 
relationships the first and second studies to focus on the question of how the effects 
those empirical studies identify come about, and what determinants are effective in 
commercial diplomacy offices' functioning as intermediaries. The study fills one of 
the main gaps in the empirical literature: the effect of office-level organisational 
characteristics and activities on trade is a highly underdeveloped area, while their 
effectiveness as intermediaries has not yet been assessed. The study consists of a cross-
sectional survey of individual offices as it is the office-level where the overarching 
resource endowments that governments steer towards commercial diplomacy are 
utilised. The study finds that there are some direct effects on exports from the offices' 
resources and activities, and that an office's effectiveness is mostly indirectly related 
to trade via its relational network characteristics and the performance of specific 
activities for various kinds of trade barrier sources. 
Lastly, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. It revisits the key findings, summarises the 
contributions this thesis makes, outlines directions for future research and discusses 
policy implications that result from this thesis.  
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Chapter 2. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
Little research exists to assess what commercial diplomacy is, and whether it is 
effective. So far, the literature mostly consists of frameworks related to its organisation 
and activities and interchangeably uses the related concepts of export promotion and 
economic diplomacy. The purpose of this Chapter is to consolidate the literature, to 
define commercial diplomacy, to identify its function as a government intervention 
tool, and to formulate hypotheses that address the gaps in the extant literature. 
Section 2.2 of this review outlines the definition1, organisation, and activities 
performed under the banner of commercial diplomacy in and compares these with the 
related concepts of economic diplomacy and export promotion. Having established the 
nature and limits of commercial diplomacy, Section 2.3 then focuses on establishing a 
link between the purpose of commercial diplomacy and the role of an intermediary. 
Section 2.4 reviews the empirical literature, after which Section 2.5 develops the 
hypotheses that the thesis addresses. Finally, section 2.6 provides a summary of this 
chapter. 
2.2. Commercial Diplomacy: Terms and Definition 
2.2.1. Definition of commercial diplomacy 
Definition 
Within the spectrum of definitions of commercial diplomacy offered by studies, four 
broad categories emerge: 
1. Home government aims;  
2. Use of diplomacy channels and processes; 
3. Trade activities performed at the diplomatic office; and  
                                                 
1 The scope of the discussion around the definition, organisation, and activities of commercial 
diplomacy in this section is limited to articles that explicitly mention the term and provide some 
conceptual or theoretical framework. This excludes case studies that only apply existing constructs 
(Coolsaet, 2004; Ibrahim, 2014; Jones–Bos et al., 2012; Ruël et al., 2013; Sridharan, 2002; Tanganelli 
& Pou, 2012; Workneh, 2012) and historical studies (Badel, 2011; Griffiths, 1970; Lloyd, 2002; Straus, 
1911).  
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4. A comprehensive integration of (1) to (3). 
Of the integrated definitions (category 4), that formulated by Ruël and Visser (2012, 
p.44) is the most expansive and will serve as the benchmark against which to contrast 
the available definitions: 
'Commercial diplomacy is an activity conducted by state representatives which 
is aimed at generating commercial gain in the form of trade and inward and 
outward investment for the home country by means of business and 
entrepreneurship promotion and facilitation activities in the host country based 
on supplying information about export and investment opportunities, keeping 
contact with key actors and maintaining networks in relevant areas.' 
This benchmark differs from the integrated definition provided by Reuvers and Ruël 
(2012), who formulate aims with a broader scope than that in the benchmark, but also 
specify that commercial diplomacy focuses on exports rather than trade. The 
benchmark is also more specific in its formulation of activities than Naray (2011, 
2012), who presents the aim of commercial diplomacy to be encouragement of 
bilateral business by means of several activity areas. His studies do emphasise the 
versatility of the roles that the state representatives may perform and thus ascribes a 
greater importance of this actor. 
Within the scope of studies that conceptualise commercial diplomacy from a 
government's aim in using it (category 1) Kostecki and Naray (2007, p.1) state that 
‘commercial diplomacy is a government service to the business community, which 
aims at the development of socially beneficial international business ventures’, 
specifying that those services relate to business support activities. Within this context  
Lee and Hudson (2004) emphasise the organisation of public officials as a key 
component in their definition. In the same vein, Okano-Heijmans (2011, p.17) defines 
commercial diplomacy to be 'the cooperative efforts by government and business that 
aim to achieve commercial objectives that advance national interests, including trade 
and investment promotion'. In relation to the benchmark definition above, these 
definitions broadly specify the aims of the government, and reveal little about the 
activities performed.  
Several authors focus more on the use of diplomatic channels and processes in 
commercial diplomacy (category 2). The aims of the government specified in these 
definitions are broad. Moreover, combined with a lack of specification regarding what 
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activities diplomatic missions perform these definitions are not as strict as the 
benchmark one, potentially leading to an interpretation beyond commercial 
diplomacy. To start with, Lee (2004, p.51) defines commercial diplomacy to be ‘the 
work of a network of public and private actors who manage commercial relations using 
diplomatic channels and processes’, which corresponds fully with (Udovič, 2011). It 
also fits in the more elaborate definition by Saner and Yiu (2003), who add that it 
pursues economic success. 
Trade activities performed at the diplomatic office (category 3), makes explicit that 
commercial diplomacy revolves around business promotion between a home and host 
country as conducted by state representatives with diplomatic status (Ruël & 
Busschers, 2012). This is supplemented by Naray (2008) who adds facilitation services 
as well, thus providing a more complete picture. However, compared with the 
benchmark definition the aims of commercial diplomacy are not clearly outlined. 
Potter (2004, p.55) addresses this by stating that commercial diplomacy is defined as 
'as the application of the tools of diplomacy to help bring about specific commercial 
gains through promoting exports, attracting inward investment and preserving outward 
investment opportunities, and encouraging the benefits of technological transfer’. 
While this does not outline the actors involved in this concept and can thus be 
construed more broadly, it does mostly amalgamate the definitions put forth in the 
diplomacy- and activity-based definitions. 
While most of the available definitions are already embedded within the benchmark 
definition, some improvements can be made to the benchmark. Notably, Reuvers and 
Ruël (2012) and Potter (2004) outline that the focus of commercial diplomacy in the 
host country lies in exports rather than bilateral trade, and Lee (2004), Saner and Yiu, 
(2003), and Ruël and Busschers (2012) emphasise the diplomatic status of the actors 
involved. A recalibration of the benchmark definition yields: 
Commercial diplomacy is an activity conducted by diplomatic actors in a host 
country which is aimed at generating commercial gain in the form of exports2 
and inward investment by means of business promotion and facilitation 
                                                 
2 The determinants of exports and investment differ to the extent that the scope of this thesis is largely 
limited to exports. Section 2.2.3 indicates this is the key focus of the activities performed by commercial 
diplomacy offices. 
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activities based on supplying information about export and investment 
opportunities, and maintaining networks with key actors in relevant areas. 
Comparison with economic diplomacy and export promotion 
The concept of economic diplomacy is more broadly defined than commercial 
diplomacy. Economic diplomacy encompasses sanctions and inducements, currency 
agreements, trade agreements, and influencing decisions made by international 
organisations such as the WTO (Okano-Heijmans, 2011; Sherman & Eliasson, 2007), 
as well as the organisation of the diplomatic apparatus (Neumayer, 2008). Commercial 
diplomacy is thus a subset of economic diplomacy. Even after Okano-Heijmans' 
(2011) establishment of commercial diplomacy as one of the five branches of 
economic diplomacy, the literature makes largely no distinction. As such, while some 
case studies present a discussion of commercial diplomacy (Ibrahim, 2014; Sherman 
& Eliasson, 2006, 2007; Tanganelli & Pou, 2012), they describe the type of 
multilateral negotiations that Okano-Heijmans (2011) defines as economic diplomacy. 
On the other side, Coolsaet (2004) focuses on a case study of the economic diplomacy 
of Belgium, and ventures into commercial diplomacy territory. Whereas Reuvers and 
Ruël (2012, p.4) state that ‘in practice there is not much of a differentiation between 
the two’, the development of the definition here indicates that commercial diplomacy 
is a differentiated sub-branch of economic diplomacy. 
Unlike economic and commercial diplomacy, export promotion is decidedly 
unambiguous. It comprises all public policy measures and practices that actually and 
potentially enhance exporting activities at the level of the firm, industry, and nation 
(Root, 1971; Seringhaus, 1986), either directly or indirectly (Belloc & Di Maio, 2012). 
As such, it entails creating awareness of exporting options, the removal of trade 
barriers to exporting, and the creation of incentives and assistance measures to 
potential and actual exporters (Seringhaus & Rosson, 1991). Export promotion differs 
from commercial diplomacy in that it takes a holistic approach to its aims: it does not 
focus solely on business promotion and facilitation activities performed by diplomatic 
actors in a host country, but includes home country activities too. While Ruël and 
Visser (2012) and Visser and Ruël (2014) state that commercial diplomacy 
encompasses export promotion, this review indicates that this is not the case. Their 
misattribution lies in their use of a narrow definition of export promotion which relates 
only to the activities performed in the host country – a conceptualisation present in 
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other commercial diplomacy studies as well (e.g. Kostecki & Naray, 2007; Naray, 
2011; Potter, 2004; Naray, 2012). 
2.2.2. Organisation of commercial diplomacy 
Organisational characteristics of commercial diplomacy 
Being associated with diplomatic missions, commercial diplomacy is inherently a 
border-out activity (Potter, 2004). The actors responsible for overseas offices' 
commercial diplomacy activities are commercial diplomats, who are members of 
diplomatic missions or heads of commercial representations with diplomatic status 
(Naray, 2008, 2011, 2012; Herbst, 1969; Potter, 2004; Saner & Yiu, 2003; Ruël & 
Visser, 2012; Kostecki & Naray, 2007). The choice to locate a commercial diplomacy 
office overseas depend on several factors. Forming part of the apparatus of diplomatic 
representation, historical and colonial relations play a part in the establishment of 
diplomatic relations and by extension their commercial diplomacy functions, as do 
pre-existing conditions such as development aid, military collaboration (Kostecki & 
Naray, 2007), and the structure of international diplomatic ties (Kinne, 2014). 
However, the establishment of commercial diplomacy offices is also influenced by 
market size, market potential, and difficulty in penetrating the markets (Naray, 2012; 
Udovič, 2011; Kostecki & Naray, 2011). 
The organisation of the offices for which commercial diplomats work can differ, 
characterised by the ministerial responsibilities between Trade and Foreign Affairs, 
influences the resulting ownership character of the commercial diplomacy offices 
(Naray, 2012). The key differentiating factor is the degree of separation of a 
commercial diplomacy office from a diplomatic mission. Typically, commercial 
diplomacy offices operate from within the diplomatic mission, in which case a 
commercial diplomat might have dual diplomatic and economic/commercial 
responsibilities. If diplomatic functions and commercial diplomacy functions are 
separated, two broad options exist. First, commercial diplomacy offices can be run 
separately (in terms of functions and physical location) from, but still have a liaising 
role with, a diplomatic mission which is then only concerned with policy issues. In this 
case, the separate commercial diplomacy office may still feature a head of office with 
diplomatic status. Second, a separate commercial diplomacy office can also exist with 
greater cooperation, where the offices operate under the auspices of a diplomatic 
mission (Kostecki & Naray, 2007; Naray, 2008, 2011). 
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By far the most widely discussed organisational aspect of commercial diplomacy is 
that of the actor, the commercial diplomat, who is posted abroad. Two studies 
characterise commercial diplomat types: those by Naray (2008) and Ruël and Visser 
(2012). Common features across the commercial diplomat types exist. Effective 
commercial diplomats are those with knowledge of private and public sectors (Naray, 
2011; Saner & Yiu, 2003) through experience or education (Naray, 2012; Saner & Yiu, 
2003; Lee, 2004). With the diplomatic status of commercial diplomats, rotation to a 
new post usually takes place every few years (Herbst, 1969; Saner & Yiu, 2003; 
Kostecki & Naray, 2007). The two studies characterising commercial diplomats apply 
some nuances that exist based on elements related to commercial diplomats' 
educational and professional background and experience (Ruël & Visser, 2012) as well 
as host country characteristics related to the difficulty of market penetration (Kostecki 
and Naray, 2007; Naray, 2012). 
Starting with the categorisation by Naray (2008), which is based on Kostecki and 
Naray (2007), three commercial diplomat types exist, and they are summarised in 
Table 2.1 below. Business promoters are firm-oriented and due to their professional 
experience adopt an entrepreneurial approach that features close ties to businesses. 
Civil servants are less directly involved with direct business assistance and have large 
experience in the public sector in the form of previous posts. Lastly, generalists are 
career diplomats who assume business support functions on an ad hoc basis or in 
addition to other diplomatic duties. 
Table 2.1: Naray's (2008) categorisation of commercial diplomat types 
 Business Promoter Civil Servant Generalist 
Approach Commercial issues are 
understood mainly as 
business issues 
Commercial issues are 
considered an integral 
part of international 
relations 
Commercial issues are 
perceived in a broader 
diplomatic and 
political perspective 
Leading concern Focus on client 
satisfaction 
Focus on satisfaction 
of the Ministry of 
Trade 
Focus on the 
satisfaction of the 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
 
The characteristics outlined in Table 2.1 are largely corroborated by Ruël and Visser's 
(2012) qualitative study of commercial diplomats in Finland, who specify them further 
to outline the order in which driving forces matter to these commercial diplomat types. 
The greatest influence is the specific skills and experiences from the public and private 
sectors, followed by the extent to which markets are penetrable, and the resources that 
are at their disposal. Additionally, they argue that commercial diplomats become more 
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actively engaged in business affairs depending on these factors. This contributes to a 
typification summarised in Table 2.2 which differentiates between proactors, reactors, 
and non-actors based on the extent to which the commercial diplomat is actively 
engaged with businesses, their knowledge of the local language, and the extent to 
which they perceive cultural differences to matter in their role as commercial 
diplomats. The categorisation of proactors, reactors and non-actors parallels Naray's 
(2008) business promoters, civil servants, though emphasises actual engagement with 
commercial diplomacy. 
Table 2.2: Ruël & Visser's (2012) categorisation of commercial diplomat types 
 
Proactor Reactor Non-actor 
Importance of 
proactivity 
Seen as the most 
important element of 
the job 
Recognised but 
marginal due to lack of 
time and resources, and 
reactive duties 
Not important 
Level of 
proactivity 
Government institutions 
and business levels 
Mostly government 
institutions level 
Government institutions 
level, if at all 
Intensity of 
proactive efforts 
Highly intensive, 
including representation 
at fairs and events, as 
well as contact with 
host country 
government and 
businesses 
Moderately intensive 
with a focus on host 
country government 
institutions 
Sporadic efforts 
pertaining to nation 
branding 
  
Comparison with economic diplomacy and export promotion 
As Okano-Heijmans (2011) states, commercial diplomacy is a branch of economic 
diplomacy, and economic diplomacy applies to domestic and international efforts that 
reconcile political and economic outcomes with the aim of enhancing national 
economic prosperity and political stability. It involves stakeholders ranging from 
international public institutions to private actors; its organisation depends on overall 
policy frameworks. Commercial diplomacy's organisation as a part of foreign policy 
(Potter, 2004) thus entails a narrow definition concerning specific actors and locations.  
The organisation of export promotion has a different focus from commercial 
diplomacy. As it focuses on developing awareness of export opportunities, assistance 
in export planning and preparation, and financial support (Belloc & Di Maio, 2012; 
Seringhaus & Botschen, 1991), export promotion's organisation consists of the set of 
public policy measures that aim at these foci. This set of facilities is organised from 
within the home country (Czinkota, 2002; Sousa, Martínez-López, & Coelho, 2008), 
and includes trade promotion organisations, which can be privately organised 
(Cavusgil & Yeoh, 1994; Lederman, Olarreaga, & Payton, 2010; Leonidou, 
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Palihawadana, & Theodosiou, 2011). Thus, the key differences between export 
promotion and commercial diplomacy in terms of organisation are that commercial 
diplomacy generally comes into play after firms have gone through the processes that 
make them export-ready (Naray, 2011), and that the distinct overseas diplomatic 
function of the offices involved is by nature publicly organised. 
2.2.3. Activities 
Activities performed by commercial diplomacy offices 
Organised as part of or liaising with diplomatic missions, commercial diplomacy 
offices engage in promoting export and investment, reporting on the host country's 
economy, and supporting and advocating for business (Herbst, 1969; Potter, 2004; 
Kostecki & Naray, 2007). The activities that appear in the conceptual literature are 
summarised below, along with caveats. The list matches the areas and activities matrix 
developed by Naray (2008, 2011), all of which fit within or across the activity sets 
described below. 
Network activities relates to building a network of contacts in the host country, finding 
partners, and organising meetings with potential partners for home country businesses. 
Network activities are not universally recognised as one of the core activities of 
commercial diplomacy, though they do appear in numerous studies (Visser & Ruël, 
2014; Lee, 2004; Potter, 2004; Herbst, 1969; Naray, 2008, 2011). Because partner 
search and meeting arrangement require contact development, it is included here as 
what Kostecki and Naray (2007) regard as a support function. 
Intelligence activities are activities related to gathering information and data on all 
relevant topics relating to the business environment of the host country, as well as the 
identification of specific business opportunities. This activity set combines the 
collection of intelligence on markets and specific partnering opportunities (Potter, 
2004; Naray, 2008, 2011, 2012) and the dissemination of information on broader 
regulatory, political and cultural aspects that may affect home country businesses 
(Herbst, 1969). 
Image campaigns consist of activities to promote the image of the home country and 
home country businesses for purposes of export and investment, and the participation 
in trade fairs (Potter, 2004; Herbst, 1969; Saner & Yiu, 2003; Naray, 2012). While 
Okano-Heijmans (2011) and Naray (2008, 2011, 2012) include tourism promotion, it 
is excluded here because it is not within the scope of business support and trade 
promotion activities. 
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Business support includes activities protecting intellectual property rights (IPR), 
assisting in marketing by home country businesses, coordinating legal action, and 
troubleshooting minor issues (Potter, 2004; Kostecki & Naray 2007; Naray 2008, 
2011, 2012) 
Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) relates to activities of investment 
support, as well as promotional activities that improve the image of the home country’s 
investment potential. Several studies separate inward and outward investment 
promotion and support (Potter, 2004; Visser & Ruël, 2014; Lee, 2004). Here, they are 
placed under the FDI promotion group compliant with the studies that consider inward 
and outward FDI activities under the same banner (Herbst, 1969; Saner & Yiu, 2003; 
Okano-Heijmans, 2011).  
Comparison with economic diplomacy and export promotion 
Commercial diplomacy's activities are a subset of economic diplomacy activities 
(Potter, 2004). As one of the branches of economic diplomacy (Okano-Heijmans, 
2011), commercial diplomacy capitalises on the opportunities created by economic 
diplomacy (Potter, 2004). 
Export promotion activities comprise direct export marketing and exporting assistance 
as well as indirect assistance through fiscal measures and incentives (Belloc & Di 
Maio, 2012; Diamantopoulos, Schlegelmilch, & Tse, 1993; Leonidou et al., 2011; 
Seringhaus, 1986), and export processing zones (Belloc & Di Maio, 2012). As a part 
of the direct measures, trade promotion organisations create awareness of exporting 
opportunities and focus on facilitating the exporting process within the domestic 
environment. As such, the activities of trade promotion organisations, as a subgroup 
of export promotion (Belloc & Di Maio, 2012; Wilkinson et al., 2011), are only 
partially relevant to commercial diplomacy. Trade promotion organisations focus on 
the pre-exporting stages as well and alleviate motivational barriers to trade (Ahmed, 
Mohamed, Johnson, & Meng, 2002; Seringhaus & Rosson, 1998), whereas 
commercial diplomacy activities inherently focus on informational and operational 
barriers to trade.  
Table 2.3 below presents an overview of the three most commonly mentioned 
activities for each activity category above, based on the commercial diplomacy 
literature and the export promotion literature that focuses on overseas offices. 
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Table 2.3: Activities performed under commercial diplomacy, accounting for the export 
promotion literature 
Network 
Activities 
Intelligence 
Activities 
Image Campaigns Business Support FDI 
Promotion 
Organising 
prospect meetings 
Disseminating 
commercial 
information 
Participating in or 
organisation of 
trade fairs and 
missions 
Coordination of 
legal action 
Organising 
investment 
seminars 
Search for 
potential partners 
Market research Performing image 
studies 
Troubleshooting 
on minor issues 
Identifying 
potential 
investors 
Developing 
business and 
government 
contacts 
Providing general 
information such 
as on regulatory 
issues 
Awareness 
campaigns 
Involvement or 
assistance in 
negotiations 
Organising 
high-level 
visits 
 
 
2.3. Commercial Diplomacy as an Intermediary 
Function 
2.3.1. Commercial diplomacy and market failures 
Section 2.2 establishes that commercial diplomacy is conducted by government offices 
in a host country, and that these offices perform activities related to networking, 
information search and dissemination, image promotion, business support, and FDI 
promotion. As such, it is a tool for governments to encourage home-business 
competitiveness and to foster international commercial relations (Potter, 2004; Naray, 
2008) with the larger aim of creating jobs and economic growth in the home country 
(Kotabe & Czinkota, 1992; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2006). Thus, part of the reason for 
governments to operate commercial diplomacy offices is to maximise business 
opportunities (Okano-Heijmans, 2011). The justification for this lies in the existence 
of market failures (Wolf, 1979). 
Not all market failure types are ones that commercial diplomacy addresses. In Wolf 's 
(1979, 1987) delineation of market failures, those relating to externalities and market 
imperfections are applicable (Belloc & Di Maio, 2012; Copeland, 2007). The existence 
of externalities may create a need for public goods if economic activities create spill-
overs that are not attributable to any one producer, thus causing firms to underinvest 
in their exporting activities because of the risk of free-riding. Market imperfections 
relate (among others) to the inequality of access to information on markets and 
products, which may result in the social benefits that arise from having such 
 21 
 
information being higher than private benefits. These information-related market 
failures impede the identification of overseas opportunities, and the willingness to bear 
the cost of engaging in foreign markets (Lederman et al., 2010; Copeland, 2007). 
Thus, market failures associated with information spill overs and information 
asymmetry apply to especially commercial diplomacy (Copeland, 2007; Lederman et 
al., 2010). Commercial diplomacy addressed these market failures through activities 
that relate to the search for overseas business opportunities (Copeland, 2007; Okano-
Heijmans, 2011; Volpe Martincus & Carballo, 2010b) and the alleviation of 
information barriers between countries (Rauch, 1996; Okano-Heijmans, 2011; 
Copeland, 2007), both of which can complement firms' internal resources and 
capabilities (Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2006). 
2.3.2. Intermediaries and commercial diplomacy 
The function of an intermediary 
Where information is costly to procure or matching is a costly process for firms, 
intermediaries are likely to take up these activities. They acquire specialised 
knowledge of the home and host markets, reducing search costs for clients, and lower 
trade barriers that result from information asymmetry problems (Copeland, 2007).  
Focusing on the matching aspect, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) present a model of 
intermediaries3 which facilitate matching by investing in identification technologies 
and by developing a knowledge base4. While such intermediaries enhance welfare, 
they may not fully overcome information problems due to a hold-up problem. 
Intermediaries underinvest relative to clients' needs because payments for services 
occurs ex-post while an intermediary wanting to improve its technologies needs to 
invest a priori (Shevchenko, 2004). 
On information asymmetry, Gary Biglaiser (1993) discusses the lack of information 
about product quality where intermediaries prevent high quality goods from being 
driven out of a market if signalling is costly; they offer expertise in markets with 
adverse selection (Petropoulou, 2008).  
Generally, the literature follows Cosimano (1996) in considering an intermediary to 
be an agency that facilitates the matching process and is efficient in doing so by 
                                                 
3 Their terminology is 'middlemen'. 
4 They also recognise inventory holding as one of the key activities, though in the discussion here this 
function is not relevant. 
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increasing the probability of a successful match. Common across the matching and 
information asymmetry alleviation functions that the intermediary literature discuss is 
that intermediaries are information brokers (Petropoulou, 2008): where information 
asymmetry and transaction costs hinder firms’ internationalisation processes, 
intermediaries may invest in developing information networks to address these issues. 
From her model, Petropoulou (2008) finds that intermediation unambiguously raises 
trade volume and social welfare by expanding the set of matching technologies 
available to firms, and that higher information costs enhance the benefits from 
intermediaries' network-building activities as well as enhance the use of 
intermediaries. 
The development of intermediaries as network intermediaries stems from Rauch and 
Watson (2004), to whom intermediaries are organisations that have deep knowledge 
of the foreign market from the information network they develop (Rauch, 2001). They 
aim at lowering clients' transaction costs which involve (ex-ante) search, negotiation 
and (ex post) monitoring costs (O. E. Williamson, 1985). The problems with acquiring 
information in distant or unfamiliar markets increases search costs, and cultural 
barriers can increase negotiation costs (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998). Intermediaries are more 
likely to exist in more distant and unfamiliar markets rather than the home market 
(Ahn, Khandelwal, & Wei, 2011; Bernard, Grazzi, & Tomasi, 2015; Ma, 2006), and 
they will be more successful if they have the knowledge of and resources in overseas 
markets to mitigate transaction costs for clients (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998; Rauch, 2001). 
Similarly, exporters are more likely to utilise intermediaries that have extensive 
network connections. Especially in emerging economies, this corresponds with the 
intermediary's network size (Petropoulou, 2008), density (Rauch, 2001), and strength 
of relationships with local actors (Ma, 2006). Smaller firms are more likely to need 
these services due to their low productivity thresholds (Abel-Koch, 2013; Ahn et al., 
2011). 
Thus, intermediaries aid smaller firms in entering overseas and unfamiliar markets by 
linking firms that otherwise would not have met (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998; Peng & York, 
2001; Wilkinson et al., 2011). They occupy what Burt (1992) calls a structural hole; 
through their network they allow firms to gain network access (Björkman & Kock, 
1995; Ellis, 2000; Rauch & Watson, 2004). By allowing firms to use their networks, 
intermediaries complement resource constrained firms that may not be able to engage 
in building network relationships themselves (Ellis, 2000; Peng & York, 2001; Perry, 
 23 
 
1996; Smedlund, 2006), or to collect key information (Bauerschmidt, Sullivan, & 
Gillespie, 1985; Musteen, Datta, & Butts, 2013). 
Parallels between private intermediaries and commercial diplomacy 
There is a strong parallel between the activities that commercial diplomacy offices 
perform (outlined in Section 2.2.3) to meet the market failure rationale behind their 
existence, and the delineation of intermediaries given above. The activities of 
commercial diplomacy deal with the gathering and dissemination of information that 
is hard to obtain for businesses, search and matching functions, and the alleviation of 
trade barriers arising from information asymmetry.  
Networking is one of the core functions that commercial diplomacy offices perform: 
creating links with key foreign players, and connecting buyers and sellers (Welch et 
al., 1998). Such a conceptualisation of state actors as network facilitators, providing 
information and assisting in relationship building, also exists in network 
internationalisation studies (Ellis, 2000; Morgan, Kaleka, & Katsikeas, 2004; 
Wilkinson et al., 2011). Moreover, the notion that network development and use is one 
of the key activities exists in case studies. In Canada, commercial diplomats focus on 
their role as relationship-builders and knowledge-brokers (Potter, 2004). Similar 
observations exist in the Finnish (Ruël & Visser, 2012) and Malaysian (Ruël et al., 
2013) contexts, as well as in relation to the role of commercial diplomacy offices 
overall (Jones-Bos et al., 2012; O'Toole & Bowe, 2012). 
Firms can access key assets through commercial diplomacy offices that can collect and 
disseminate such key information (Bauerschmidt et al., 1985; Musteen et al., 2013) 
due to advantageous positioning by means of network development (Alexander & 
Warwick, 2007). The networks that commercial diplomacy offices develop in this 
process become a resource that continues to facilitate firm entry over time (Welch et 
al., 1998). Thus, commercial diplomacy is a public institutional arrangement that 
creates networks and uses them to provide facilitating services (G. Naidu, Cavusgil, 
Murthy, & Sarkar, 1997). This fits with Naray's (2012) assertion that networks are part 
of both the process and the outcomes of commercial diplomacy. 
By using the network that they develop, a commercial diplomacy office can facilitate 
the collection and dissemination of key information (Alexander & Warwick, 2007; 
Che Senik, Scott-Ladd, Entrekin, & Adham, 2011; Musteen et al., 2013; Neumayer, 
2008). This is more important in markets that are more difficult to penetrate (Ahn et 
al., 2011), or in markets where governments maintain strong influence over economic 
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institutions (Child & Möllering, 2003; Peng & Zhou, 2005), as a firms' costs of 
internationalisation in such situations is greater (Griffith, Lee, Yeo, & Calantone, 
2014; Magnusson, Westjohn, Semenov, Randrianasolo, & Zdravkovic, 2013; Stoian, 
Rialp, & Rialp, 2011).  
Commercial diplomacy offices provide information provision services that can 
directly contribute to lowering the uncertainty of cultural, political, and economic 
differences to firms (Anderson & Sutherland, 2015); where transaction costs are 
highest (Harding & Javorcik, 2011; Lim, 2008). Given that the networks that firms 
gain entry to in countries that are either geographically distant or institutionally 
unfamiliar, and are generally more difficult to penetrate (Alexander & Warwick, 
2007), the network activities commercial diplomacy offices perform provide an 
additional benefit if the offices are located in such distant or unfamiliar countries. 
O'Gorman and Evers (2011) establish export promotion offices as intermediaries. 
Considering the specific roles of commercial diplomacy offices operating overseas, 
commercial diplomacy can also be viewed as an intermediary. In the categorisation of 
intermediaries by Smedlund (2006, p.266) of macro-, meso-, and micro-level 
intermediaries, the role of commercial diplomacy is specifically that of a micro-level 
intermediary considering how 'it functions locally and helps firms (…) to gain 
knowledge' by establishing contacts and arranging networks and linking individuals 
and organisations that would otherwise not have met (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998). By 
having “deep knowledge” in the form of specific country knowledge (Saner & Yiu, 
2003; Yakop & van Bergeijk, 2011), commercial diplomacy offices alleviate problems 
resulting from institutional differences (Kang, 2011) and provide information to 
promote international trade (Gillespie & Riddle, 2004; Moons & van Bergeijk, 2016; 
Rauch, 2001; Yakop & van Bergeijk, 2011). Moreover, the ties that these office form 
with host-country actors may substitute for weak institutional arrangements in the host 
country (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). 
Differences between private intermediaries and commercial diplomacy 
The functions of private intermediaries as described by Rubinstein and Wolinsky 
(1987), Biglaiser (1993), and Cosimano (1996) and the role that commercial 
diplomacy offices play, as outlined above, overlap to a considerable extent. The key 
differences are in the actors that perform the activities and the extent to which 
commercial diplomacy offices perform activities that private intermediaries do not 
(and vice versa). 
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From the perspective of other types of solutions that may facilitate entry into 
international export markets, including insurance, use of personal contacts, and private 
intermediaries (Alexander & Warwick, 2007), commercial diplomacy as a government 
intervention may crowd out such options due to lower or non-existent fees (Copeland, 
2007). However, a public-sector intermediary is beneficial if it helps firms to select 
private intermediaries, offers services that are complementary to those offered by 
private sector intermediaries, and if it operates in a type of market where government 
actors have specific advantages, and (Copeland, 2007).  
The first point Copeland (2007) raises is the limited service offering. As government 
actors, commercial diplomacy offices are not directly involved in transactions 
(O'Gorman & Evers, 2011), and their role as a network intermediary is restricted to 
being a facilitator (Welch et al., 1998), and providing referral to private sector 
intermediaries (Naray, 2011). The second point Copeland (2007) raises is that private 
intermediaries lower search, negotiation, and monitoring costs (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998). 
Commercial diplomacy offices focus on search, and on negotiation in a limited 
manner. Because monitoring costs are incurred ex post, there is scope for coexistence 
between public and private sector, especially given the advantages that government 
actors enjoy (Copeland's third point): commercial diplomats may have access to 
otherwise unavailable information (Alexander & Warwick, 2007; Kostecki & Naray, 
2007), which Welch et al. (1998) attribute to overseas government offices being 
regarded as honest brokers.  
Taking the third point separately, the private sector may not be willing to develop or 
support networks to address the difficulty of network entry for firms in geographically 
or institutionally distant markets. Moreover, networks may be considered as public 
goods (Lomi & Fonti, 2012) when there are free-rider effects, in which case firms may 
be reluctant to develop networks (Alexander & Warwick, 2007). Here, the focus on 
the supply of information through commercial diplomacy may result in positive 
externalities in the form of demonstration effects that may encourage 
internationalisation (Naray, 2012). 
Commercial diplomats can perform this intermediary-type role well because: actors at 
embassies are usually better at gathering local intelligence than businesses, they 
contribute to a positive image and enjoy higher visibility through media; their status 
gives them better access to highly-placed host country actors; as government actors 
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they enjoy high credibility (Kostecki & Naray, 2007), and that the services offered 
may be complementary. 
2.3.3. How commercial diplomacy offices perform their 
intermediary roles 
The preceding discussion outlines that commercial diplomacy offices are an 
intermediary actor working principally through networking and trade barrier 
alleviation. Following this, the discussion below outlines how commercial diplomacy 
offices perform this role: both their network development and use, and how they 
alleviate trade barriers. 
The intermediation process 
In a qualitative case study of Irish SME internationalisation, O’Gorman and Evers 
(2011) explore how an export promotion office influences new firms’ 
internationalisation strategies by means of knowledge transfer. Adapted to commercial 
diplomacy offices, which operate in the host country, this process proceeds by first 
establishing a network of host country connections, and then using these connections 
to make the information flows between home and host countries more efficient. Upon 
matching a set of businesses from the home and host countries, the commercial 
diplomacy office distances itself from the transaction. It thus acts as a developer of a 
network and a utiliser of this network for the purposes of information flows and 
matching. Hence, the effectiveness of a commercial diplomacy office's intermediary 
role depends on (1) the extent and nature of its network and (2) the strength of its 
relationship with local firms (O'Gorman & Evers, 2011). 
Network development 
A network can be defined as being comprised of actors that have certain ties between 
them (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Hayter, 2013), and that they are a nonmarket means 
of organising exchange between actors (Hayter, 2013; Kranton & Minehart, 2003; 
Rauch, 2001). The size of an office's network determines the amount of resources it 
can access (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003), and a larger network facilitates the matching 
process by increasing the probability with which clients are successfully matched 
(Bastos & Silva, 2012; Rauch & Watson, 2004). The ties within a network are defined 
by their strength, which is ‘a combination of the amount of time, the emotional 
intensity, the intimacy and the reciprocal services which characterise the tie’ 
(Granovetter, 1973, p. 1361), or, as Marsden and Campbell (1984) put it, a 
combination of closeness with, frequency of contact with, and duration of a tie. 
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Following Burt (1992), the diversity of the networks developed by commercial 
diplomacy offices affect the quality and quantity of information they may gain: 
networks with diverse sets of contacts provide access to diverse informational sources 
(Kiss & Danis, 2008, 2010; Musteen et al., 2013). 
By exploiting the resource- and information-benefits available through strong- and 
weak-tie associations5 that bridge structural holes6, these networks provide access to 
strong information and resources outside of the immediate contacts (Granovetter, 
1983; Daniel Z Levin, Cross, & Abrams, 2002) to benefit firms' internationalisation 
(Kjos, Worley, & Schommer, 2013) in environments that might otherwise be difficult 
to navigate or when businesses lack the resources required to enter (Ellis, 2000). The 
outcome of network development by the commercial diplomacy office is that ‘there 
are unique information benefits available to those players who are connected by 
exclusive or non-redundant ties to distant clusters’ (Ellis, 2000, p.447), which is 
especially beneficial in knowledge transfer to businesses, and as a precursor to that, 
the partner search activity. Such knowledge is commonly acquired via existing 
interpersonal links rather than collected systematically via market research (Ellis, 
2000). The network relations that need to be built depend on long-term personal 
association from which trust and reciprocal obligations emerge (Perry, 1996).  
Seeing as the strength of an office’s network determines its capacity to impact on SME 
internationalisation (O’Gorman & Evers, 2011) and the commercial diplomat develops 
and uses these networks, the properties of this individual become an important factor 
in the approach toward network development and use, as Chetty and Agndal (2008) 
note. The perceived quality of the commercial diplomat depends largely on the 
experience of the individual at that particular office and the office’s network (Ruël & 
Zuidema, 2012) as Che Senik et al. (2011) suggest as well. The ability to recognise 
and act on opportunities as well as the strength of the commercial diplomat’s contacts 
depends on his/her experience, skills and attitude (Andersen, 2006); elements that are 
described by the characteristics of commercial diplomats in Naray (2008) and Ruël 
and Visser (2012). 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Granovetter (1973, 1983), Hoang and Antoncic (2013), Zaheer, Gözübüyük, and Milanov 
(2010), Borgatti and Halgin (2011), Peng and Zhou (2005), Ellis (2000) and Phelps, Heidl, and Wadhwa 
(2012). 
6 See e. g. Burt (2001), Hayter (2013), Hoang & Antoncic (2013), Ellis (2000), Phelps et al. (2012), 
Susskind, Miller, and Johnson (1998) and Zaheer et al. (2010). 
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Network use 
Developing a network through the process described above allows for commercial 
diplomacy offices to alleviate problems resulting from institutional differences and 
provide information to promote international trade (Rauch, 2001; Yakop & van 
Bergeijk, 2011; Gillespie & Riddle, 2004; Moons & van Bergeijk, 2016). The 
matching process is facilitated by the commercial diplomacy office's network and the 
information gained from it. Commercial diplomacy offices will also collect and make 
available intelligence on formal and informal institutional constraints that does not 
necessarily stem from the office’s network. Such constraints can relate to problems 
regarding translation and business culture adaptation as well as difficulty in navigating 
the formal institutional environment. As Section 2.2.3 indicates, commercial 
diplomacy provides opportunity-specific information as well as information on more 
broadly defined barriers, and directly assists firm entry by overcoming trade barriers 
the office’s intelligence and network. 
The outcome of a commercial diplomacy office's network depends on the size and 
composition of this network, as well as the types of ties that it maintains with other 
actors. Commercial diplomacy offices decrease the transaction costs in international 
markets for businesses by the creation of networks and the relationships therein, as 
well as knowledge capital gained from these networks (Perry, 1996; Ellis, 2000; 
Smedlund, 2006). Both organising meetings and partner search activities stem from 
the network development process and have a positive impact on business 
internationalisation. In less institutionally developed host countries or in host countries 
that have high cultural distance from the home country, strong ties drive these activities 
as they connote direct connections and trust between network actors. On the other 
hand, in developed host countries, the importance of weak ties in the form of indirect 
ties prevails as network entry is based on indirect referral via network contacts (Kiss 
& Danis, 2008, 2010; Peng & Zhou, 2005). In using their networks appropriately to 
the host country’s constraints, commercial diplomacy offices can increase their 
effectiveness. 
2.4. Empirical Literature 
2.4.1. Selection of relevant studies 
Little empirical work exists that corresponds directly with the definition of commercial 
diplomacy in Section 2.2.1. However, as commercial diplomacy is a special form of 
 29 
 
export promotion as well as a subset of economic diplomacy, the assessment of the 
empirical literature therefore adopts a broader spectrum of studies which touch on 
commercial diplomacy, though within the confines of overseas offices. Studies on 
private intermediaries are not excluded here as they fall under the definition of 
commercial diplomacy as a publicly organised activity. This excludes such studies as 
those by Peng and York (2001), Balabanis (2000), Ahn et al. (2011) and Abel-Koch 
(2013).  
Relevant studies on economic diplomacy are those that assess the effect of the presence 
of diplomatic representation on trade. Relevant studies on commercial diplomacy are 
those that identify the effect on trade through the activities and resources of individual 
offices. These two literatures overlap to some degree with the empirical export 
promotion literature, only a small part of which focuses on overseas offices. Moreover, 
the export promotion literature is heterogeneous and studies often do not clarify 
whether they assess publicly funded overseas offices and activities. The empirical 
studies that do are adopted into this review directly. Nevertheless, studies that examine 
export promotion taking place in the home country may have some consequences for 
commercial diplomacy. As such, the review also includes a summary of these studies, 
for which Appendix A provides a more extensive discussion. 
2.4.2. The effect of overseas offices on trade 
Given that commercial diplomacy concerns overseas offices, the first directly relevant 
set of studies is that regarding the presence of diplomatic representations. Common 
across all these studies is the assumption that all diplomatic representations in these 
studies' datasets perform commercial diplomacy functions. Because commercial 
diplomacy is performed by diplomatic representations, the conclusions drawn from 
these studies relate strongly to the trade outcomes that commercial diplomacy brings 
about. A caveat is that these studies identify all types of diplomatic representations to 
be equal. But this is not the case, and some representations have more active 
commercial diplomacy offices than others. 
The starting point in this set of studies is the meta-analysis by Moons and van Bergeijk 
(2016). They analyse 32 studies to conclude that embassies and consulates have 
positive and significant effects on trade. They also identify a substantial heterogeneity 
of results. Studies using a single country are less likely to report positive and 
significant effects. They also find that embassies and consulates have significantly 
different effects: embassies' positive impacts on trade are larger than consulates' 
 30 
 
impacts, and embassies and consulates from high-income countries are more effective 
in low- and mid-income countries than they are in other high-income countries. 
However, the scope of their research includes studies that are only marginally relevant 
due to their focus on home-country oriented export promotion, or their marginal role 
for the existence of diplomatic relations7. They do note that studies are needed where 
available data and country coverage is greater. 
Diving more deeply into the empirical literature that discusses the effect of overseas 
diplomatic representations on trade, Rose's (2007) study is seminal. Based on data 
averaged over 2002 and 2003 for 22 exporting countries and 200 importing countries, 
he finds that exports increase by 6 to 10 per cent for each additional consulate, and by 
about 120 per cent for embassies – after controlling for endogeneity by means of a set 
of instrumental variables relating mostly to tourism. Subsequent studies have followed 
in these footsteps. Using an updated dataset of 63 countries' foreign missions for 2006, 
van Bergeijk, Veenstra, and Yakop (2010) perform estimations identical to those in 
Rose (2007). Their estimations indicate that embassies increase exports by 97 to 150 
per cent, consulates by 6 per cent, and that dedicated trade offices do not. Their results 
for imports are similar, but lower. Using this same dataset, Yakop and van Bergeijk 
(2009, 2011) focus on the number of foreign missions (treating embassies and 
consulates as equal) to find that they increase trade by 6 to 17 per cent. From a different 
perspective, Ciurak and Kinjo (2006) extend Rose's (2007) data to investigate whether 
foreign missions are more effective when economic freedom is low. They do so by 
dividing the number of diplomatic missions a country has in another country by an 
index of economic freedom. Without accounting for endogeneity, they conclude that 
an additional consulate has a greater effect on exports in a less economically free 
market. However, the interpretation of the variable this created remains unclear 
because its construction does not allow for an estimation of marginal effects of the 
interaction. 
                                                 
7 For this reason, this section of the empirical literature review does not discuss several articles used in 
Moons and van Bergeijk's (2016) meta-analysis. The first set of excluded studies are those that do not 
directly relate to the presence of foreign offices abroad but to political relations between countries. This 
includes Nigh (1985), Polachek (1997), Pollins (1989), and Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007). Related to 
this set is the study by Summary (1989), whose variable 'number of civilian U.S. government employees 
in the host country' is too broadly defined to be assumed to relate to foreign offices alone. The second 
set of excluded studies consists of studies that look at foreign offices in relation not to trade, but tariff 
reduction (Maurel & Afman, 2007) and tourism Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, and Martínez-Serrano 
(2007). 
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Four studies depart from Rose's (2007) data by collecting data for U.S. states 
(Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000), California (Cassey, 2012), Korea and Japan, 
(Hayakawa, Lee, & Park, 2014), as well as export promotion agencies (Lederman et 
al., 2010). While studies of diplomatic representation are marred with endogeneity 
issues, Cassey (2012) uses an exogenous budget crisis to estimate the impact of the 
closure of all of California's overseas state export promotion offices in 2004. Applying 
a difference-in-differences approach of these offices' closures on manufacturing 
exports to 44 countries, he finds no evidence of positive effects before closure, nor of 
negative effects after closure. This concurs with Wilkinson and Brouthers (2000), who 
using a cross-section framework, examine the effect of (among others) the presence of 
U.S. states' export promotion offices overseas. They find that they do not significantly 
affect total exports or exports of high-tech goods. 
However, as Moons and van Bergeijk (2016) note, studies focusing on a limited 
number of countries or regions may not have generalisable findings. Nevertheless, the 
insignificance of the presence of overseas offices occurs in other studies as well. For 
example, Lederman et al. (2010) focus on the budget of national-level export 
promotion agencies (discussed in Appendix A), yet provide some further analysis by 
including a variable that explains whether an export promotion agency maintains 
offices abroad. As in Cassey (2012), this variable is insignificant. However, they do 
not explore this result further. Related to these studies is a Japan and Korea-focused 
analysis of whether having an overseas trade promotion office in a country affects 
exports (Hayakawa et al., 2014). By utilising a large set of fixed effects to purge 
endogeneity issues (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007) in addition to using time-lagged effects 
of the dependent variable, they find that they positively affect exports by 41 to 61 per 
cent. 
As for FDI, one part of Kotabe's (1993) study is to assess whether the presence of U.S. 
state office(s) in Japan has a positive impact on the number of investment cases into 
those U.S. states. In a cross-sectional analysis, he finds that the existence of a state 
office is not significantly related to an increase in investment cases, which he attributes 
to the presence of these offices being image building in themselves. Contrast this 
finding with a study by Anderson and Sutherland (2015), who identify that the 
presence of Canadian investment promotion offices in China positively affects the 
likelihood of investment into Canada as well as the level of such investment. While 
ascribing this to the role of such offices in mitigating the transaction costs between 
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(culturally) distant economies, they perform no further analysis to verify this. 
Moreover, the case for positive effects of overseas export promotion offices on FDI 
inflows is furthered by Bobonis and Shatz (2007). However, their focus is not on U.S. 
states' foreign offices; they find that the number of years since their establishment in a 
country positively affects FDI. 
The mixture of significant and insignificant results is potentially related to the 
heterogeneous impact that offices might have on different types of goods, and on the 
extensive and intensive margins of trade8. Different types of goods require firms to 
incur different levels of search costs, which may imply that diplomatic representation 
is more effective at stimulating trade in goods for which it is more difficult to find 
information. Similarly, the difference between the extensive and intensive margins is 
that the former relates to fixed trade costs, and the latter to variable trade costs9, with 
fixed costs especially forming a barrier to entry. 
Considering trade in types of goods rather than total trade, Volpe Martincus and 
Carballo (2010b) use Rauch's (1999) types of goods10 in their study of 26 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries for the period 1995-2004. While their focus is on 
export promotion instruments, they do find that the presence of diplomatic 
representation increases trade in homogeneous and reference priced goods, but not in 
differentiated goods. In contrast to this, the cross-sectional study by Moons and de 
Boer (2014), which uses the same dataset as Yakop and van Bergeijk (2009, 2011) and 
van Bergeijk et al. (2010), shows that embassies increase trade in reference priced and 
differentiated goods by 114 and 79 per cent respectively, but not trade in homogeneous 
                                                 
8 The extensive margin can be measured in terms of number of product categories exported, in terms of 
firm-level transactions, and in terms of whether a country trades with another. The intensive margin can 
be defined as the value traded per goods category, per transaction, or volume of total sales (Felbermayr 
& Kohler, 2006; Lawless, 2010). 
9 Where the negative relationship between the extensive margin and fixed and variable trade costs is 
unambiguous in the Melitz (2003) model, this is not the case for the intensive margin (Dutt et al., 2013; 
Lawless, 2010); a reduction in both fixed and variable costs of trade increases the extensive margin, 
while they may have opposite effects on the intensive margin. 
10 Rauch (1999) distinguishes between three types of goods. Following his definition, homogeneous 
goods are goods for which there is an organised exchange, and examples are corn, oil, and wheat. This 
sets them apart from reference priced goods, which are goods whose prices are quoted in trade 
publications. Such goods are not quoted on organised exchanges but are still standard to such an extent 
that they can be bought using price lists without knowledge of the particular supplier. Examples of 
reference priced goods are chemicals whose prices are quoted in the Chemical Marketing Reporter 
publication. All goods that possess neither of these characteristics are differentiated goods, in which 
case the buyer buys from a specific supplier. Search costs for differentiated goods will be higher than 
homogeneous and reference priced goods as the buyer needs to identify individual suppliers. In addition, 
as reference priced goods are listed only in specialised trade publications, their search costs are higher 
than for homogeneous goods (Rauch, 1999; Besedeš & Prusa, 2006). 
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goods. Furthermore, they find that consulates increase trade in reference priced goods 
by 5 per cent, differentiated goods by 8 per cent, and homogeneous goods by 7 per 
cent. As part of a panel data study of Spanish regional export promotion offices 
overseas, Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, Martínez-Serrano, and Requena-Silvente (2014) 
support Moons and de Boer's (2014) findings in that the presence of regional offices 
mostly favours exports of differentiated goods11.  
These studies show evidence that overseas offices alleviate information asymmetry 
related to search costs. However, this evidence is not strong due to the conflicting 
evidence following from regional specificity and the absence of endogeneity checks 
in Moons and de Boer (2014) and Gil-Pareja et al. (2014), with neither study exploring 
further how diplomatic representations alleviate these search costs. 
The empirical literature that identifies the effect of diplomatic representations (or 
overseas offices) on the margins of trade yields more homogeneous conclusions. Based 
on Rose's (2007) data, Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) find that the presence of 
a foreign mission increases the extensive margin (whether a country exports to another 
country) by 11 to 18 per cent, and that it has no effect on the intensive margin (volume 
of exports). Utilising data on Latin American and Caribbean countries, Volpe 
Martincus, Estevadeordal, Gallo, and Luna (2010) specify the extensive margin as the 
number of 6-digit goods exported (within the Harmonised System (HS) classification 
of goods) and find that a diplomatic representation increases the extensive margin of 
homogeneous goods by 1 per cent, and reference priced goods by 0.5 per cent. Using 
the same data, though looking at overall trade, Volpe Martincus, Carballo, and Gallo 
(2011) find that the effect of embassies and consulates is positive and significant for 
both the extensive and intensive margins, and largest for the extensive margin.  
At the level of individual transactions, Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) can differentiate 
between the effect of Spanish regional overseas trade promotion offices on the number 
of product types exported, the number of transactions reported per product type (both 
the extensive margin), and the average value per transaction (the intensive margin). 
Following panel data estimations that do not account for endogeneity, they find that 
these offices are more beneficial for the extensive margin than the intensive margin. 
Going into firm-level data, Creusen and Lejour (2013) utilise Dutch firm dynamics 
                                                 
11 Additionally, they find that these offices positively affect exports in general. Moreover, similar to 
Bobonis and Shatz (2007) they find that an office's age is also positively and significantly related to 
exports. 
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data for 2003 to 2007 to determine the effect of the presence of foreign missions in 50 
destination countries on the probability of market entry. Under the assumption that the 
2006 data on foreign missions is constant for all years in their dataset, they find that 
the presence of diplomatic representation in middle-income countries raises the 
probability of firm entry by up to 1 per cent. However, they reach this figure after 
using a set of instrumental variables relating to development level which is itself a 
factor of endogeneity in trade. While the studies unambiguously suggest that 
diplomatic representations and overseas trade promotion offices benefit the extensive 
margin most of all, these studies suffer from the problems identified by Moons and 
van Bergeijk (2016) in terms of regional specificity and the limited explanatory power 
of the variable of interest – the presence of an office. Moreover, the approaches 
towards endogeneity could bear improvement. The evidence so far suggests there is a 
positive association with the extensive margin more so than the intensive margin, 
though this requires additional research. 
The findings from the empirical literature on the effect of diplomatic representations 
(and trade promotion offices) are favourable in relation to commercial diplomacy. As 
stated earlier, while not all the diplomatic representations in the studies above are 
likely to have a commercial diplomacy function, many representations do (Kostecki & 
Naray, 2007) which makes the conclusions drawn from these studies highly 
transferable to commercial diplomacy. 
2.4.3. Lessons from export promotion in the home country 
Macro-economic studies of export promotion relate to outcomes in terms of their 
overall effect on trade and FDI, resulting from implementing such programs. This set 
of studies includes how specific investment promotion strategies affect FDI (Harding 
& Javorcik, 2011), the effect of specific export promotion programs on trade (Head & 
Ries, 2010), as well as studies of export and investment promotion expenditure 
(Bernard & Jensen, 2004; Lederman et al., 2010; Morisset, Mirioux, & Smith, 2003). 
These studies find positive and significant effects on FDI inflows from targeting of 
specific sectors (Harding & Javorcik, 2011) and in most cases a positive effect on trade 
and FDI from expenditure on export and investment promotion. In addition, larger 
budgets are especially effective in relation to differentiated goods, and when the 
country implementing export promotion faces high barriers to trade (Lederman et al., 
2010). Mixed results appear for budget allocations towards more specifically defined 
activities (Lederman et al., 2010; Morisset et al., 2003). The direct applicability to 
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commercial diplomacy is limited as the studies outlined here relate to overall (national) 
export and investment agencies rather than individual offices. 
Myriad studies use survey data to identify firms' awareness, usage, and perception of 
usefulness of export promotion programs. This set of studies focuses on specific export 
promotion programs (e.g. Seringhaus, 1987), as well as the full spectrum of programs 
(e.g. Leonidou et al., 2011). Some tie this in with firm characteristics such as firm size 
(Moini, 1998), internationalisation experience (e.g. Ahmed et al., 2002), and 
management (Gray, 1997). Findings indicate that firm size and internationalisation 
stage influence the type of support needed; firms in early internationalisation stages 
require export training services most of all (Francis & Collins-Dodd, 2004). Mismatch 
between firm needs and assistance provision occurs frequently (Seringhaus & Rosson, 
1991) and small firms especially have little awareness of such programs (Kedia & 
Chhokar, 1986). These studies imply that commercial diplomacy's usefulness depends 
on the resources it has available as well as the types of firms that it services. Firms in 
early internationalisation stages will benefit more from export promotion programs as 
commercial diplomacy focuses on concrete opportunities. Additionally, due to 
resource constraints, small firms will find activities offered by commercial diplomacy 
especially useful. 
A large group of studies focus on export performance or satisfaction with export 
performance in export promotion. Such performance relates to building the 
competency and knowledge to engage in exports as well as economic and financial 
performance of the firm. These studies indicate that use of export promotion has 
indirect effects on export performance through enhancement of firm and managerial 
competencies (Freixanet, 2012; Seringhaus & Rosson, 1990; Singer & Czinkota, 
1994), as well as direct effects (Shamsuddoha, Ali, & Ndubisi, 2009), and are 
especially beneficial to smaller firms and sporadic exporters (Francis & Collins-Dodd, 
2004; Leonidou et al., 2011). These studies indicate a larger impact from export 
promotion programs of any kind on indirect effects rather than direct effects on export 
performance. When it comes to commercial diplomacy, which is applied in the host 
country environment, some similarities nevertheless exist in relation to firm size and 
to the provision of experiential knowledge12. 
                                                 
12 A small part of Leonidou et al.'s (2011) study addresses firms receiving support from offices abroad 
as part of a factor related to trade mobility. This factor is positively related to indirect export outcomes 
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Other studies that assess firm outcomes use highly disaggregated secondary data, 
which allows for a more robust analysis of the use of export promotion programs on 
firm outcomes. These studies assess whether using export promotion is a factor in 
export success for the average firm, specifying export promotion use as a binary 
variable. Findings suggest that using export promotion positively affects firms' export 
performance (Munch & Schaur, 2017), export propensities (Cruz, 2014), 
product/market diversification (Volpe Martincus & Carballo, 2010b), and the extent 
to which they export differentiated goods (Volpe Martincus & Carballo, 2010c). They 
indicate that export promotion use decreases the costs of internationalisation. 
However, because the export promotion studies in this category do not include 
overseas office support, the findings have only limited applicability to commercial 
diplomacy. They do suggest that commercial diplomacy performs best when servicing 
small firms that are past the decision-making stage on whether to internationalise, and 
that it could be a useful tool to improve trade outcomes that relate to various types of 
trade barriers. 
2.4.4. Studies at the commercial diplomacy office-level 
Resources, activities, and trade 
When it comes to examining the effect of office resources on trade and FDI, the 
empirical literature largely focuses on the individual office’s budgets (Kang, 2011; 
Martin, 2003; Wilkinson, 2006; Kotabe, 1993) excepting a study that focuses on 
personnel resources (Lim, 2008). Looking at Korea's export promotion agency's 
offices overseas, Kang (2011), using a panel data set spanning 1994 to 2004, finds that 
Korean exports increase with the budgets of the offices. More specifically, he finds 
that a ten per cent increase in the offices' budgets yields a 2.45 to 6.34 per cent increase 
in exports. This result holds when using a set of instrumental variables which relate to 
communication technology penetration, energy consumption, and wage conditions. In 
addition, he finds that this effect is greatest in smaller and developing countries.  
The direct effects of offices' budgets on exports identified by Kang (2011) do not 
appear in a U.S.-focused study by Martin (2003). In a cross-sectional survey of 34 U.S. 
state trade promotion offices in Japan, he analyses their impact on these states' exports 
and finds that there is no relationship between exports and the use of state promotional 
                                                 
of capacity and resource building. In other words, while direct effects may be more likely than indirect 
effects, this does not mean that commercial diplomacy does not also carry indirect effects. 
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offices, arguing that the primary function of such offices is to increase awareness of 
opportunities through information exchange and relationship development. From a 
broader perspective, Wilkinson's (2006) cross-sectional results paint a more 
favourable picture. Here, U.S. states' investments in 114 foreign trade offices, in an 
OLS-based analysis similar to Martin (2003), have a positive and significant 
relationship with states' exports. Moreover, he finds that this positive association is 
higher in states where the entrepreneurial climate (as measured by GDP and 
employment levels) is higher. However, neither study accounts for reverse causality 
rendering the causal relationship uncertain. 
Bucking the trend of analyses based on offices' budgets, Lim (2008) assesses the 
effectiveness of 68 South Korean overseas investment promotion offices on FDI by 
using data on the number and makeup of staff13 and year of establishment in 
combination with maximum likelihood estimation. From his results, such offices are 
principally mediators between a host country's FDI environment and FDI inflows into 
South Korea. However, an increase in office resources will not automatically lead to 
an impact on FDI inflows. Overall, the limited number of studies that look at individual 
offices' resources do so mostly from the perspective of budget expenditure.  
The number of studies assessing the effect of activities of individual offices on trade 
is again small: four studies empirically assess the activities these offices perform. In 
his study of 34 U.S. state trade promotion offices, Martin (2003) identifies the 
insignificance of these offices' budgets on state exports to Japan. He also performs an 
additional analysis of the percentage of time that the office spends on trade promotion. 
Here too the results suggest an insignificant impact. In much the same way, Kotabe 
(1993) performs an analysis based on FDI as the dependent variable, and the budget 
expenditures on export promotion activities and investment promotion activities as the 
key independent variables. Like Martin's (2003) study it is based on 50 U.S. states' 
offices in Japan. However, Kotabe (1993) finds that while export promotion activities 
positively affect Japanese FDI into U.S. States, investment promotion activities do not. 
He explains this apparent conundrum by pointing to increased exports as image-
boosting, and to locational preferences of Japanese investments being historically 
determined through, for example, pre-existing plant-level relations. 
                                                 
13 In particular, the proportion of locally employed personnel and the total number of staff. 
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Two studies assess the effect of a set of activities on exports, not proxied by either 
percentage of time spent on overall export promotion activities as in Martin (2003) or 
the budgets towards overall activities as in Kotabe (1993). First is a study that adopts 
a measure of objective market information. Identifying what activities a foreign office 
performs, Wilkinson and Brouthers (2000) summate these dummy variables for a set 
of ten activities14. Using information about 47 U.S. state offices abroad, they find that 
this set of ten activities is negatively related to overall exports, and insignificantly 
related to high-tech exports (in a cross-sectional setting). Because they also note in 
their study a positive and significant effect of trade shows, they argue that the set of 
ten activities are not necessarily directly related to lower exports, but that they present 
an opportunity cost where the focus on these activities absorbs time from an activity, 
such as trade shows, that is positively and significantly related to exports. What they 
do not account for is potential reverse causality. In this case, this may be that if a state 
deems the level of exports to a country to be high enough, it will direct its resources 
towards another country where the level of exports is relatively low. A strongly related 
study by Wilkinson et al. (2011) uses a similar set of activities and again a dummy-
summation approach to construct a variable for network entry activities15. Based on 
cross-sectional information of 153 U.S. states' foreign offices, their OLS analysis finds 
that the activity set is insignificantly related to exports. However, it becomes 
significant when interacted with the extent to which a state fosters an entrepreneurial 
climate16. 
Perspectives on the usefulness of commercial diplomacy 
Much alike the export promotion literature, a small number of studies relate to the use 
and usefulness of commercial diplomacy. Studies assess this from the firm perspective 
except for Ruël and Zuidema (2012), who conduct a survey of 110 actors involved in 
                                                 
14 Their measure for objective market information contains both activities performed by officials within 
the U.S. states and activities performed by officials in overseas offices. Therefore this group of activities 
is applicable here. The variable includes trade lead programs, matchmaker programs, foreign buyers’ 
programs, identifying agents and distributors, the publication of product descriptions abroad, market 
studies performed by state staff, market studies performed by overseas staff, market studies which are 
outsourced, the availability of an electronic trade lead system, and whether market studies are available 
on specific industries. 
15 This variable includes indicators for the provision of trade leads; counselling services; identification 
of agents and distributors; protocol functions; market studies; trade mission participation; and trade 
shows participation. 
16 From Wilkinson, et al. (2011, p.188): 'Entrepreneurial climate was measured using a variable 
developed by Goetz and Freshwater (2001). The authors developed this measure using a regression 
equation in which the dependent variable, termed “entrepreneurial process”, consists of two indicators 
of entrepreneurial activities: number of Inc. 500 firms per 1 million state population and initial public 
offerings in the technology sector per 1 million state population. ' 
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commercial diplomacy activities at 65 Dutch foreign posts with the purpose of 
identifying the characteristics of foreign posts and individual commercial diplomats 
that affect the self-assessed service quality17 of commercial diplomacy. Based on a 
series of regressions between the constructs they identify and the service quality 
outcome, they find that a commercial diplomat's experience and the extent to which 
they have established a business network positively impact service quality. Moreover, 
they construct a measure of service relevance which includes commercial diplomats' 
assessments of the activities offered to firms. Here, they find that the relevance of 
commercial diplomacy increases as informal institutional distance increases. In 
addition, they find that the informal institutional environment has no bearing on this. 
Lastly, in a separate analysis of whether significant differences exist between types of 
commercial diplomats as defined by Naray (2011) and Ruël and Visser (2012), they 
find that no such differences exist. While Ruël and Zuidema (2012) venture into the 
territory of which of the resources and activities are significantly related to commercial 
diplomacy outcomes, the findings cannot be generalised. This is due to the small 
sample size, the number of missing values in the survey, and it being unclear whether 
the respondents are indeed commercial diplomats and administrative staff. 
From the firm perspective, one study that explicitly relates to commercial diplomacy 
assesses the determinants of commercial diplomacy’s value from the perspectives of 
SMEs. Based on a survey of 103 Dutch SMEs, Ruël and Busschers (2012) conclude 
that service quality18 and the extent to which businesses must deal with public actors 
in the host country are significant determinants of the perceived value of commercial 
diplomacy. The formal institutional environment of the host country, firm size and the 
absence of an SME’s existing business network are not significant. Some of these 
findings are at odds with the export promotion literature. This is possibly due to the 
low number of responses, the lack of variation in firm size, the global dispersion of the 
Dutch missions which may imply that different destination countries difference out 
such factors as firm size within the small sample. In addition, the insignificance of the 
host country's formal institutional environment is not explored further and is possibly 
a result of the specific variable used.  
                                                 
17 They adapt a measure of service quality from a standardised Likert-scale SERVPERF. Their measure 
consists of 21 items that ask for the respondent's assessment of overall quality, and four broad topics: 
service reliability, knowledge of employees, tangibility of the service, empathy of the employees and 
responsiveness. 
18 In terms of experiential knowledge received and the fit of the assistance with the firm's need. 
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The study by Ruël and Busschers (2012) indicates that firms do not perceive a 
commercial diplomacy office's existing network as a significant contributor to its 
service quality. This is contrary to what Abeson and Taku (2007) find in a study of 
U.S. firms' sales performance in relation to Africa and the Middle East. More 
specifically, they assess the sales performance in overseas markets of firms that have 
used the network of contacts provided by embassy actors. Their study contains 52 
respondents, and based on a regression analysis they find that connectedness with 
embassy officials has a positive effect on sales. Considering that (1) network entry is 
more difficult in distant countries, (2) Abeson and Taku (2007) survey U.S. firms that 
are active in relatively distant markets from an institutional perspective, and (3) Ruël 
and Busschers' (2012) study does not clarify where their SME respondents export to, 
it is likely that this difference in significance relates to the intermediary role identified 
in Section 2.3. In Abeson and Taku's (2007) study the significant effect of U.S. 
overseas missions relates to them being located in Middle Eastern countries and 
thereby in part captures that such missions are more effective when the host country's 
formal institutions are unfamiliar to home country firms. In contract to this, in Ruël 
and Busschers' (2012) study it is likely that Dutch firms export to neighbouring 
European countries, in relation to which there is high formal institutional familiarity 
and little need for an intermediary in the form of commercial diplomacy. However, 
neither study recognises this.  
The findings from the empirical literature on the effect of specific resources and 
activities on trade outcomes are at best ambiguous. Potentially, this is due to the limited 
way in which the resource and activity variables have been defined and used. Most 
importantly, at the office level the intermediary effects of search cost and trade barrier 
alleviation come into play, and none of the studies account for this function. 
2.5. Gaps and Hypotheses 
2.5.1. Missing links 
Missing links between conceptual and empirical studies 
The literature on commercial diplomacy has so far focused on building the concept in 
terms of commercial diplomacy resources and activities. In-depth conceptualisations 
of the individual commercial diplomat exist (Naray, 2011; Ruël & Visser, 2012) as do 
conceptualisations of the overall term (Naray, 2012), but few studies exist that 
empirically assess the value of employing commercial diplomacy at the office-level. 
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Those that do focus on broadly defined resources and activities (Kang, 2011; Martin, 
2003; Wilkinson, 2006; Kotabe, 1993; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000; Wilkinson et al., 
2011). Two studies focus on the resources and activities of commercial diplomacy in 
relation to service quality. The first does so by means of a self-assessed measure of 
service performance by commercial diplomats (Ruël & Zuidema, 2012). The second 
does so from the perspective of SMEs using commercial diplomacy (Ruël & 
Busschers, 2012).  
The empirical literature neither fully captures the impact on trade from the resources 
that these offices have, nor the full spectrum of activities they perform and the extent 
to which they perform them. 
Missing links in the empirical literature on commercial diplomacy's intermediary 
function 
Commercial diplomacy offices acting as intermediaries aid in promoting trade in 
goods for which more search effort is required, alleviate trade barriers, and their office-
level activities and network ties aid in accomplishing this. In the empirical literature, 
only the first two elements are detailed. When it comes to search costs, studies focus 
on Rauch's (1999) product groups, whereas trade barriers are assessed from the 
perspective of the margins of trade as well as the existence of institutional barriers. 
However, these aspects appear only in two literatures. The first of these is the export 
promotion literature which does not discuss overseas offices. The second is the 
literature that assesses the effect of the existence of overseas offices on trade.  
No study exists that assesses the impact on trade of individual offices' activities and 
relational (actors and strength of ties between actors) network characteristics; whether 
these offices are effective at performing an intermediary role remains unknown. 
Product differentiation 
When it comes to the alleviation of search costs, the export promotion literature that 
does not consider the role of overseas offices indicates that generally, export 
promotion is more effective at promoting exports in more differentiated goods (see 
Appendix A). This unanimity of conclusion is not reflected in the set of studies that 
focus on the effect of the presence of overseas offices on trade. Here, Volpe Martincus, 
Estevadeordal, et al. (2010) find that diplomatic representation increases trade in 
homogeneous priced and reference priced goods, but not in differentiated goods. In 
contrast to this, Moons and de Boer (2014) and Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) find that 
diplomatic representation increases trade in reference priced and differentiated goods, 
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but not in homogeneous goods. However, two of these studies are limited to specific 
regions, and neither Moons and de Boer (2014) nor Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) account 
for reverse causality.  
The effectiveness commercial diplomacy at promoting trade in different types of goods 
remains unclear.  
Margins of trade 
Much like studies into search cost alleviation, studies that focus on the margins of trade 
as outcome variables for entry cost alleviation are limited. In the home-country 
focused export promotion literature, the consensus is that firms that use export 
promotion enjoy export diversification in terms of products and markets, within mostly 
a Latin American panel data setting (see Appendix A). Studies of the presence of 
overseas offices on trade are either cross-sectional (Segura-Cayuela & Vilarrubia, 
2008) whereas estimation of the margins of trade requires variation over time (Besedeš 
& Prusa, 2011; Bernard et al., 2004), or they are focused on a small region or single 
country (Creusen & Lejour, 2013; Gil-Pareja et al., 2014; Volpe Martincus et al., 2011; 
Volpe Martincus, Estevadeordal, et al., 2010) whereas broader country coverage is 
needed (Moons & van Bergeijk, 2016).  
It remains unclear whether commercial diplomacy is effective at promoting trade along 
the extensive and intensive margins of trade. 
Trade barriers 
Very few studies exist on the relationship of commercial diplomacy to the topic of 
trade barriers arising from institutional constraints. Within the export promotion 
literature outlined in Appendix A, only two studies take this into account in relation to 
national investment promotion strategy (Harding & Javorcik, 2011) and expenditure 
on export promotion (Lederman et al., 2010). Within the set of studies that do focus 
on the presence of overseas offices, only Ciurak and Kinjo (2006) account for 
institutional constraints. However, as identified in the empirical literature review, the 
interpretation of this variable's coefficient is unclear, and they assess it without 
accounting for reverse causality, only factoring in a specific type of trade barrier.  
While commercial diplomacy's activities and network resources should aid in 
overcoming trade barriers, it is unclear whether commercial diplomacy affects trade 
differently in varying institutional conditions. 
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Other gaps 
Besides the empirical gaps outlined above and that few empirical studies of 
commercial diplomacy exist in compared to conceptual studies, some overall gaps 
exist in the literature. This thesis fills a gap pointed out by Gillespie and Riddle (2004) 
by assessing office-level activities and resources. They indicate that research is needed 
to contextualise the input and output of these offices within the environments they 
operate in. Adding to this the role of the commercial diplomat and the activities 
performed, Naray (2012) also calls for an input-output analysis. Moreover, a gap exists 
in terms of Welch et al.'s (1998) assertion that network characteristics of offices in host 
countries should be included in these offices' performance assessments. Most of all, 
assessing commercial diplomacy as a network intermediary also extends the 
conceptualisation put forth by O'Gorman and Evers (2011) which is without empirical 
assessment. Discussing empirical assessment, Visser and Ruël (2014) point out that to 
date, studies focus only on the perspective of commercial diplomacy and that an 
integrated perspective is lacking. They advocate that studies assess commercial 
diplomacy from a multitude of perspectives rather than maintaining a focus on a single 
perspective or conceptualisation of commercial diplomacy. This ties in with Moons 
and van Bergeijk (2016) as well, who call for studies that cover a larger number of 
countries. 
2.5.2. Hypotheses development 
The hypotheses that this thesis addresses relate to the effect of commercial diplomacy 
on alleviating the negative effect of trade barriers and search costs, as well as the 
offices' resources, activities, and networks in relation to their role as network 
intermediaries. The hypotheses development first addresses the general role of 
commercial diplomacy in relation to trade and search costs, and then moves to the 
development of hypotheses relating to offices' resources, activities, and networks. 
Trade barrier alleviation 
As network intermediaries (Welch et al., 1998; O'Gorman & Evers, 2011), commercial 
diplomacy offices have advantages of trust and access (Alexander & Warwick, 2007) 
that may especially benefit trade in goods that require more search effort. In assessing 
search effort, Rauch's (1999) types of goods apply. Because differentiated goods are 
not sold on organised markets like homogeneous goods and reference priced goods, 
their search costs are higher than homogeneous and reference priced goods as the 
buyer needs to identify individual suppliers. In addition, as reference priced goods are 
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listed only in specialised trade publications, their search costs are higher than for 
homogeneous goods (Rauch, 1999; Besedeš & Presa, 2006). If commercial diplomacy 
offices are effective in their role as intermediaries, they should alleviate search cost 
barriers to matching of buyers and suppliers.  
Hence, commercial diplomacy offices should have larger effects on trade in 
differentiated goods than in reference priced goods, and larger in reference priced 
goods than in homogeneous goods. However, the empirical literature is not in 
agreement as to whether these offices affect trade in all three types of goods in the first 
place: while Volpe Martincus, Estevadeordal, et al. (2010) find that the presence of 
diplomatic representation increases trade in homogeneous priced and reference priced 
goods but not in differentiated goods, Moons and de Boer (2014) and Gil-Pareja et al. 
(2014) find that embassies increase trade in reference priced and differentiated goods, 
but not in homogeneous goods. To identify which types of goods commercial 
diplomacy offices promote trade in and whether they are more effective as search costs 
increase, the first hypothesis consists of two parts: 
- H1a: Commercial diplomacy positively impacts trade in all types of goods: 
differentiated, reference priced, and homogeneous goods. 
- H1b: Commercial diplomacy has a larger positive effect on trade in 
differentiated goods than trade in reference priced goods, and it has a larger 
positive effect on trade in reference priced goods than trade in homogeneous 
goods. 
Besides performing search and matching activities, commercial diplomacy offices 
provide information to businesses regarding the host-country environment and specific 
market conditions (Wilkinson et al., 2011). This set of activities is especially useful to 
firms looking to enter foreign markets where search costs constitute prohibitive 
barriers to exporting (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998; Ahn et al., 2011). The existence of trade 
barriers imposes fixed and variable costs of entry. Higher fixed costs require firms to 
be more productive to make exporting viable (Helpman et al., 2008; Dennis & 
Shepherd, 2011; Lawless, 2010; Chaney, 2008), and affect the variety of products 
traded as well as the number of firms engaged in exporting relationships. Variable 
costs of entry affect the volume of goods traded. The extensive and intensive margins, 
outcomes of fixed and variable costs of trade, form the link between trade costs and 
the extent to which commercial diplomacy offices foster new trade rather than more 
trade through existing relationships. Dennis and Shepherd (2011) note that trade 
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facilitation policy has significant scope to promote exports along the extensive margin. 
While only fixed costs impact the extensive margin, both fixed and variable costs of 
trade can impact the intensive margin (Dutt et al., 2013). While the effect of 
commercial diplomacy offices should be seen mostly on the extensive margin, it is 
possible that it affects the intensive margin as well. The second hypothesis follows: 
- H2a: Commercial diplomacy positively affects both the extensive margin and 
the intensive margin of trade. 
- H2b: Commercial diplomacy has a larger positive effect on the extensive 
margin than on the intensive margin of trade19. 
Another way to identify the effect of trade barriers on trade is to directly estimate the 
negative effect of transaction costs arising from institutional constraints on trade, 
instead of indirectly assessing the dependent variable as in the above hypotheses. 
Institutional constraints determine the costs of transacting because not all information 
is available (Ingram & Clay, 2000; North, 1990, 1993). Empirical literature points to 
the detrimental effects on trade of institutional constraints, both formal (Aeberhardt, 
Buono, & Fadinger, 2014; Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013; Estrin, Baghdasaryan, & 
Meyer, 2009; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004) and informal (Felbermayr & 
Toubal, 2010; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2009; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Lewer & van 
den Berg, 2007; J. Melitz & Toubal, 2014). The information that commercial 
diplomacy offices provide to businesses may lower uncertainty arising from such 
constraints (Anderson & Sutherland, 2015), i.e. when transaction costs are highest 
(Harding & Javorcik, 2011; Lim, 2008). Barriers arising from differences in informal 
institutional constraints have an unambiguous negative effect on trade, whereas 
barriers arising from formal institutional distance is ambiguous as the distance could 
be a comparative advantage (Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013; Levchenko, 2007).  
Commercial diplomacy's effect on trade barrier alleviation relates to informal 
institutional differences between the home and host countries and to the formal 
institutional environment of the host country as follows: 
                                                 
19 The extensive and intensive margins used in Chapter 4 is based on exports data. Hypotheses H1a to 
H2b are assessed in Chapter 4 based on exports and bilateral representation data. This allows for an 
assessment of whether commercial diplomacy affects exports and imports equally. As such, while these 
hypotheses as well as all those that follow mention trade, Chapter 4's results could indicate that only 
exports are of interest.  
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- H3a: Commercial diplomacy alleviates the negative effect of trade barriers 
arising from differences between two countries' informal institutional 
constraints. 
- H3b: Commercial diplomacy alleviates the negative effect of trade barriers 
arising from a low-quality formal institutional environment. 
Office-level resources, activities, and organisation 
Office-level studies often focus on the effect of office budgets on exports (Kang, 2011; 
Martin, 2003; Wilkinson, 2006; Kotabe, 1993). As a key proxy for the resources that 
these offices possess, the positive and significant results in Kang (2011) and Wilkinson 
(2006) contrast with the insignificant results in Martin (2003) and Kotabe (1993). 
Within the context of the export promotion literature which overwhelmingly indicates 
the positive and significant effect of export promotion expenditure on trade, the 
expected pattern for the commercial diplomacy offices' budgets follows Kang's (2011) 
Korea-specific and Wilkinson's (2006) U.S.-specific positive and significant results. 
More specific resources relate to personnel, particularly the number of staff at an 
office, and the percentage of locally employed personnel. Given that Lim (2008) 
identifies a positive effect of Korean overseas export promotion offices' personnel 
characteristics on FDI, and the same pattern taking place in the private sector 
intermediary literature (e.g. Balabanis, 2000; Peng & York, 2001), the expectation is 
that commercial diplomacy offices' personnel resources in both these respects 
positively contributes to their effect on trade: 
- H4a: A larger budget for a commercial diplomacy office positively impacts its 
effect on trade. 
- H4b: A commercial diplomacy office's number of staff as well as the 
percentage of its staff which is locally employed20 both positively contribute 
to the office's effect on trade. 
Organisation age, as a proxy for the accumulation of experiential knowledge that an 
office may develop and the increased visibility as longevity increases (Alexander & 
Warwick, 2007; Kostecki & Naray, 2007), may be considered an organisational 
resource. Considering the positive and significant effects of an office's age on U.S. and 
Korean FDI inflows (Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; Lim, 2008) as well as on Spanish export 
flows (Gil-Pareja et al., 2014), this pattern is expected to hold for commercial 
                                                 
20 Locally employed staff are citizens of the host country. 
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diplomacy offices. Another point of differentiation in the literature is that dedicated 
trade offices may affect trade flows differently from diplomatic representations 
(Creusen & Lejour, 2013; van Bergeijk et al., 2010; Volpe Martincus, Estevadeordal, 
et al., 2010). Due to contrasting results within these studies, the direction in which 
more dedicated commercial diplomacy offices affect trade relative to traditional 
diplomatic representations remains unclear. Differences in effectiveness are likely to 
arise from quality and types of resources, rather than the designation of the office. 
The following set of hypotheses capture the above: 
- H5a: The longer a commercial diplomacy office is located in a country, the 
larger its effect on trade. 
- H5b: There is no difference in the effectiveness of different types of 
commercial diplomacy offices; an office within a diplomatic representation is 
as effective as an office which is in a separate location. 
The conceptual commercial diplomacy literature pays particular attention to the 
resource type of the individual commercial diplomat. The perceived quality of the 
commercial diplomat depends largely on the experience of the individual at a post and 
the post’s network (Ruël & Zuidema, 2012; Ruël & Busschers, 2012). The ability to 
recognise and act on opportunities as well as the strength of the commercial diplomat’s 
contacts depends on his/her experience, skills and attitude (Andersen, 2006), which 
constitutes experiential knowledge (Morgan et al., 2004). The attributes of a 
commercial diplomat are described by the categorisations developed by Kostecki and 
Naray (2007) and Ruël and Visser (2012). Their characterisations positively contribute 
to the office's effect on trade such that commercial diplomats that are more engaged in 
commercial affairs have a larger contribution to an office's effect on trade than those 
who do not. Following the international management and private sector intermediary 
literature, it is expected that a commercial diplomat's experience in international 
markets contributes positively to an office's effect on trade due to the accumulation of 
experiential knowledge (Musteen et al., 2013; Sala & Yalcin, 2015; Peng & York, 
2001). For the same reason, being able to communicate in the local language 
contributes positively to this as well (Musteen et al., 2013; Peng & York, 2001). This 
yields the following hypotheses: 
- H6a: Within the frameworks drawn by Naray (2011) and Ruël and Visser 
(2012), a commercial diplomacy office which is headed by a commercial 
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diplomat who is a business promoter or proactor has a larger effect on trade 
than offices headed by commercial diplomats who are not21. 
- H6b: The more experience a commercial diplomat has, the larger the 
commercial diplomacy office's effect on trade. 
- H6c: A commercial diplomat who speaks the language of the country in which 
he/she is posted contributes more to an office's effect on trade than a 
commercial diplomat who does not. 
The next set of hypotheses relate to the activities that commercial diplomacy offices 
perform. Networking and intelligence activities relate to matching and trade barrier 
alleviation respectively. While the empirical literature obtains mixed results for 
offices' activity performance (Martin, 2003; Kotabe, 1993; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 
2000; Wilkinson et al, 2011), these studies utilise too broadly defined activities, and 
focus on specific pairs of countries. Following from Hypotheses H1a to H3b, it is 
expected that the activities that alleviate these search costs and trade barriers positively 
affect exports. For image promotion activity, key instruments relate to the participation 
in and organisation of trade shows and trade missions. Here, the empirical literature 
points to non-contemporaneous effects of such activities (Nitsch, 2007; Head & Ries, 
2010) in addition to trade shows and trade missions being used mostly for experiential 
resources (Duran & Ubeda, 2001; Seringhaus & Mayer, 1988; Seringhaus & Rosson, 
1998). As such, these activities are not expected to directly affect trade. If business 
support and FDI promotion activities do not directly affect trade, and due to the 
opportunity cost effect that Wilkinson and Brouthers (2000) allude to it is even 
possible that if they do not affect trade positively, then they affect it negatively because 
they take away time that could be spent on trade-increasing effects. On the other hand, 
when it comes to FDI promotion, Kotabe (1993) indicates that exports often precede 
FDI. From this, the following hypotheses follow: 
- H7a: A commercial diplomacy office's positive effect on trade increases as it 
performs more network and intelligence activities. 
- H7b: The performance of image campaigns and FDI promotion do not 
contemporaneously affect the effectiveness of a commercial diplomacy office. 
                                                 
21 The method to differentiate between business promoters and non business promoters (Naray, 2011) 
and between proactors and non-proactors (Ruël & Visser, 2012) is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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- H7c: The performance of business support activities negatively affect a 
commercial diplomacy office's effect on trade. 
In relation to the activities performed, commercial diplomacy offices may focus on 
specific sectors. This can be due to specific advantages that government actors might 
enjoy (Copeland, 2007), or it may be part of the overall strategic trade policy (Naray, 
2008, 2011), or countries may choose to focus on the development of certain sectors 
(Okano-Heijmans, 2011; Belloc & Di Maio, 2012; Wilkinson et al., 2011). In Harding 
and Javorcik (2011), sector targeting is beneficial to investment promotion success, 
but in a study by Lederman et al. (2010) it is not. However, both studies conceptualise 
sector specification at the level of the overall strategy of the export/investment 
promotion agency (i.e. with a focus on the home country), and not at the commercial 
diplomacy office-level. Thus, while sector-specificity may be beneficial due to 
concentration of resources and activities, a too narrowly defined focus may inhibit 
export diversification while a too broadly defined focus may be detrimental if 
insufficient resources are available: 
- H8a: A commercial diplomacy office is more effective in promoting trade 
within a targeted set of sectors than it is in promoting overall trade. 
- H8b: A commercial diplomacy office has a larger effect on trade as it operates 
in a larger number of sectors. 
A last element from the activity performance point of view is the recipient of the 
service. From the export promotion literature discussed in Section 2.4.3, especially 
small firms stand to benefit from export promotion services due to their resource 
constraints. In their study of Dutch SMEs' perception of the service quality of 
commercial diplomacy, Ruël and Busschers (2012) find a similar result. As such, it is 
expected that the share of SMEs in a commercial diplomacy office's client network is 
beneficial to its performance. From here: 
- H9a: A commercial diplomacy office has a larger effect on trade as the share 
of its client base which are SMEs increases. 
- H9b: A commercial diplomacy office has a larger effect on trade as the share 
of firms they contact in the host country increasingly consists of SMEs. 
A commercial diplomacy office's network is a key resource. From the intermediary 
literature, network utilisation positively affects bilateral trade (Rauch & Trindade, 
2002; Rauch & Watson, 2004). Larger networks provide more experiential resources 
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(Morgan et al., 2004). The success of an office depends on the extent to which its 
network consists of contacts it has established, and the size of the network (O'Gorman 
& Evers, 2011). Additionally, commercial diplomacy offices' success depends not only 
on the size of their host country networks, but in having large home-country networks 
of clients. Hence: 
- H10a: A commercial diplomacy office is more effective as its network of 
business contacts in the host country increases. 
- H10b: The effectiveness of a commercial diplomacy office's network is 
positively affected by the proportion of pre-established contacts it features. 
- H10c: A commercial diplomacy office is more effective as it services a larger 
number of firms from the home country. 
Office-level trade barrier alleviation 
Commercial diplomacy offices alleviate problems that arise from the combination of 
trade barriers and search costs, and one of the principal ways they do so is through the 
provision of the sets of activities as defined in Section 2.2.3. The effectiveness of their 
activities varies with the degree to which formal and informal institutional constraints 
inhibit trade (Gillespie and Riddle, 2004). In the private sector intermediary literature 
two empirical studies to some degree assess this. The performance of intermediaries 
depends on the extent to which they mitigate transaction costs (Peng & York, 2001), 
and Balabanis (2000) finds that an intermediary's services are geared to specific 
market-related factors relating to (among others) transaction costs. For a commercial 
diplomacy office, the activities they perform alleviate trade barriers. More specifically, 
the activities commercial diplomacy offices perform alleviate trade barriers that stem 
from high informal institutional distance as well as from low formal institutional 
quality. 
However, the private intermediary literature identifies activities that are different from 
the activities commercial diplomacy offices perform, and a similar connection has not 
been made yet in the empirical literature related to commercial diplomacy. While it is 
likely that network search and intelligence provision activities are especially effective 
at reducing trade barriers, when it comes to the other activities this connection is not 
evident. Therefore, the following hypotheses arise:  
- H11a: In countries with less developed formal institutions, and in countries 
with greater informal institutional distance from the home country, the positive 
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effect of a commercial diplomacy office on trade increases with the extent to 
which the office performs network and intelligence activities. 
- H11b: In countries where formal institutional quality is low or informal 
institutional distance is high, the positive effect of a commercial diplomacy 
office on trade is not related to the extent to which it performs image 
campaigns, business support and FDI promotion  
The commercial diplomacy office's role in trade barrier alleviation depends not only 
on its activities, but also on the strength of its relationship with local businesses 
(O'Gorman & Evers, 2011) as well as other actors (Kostecki & Naray, 2007; 
Smedlund, 2006). Information gained through network development lowers 
uncertainty (Kranton & Minehart, 2003) that stems from transaction costs in the host 
country (Peng & Zhou, 2005). Thus, utilising network ties to gain knowledge is more 
prudent in relation to countries with less developed formal institutions, or counties 
with a greater distance in informal institutions (Danis, De Clercq, & Petricevic, 2011)., 
2011). More specifically, in countries with less developed formal institutions or 
countries between which informal institutional distance is high, commercial 
diplomacy offices are expected to benefit from networks that feature strong ties. In 
countries that have high quality formal institutions or between which informal 
institutional distance is low, the importance of weak ties prevails. In addition, tie 
strength in relation to institutional factors matters not only to the network as a whole, 
it also matters in relation to sets of actors within the network (Milanzi, 2012; Musteen 
et al., 2013). As commercial diplomacy offices enjoy high visibility and status, they 
could particularly exploit from their improved levels of connections with actors in the 
public sector in addition to those in the private sector. This gives rise to the final set of 
hypotheses: 
- H12a: In less institutionally developed countries than the home country, and in 
countries which are distant from the home country in terms of informal 
institutions, the effect of commercial diplomacy offices on trade will increase 
as the offices' networks increasingly feature stronger ties. 
- H12b: A commercial diplomacy office's effect on trade in countries where 
entry is more difficult due to trade barriers is larger as the strength of ties with 
public and private actors in its network increases. 
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2.6. Chapter Summary 
This Chapter presented an overview of the literature on commercial diplomacy and 
outlined the gaps that this thesis addresses. The first step in this process was the 
determination of a definition of commercial diplomacy in Section 2.2. The Chapter 
then moved to establish commercial diplomacy as a network intermediary in Section 
2.3. An extensive discussion of the empirical literature related to commercial 
diplomacy featured in Section 2.4, which enabled the identification of gaps around 
which hypotheses were developed in Section 2.5. 
The next Chapter discusses the methodology that will be used to address the 
hypotheses, developed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 3. 
 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 has identified what commercial diplomacy is, how it acts as an intermediary, 
and what gaps exist in the empirical literature. The current Chapter describes the 
approach this thesis adopts to test the hypotheses specified at the end of Chapter 2. The 
scope of this Chapter is to outline the motivations for the approaches taken. 
This Chapter begins by substantiating the need for quantitative research in Section 3.2 
after which the applicability of the gravity model for this thesis is assessed in Section 
3.3. Section 3.4 follows to outline how the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 will be 
addressed in the remainder of this thesis. 
3.2. Quantitative Research 
This thesis follows up on previous research on commercial diplomacy, which has been 
descriptive or exploratory, in outlining the existence and extent of commercial 
diplomacy through both case studies and conceptual development (Kostecki & Naray, 
2007; Naray, 2008, 2011, 2012; Ruël & Busschers, 2012; Ruël & Visser, 2012; Ruël 
& Zuidema, 2012). The literature review extended the findings of the previous research 
to include the intermediary perspective, and the resulting testable hypotheses extend 
the field of commercial diplomacy into the realm of explanatory research. 
All hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 relate to commercial diplomacy's effect on 
trade, the resources and activities it employs in doing so, and its alleviation of barriers 
to trade. The hypotheses constitute a set of quantifiable aspects of commercial 
diplomacy and the circumstances under which it is performed. Since the crux of this 
thesis is quantifying commercial diplomacy rather than adding a conceptual study to 
the body of literature, a quantitative design is most appropriate.  
The subject of commercial diplomacy – relating to trade barriers and the network 
intermediary function – does not allow for a controlled lab environment; nor would an 
experimental design be feasible due to time, resources and constraints on access to the 
subject under investigation. Therefore, this thesis employs a non-experimental design. 
While an experimental design can precisely determine and control the impact of the 
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factors under investigation, it requires a study environment where those factors can be 
controlled (Creswell, 2013). 
The quantitative approach of this thesis builds upon the commercial diplomacy 
literature discussed in the literature review, especially Sections 2.2 and 2.3, and 
advances the literature by addressing the gaps identified in Section 2.5, responding to 
calls by Naray (2012) and O'Gorman and Evers (2011) for studies that adopt an 
empirical perspective. 
3.3. Applicability of the Gravity Model 
As the empirical literature review of Chapter 2 indicates, most commercial diplomacy 
related empirical studies focus on trade outcomes. The few that do not do so utilise 
self-reported outcome measures for service quality (Ruël & Zuidema, 2012; Ruël & 
Busschers, 2012) or firm-level sales (Abeson & Taku, 2007). The hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 2 follows the focus on trade outcomes. This thesis has selected 
the gravity model of international trade to describe the underlying relationship between 
trade outcomes and commercial diplomacy. 
In its simplest form, the gravity model states that trade between a country-pair is 
directly proportional to their GDPs as well as the geographical distance between them; 
the larger the GDPs, the more they will trade, and the inverse is true for the distance 
between them (Aviat & Coeurdacier, 2007; Baier & Bergstrand, 2001; Feenstra, 2004). 
Analogous to Isaac Newton's theory of gravity is a multiplicative model for this 
relationship, describing trade flows between two countries: 
(3.1) 𝐹𝑖𝑗 ∝
𝑀𝑖∗ 𝑀𝑗
𝐷𝑖𝑗
 
Where M stands for the economic mass of countries i and j, Dij is the distance between 
the two countries, and Fij is the trade flow between those two countries. This 
relationship has performed well empirically since Tinbergen’s (1962) original work 
on the subject (J. E. Anderson, 1979; Baier & Bergstrand, 2001; Feenstra & Kee, 2004; 
Sattinger, 1978)22. When the gravity model was first used, it was based on the 
hypothecated relationship in equation (3.1). A formal theoretical foundation appeared 
later with Anderson (1979). Following from subsequent theoretical studies, the gravity 
                                                 
22 Pöyhönen independently published a similar paper in 1963 (J. E. Anderson, 2011; Broekel, Balland, 
Burger, & van Oort, 2014; de Benedictis & Taglioni, 2011; Sattinger, 1978; Zwinkels & Beugelsdijk, 
2010), though the origin of the gravity model is often attributed to Tinbergen. 
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model is now a micro-founded model (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2007; Bergstrand, 1985; 
Head & Mayer, 2013) derived as a reduced form from a general equilibrium model of 
international trade in final goods (Baier & Bergstrand, 2001). 
The flexibility of the gravity model to explain trade flows from multiple perspectives 
makes it highly relevant when considering the hypotheses specified in Chapter 2. 
Several topics appear in the hypotheses: some revolve around trade outcomes related 
to total trade, the margins of trade, and product differentiation and its relation with 
commercial diplomacy. Others yet focus on determinants of trade in the form of the 
interplay between commercial diplomacy and trade barriers. Several hypotheses relate 
to commercial diplomacy from an office-level perspective in terms of resources, 
activities, network characteristics, and the interplay with trade barriers. The 
applicability of the gravity model to these hypotheses arises from the appearance of 
the elements within the hypotheses throughout the gravity model literature: 
- Broadly taken, studies of overall trade, exports, and imports have driven the 
empirical gravity model literature since Tinbergen (1962) outlined his 
empirical study. Following the identification of the effects of distance and 
economic growth (GDP), the literature has explored a multitude of explanatory 
factors behind trade flows. 
- Studies of the margins of trade, i.e. relating to export diversification and 
intensification, have taken place with a focus on whether nations trade with 
each other and how much (Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein, 2008), as well as 
on the product (Besedeš & Prusa, 2011; Dennis & Shepherd, 2011; Dutt, 
Mihov, & van Zandt, 2013) and firm levels (Berman & Héricourt, 2010; 
Lawless, 2010). This diverging set of levels at which the margins of trade can 
be assessed originates in the firm heterogeneity models developed by Chaney 
(2008) and M. J. Melitz (2003), and the explanation of zero trade flows 
developed by Helpman et al. (2008). The different margins of trade exist in the 
literature related to commercial diplomacy, where (Segura-Cayuela & 
Vilarrubia, 2008) focus on the country-level, Volpe Martincus and Carballo 
(2010b) and Volpe Martincus et al. (2011) on the product level, and (Creusen 
& Lejour, 2013) on the firm level. 
- The literature on types of goods related to search cost follows from Rauch 
(1999). In this literature, information on product-level trade is often aggregated 
to the industry or country level. This data has served to inform studies on 
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relationship specificity (Nunn, 2007), ease of communication (Hutchinson, 
2002, 2005; Lawless, 2010), and aspects of North-South trade (Hallak, 2006). 
The literature related to commercial diplomacy also adopts this country-level 
perspective. 
- Numerous authors employ the gravity model to investigate the effect of 
institutional factors, such as the influence of cultural and informal institutional 
effects on trade (Aggarwal, Kearney, & Lucey, 2012; Chang, Kao, Kuo, & 
Chiu, 2012; Felbermayr & Toubal, 2010; Guo, 2004; Lewer & van den Berg, 
2007), the effect of institutional distance or similarity on trade (de Groot, 
Linders, Rietveld, & Subramanian, 2004; Linders, Slangen, De Groot, & 
Beugelsdijk, 2005), and the effect of institutional quality on trade (Briggs, 
2013; de Groot et al., 2004; Francois & Manchin, 2013; Linders et al., 2005). 
In the empirical literature directly related to commercial diplomacy, only 
Ciuriak and Kinjo (2006) address formal institutional quality. 
- As indicated in the above points, empirical studies related to commercial 
diplomacy focus on country-level trade flows in relation to diplomatic 
representation (Rose, 2007; Yakop & van Bergeijk, 2011) and different trade 
outcomes. Several of these studies have focused on the office-level in relation 
to trade (e.g. Martin, 2003; Kang, 2011; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000). 
- The gravity model specification is well-suited to directly accommodate 
network characteristics related to structure such as size. The literature includes 
research on the effect of the size of different types of networks on trade, such 
as those formed by immigrants (Bastos & Silva, 2012; Rauch & Trindade, 
2002); educational ties (Murat, 2014); cultural factors (Rauch, 1999; Lewer & 
van den Berg, 2007); and businesses themselves (de la Mata, 2014; J. Lee, 
2012). 
To strengthen the rationale for using the gravity model beyond historical precedent, a 
closer look at the theoretical foundations is required to assess where commercial 
diplomacy fits. The key development in this respect is the inclusion of trade frictions 
in the gravity model specification. Adopting multilateral resistance terms into the 
gravity model, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) transform the naïve model outlined 
earlier (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2007) to a general equilibrium model with CES 
preferences of the following form: 
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(3.2) 𝑋𝑖𝑗 =
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑊
(
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝛱𝑖𝑃𝑗
)
1−𝜎
 
Here, i is the exporting country, j the importer, and W the world. In the model, X are 
exports, Y GDPs, and σ>1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between product 
varieties. The most important feature of this model lies in the second term on the right-
hand side. The numerator features the inclusion of shipment costs in the form of τij, 
usually relating to border and distance effects. The factors in the denominator denote 
the relative outward and inward multilateral resistances, respectively. Pj denotes the 
prices faced by consumers in j and their relatively desirability against the rest of the 
world. Similarly, Πi are the trade costs that i faces when exporting to j relative to 
exporting to other countries. This multilateral resistance term has since been adopted 
into firm heterogeneity models which make explicit how trade costs affect firms as 
well (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Chaney, 2008). It is by affecting trade frictions between two 
countries that commercial diplomacy is expected to be effective in its role as an 
intermediary. The heterogeneity of the effect of commercial diplomacy on trade is 
addressed next. 
3.4. Three Empirical Studies 
From the hypotheses in Chapter 2, the key contribution of this thesis lies in assessing 
the effect of office-level resources and activities on trade, and in addressing the 
intermediary role of commercial diplomacy at the office-level. In the empirical 
literature, little such office-level studies exist and the bulk focus on the presence of 
overseas offices on trade. As the gaps in Chapter 2 also indicate, this latter type of 
research identifies largely positive effects on trade, yet the delineation of these offices' 
effects on trade outcomes associated with trade costs as well as their effects in relation 
to trade barriers remains unclear. 
The hypotheses in this thesis belong to a sequence of three groups, each prior group 
establishing the ground for the subsequent group. In group 1, Hypotheses H1a to H2b 
relate to trade outcomes as a measure of trade costs and barriers. Group 2, Hypotheses 
H3a and H3b, considers the effectiveness of commercial diplomacy in reducing the 
various trade costs and barriers. Group 3, H4a to H12b, considers how the resources 
and activities of commercial diplomacy offices affects trade (H4a to H10b) and how 
their activities and the characteristics of their networks alleviate the negative effects 
of trade barriers (H11a to H12b). Each group of hypotheses is tested by a separate 
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study, each study requiring a different approach, as suggested by the empirical studies 
that motivated the hypotheses. 
The first study assesses whether commercial diplomacy offices positively affect export 
diversification and intensification, and whether they are more effective when it comes 
to stimulating exports in goods for which information is more difficult to obtain. The 
purpose of this study is to test Hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b. This study is first 
in the empirical hierarchy as it assesses whether commercial diplomacy offices lower 
search costs and entry barriers. It contributes to the subsequent studies in this thesis by 
providing an initial assessment of the effectiveness of commercial diplomacy offices, 
thus forming the motivation for the next two empirical studies. 
The second study examines whether commercial diplomacy offices alleviate the 
negative effects of the information asymmetry problems that arise from institutional 
constraints. The purpose of this study is to test Hypotheses H3a and H3b. By 
addressing these hypotheses, the second study contributes to the entire set of studies 
in this thesis by providing deeper insight into which of the causes of trade barriers 
commercial diplomacy alleviates, and to what extent commercial diplomacy is more 
effective as such trade barriers become more prevalent. 
The third and last study examines the underlying factors behind the performance of 
commercial diplomacy offices, and what activities and resources are helpful in 
alleviating information asymmetry problems. To know what these are, it is first 
necessary to identify whether these offices work in the first place in the first study, and 
it is necessary to determine whether these offices affect information asymmetry in the 
first place in the second study. The purpose of the third study is thus to test the 
hypotheses that relate to specific elements of the offices' resources, organisation, and 
activities, as well as the hypotheses that relate to the trade barrier alleviating effect of 
these offices' activities and relational network characteristics. This is the set of 
hypotheses from H4a to H12b. Identifying this outlines how commercial diplomacy 
works at the office-level, and which factors contribute to successful performance of 
commercial diplomacy offices' intermediary role.  
According to Visser and Ruël (2014), who state that the performance of integrative 
studies is a necessary element for this literature to proceed, this three-study approach 
constitutes a contribution to the literature; the sequence of studies in this thesis forms 
such an integrative assessment.  
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3.5. Chapter Summary 
This Chapter presented an overview of the research methodology that the remainder 
of this thesis revolves around. Based on the hypotheses outlined at the end of Chapter 
2, a hierarchy of three studies arises, each of which progressively dives deeper into 
whether commercial diplomacy offices are effective intermediaries, and what the 
underlying factors are. The next Chapter discusses the first of these studies.  
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Chapter 4. 
 
COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY, 
PRODUCT TYPES, AND THE 
MARGINS OF TRADE23 
4.1. Introduction 
Following from the research strategy outlined in Chapter 3, the purpose of the current 
Chapter is to estimate a panel data gravity model which tests Hypotheses H1a, H1b, 
H2a and H2b. 
This Chapter is the first of the empirical studies in this thesis as it assesses whether 
commercial diplomacy's intermediary effect results in reduced transaction costs from 
the perspective of the dependent variable. This is a precursor to the second study in 
Chapter 5, which identifies whether commercial diplomacy offices are more effective 
when information asymmetry barriers (as sources of transaction costs) are more 
prevalent. Chapters 6 and 7 flow from this as they discuss the survey and its results in 
terms of how a commercial diplomacy office's resources, activities and network 
characteristics make it effective. In relation to the other empirical studies, the current 
Chapter investigates whether commercial diplomacy works; the other studies 
investigate the mechanisms that underlie the results in this Chapter. 
The key dependent variables in this Chapter are trade in Rauch's (1999) types of goods, 
and the margins of trade. If commercial diplomacy offices are effective in their role as 
intermediaries, they should alleviate search cost barriers to allow for matching of 
buyers and suppliers. This is the essence of Hypotheses H1a and H2a. Because search 
costs exist for differentiated goods but not homogeneous goods, since the latter are 
traded on organised exchanges while the former depend on identifying individual 
suppliers (Rauch, 1999), it follows from Rauch and Watson (2004) that as 
intermediaries, a commercial diplomacy office’s knowledge of the host-country 
                                                 
23 A preliminary version of the results in this Chapter were presented at the Australasian Public Choice 
Conference 2015 held at the Queensland University of Technology in December 2015. A paper using 
parts of the methodology in this Chapter for a different variable of interest was presented at the Asia-
Pacific Trade Seminars in Taipei in June 2016 and at the Australian Conference of Economists at 
Flinders University in July 2016. 
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market should be effective when it comes to stimulating trade in differentiated goods, 
followed by reference priced goods, and then homogeneous goods (which are not 
susceptible to search costs). This is Hypothesis H1b. However, the empirical literature 
includes mixed results, with studies that identify significant effects on either 
homogeneous goods (Volpe Martincus, Estevadeordal, et al., 2010), or on 
differentiated and reference priced goods (Moons & de Boer, 2014; Gil-Pareja et al., 
2014). Testing Hypothesis H1a is therefore a prerequisite to determine whether 
commercial diplomacy significantly affects trade in all three types of goods in the first 
place. 
Similarly, if commercial diplomacy offices effectively alleviate transaction cost 
barriers that constitute prohibitive entry barriers to firms, it follows from firm 
heterogeneity models by Chaney (2008) and Melitz (2003) that they have a larger 
effect on the extensive margin than the intensive margin of trade because entry costs 
predominantly affect the extensive margin – this is Hypothesis H2b. Nevertheless, 
there is some evidence that such offices affect both the extensive and intensive margins 
(Volpe Martincus et al., 2011) which necessitates the testing of Hypothesis H2a first 
as this Hypothesis relates to whether commercial diplomacy affects the extensive and 
intensive margins in the first place24. 
The analysis in this Chapter is related to the empirical studies outlined in the empirical 
literature review in Chapter 225, which focus on the effect of diplomatic representation 
(or similar offices) on trade. The contributions this Chapter makes to this literature are 
fivefold. 
- It adds to the existing literature by providing a broad country-coverage study 
this phenomenon as is called for by Moons and van Bergeijk (2016).  
- In doing so it follows Baier and Bergstrand (2007) by employing a structural 
gravity model using an appropriate set of fixed effects to address the 
                                                 
24 Three elements preclude basing conclusions on Hypotheses H1b and H2b from the coefficients and 
signs that testing Hypotheses H1a and H2a yield: the dataset is unbalanced; the results for exports and 
imports in different types of goods rely on a different set of observations; and a direct comparison of 
coefficients does not account for the likelihood of confidence intervals overlapping which may lead to 
incorrect conclusions as to the relative importance of commercial diplomacy in types of goods and in 
the margins of trade 
25 More specifically, they are Rose (2007), van Bergeijk et al. (2010), Yakop and van Bergeijk (2011), 
Hayakawa et al. (2014), Volpe Martincus, Estevadeordal, et al. (2010), Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia 
(2008), Gil-Pareja et al. (2014), Volpe Martincus et al. (2011), and Creusen and Lejour (2013). 
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simultaneity bias that previous papers suffer from; only Hayakawa et al. (2014) 
address this, although their focus is narrow26.  
- It addresses the debate revolving around types of goods traded, where the 
application of this panel dataset and estimation strategy sheds new light on the 
contradictory findings in the previous literature27.  
- It extends the empirical literature on the effect of overseas offices on the 
extensive and intensive margins of trade beyond region-specificity. Moreover, 
the panel data estimation accounts for the growth of these margins over time. 
The study will yield more accurate inferences regarding the role of these offices 
in trade creation along these margins than the extant literature. It thereby 
addresses the need for studies focusing on the margins of trade as raised by 
Moons and van Bergeijk (2016).  
- The data allows for a comparison of the effect of these offices on exports and 
imports. So far, the literature has focused mostly on exports. 
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the 
specific estimation strategy as well as the dataset. Then, Section 4.3 displays and 
discusses the results after which Section 4.4 concludes. 
4.2. Empirical Strategy 
4.2.1. Data sources 
Commercial diplomacy 
Time-varying data on commercial diplomacy is hard to come by because official 
records reveal little about this concept. If they do, they only contain information about 
where diplomatic representations (or specific trade promotion offices) are currently 
located, and where such information is available, countries do not consistently record 
it on a year by year basis, nor do they make available sufficient historical information 
as a substantive panel data analysis would require. Therefore, this study relies on the 
Correlates of War (COW) Diplomatic Exchange dataset (Bayer, 2006)28. This dyadic 
dataset captures diplomatic representation at the level of the interest section, chargé 
d'affaires, minister-counsellor, and ambassador. This data serves to specify a dummy 
                                                 
26 Their study relates only to Japanese and Korean export promotion offices overseas. 
27 Volpe Martincus, Estevadeordal, et al. (2010) find that diplomatic representation affect homogeneous 
goods most of all, while Moons and de Boer (2014) and Gil-Pareja et al. (2014), both of which do not 
account for endogeneity, find that they affect trade in differentiated goods more than homogeneous 
goods. 
28 Available at http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/diplomatic-exchange 
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variable that signifies whether country i has a diplomatic presence in country j, and 
vice versa. The data are available for as far back as 1817, though this study uses 
information from 1985 to 2005 in five year intervals29. 
For the purposes of analysis, the variable that is constructed from the COW dataset, 
the presence of diplomatic representation, serves as a proxy for the existence of 
commercial diplomacy. While not all diplomatic representations have a trade 
promotion function, the overlap is high and thus the results obtained with this variable 
applies to commercial diplomacy. While Moons and van Bergeijk (2016) note that 
studies need to account for embassies and consulates separately, the nature of the COW 
data is such that it only indicates whether a diplomatic representation exists and at 
what level. While in many cases the existence of representation at the ambassadorial 
level would consist of both embassies and consulates, this distinction is not made in 
the dataset. A comprehensive panel dataset with a broad country coverage remains 
unavailable and the COW dataset is the best option available. 
Trade data 
Types of goods 
Information on trade in types of goods is based on Rauch (1999), the first to distinguish 
products in this way. Unsurprisingly, the three related empirical studies to this Chapter 
which also focus on product types use this classification as well.  
Rauch’s (1999) product types are an intuitive way to consider search cost problems as 
the division into three types distinguishes products for which the sources do not matter 
to consumers as well as those which are supplier-specific. In addition, the product 
coverage of this classification is broad – it covers seven of the ten industries in the 1-
digit SITC classification (Besedeš & Prusa, 2006). 
Rauch's (1999) product types are disaggregated to a 4-digit SITC level, containing 
around 750 product codes. Despite the coarseness of this aggregation level as opposed 
to the HS classification, which at the 6-digit level yields around 5200 product codes, 
Rauch’s product types have been mapped on the higher aggregation level in the SITC 
classification only, so utilising the HS-data would yield exactly the same trade 
variables.  
                                                 
29 The COW data changed its coding after 1980, making prior data unusable for the study, and key 
variables are only available in 5 year intervals. 
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Rauch (1999) notes that some ambiguities arise at the three and four-digit SITC level 
that affect his classification. To address this, he creates two classifications; the 
'conservative' classification minimises the number of homogeneous and reference 
priced goods, while the 'liberal' classification maximises this number. The switch from 
homogeneous and reference priced goods to differentiated goods across the two liberal 
and conservative classifications affects around ten per cent of the 4-digit SITC product 
codes. For the analysis of trade flows in types of goods, consistent estimates across 
both the liberal and conservative classifications thus indicate robustness. 
The trade data comes from the UN Comtrade database, and is available in the SITC 
Revision 2 classification. While trade in types of goods adheres to standard export 
level models and thus to a cross-sectional multilateral resistance model, a necessity in 
terms of the overall dataset for this Chapter is to construct panel data for the margins 
of trade. A further requirement for panel data stems from the estimation technique 
utilised in this Chapter; this is discussed in Section 4.2.2. 
The margins of trade 
Like trade in types of goods, data on the extensive margin of trade is available from 
secondary sources. The empirical literature related to this Chapter utilises such 
secondary data on the country-level (whether a country exports), the product level 
which is then aggregated to the country level, and the firm-level decision of whether 
to export.  
From the perspective of the gaps that this Chapter addresses, country-coverage is 
essential. As such, the use of firm-level data is not feasible because such data is 
heterogeneously available across countries; studies of the firm-level margins focus on 
a single country due to effort required in constructing this dataset. The country-product 
level is feasible to construct across countries and satisfies the coverage condition. 
Another consideration regarding the country-product margins of trade is that of 
aggregation from the product to the country level. At any level of aggregation, two 
main methods exist (Dutt et al., 2013). First is an unweighted measure, wherein the 
extensive margin is the number of products traded, and the intensive margin is the 
average trade value per product traded. This approach is common (Dennis & Shepherd, 
2011; Santos Silva, Tenreyro, & Wei, 2014; Volpe Martincus et al., 2011; Volpe 
Martincus, Estevadeordal, et al., 2010), though does not take into account the relative 
importance of some products over others. Studies that do account for product 
importance are from Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Feenstra and Kee (2004, 2008). 
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This latter approach is highly correlated with the unweighted measures (Dutt et al., 
2013), and estimations using both approaches should yield similar estimates. For the 
analysis of margins of trade, both weighted and unweighted margins are used. 
The margins of trade revolve around dynamics rather than statics (Besedeš & Prusa, 
2011; Dutt et al., 2013; Segura-Cayuela & Vilarrubia, 2008) and therefore require 
panel data to investigate. As for the time period that applies to this study, while the 
databank’s 6-digit HS-classification data is the most disaggregated available with 
which the margins of trade can be constructed, information on these codes only goes 
back to 1992. The 4-digit SITC coding is less disaggregated, but goes back to 1962. 
Given that the diplomatic representation data is available for 1985 to 2005, the SITC 
classification maximises the diplomatic representation data that can be used. 
Control variables 
This study also contains standard control variables from the gravity model literature, 
as far as the fixed effects do not limit their inclusion. Data for the control variables for 
1985 to 2006 comes from the CEPII gravity database (Head, Mayer, & Ries, 2010). 
Applied to this study, relevant data relates to whether countries are members of the 
same free trade agreements, and whether countries share a common currency. Data for 
2007 to 2009 is extended based on from the 2006 values, and adjusted where needed 
(e.g. in the case of entry into the EU). For a baseline estimation, information on a larger 
set of control variables comes from this same dataset. These additional control 
variables are GDPs for both countries, and population sizes for both countries. 
4.2.2. Identification strategy and estimation models 
This Chapter adopts a gravity model approach to determine the effect of commercial 
diplomacy, proxied by diplomatic representation, on trade outcomes30. This approach 
follows Rose (2007) and the subsequent empirical literature as well as the empirical 
international trade literature in general. 
Estimation of the basic log-linear model of the gravity model adopts the following 
functional form: 
(4.1) Fij = f(Dij, Yi, Yj, Popi, Popj, Areaij, X) 
                                                 
30 As Section 3.3 outlines, the gravity model allows for the incorporation of multilateral resistance terms 
to account for trade costs and factors that alleviate trade costs. 
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Where i denotes the exporter, j denotes the importer, Fij is the trade flow, Dij is the 
geographical distance, Yi and Yj are GDPs, Popi and Popj stand for population sizes, 
Area is the product of land areas of countries i and j, and X is a vector of dummy 
variables. 
Traditional estimation of the model above takes place using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). However, since Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) outlined the importance of 
multilateral resistance terms in the gravity equation, research has shifted to account for 
the structural nature of the gravity model by including fixed effects. In this regard, due 
to the violation of the strict exogeneity assumption with random effects (Olivero & 
Yotov, 2012), evidence overwhelmingly favours fixed over random effects (Egger, 
2000). As such, empirical literature on the presence of diplomatic representation has 
focused on the inclusion of country and country-pair fixed effects to account for 
countries' heterogeneity. However, in the presence of endogeneity, only country-year 
and bilateral fixed effects will give consistent estimates of the variable(s) of interest 
(Baltagi, Egger, & Pfaffermayr, 2014; Bergstrand, Larch, & Yotov, 2015)31. 
Therefore, for this panel data study the use of country-pair specific time-invariant 
effects alone is inadequate. Time-varying fixed effects for the exporter and importer 
are critically important to capture any importer or exporter time-varying 
characteristics. These terms correct biases that would otherwise arise in panel datasets 
(Baier & Bergstrand, 2007; Baldwin & Taglioni, 2007; Bergstrand et al., 2015; Dutt 
et al., 2013; Gómez-Herrera, 2013). 
The bilateral fixed effects control for time-invariant variables on the country-pair level, 
and thus capture the effects of commonly used gravity model variables that can no 
longer be estimated (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2007), such as geographic distance, land 
size, and dummy variables for common language and sharing a border (Baier & 
Bergstrand, 2007; Hayakawa et al., 2014; Yang & Martinez-Zarzoso, 2014). 
Moreover, the country-year fixed effects control for determinants that vary in the 
country-year (it and jt) dimensions, and therefore absorb the effects for GDP and 
population size as these variables vary in exactly those dimensions (Baier & 
Bergstrand, 2007; Bergstrand et al., 2015; Eicher & Henn, 2011a; Gómez-Herrera, 
2013; Yang & Martinez-Zarzoso, 2014). Thus, the exclusion of these standard gravity 
                                                 
31 Most variables that could be considered as plausible instruments are at the same time determinants of 
such policy instruments as well, as is shown by Kinne (2014) in the case of diplomatic representation. 
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model variables is necessary when using Baier and Bergstrand's (2007) set of fixed 
effects for identification purposes. This approach is common in the empirical literature 
that employs country-year and bilateral fixed effects32.  
Accounting for country-year and bilateral fixed effects in a standard gravity model of 
international trade means that only variables that vary in the bilateral-time dimension 
remain. Besides the variable for commercial diplomacy, this is the case with standard 
gravity model dummy variables for whether a free trade agreement exists between two 
countries, and whether they share a common currency (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2007). 
Accounting for the inclusion of country-year and bilateral fixed effects, the gravity 
equation for the export- and import-promoting effects are as follows: 
(4.2) ln(Fij,t,k) = β0 + β1Representationij,t + β2RTAij,t + β3Currencyij,t + uij + ui,t + uj,t 
+ εij,t 
(4.3) ln(Fij,t,k) = β0 + β1Representationji,t + β2RTAij,t + β3Currencyij,t + uij + ui,t + uj,t 
+ εij,t 
With Fij being the trade variable, t denoting year, and the u-terms denoting exporter-
year (uit), importer-year (ujt), and country-pair (uij) fixed effects. Representation is the 
proxy for commercial diplomacy and denotes the presence of diplomatic 
representation of i in j in equation (4.2), and of j in i in equation (4.2). RTAij,t and 
Currencyij,t are control variables for being members of a free trade agreement and 
sharing a common currency, respectively. While the fixed effects account for 
multilateral resistance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, the inclusion of trade 
agreement and currency agreement membership as control variables is necessary to 
further reduce the potential for omitted variable bias, which may give upwards bias to 
the estimates for the effect of commercial diplomacy on trade. 
In equations (4.2) and (4.3), the trade variable can be one of six types as denoted by k: 
total exports, total exports in homogeneous goods, total exports in reference priced 
goods, total exports in differentiated goods, the extensive margin, and the intensive 
margin. Information from Rauch (1999) is used to construct totals for homogeneous, 
reference priced, and differentiated goods. This information is available for seven of 
the ten broad industries in the SITC-classification and thus leads to some loss of data, 
                                                 
32 See e.g. Dutt et al. (2013), Bergstrand et al. (2015), Yang and Martinez-Zarzoso (2014), Eicher and 
Henn (2011a, 2011b), Fugazza and Nicita (2013), Vijil (2014), Felbermayr and Toubal (2010), Head et 
al. (2010) and Melitz (2008). 
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though as Besedeš and Prusa (2006) note, this does not create a large bias when using 
annual data. To construct the extensive and intensive margins of trade this Chapter 
uses the margins as defined by Hummels and Klenow (2005), albeit with the 
adjustments made by Dutt et al. (2013). That is, whereas Hummels and Klenow (2005) 
calculate the margins for country-pairs relative to the rest of the world, Dutt et al.'s 
(2013) adjustment to calculate them relative to the world allows for a more intuitive 
interpretation of the margins. As such, with Gij being the set of goods exported by 
country i to country j, the index W representing the sum of all origin countries, X 
denoting exports (of good g), and dropping the subscript t, the extensive margin is: 
(4.4) Extensive margin (EMij) = 
∑ 𝑋𝑊𝑗
𝑔
𝑔∈𝐺𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑋
𝑊𝑗
𝑔
𝑔∈𝐺𝑊𝑗
 
This margin is a measure of the fraction of goods in which country i exports to country 
j, weighting each product by its importance in world exports to j. The numerator 
measures exports from the world to country j in the 4-digit products in which i exports 
to j. The denominator is all exports from the world to country j. Here, the extensive 
margin becomes the fraction of products that country i exports to country j if all 
products have equal importance to country j. The intensive margin is: 
(4.5) Intensive margin (IMij) = 
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑔
𝑔∈𝐺𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑋
𝑊𝑗
𝑔
𝑔∈𝐺𝑖𝑗
 
This margin measures the overall market share country i has within the set of goods in 
which it exports to country j relative to world exports to country j in those goods.  
Both the extensive and intensive margins, defined as such, are bounded between 0 and 
1. Thus, as the extensive margin increases, the relative importance of the goods that 
country i exports to country j (with respect to all goods the importing country receives) 
increases; a value of 1 indicates that the set of goods exported by country i exactly 
corresponds with all goods that the world exports to country j. As for the intensive 
margin, an increase from the lower to the upper boundary indicates that country i's 
market share in the set of goods that it exports to country j increases. Because these 
margins are consistent across countries and over time (Feenstra & Kee, 2008), they are 
accurate measures of export diversity, and export intensity. 
The Representationij,t and Representationji,t variables denote whether diplomatic 
presence exists or not, taking the value of one if it does and zero if it does not. Noting 
that exports from i to j can be stimulated by i's commercial diplomacy efforts in j, and 
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by j's commercial diplomacy efforts in i, equations (4.2) and (4.3) distinguish between 
the export- and import-promoting functions of diplomatic representation.  
However, even with the set of fixed effects used above there may still be some 
simultaneity bias present in the equations that potentially renders the variable of 
interest to be biased upwards. Therefore, to strengthen identification this study follows 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Hayakawa et al. (2014) by introducing the lagged 
effect of the commercial diplomacy proxy variable on current exports. This way, it 
also recognises that commercial diplomacy's main trade function is the collection of 
information through its networks and that it may take time for firms to respond to this 
information. Therefore, the following models serve as the main estimation equations: 
(4.6) ln(Fij,t,k) = β0 + β1Representationij,t-n + β2RTAij,t + β3Currencyij,t + uij + ui,t + uj,t 
+ εij,t 
(4.7) ln(Fij,t,k) = β0 + β1Representationji,t-n + β2RTAij,t + β3Currencyij,t + uij + ui,t + uj,t 
+ εij,t 
Here, the Representation variable is lagged by n years, where n is 1 to 4. The choice 
for an upper limit of four lag years is motivated by the five-yearly intervals in which 
the diplomatic representation data is available. In addition, estimations using a fifth 
lag year indicate that no significant effects of diplomatic representation remain. 
The diplomatic representation data is available in five year intervals; the time lagged 
estimations in equations (4.6) and (4.7) assume that within an interval (e.g. 1985 to 
1989) there is no change to diplomatic representation – in a lagged estimation the effect 
of the diplomatic representation variable for 1985 is estimated on exports for 1986 to 
198933. 
The estimations to test Hypotheses H1a to H2b take place in two steps. The first step 
tests Hypotheses H1a and H2a which relate to commercial diplomacy working to 
increase trade in all types of goods and along both the extensive and intensive margins 
of trade. The second step is then to test Hypotheses H1b and H2b, which relate to the 
relative effectiveness of commercial diplomacy between the types of goods and 
between the margins of trade. This is accomplished by means of Wald-tests of the 
equality of coefficients. 
                                                 
33 Potential concerns about this assumption are alleviated by the robustness of the results in this Chapter. 
 70 
 
4.2.3. Robustness issues 
Zero trade flows 
In the dataset, zero trade flows comprise around 16 per cent of all trade flows. With 
the 4-digit data, the occurrence of these zero trade flows signifies in part the absence 
of trade, while the impact of unreported trade data in the Comtrade database is 
unknown. Looking at the specific variable of interest, the presence of diplomatic 
representation is nonzero in less than 12.8 per cent of the number of zero trade flows, 
which comes down to around 2 per cent of the dataset used for this study. The pattern 
that emerges from this combination is consistent with Kinne's (2014) findings that 
countries establish diplomatic relations with countries that they have trade relations 
with in the first place. Retaining the countries that have zero trade flows in the dataset 
would inflate the coefficients on the commercial diplomacy proxy variable due to the 
systematic absence of diplomatic representation where there is no trade. Therefore, 
zero trade flows are omitted from the main analysis to prevent an upwards bias of the 
estimates. This dropping of zero trade flows approach follows Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007). Nevertheless, to verify whether the upwards bias takes place, the preliminary 
analysis in Section 4.3.2 includes an estimation of equation (4.2). This takes place by 
adding a small constant to total exports to transform it into a strictly positive variable, 
and then running equation (4.2) with this altered dependent variable34.  
Alternative definitions of variables 
Apart from total exports, the trade variables in equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.6) and (4.7) 
can be defined in different ways. First, in differentiating between the three types of 
goods he identifies, Rauch (1999) notes that some ambiguities arise at the three and 
four-digit level, that results in the development of the ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ 
classifications. In the data used here, the classification difference affects 36 per cent 
of trade flows. The estimation adopts the liberal classification and further robustness 
checks take place using the conservative classification. Second, the approach to weight 
the extensive and intensive margins according to Hummels and Klenow (2005) can be 
substituted for one that adopts unweighted measures. In this case, the extensive margin 
                                                 
34 Unfortunately, the use of PPML as outlined by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is not possible here 
for two reasons. The first is that the number of fixed effects we would have to generate to manually 
include in such models goes beyond what Stata is comfortable handling. Second, even when reducing 
the dataset to 50x50 countries to circumvent this, the models suffer from well-known convergence 
issues which occur when maximum likelihood models feature many dummy variables (Bratti, de 
Benedictis, & Santoni, 2014). 
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is a simple count of the number of 4-digit goods exported from i to j, and the intensive 
margin is the value of exports per product traded. This approach is common in the 
literature (e.g. Dennis & Shepherd, 2011; Dutt et al., 2013). The unweighted margins 
are used as a robustness check. 
4.3. Results and Discussion 
This section details the results of the estimations. Section 4.3.1 first provides a brief 
overview of the data used. Section 4.3.2 then illustrates the effect of the inclusion of 
specific sets of fixed effects to build the case for the estimation approach outlined 
earlier. The Chapter then continues by testing Hypotheses H1a and H2a in Section 
4.3.3 and Hypotheses H1b and H2b in Section 4.3.4. Testing Hypotheses H1a and H2a 
is based on equations (4.6) and (4.7), while Hypotheses H1b and H2b require Wald 
tests of the equality of coefficients across different estimations. 
4.3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 lists the geographically dispersed countries in the (unbalanced) panel. 100 
countries have data available across all the datasets used; they are a mixture of 
developed and developing countries. 
Table 4.1: List of countries in dataset 
Algeria 
 
Benin 
 
Italy 
 
New 
Zealand 
 
Zimbabwe 
Angola 
 
Denmark 
 
Ivory Coast 
 
Niger 
 
Spain 
Azerbaijan 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
Jamaica 
 
Nigeria 
 
Sweden 
Argentina 
 
Ecuador 
 
Japan 
 
Norway 
 
Switzerland 
Australia 
 
El Salvador 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Pakistan 
 
Syria 
Austria 
 
Ethiopia 
 
Kenya 
 
Panama 
 
Thailand 
Bangladesh 
 
Finland 
 
South 
Korea 
 
Paraguay 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Belgium 
 
France 
 
uw it 
 
Peru 
 
United Arab Emirates 
Bolivia 
 
Gabon 
 
Lebanon 
 
Philippines 
 
Tunisia 
Botswana 
 
Germany 
 
Libya 
 
Poland 
 
Turkey 
Brazil 
 
Ghana 
 
Madagasca
r 
 
Portugal 
 
Uganda 
Cameroon 
 
Greece 
 
Malaysia 
 
Qatar 
 
Ukraine 
Canada 
 
Guatemala 
 
Mali 
 
Romania 
 
Egypt 
Sri Lanka 
 
Guinea 
 
Mauritius 
 
Russia 
 
United Kingdom 
Chile 
 
Hungary 
 
Mexico 
 
Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Tanzania 
China 
 
Indonesia 
 
Morocco 
 
Senegal 
 
United States of 
America Colombia 
 
Iran 
 
Oman 
 
India 
 
Uruguay
Costa Rica 
 
Iraq 
 
Namibia 
 
Singapore 
 
Venezuela 
Cuba 
 
Ireland 
 
Nepal 
 
Vietnam 
 
Yugoslavia 
Czech 
Republic 
 
Israel 
 
Netherland
s 
 
South 
Africa 
 
Zambia 
 
Table 4.2 provides summary statistics for the variables included in the estimations. 
Here, the total number of observations for the trade flows (including zeroes) is 202,102 
for all years from 1985 to 2009. However, equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.6) and (4.7) are 
restricted to a maximum of 37,013 observations because the diplomatic representation 
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data is available at 5-year intervals from 1985 to 2005. All dependent variables are in 
log form, and the summary statistics reflect this. As such, the trade volume variable 
for total exports and exports in types of goods average between US$ 5 million for 
homogeneous goods, and US$ 12 million for total exports. The intensive and extensive 
margins vary between 0 and 1. Also noticeable is that the average for the commercial 
diplomacy proxy is around 0.5 for both i's diplomatic presence in j, and j's diplomatic 
presence in i, suggesting that half of all countries maintain diplomatic relations with 
each other. Most importantly, however, both between- and within-variation are 
substantial, indicating that there is enough variation in these variables to make 
inferences from. This variation is especially noticeable when considering the Regional 
Trade Agreement and Common Currency policy instruments, which are both far less 
time-varying. 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Log of Total Exports 
(US$) 
overall 16.297 3.566 0 26.592 N = 171597 
between 
 
3.722 1.386 25.816 n = 9540 
within 
 
1.393 3.411 26.003 T-bar = 17.987        
Log of Homogeneous 
Goods Exports (US$) 
overall 14.626 3.371 0 25.205 N = 121365 
between 
 
3.348 0 23.808 n = 8340 
within 
 
1.618 -0.106 23.217 T-bar = 14.552        
Log of Reference 
Priced Goods Exports 
(US$) 
overall 15.154 3.275 0 24.674 N = 145263 
between 
 
3.462 0 24.069 n = 8942 
within 
 
1.399 0.135 24.981 T-bar = 16.245        
Log of Differentiated 
Goods Exports (US$) 
overall 15.389 3.691 0 26.220 N = 161554 
between 
 
3.813 0 25.301 n = 9367 
within 
 
1.405 3.449 24.903 T-bar = 17.247        
Log of Extensive 
Margin 
overall -2.325 2.116 -22.84 0 N = 170205 
between 
 
2.165 -12.989 0 n = 9531 
within 
 
1.018 -17.011 4.256 T-bar = 17.858        
Log of Intensive 
Margin 
overall -4.795 2.125 -19.471 0 N = 170205 
between 
 
1.979 -16.026 0 n = 9531 
within 
 
1.22 -16.588 4.424 T-bar = 17.858        
Representationij overall 0.519 0.5 0 1 N = 37013 
between 
 
0.478 0 1 n = 9534 
within 
 
0.152 -0.281 1.319 T-bar = 3.882        
Representationji overall 0.516 0.5 0 1 N = 37013 
between 
 
0.477 0 1 n = 9534 
within 
 
0.152 -0.284 1.316 T-bar = 3.882        
Regional Trade 
Agreement 
overall 0.086 0.28 0 1 N = 202102 
between 
 
0.248 0 1 n = 9540 
within 
 
0.133 -0.876 0.894 T-bar = 21.185        
Common Currency overall 0.011 0.105 0 1 N = 202102 
between 
 
0.096 0 1 n = 9540 
within 
 
0.052 -0.822 0.973 T-bar = 21.185 
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Finally, Table 4.3 shows the correlations between all variables used in this study. The 
correlations between the variables for commercial diplomacy and other predictor 
variables are about equal to that in Rose (2007), thus multicollinearity is not an issue. 
Table 4.3: Correlation matrix 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Log of Total Exports (US$) 1          
(2) Log of Homogeneous Goods Exports 0.68 1         
(3) Log of Reference Priced Goods Exports 0.88 0.56 1        
(4) Log of Differentiated Goods Exports 0.89 0.46 0.79 1       
(5) Log of Extensive Margin 0.73 0.34 0.69 0.83 1      
(6) Log of Intensive Margin 0.43 0.29 0.36 0.35 0.24 1     
(7) Representationij 0.47 0.32 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.13 1    
(8) Representationji 0.46 0.35 0.43 0.41 0.35 0.08 0.66 1   
(9) Regional Trade Agreement 0.32 0.22 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.11 0.18 0.18 1  
(10) Common Currency 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.26 1 
Notes: 
Exports are in US$ 
4.3.2. Fixed effects and diplomatic representation 
The results in this section utilise equation (4.2), and add control variables from the 
CEPII database for GDP and population size. To closely follow the related empirical 
literature, total exports is the dependent variable. Table 4.4 shows the results. Column 
(1) includes only time-invariant fixed effects, to which column (2) adds a fixed effect 
for time. Column (3) is the preferred specification which comes down to estimating 
equation (4.2), and explains the largest amount of variance in the sample with an R-
square of 0.926. The results also show how the use of certain fixed effects renders 
control variables to be perfectly collinear with the fixed effects, leading to their 
exclusion. Additionally, the Table includes in column (4) an analysis of the effect of 
the Representation variable when accounting for zero trade flows as discussed in 
Section 4.2.3. 
Utilising the panel dataset, column (1) includes bilateral fixed effects and exporter- 
and importer-specific fixed effects while ignoring time-varying fixed effects. The 
coefficient of the variable of interest is 0.169, significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Column (2), which adds a fixed effect for year, does not change this result. However, 
the preferred specification in column (3) shows that the utilisation of country-year 
fixed effects to account for time-varying factors cuts the coefficient for the commercial 
diplomacy proxy by a third, from 0.169 to 0.112. This underlines the importance of an 
appropriate set of fixed effects once again, and re-affirms the need for panel data 
estimation to account for temporal variation and endogeneity (Baier & Bergstrand, 
2007).  
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Table 4.4: The effect of diplomatic representation on total exports in cross-sectional and panel data settings 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log of Total Exports (US$)    Log (1+Exports) 
     Representationij 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.112** 0.229** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) (0.121) 
Log of i's Population 1.175*** 1.479***   
 (0.139) (0.152)   
Log of j's Population 0.554*** 0.812***   
 (0.107) (0.123)   
Log of i's GDP 0.536*** 0.653***   
 (0.032) (0.044)   
Log of j's GDP 0.621*** 0.691***   
 (0.030) (0.033)   
RTA 0.205*** 0.236*** 0.306*** 0.325*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.050) (0.049) 
Currency 0.040 0.128*** 0.241*** 0.236*** 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.060) (0.055) 
     Observations 29,550 29,550 30,186 36,808 
R-squared 0.915 0.915 0.926 0.823 
Exporter FE Yes Yes No No 
Importer FE Yes Yes No No 
Country-pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes No No 
Exporter-Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Importer-Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors in parentheses for columns (1) to (3). Columns (4) to (7) feature cluster-robust standard errors (on country-pair). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts included but not recorded. This table adds 
control variables used in Head et al. (2010) to equation (4.2) and illustrates the effect of the inclusion of different types of fixed effects in columns (1) to (6) as well as the effect of accounting for zero trade flows in column (7). 
Aside from control variables used in equation (4.2), this Table adds GDPs for both countries, and Population sizes for both countries. 
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The results in column (4) of Table 4.4 indicate that retaining zero trade flows biases 
the commercial diplomacy proxy variable upwards. This confirms the point in Section 
4.2.3 which states that an upwards bias is expected due to the systematic absence of 
diplomatic representation where there is no trade. In all columns in Table 4.4, the 
control variables behave as expected in a gravity model. 
Preliminary to the main analysis in Section 4.3.3, Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 respectively 
assess equations (4.2) and (4.3) for all trade variables of interest whereas Table 4.4 
only does this for total exports in column (6). These results do not use a lag-structure 
like the main analysis based on equations (4.6) and (4.7). The effects of the commercial 
diplomacy proxy on exports are shown in Table 4.5, while the effects for imports are 
in Table 4.6. Both Tables share the same structure: the dependent variable in column 
(1) is total exports; columns (2) to (4) are the exports in different types of goods; and 
columns (5) and (6) are the margins of trade.  
Looking at the export-promotion function of commercial diplomacy, the pattern of 
results in Table 4.5 provides only partial support for Hypotheses H1a and H2a as 
diplomatic representation does not affect exports in homogeneous goods (H1a), nor 
the intensive margin (H2a). The pattern of results is identical to that in Moons and de 
Boer (2014). As for the import-promoting function of commercial diplomacy (i.e. the 
effect of country j's diplomatic representation in country i on country i's exports to 
country j) in Table 4.6, again partial support for Hypotheses H1a and H2a exists. The 
change from the export-promoting function in Table 4.5 is that there is no longer a 
significant effect for differentiated exports, but that there is a significant effect for 
homogeneous goods. While these results correspond with Volpe Martincus et al. 
(2010), they do not take into account the possible remaining simultaneity bias. Because 
homogeneous goods do not incur search costs, the significance of the Representationji 
variable indicates the likely presence of an endogeneity issue in the form of 
simultaneity bias. Moreover, the extent to which the differences between the export- 
and import-promoting functions are structural is unclear without estimating equations 
(4.6) and (4.7), to which the discussion now turns. 
 
 76 
 
Table 4.5: Estimation of equation (4.2)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of 
 Log of Homogeneous Reference Priced Differentiated Extensive Intensive 
 Exports Exports Exports Exports Margin Margin 
       Representationij 0.112** 0.076 0.168*** 0.140*** 0.093*** -0.008 
 (0.048) (0.079) (0.062) (0.049) (0.034) (0.047) 
RTA 0.306*** 0.305*** 0.200*** 0.252*** -0.135*** 0.430*** 
 (0.050) (0.068) (0.055) (0.049) (0.034) (0.045) 
Currency 0.241*** 0.804*** 0.097 0.058 -0.024 0.259*** 
 (0.060) (0.112) (0.082) (0.061) (0.041) (0.062) 
       
Observations 30,186 22,690 24,649 28,058 29,891 29,891 
R-squared 0.926 0.860 0.906 0.937 0.887 0.799 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts included but not recorded. All estimations include exporter-year, importer-year, and country-pair fixed effects. They 
are not included here for brevity. Homogeneous, reference priced, and differentiated goods defined as in the 'liberal' classification from Rauch (1999). Extensive and intensive margins are based on Hummels and Klenow (2005) 
and Dutt et al. (2013). 
Table 4.6: Estimation of equation (4.3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of 
 Log of Homogeneous Reference Priced Differentiated Extensive Intensive 
 Exports Exports Exports Exports Margin Margin 
       Representationji 0.110** 0.170** 0.130** 0.059 0.070** 0.049 
 (0.050) (0.079) (0.066) (0.051) (0.036) (0.049) 
RTA 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.198*** 0.251*** -0.136*** 0.430*** 
 (0.050) (0.068) (0.055) (0.049) (0.034) (0.045) 
Currency 0.240*** 0.807*** 0.096 0.055 -0.025 0.261*** 
 (0.060) (0.112) (0.082) (0.061) (0.041) (0.062) 
       
Observations 30,186 22,690 24,649 28,058 29,891 29,891 
R-squared 0.926 0.860 0.906 0.937 0.887 0.799 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts included but not recorded. All estimations include exporter-year, importer-year, and country-pair fixed effects. 
Homogeneous, reference priced, and differentiated goods defined as in the 'liberal' classification from Rauch (1999). Extensive and intensive margins are based on Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Dutt et al. (2013).
 77 
 
4.3.3. Testing Hypotheses H1a and H2a35 
The discussion now turns to the main results based on equations (4.6) and (4.7), 
focussing first on the results for exports, and then moving to imports. In accordance 
with Egger (2000) and the empirical literature that utilises the gravity model, a 
Hausman test (not included) strongly suggests the use of fixed effects over random 
effects for the data. In addition, the gravity model is a good fit for the data; the R-
squared is within the 0.802 to 0.936 range in all models. Considering the extent to 
which the estimations feature fixed effects in multiple dimensions such high numbers 
are expected. 
Exports 
Table 4.7 presents the results from estimating equation (4.6) for the presence of 
diplomatic representation of country i in country j on exports from country i to country 
j. It thus represents the export-promoting function of commercial diplomacy. The 
dependent variable in column (1) is total exports, columns (2) to (4) are the results for 
exports in homogeneous, reference priced, and differentiated goods, and columns (5) 
and (6) are the results for the Dutt et al. (2013)-adjusted extensive and intensive 
margins of trade. All columns employ exporter-year, importer-year, and country-pair 
fixed effects which are omitted from the table in the interest of brevity, as is the 
constant. In addition, the representation variable is lagged by one year to alleviate 
simultaneity concerns beyond the extent to which the country-year and bilateral fixed 
effects take care of this. 
The results in Table 4.7 provide partial support for Hypotheses H1a and H2a. The 
pattern of significance of the coefficients here is identical to that in Table 4.5. 
However, the sizes and significance levels have gone down, suggesting that for 
simultaneity, utilising equation (4.6) is an improvement over equation (4.2). The 
results suggest that commercial diplomacy stimulates exports in differentiated goods 
and in reference priced goods, but not in homogeneous goods. In addition, the effect 
on the extensive margin of exports is positive and significant, while on the intensive 
margin it is not significant. More specifically, the effect of the commercial diplomacy 
proxy is significant at the 10 per cent level for exports in differentiated goods (column 
4) and exports in reference priced goods (column 3), and insignificant for exports in 
                                                 
35 H1a: Commercial diplomacy positively impacts trade in all types of goods: differentiated, reference 
priced, and homogeneous goods. H2a: Commercial diplomacy positively affects both the extensive 
margin and the intensive margin of trade. 
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homogeneous goods (column 2). It is significant at the 10 per cent level for the 
extensive margin (column 5) as well, and insignificant for the intensive margin 
(column 6). Lastly, the effect on total exports (column 1) is insignificant; given that 
the effect on reference priced and differentiated exports is significant at the 10 per cent 
level only, the addition of homogeneous goods drives the effect on total exports just 
beyond the 10 per cent significance level. Thus, commercial diplomacy increases 
exports in differentiated goods by 10.2 per cent (coefficient of 0.097) and exports in 
reference priced goods by 12.3 per cent (coefficient of 0.116). Moreover, this trade 
increase comes from the effect of commercial diplomacy on the extensive margin, 
which sees an increase of 6 per cent (coefficient of 0.058). 
The control variables behave as expected. The results for Currency are in line with 
Rose and van Wincoop (2001), Yeyati (2003), and Glick and Rose (2002). Moreover, 
the results for the effect of RTA on the margins of trade are identical in terms of sign 
and highly similar in terms of coefficient to studies that use the same set of fixed effects 
(Dutt et al., 2013; Feenstra & Ma, 2014). Notably, the effects of joint membership in 
a trade agreement and of sharing a common currency outweighs the effect of 
diplomatic representation strongly in all cases except exports in differentiated goods 
and the extensive margin. The difference between the control variables on the one hand 
and the variable of interest on the other is to be expected; regional trade agreements 
and a common currency both directly affect the terms of trade, whereas diplomatic 
representation does not. 
To explore these results further additional analysis of equation (4.6) takes place using 
lags of two, three, and four years36. Table 4.8 presents the results of this exercise where 
the columns are as before, and the three rows display the coefficients for the diplomatic 
representation of country i in country j for the second, third, and fourth lags37. 
                                                 
36 Further results, not shown, indicate that from the fifth lagged year onwards diplomatic representation 
is not significant for any of the trade variables. 
37 Because this table would necessitate 30 columns, it instead features aggregated results in the interest 
of brevity. That is, the table omits the control variables, the constant, and the country-year and country-
pair fixed effects, which behave as before. 
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Table 4.7: Estimating equation (4.6) using a one-year lag structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of 
 Log of Homogeneous Reference Priced Differentiated Extensive Intensive 
 Exports Exports Exports Exports Margin Margin 
       Representationij,t-1 0.057 -0.041 0.116* 0.097* 0.058* -0.014 
 (0.052) (0.080) (0.062) (0.052) (0.034) (0.047) 
RTA 0.251*** 0.192** 0.121** 0.222*** -0.212*** 0.423*** 
 (0.051) (0.076) (0.058) (0.053) (0.036) (0.048) 
Currency 0.126* 0.716*** 0.123 -0.079 -0.048 0.161** 
 (0.066) (0.116) (0.091) (0.067) (0.040) (0.064) 
       
Observations 30,362 22,850 24,962 28,281 30,079 30,079 
R-squared 0.925 0.858 0.906 0.936 0.891 0.802 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts included but not recorded. All estimations include exporter-year, importer-year, and country-pair fixed effects. 
Homogeneous, reference priced, and differentiated goods defined as in the 'liberal' classification from Rauch (1999). Extensive and intensive margins are based on Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Dutt et al. (2013). 
 
Table 4.8: Estimating equation (4.6) using various lag-structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of 
 Log of Homogeneous Reference Priced Differentiated Extensive Intensive 
 Exports Exports Exports Exports Margin Margin 
       
Representationij,t-2 0.079 -0.033 0.056 0.102** 0.05 0.027 
 (0.048) (0.076) (0.059) (0.047) (0.032) (0.044) 
       
Representationij,t-3 0.092* -0.125 0.095* 0.103** 0.029 0.034 
 (0.048) (0.08) (0.057) (0.046) (0.033) (0.044) 
       
Representationij,t-4 0.049 -0.054 0.057 0.072 0.036 -0.101** 
 (0.046) (0.075) (0.059) (0.047) (0.03) (0.44) 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include exporter-year, importer-year, and country-pair fixed effects. Homogeneous, reference priced, and 
differentiated goods defined as in the 'liberal' classification from Rauch (1999). Extensive and intensive margins are based on Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Dutt et al. (2013). This table displays the lagged effect of 
diplomatic representation (a dummy variable) of country i in country j on exports from country i to country j. Row-column intersects are results to individual regressions for the main variable of interest. Control variables that 
are included but not recorded here are RTA and Common Currency.
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Combining Table 4.5, Table 4.7, and Table 4.8, the pattern of results remains 
consistent throughout. In Table 4.8, the effect on exports in homogeneous goods 
(column 2) is still insignificant for all years. The effect on reference priced goods 
(column 3) is significant at the 10 per cent level in the third lag year and with a 
coefficient of 0.095, increases exports of such goods by 10 per cent. The effect on 
differentiated goods exports (column 4) is significant at the 5 per cent level, increasing 
trade by 10.7 and 10.8 per cent in the second and third lag years respectively 
(coefficients of 0.102 and 0.103). Thus, commercial diplomacy is effective in 
stimulating exports in differentiated goods and in reference priced goods, but not in 
homogeneous goods. 
When it comes to the margins of trade, the effect of the commercial diplomacy proxy 
on the intensive margin is now negative and significant at the 5 per cent level in the 
fourth lag year, decreasing it by 9.6 per cent. Together with the positive effect of 
diplomatic representation on the extensive margin in Table 4.7 this is consistent with 
the theoretical model of trade costs and firm productivity that Dutt et al. (2013) extend 
from Chaney (2008) and Lawless (2010). From their model, a decrease in fixed or 
variable costs raises the extensive margin, but may have opposite effects on the 
intensive margin. Hence, the question whether commercial diplomacy reduces fixed 
costs rather than variable costs should become apparent in the intensive margin, which 
only reduces when fixed costs fall38; this is exactly the case in the results. 
The results suggest that commercial diplomacy positively affects exports in reference 
priced and differentiated goods, i.e. those types of goods that require the largest 
amount of network search. Moreover, the significance of its effect on the extensive 
margin indicates that commercial diplomacy alleviates fixed trade costs. Compared 
with previous authors, these results side with Moons and de Boer (2014) and Gil-Pareja 
et al. (2014) in the types of goods for which diplomatic representation promotes 
exports. The estimates obtained here for the increase in exports of reference priced and 
differentiated goods are smaller than all those obtained by Moons and de Boer (2014) 
and Gil-Pareja et al. (2014). It is possible that the results obtained by Volpe Martincus, 
Estevadeordal, et al. (2010) are specific to the region or development level of the 
countries in their dataset. The coefficients for the margins of exports are in line with 
                                                 
38 When fixed costs decrease, the entry of less efficient firms that have lower revenues in the market 
dilutes the market share of incumbent firms and thereby reduces the intensive margin as average exports 
decrease.  
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those reported by Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) although smaller, which 
indicates once again the importance of the inclusion of the set of fixed effects. Along 
the same lines, the results differ from Volpe Martincus et al. (2011) in that the 
commercial diplomacy proxy variable has a smaller coefficient for the extensive 
margin, and that it is negative for the intensive margin instead of positive. Further 
exploration of these results in a robustness check that uses different definitions of the 
trade variables takes places later in this Chapter. 
Imports 
While the above estimations focus on exports, the effect on imports may diverge from 
those for exports because, following from the definition in Chapter 2, commercial 
diplomacy’s focus is on exports. In the estimation of equations (4.2) and (4.3), this 
divergence is strong though does not account for potentially remaining simultaneity. 
Table 4.9 presents the results from estimating equation (4.7) for the presence of 
diplomatic representation of country j in country i on exports from country i to country 
j. Hence, where Table 4.7 focuses on the export-promoting function of commercial 
diplomacy, the results in this section relate to its import-promoting function. As before, 
the six columns in Table 4.9 are the six trade flows: total exports, the liberal 
classification of the types of goods, and the Dutt et al. (2013)-adjusted margins of 
trade. Here too, all columns feature exporter-year, importer-year and country-pair 
fixed effects that are omitted for brevity. As before, the variable of interest – the 
commercial diplomacy proxy – is lagged by one year. 
Overall, the results for the import-promoting effect of commercial diplomacy provide 
partial support for Hypotheses H1a and H2a; it increases trade in reference priced 
goods only, and along the extensive margin but not the intensive margin. The effect of 
the commercial diplomacy proxy on imports is only significant for reference priced 
goods (column 3) at the 1 per cent level, and for the extensive margin (column 5) at 
the 5 per cent level. As such, the import-promoting function of country j's commercial 
diplomacy efforts in country i works to increase exports from country i to country j by 
up to 24.2 per cent, and increases the extensive margin by up to 7.1 per cent. The 
control variables behave as before. 
As with the export-promoting function of commercial diplomacy, additional analysis 
takes places based on equation (4.7) using lags of two to four years. Table 4.10 displays 
the results and has the same structure as Table 4.8: the three rows contain the 
coefficients for the variable of interest for the second, third, and fourth lags, and the 
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six columns are for the six trade variables. For brevity, these tables do not display the 
coefficients for the control variables RTA and Currency, nor of the full set of fixed 
effects. The results tell the same story as those in Table 4.9: for imports, commercial 
diplomacy only stimulates reference priced goods (column 3) and the extensive margin 
(column 5). Both are significant at the 5 per cent level in the second lag year, and this 
re-affirms, as with the export-promoting function, that the effects are diminishing over 
time. The increase from the commercial diplomacy proxy in imports of reference 
priced goods is 17.9 per cent with a coefficient of 0.165; the extensive margin increases 
by 8.9 per cent (coefficient of 0.085). 
While the effect of the import-promoting function of commercial diplomacy on 
reference priced goods is positive and significant, for differentiated goods it is not 
significantly different from zero. Like its export-promoting function, the increase in 
imports that commercial diplomacy effectuates comes from an increase in the 
extensive margin, and not the intensive margin. Note also that while in Table 4.6 the 
effect of Representationji on homogeneous goods is significant even though these 
goods do not incur search costs, this significance is no longer present in Table 4.9 nor 
in Table 4.10. This is an indication that the lag-structure estimation strategy addresses 
the endogeneity problem of simultaneity bias that is present in Table 4.6. 
Comparing the results for imports with those for exports, the most notable difference 
lies in the type of goods commercial diplomacy promotes. For exports, it is effective 
in promoting trade in both reference priced and differentiated goods. On the other 
hand, the import-promoting function of diplomatic representation works only to 
increase trade in reference priced goods. This divergence between exports and imports 
is in line with the pattern of results in van Bergeijk et al. (2010). Moreover, this 
divergence provides a possible indication as to why Moons and van Bergeijk's (2016) 
meta-analysis reveals that empirical research focuses heavily on exports, and less so 
on imports: commercial diplomacy offices tend to focus more on promoting home-
country businesses' exports in the host country. This is reflected in the activities 
performed by these offices where export-promoting activities outweigh import-
promoting activities (Ruël & Visser, 2012). 
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Table 4.9: Estimating equation (4.7) using a one-year lag structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of 
 Log of Homogeneous Reference Priced Differentiated Extensive Intensive 
 Exports Exports Exports Exports Margin Margin 
       Representationji,t-1 0.045 -0.052 0.217*** 0.052 0.069** -0.030 
 (0.052) (0.081) (0.063) (0.053) (0.034) (0.048) 
RTA 0.251*** 0.192** 0.122** 0.222*** -0.212*** 0.423*** 
 (0.051) (0.076) (0.058) (0.053) (0.036) (0.048) 
Currency 0.125* 0.716*** 0.127 -0.081 -0.047 0.160** 
 (0.066) (0.116) (0.091) (0.067) (0.040) (0.064) 
       
Observations 30,362 22,850 24,962 28,281 30,079 30,079 
R-squared 0.925 0.858 0.906 0.936 0.891 0.802 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts included but not recorded. All estimations include exporter-year, importer-year, and country-pair fixed effects. 
Homogeneous, reference priced, and differentiated goods defined as in the 'liberal' classification from Rauch (1999). Extensive and intensive margins are based on Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Dutt et al. (2013). 
 
Table 4.10: Estimating equation (4.7) using various lag-structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of 
 Log of Homogeneous Reference Priced Differentiated Extensive Intensive 
 Exports Exports Exports Exports Margin Margin 
       
Representationji,t-2 0.052 0.009 0.165** 0.015 0.085** -0.018 
 (0.049) (0.079) (0.065) (0.048) (0.034) (0.046) 
       
Representationji,t-3 0.048 0.038 0.079 0.061 0.038 0.009 
 (0.052) (0.086) (0.06) (0.045) (0.034) (0.048) 
       
Representationji,t-4 -0.059 -0.063 0.022 0.041 0.014 -0.067 
 (0.047) (0.08) (0.06) (0.048) (0.033) (0.045) 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include exporter-year, importer-year, and country-pair fixed effects. Homogeneous, reference priced, and 
differentiated goods defined as in the 'liberal' classification from Rauch (1999). Extensive and intensive margins are based on Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Dutt et al. (2013). This table displays the lagged effect of 
diplomatic representation (a dummy variable) of country j in country i on exports from country i to country j. Row-column intersects are results to individual regressions for the main variable of interest. Control variables that 
are included but not recorded here are RTA and Common Currency.
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Robustness to changes in trade variable definitions 
The preceding analysis adopts Rauch's (1999) liberal classification which maximises 
the number of homogeneous and reference priced goods. As a robustness check a re-
estimation of equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.6) and (4.7) uses the conservative classification, 
which minimises this number. In addition, the effect of diplomatic representation on 
the margins of trade requires a robustness analysis. This is done through a simple count 
of the number of 4-digit goods exported as the extensive margin, and the average value 
of exports per product category as the intensive margin in accordance with Dennis and 
Shepherd (2011) and Dutt et al. (2013).  
Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 display the results for the export- and import-promoting 
functions respectively. The first row presents the coefficients of the commercial 
diplomacy proxy for equation (4.2) in Table 4.11 and equation (4.3) in Table 4.12. The 
next four rows contain the coefficients for equation (4.6) in Table 4.11 and equation 
(4.7) in Table 4.12. Both Tables display the results for the first, second, third, and 
fourth lags in rows two to five. In addition, both Tables have five columns as opposed 
to six because the total exports variable is omitted; it is not affected by an alternative 
specification of the trade variables. As such, the dependent variables are exports in 
homogeneous goods (column 1), reference priced goods (column 2), and differentiated 
goods (column 3), while columns (4) and (5) are the extensive and intensive margins 
of trade. The tables do not report the control variables, which behave normally, nor the 
fixed effects and constant terms. 
The results for the export-promoting function of commercial diplomacy in Table 4.11 
support the earlier discussion in all but one respect: where in Table 4.5 and Table 4.7 
the effect of the commercial diplomacy proxy on reference priced goods is significant 
at the 1 and 10 per cent levels respectively, this is no longer significant when using the 
alternative Rauch (1999) classification. At the same time, for exports in differentiated 
goods and for the extensive margin of trade, the results are more strongly significant 
than in the Tables that use Rauch’s liberal classification of goods and the weighted 
margins of trade. The results are unchanged for exports in homogeneous goods and for 
the intensive margin. Thus, when it comes to exports in types of goods, commercial 
diplomacy increases trade in differentiated goods only, and only along the extensive 
margin. This indicates that the results are robust to alternative specifications of the 
dependent variables. 
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Table 4.11: Robustness of the export-promoting function: alternative trade variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of 
 Homogeneous Reference Priced Differentiated Extensive Intensive 
 Exports Exports Exports Margin Margin 
      
Equation (4.2)      
  Representationij 0.068 0.087 0.156*** 0.099*** -0.014 
 (0.090) (0.063) (0.049) (0.021) (0.044) 
      
Equation (4.3)      
  Representationij,t-1 0.037 0.074 0.125** 0.103*** -0.059 
 (0.089) (0.064) (0.052) (0.021) (0.045) 
      
  Representationij,t-2 0.044 -0.015 0.111** 0.097*** -0.02 
 (0.088) (0.06) (0.048) (0.02) (0.042) 
      
  Representationij,t-3 -0.009 0.013 0.090* 0.063*** 0 
 (0.091) (0.059) (0.046) (0.02) (0.043) 
      
  Representationij,t-4 0.048 -0.007 0.074 0.042** -0.107** 
 (0.089) (0.056) (0.046) (0.018) (0.042) 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include 
exporter-year, importer-year, and country-pair fixed effects. They are not included here for brevity. Homogeneous, reference 
priced, and differentiated goods defined as in the 'conservative' classification from Rauch (1999). Extensive and intensive 
margins are defined (respectively) as a simple count of the number of product codes exported, and the average value of exports 
per product code. This table displays the effect of diplomatic representation (a dummy variable) of country i in country j on 
exports from country i to country j. Row-column intersects are results to individual regressions for the main variable of interest. 
Control variables that are included but not recorded here are RTA and Common Currency. 
 
Table 4.12: Robustness of the import-promoting function: alternative trade variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of 
 Homogeneous Reference Priced Differentiated Extensive Intensive 
 Exports Exports Exports Margin Margin 
      
Equation (4.6)      
  Representationji 0.101 0.060** 0.076 0.078*** -0.042 
 (0.094) (0.066) (0.052) (0.021) (0.046) 
      
Equation (4.7)      
  Representationji,t-1 -0.172* 0.154** 0.069 0.082*** -0.043 
 (0.094) (0.067) (0.053) (0.021) (0.046) 
      
  Representationji,t-2 0.063 0.124* 0.034 0.076*** -0.009 
 (0.088) (0.064) (0.049) (0.02) (0.043) 
      
  Representationji,t-3 0.073 0.049 0.06 0.047** 0 
 (0.095) (0.062) (0.045) (0.02) (0.047) 
      
  Representationji,t-4 -0.051 0.004 0.042 0.03 -0.083* 
 (0.092) (0.55) (0.048) (0.19) (0.042) 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include 
exporter-year, importer-year, and country-pair fixed effects. They are not included here for brevity. Homogeneous, reference 
priced, and differentiated goods defined as in the 'conservative' classification from Rauch (1999). Extensive and intensive 
margins are defined (respectively) as a simple count of the number of product codes exported, and the average value of exports 
per product code. This table displays the effect of diplomatic representation (a dummy variable) of country j in country i on 
exports from country i to country j. Row-column intersects are results to individual regressions for the main variable of interest. 
Control variables that are included but not recorded here are RTA and Common Currency. 
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Comparing Table 4.12 to Table 4.6, Table 4.9 and Table 4.10, the results support the 
earlier discussion: commercial diplomacy's effect on imports of differentiated goods 
remains insignificant. At the same time, the conservative classification yields a less 
positive and significant result for reference priced goods at the 5 and 10 per cent levels 
in the first two lagged years. The major change using the conservative classification 
scheme is that the commercial diplomacy proxy now negatively impacts imports of 
homogeneous goods at the 10 per cent level (column 1, Table 4.12). With the positive 
and significant results for reference priced goods, this might mean that commercial 
diplomacy allows for a change in imports from homogeneous to reference priced goods 
although such switching behaviour cannot be directly identified from the results here. 
This happens as the effect of the variable of interest on the unweighted extensive 
margin of imports becomes more strongly significant (column 4, Table 4.12) than in 
the main results. In addition, the effect of the commercial diplomacy proxy on the 
intensive margin becomes negative and significant at the 10 per cent level (column 5, 
Table 4.12) rather than insignificant as in Table 4.10.   
It is possible that the reduction in trade barriers allows businesses to switch from 
homogeneous goods to reference priced goods. However, the results for homogeneous 
goods and the intensive margin are apparent only when using the alternative trade 
variables. The results for imports are robust for reference priced and differentiated 
goods as well as the extensive margin, and less so for homogeneous goods and the 
intensive margin. Nevertheless, the results for imports continue to show partial support 
for H1a and H2a. 
4.3.4. Testing Hypotheses H1b and H2b39 
Section 4.3.3 has identified the effect of the commercial diplomacy proxy variable on 
different types of goods, and on the margins of trade. This amounts to Hypotheses H1a 
and H2a. As Hypotheses H1b and H2b relate to the relative effectiveness of 
commercial diplomacy within different types of goods and within the two margins of 
trade, the next step is to compare the coefficients and significance levels from Table 
4.5 to Table 4.12.  
                                                 
39 H1b: Commercial diplomacy has a larger positive effect on trade in differentiated goods than trade 
in reference priced goods, and it has a larger positive effect on trade in reference priced goods than 
trade in homogeneous goods. H2b: Commercial diplomacy has a larger positive effect on the extensive 
margin than on the intensive margin of trade. 
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The analysis of Hypotheses H1b and H2b below relies on a set of Wald tests to 
compare the coefficients of the variable of interest across estimations. With the null 
hypothesis of the Wald test being that two coefficients are equal, a rejection of the 
statistic lends support to H1b and H2b. The Tables below show the significance levels 
of the Wald tests for each of the comparisons of interest with respect to Hypotheses 
H1b and H2b. A value below 0.1 indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of the Wald 
test at the 90 per cent confidence level, a value of 0.05 rejection at the 95 per cent 
confidence level, and 0.01 rejection at the 99 per cent confidence level. 
Exports 
Starting with the results of the Wald tests for equations (4.2) and (4.6), Table 4.13 
compares the estimates obtained from Table 4.5, Table 4.7, Table 4.8 and Table 4.11 
by each pair of trade outcomes per Hypotheses H1b and H2b. Columns (1) and (2) 
relate to Hypothesis H1b and column (3) to Hypothesis H2b. Columns (4) to (6) follow 
the same pattern based on the alternative trade variables. The Wald test's null 
hypothesis is not rejected in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5). As such, there is no support 
for Hypothesis H1b. On the other hand, the Wald test's null hypothesis is rejected in 
columns (3) and (6), lending support for Hypothesis H2b. Thus, despite the support 
for Hypothesis H1a in Section 4.3.3 there is not enough evidence to make a definitive 
comparative assessment between the effects of the commercial diplomacy proxy on 
the different types of goods. 
Imports 
Turning now to the equality of coefficients based on the estimations of equations (4.3) 
and (4.7), Table 4.14 is structured in the same way as Table 4.13, but based on a 
comparison of coefficients from Table 4.6, Table 4.9, Table 4.10 and Table 4.12. As 
for Table 4.13 there is no support for Hypothesis H1b, while there is some support for 
H2b when it comes to the alternative trade variables – those used for a robustness 
check. The average effect of the commercial diplomacy proxy variable is stronger 
when it comes to the extensive versus the intensive margins than when it comes to 
trade in different types of goods. Thus, while Section 4.3.3 identifies significant effects 
for the commercial diplomacy proxy variable on exports of differentiated and 
reference priced goods but not homogeneous goods, the results here indicate that the 
relative average effect does not differ. 
 
 88 
 
Table 4.13: Wald-test results for equality of coefficients of Representationij across estimations 
 Main trade variables  Trade variables – robustness check 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
Differentiated 
Goods & 
Reference Priced 
Goods 
Reference Priced 
Goods & 
Homogeneous 
Goods 
Extensive 
Margin & 
Intensive 
Margin 
 Differentiated 
Goods & 
Reference Priced 
Goods 
Reference Priced 
Goods & 
Homogeneous 
Goods 
Extensive 
Margin & 
Intensive 
Margin 
Representationij 0.782 0.619 0.137  0.504 0.937 0.015 
Representationij,t-1 0.851 0.401 0.275  0.634 0.874 0.001 
Representationij,t-2 0.608 0.612 0.705  0.179 0.792 0.005 
Representationij,t-3 0.93 0.225 0.941  0.386 0.924 0.156 
Representationij,t-4 0.866 0.519 0.018  0.333 0.805 0 
Notes: 
Table displays significance tests for the Wald-statistic of equality of coefficients. Columns (1) to (3) are based on the estimation of the variable of interest on the trade variables from the main analysis (Rauch's liberal 
classification of goods and Hummels & Klenow's margins of trade). Columns (4) to (6) use the alternative trade variables, i.e. Rauch's conservative classification of goods and the count-based margins of trade. 
 
Table 4.14: Wald-test results for equality of coefficients of Representationji across estimations 
 Main trade variables  Trade variables – robustness check 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
Differentiated 
Goods & 
Reference Priced 
Goods 
Reference Priced 
Goods & 
Homogeneous 
Goods 
Extensive 
Margin & 
Intensive 
Margin 
 
Differentiated 
Goods & 
Reference Priced 
Goods 
Reference Priced 
Goods & 
Homogeneous 
Goods 
Extensive 
Margin & 
Intensive 
Margin 
Representationji 0.488 0.829 0.762  0.873 0.867 0.449 
Representationji,t-1 0.085 0.157 0.134  0.429 0.189 0.009 
Representationji,t-2 0.12 0.41 0.109  0.349 0.79 0.045 
Representationji,t-3 0.831 0.834 0.659  0.904 0.92 0.324 
Representationji,t-4 0.841 0.646 0.186  0.649 0.813 0.006 
Notes: 
Table displays significance tests for the Wald-statistic of equality of coefficients. Columns (1) to (3) are based on the estimation of the variable of interest on the trade variables from the main analysis (Rauch's liberal 
classification of goods and Hummels & Klenow's margins of trade). Columns (4) to (6) use the alternative trade variables, i.e. Rauch's conservative classification of goods and the count-based margins of trade.
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4.4. Chapter Summary 
This Chapter tested Hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b. The Chapter represents an 
improvement on the limited number of studies in this area performed so far. 
The results suggest that Hypotheses H1a and H2a receive partial support: commercial 
diplomacy positively and significantly affects exports in reference priced goods and 
differentiated goods, but not in homogeneous goods. It affects imports positively and 
significantly only in reference priced goods. There are strong significant effects on the 
extensive margin, but not the intensive margin, for both the export- and import-
promoting functions. 
The results only support Hypothesis 2b; Hypothesis 1b is not supported. Wald-tests 
indicate that commercial diplomacy offices affect the extensive margin more than the 
intensive margin, while no significant results exist for the relative performance in 
relation to the different types of goods.  
The results in this Chapter indicate that commercial diplomacy has significant scope 
to reduce search and trade costs. The next Chapter will identify whether commercial 
diplomacy offices are more effective when information asymmetry barriers (as sources 
of trade and search costs) are more prevalent. 
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Chapter 5. 
 
COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY AND 
INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF 
TRADE BARRIERS40 
5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of the current Chapter is to estimate a cross-sectional gravity model that 
tests Hypotheses H3a and H3b. 
This Chapter is the second empirical study. The first study, in Chapter 4, by observing 
the effect of commercial diplomacy on trade outcomes that are associated with search 
and entry costs, identified that commercial diplomacy does alleviate trade costs. This 
Chapter focuses on the sources of trade costs in the form of institutional barriers. It 
shifts the focus from the dependent variable to the independent variables, and identifies 
which sources of trade costs are alleviated through commercial diplomacy. The 
outcomes from this Chapter lead into Chapters 6 and 7, which discuss the survey to 
identify the activities, resources, and relational network characteristics of commercial 
diplomacy offices that are effective in reducing the negative effects of such trade 
barriers. 
Following from Hypotheses H3a and H3b the relationship of interest here is between 
commercial diplomacy and the sources of trade barriers. If commercial diplomacy 
offices are effective in their role as intermediaries, they should alleviate trade barriers 
that arise from information asymmetry. Such problems arise from formal and informal 
institutional constraints (North, 1990). The information dissemination function of 
commercial diplomacy suggests that it should be more effective in stimulating exports 
between countries which have larger informal institutional differences, and that it 
should be more effective where the quality of a country's formal institutional 
environment is lower. 
                                                 
40 A preliminary version of the results in this Chapter was presented at the Australia and New Zealand 
International Business Academy conference 2015 held at the University of Melbourne in February 2015. 
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Because the Chapter uses Rose's (2007) dataset, it is directly related to his study as 
well as the cross-sectional studies that have since followed based on his dataset41. It is 
also related to studies that assess the effect of diplomatic representation and similar 
overseas offices on exports42. The contribution of this study lies first and foremost in 
its connection with the other empirical studies in this thesis, with which it constitutes 
an integrative analysis of the effect of commercial diplomacy on exports. This chapter 
also fills a gap in substantive research on the effect of commercial diplomacy on the 
alleviation of the sources of trade barriers. Only Harding and Javorcik (2011), 
Lederman et al. (2010) and Ciurak and Kinjo (2006) address this directly; however, as 
outlined in Chapter 2, the first two studies do so from the perspective of national 
export/investment promotion agencies and do not relate to overseas offices. Ciurak & 
Kinjo (2006) do consider overseas offices, but assesses only economic freedom and 
do so in a manner that neither accounts for reverse causality, nor is consistent with the 
assessment of interaction variables in the gravity model. 
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the 
estimation strategy and dataset; Section 5.3 displays and discusses the results; and 
Section 5.4 presents conclusions. 
5.2. Empirical Strategy 
5.2.1. Data sources 
Barriers to trade 
Assessing trade barriers which arise from institutional constraints presents a situation 
where informal institutions, those relating to social norms, are slow to change, but, 
formal institutions, which include economic and political institutions, can change 
quickly (Chang et al., 2012; Roland, 2004). While informal institutions tend to move 
at the same pace across countries at different stages of development, the development 
of formal institutions is more rapid in developing countries than it is in developed 
countries because there is more scope for improvement. For this reason, the 
exploitation of cross-country variation to assess commercial diplomacy's effect on 
trade conditional on both sources of trade barriers is more relevant in this study than 
the time dimension. This ensures comparability of the estimates, and is consistent with 
                                                 
41 These are Van Bergeijk et al., (2010), Yakop and van Bergeijk (2009; 2011), Ciurak and Kinjo (2006),  
42 Wilkinson and Brouthers (2000), Cassey (2012), Hayakawa et al. (2014), Lederman et al. (2010), 
Kotabe (1993), Anderson and Sutherland (2015) and Bobonis and Shatz (2007). 
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key literature on institutions (Levchenko, 2007; Rodrik et al., 2004), especially the 
literature that assesses both formal and informal institutions' effects on trade (e.g. 
Linders et al., 2005; Cyrus, 2015; Estrin et al., 2009). 
Formal institutions 
While the debate on the definition and measurement of variables that denote formal 
institutions continues (Voigt, 2013; Williams & Siddique, 2008), the empirical 
literature almost unanimously adopts the World Governance Indicators (WGI) from 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) in their assessment of formal institutions. Use 
of the WGI ranges from averaging the six indicators in the dataset to arrive at 
institutional quality (Chang et al., 2012; de Groot et al., 2004; Linders et al., 2005; 
Meon & Sekkat, 2008), to studies that use only a single indicator (Araujo, Mion, & 
Ornelas, 2016; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Gooris & Peeters, 2014; Levchenko, 2007; 
Nunn, 2007; Rodrik et al., 2004). Others use the WGI data in addition to similar data 
from Freedom House, Polity IV, or Heritage databases (Aeberhardt et al., 2014; Berry, 
Guillén, & Zhou, 2010; Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013; Söderlund & 
Tingvall, 2014). Only a small number of studies do not use the WGI data (Autio & Fu, 
2014; Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer, 2007; Estrin et al., 2009; Francois & 
Manchin, 2013; Zelekha & Sharabi, 2012). 
The six WGI indicators are the principal way of operationalising variables by 
averaging them into a measure of formal institutional quality. The components are as 
follows: 
- Regulatory quality, which relates to the ability of a government to formulate 
and implement regulations that promote private sector development. 
- Government effectiveness, which relates to the quality of public services, its 
independence from political pressure, and a government's formulation and 
implementation of policies. 
- Control of corruption relates to the degree to which corruption is prevalent. 
- Voice and accountability measures the extent to which elections are fair and 
free, and the extent to which people are free. 
- Rule of law relates to the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
police, and the courts. In addition, it incorporates the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
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- Political stability measures the likelihood of political instability or politically-
motivated violence. 
These indicators reflect mostly regulatory and political formal institutions. Therefore, 
the addition of an indicator for economic institutions is required. It is not feasible to 
directly include the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index as this variable 
treats institutions differently from the WGI and may interfere with comparative 
interpretation; instead, the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom index is used as 
a robustness check for the WGI variable. 
An alternative indicator for economic freedom relates to the internet infrastructure as 
this is an arrangement that sets transaction conditions. Data on the number of internet 
users and the number of broadband subscriptions comes from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The principal variable to denote the quality of internet 
infrastructure is the number of internet users in the host country (per 100 people). As 
a robustness check the indicator for the number of fixed broadband subscriptions per 
100 people is used; it is a proxy for the infrastructural economic development that 
facilitates such communication (Bojnec & Fertö, 2009; Choi, 2010; Freund & 
Weinhold, 2004). 
Informal institutions 
Most authors consider culture to reflect a country’s informal institutions (Holmes et 
al., 2013). The best-known attempt at formalising the concept of culture is the work of 
Hofstede (1980), whose dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, masculinity, and long-term orientation appear in many studies. A 
similar approach is adopted by the GLOBE study (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, 
& Gupta, 2004), which identifies nine cultural competencies.  
However, such broad indicators of culture are the target of a suite of conceptual and 
methodological criticism43. Therefore, this study uses data on linguistic proximity and 
                                                 
43 Focusing on the most recently introduced cultural dimension (long term orientation), Fang (2003) 
identifies philosophical flaws relating to the disconnect between its specification, and the extension into 
Confucianism. In addition, he points to the survey on which the indicator was based as being lacking in 
terms of quality due to its construction, and in terms of its translation into English. Additionally, he 
notes that the subjects for this survey are different from the ones originally used by Hofstede. A more 
holistic argument against using Hofstede's indicators comes from McSweeney (2002),  who faults the 
assumptions in the analysis of the data used. Supportive of this flaw is Baskerville (2003), who indicates 
that Hofstede's conceptualisation of culture relies too little on sociological or anthropological 
foundations. As such, the danger in using this data lies in the assumptions of homogeneity within a 
country, country-level cultural determinants being wholly indicative of individual behaviour, and 
 94 
 
religious proximity from Melitz and Toubal (2014) for culture. They are an adequate 
proxy for trade costs arising from cultural dissimilarity (Boisso & Ferrantino, 1997; 
Guiso et al., 2009; Melitz, 2008) fitting with the conceptualisation of informal 
institutions in North (1990), and there is extensive and consistently robust empirical 
evidence regarding the role of linguistic (dis)similarity in trade (Egger & Lassmann, 
2012, 2015; Felbermayr & Toubal, 2010; Melitz, 2008; Melitz & Toubal, 2014)44. The 
measures developed by Melitz and Toubal (2014) are especially useful relative to 
dummy variables that denote common language or religion because of their continuous 
nature and their specificity of measurement. The advantage of these continuous 
variables over more commonly used dummy variable is that a continuous variable 
lends itself to detailed interaction analysis, and that it considers a wide range of 
linguistic and religious features that a dummy variable would fail to pick up. 
In line with Rose's (2007) approach towards averaging the data in his study over 2002 
and 2003, all institutional variables are averaged over these years. Where this is not 
possible due to missing data, the missing values are imputed based on average growth 
in the previous years' values, if available. The extent of missing data in the institutional 
variables is limited, with a maximum of around 10 per cent of observations missing 
from the estimations. Good data availability is an additional motivation for using 
Melitz and Toubal's (2014) data (when it comes to informal institutions) rather than 
Hofstede's (1981) or House et al.'s (2004) data. Hofstede's and House et al.'s datasets 
respectively contain data on 124 and 62 importers. Using this data for informal 
institutions rather than linguistic and religious distance would reduce the number of 
observations in the dataset by around 30 to 65 per cent. 
Commercial diplomacy 
For commercial diplomacy, a cross-sectional variable suffices to complement the 
institutional data. While detailed data can be gathered on the office-level activities and 
resources by means of a survey, this approach does not fit with the aims of this 
empirical study to achieve country coverage and explanatory power. A secondary data 
source that contains cross-sectional data on a proxy for commercial diplomacy is 
available from Rose (2007). The key element of his data is a variable that contains 
                                                 
assuming a direct relationship between the indicators and the constructs for which they are approximate 
measures (Williamson, 2002). 
44 This is not the case with Hofstede and GLOBE, which see mixed results on trade outcomes. 
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information on the number of diplomatic missions of 22 exporters in 200 importers45. 
The country heterogeneity on the importer side aligns with the cross-sectional 
variation that this study intends to capture. 
Rose (2007) treats all diplomatic representations in the resulting variable as equal, 
while Moons and van Bergeijk (2016) indicate that separation into different types of 
missions is needed. This Chapter does not analyse the types of missions separately for 
two reasons. First, in doing so the estimates for embassies become implausible – as 
large as the estimate in Table 4.4's column (1) in Chapter 4. Second, the consolidation 
of all foreign missions from an exporter in an importer is an appropriate proxy for the 
level of commercial diplomacy effort taking place, and is an improvement on the 
variable that Chapter 4 uses, which identifies only whether a commercial diplomacy 
presence exists. 
Trade data and control variables 
Rose's (2007) dataset also contains the dependent variable, exports in US$, which he 
averages over 2002 and 2003. Given that Chapter 4 indicates that commercial 
diplomacy is more effective in stimulating exports than imports for trade in 
differentiated goods and trade along the extensive rather than the intensive margin, 
this Chapter looks only at exports. Rose's (2007) dataset contains information on all 
control variables he uses; averaged over 2002 and 2003 where the variables are given 
in levels, in addition to a set of dummy variables. The control variables are standard 
gravity model variables for population, GDP per capita, geographic features (land area, 
geographic distance, landlocked, islands, contiguity) and several dummy variables to 
denote linguistic commonalities, joint FTA membership, joint currency union 
membership, and shared colonial history. 
5.2.2. Identification strategy and estimation models 
The estimation in this study is principally centred around Rose's (2007) identification 
strategy. He initially estimates the following equation: 
(5.1) ln(Xij) = β0 + β1EmbConij + β2ln(GeoDistij) + β3ln(GDPCi) + β4ln(GDPCj) + 
β5ln(Popi) + β6ln(Popj) + β7ln(AreaiAreaj) + βZZ + εij 
Where i is the exporter, j the importer, and the variables are as follows: 
- Xij denotes (real) exports from i to j in US$, averaged between 2002 and 2003, 
                                                 
45 Collected from Ministry websites 
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- EmbConij is the commercial diplomacy proxy which indicates the number of 
embassies, consulates and official foreign missions that i has in j, 
- GeoDistij is the distance (in kilometres) between i and j, 
- GDPC is real GDP per capita in US$, averaged between 2002 and 2003, 
- Pop is population size (averaged between 2002 and 2003), 
- Area is the product of country sizes in terms of land area (in square kilometres), 
and 
- Z is a vector of dummy variables that denote whether i and j share a common 
language, are geographically contiguous, whether either i or j is landlocked, 
whether either i or j is an island, whether they are members of the same 
currency agreement, and whether they are members of the same trade 
agreement. 
Initially, Rose (2007) assumes that the error term εij is exogenous and his baseline thus 
consists of an OLS estimation of equation (5.1). He subsequently accounts for 
multilateral resistance terms (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2004) by the inclusion of both 
exporter and importer fixed effects, which does not alter his estimates for the variable 
of interest, EmbConij, in any way. More importantly, he then estimates an instrumental 
variables model to account for the endogeneity of the EmbConij variable. To do so he 
uses two sets of instrumental variables, both of which arrive at the same estimate for 
the variable of interest. For computational efficiency the smallest of the two sets of 
instruments is adopted in the remainder of this Chapter.  
The small set of instrumental variables contains information on the geopolitical 
importance of an importer through its level of proven oil reserves, and the extent to 
which a rotationally based diplomat may want to work in a particular country as 
measured by tourist attractions in terms of the number of Zagat guides, the number of 
Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations, the number of Lonely Planet (country and city) 
guides, and the number of Economist city guides. In Rose (2007) and Segura-Cayuela 
and Vilarrubia (2008) the combination of these instruments are exogenous 
determinants of the existence of diplomatic representations. This motivates the choice 
for this set of instrumental variables - more strongly so given that the empirical 
literature has not yet identified a different (set of) instrument(s). 
The addition of the trade barrier variables and the analysis of the alleviating impact of 
the commercial diplomacy proxy to this baseline model has implications for the 
variables included and the estimation strategy: 
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- The inclusion of the linguistic distance variable from Melitz and Toubal (2014) 
means that the binary indicator for common language in the control variable 
set Z in equation (5.1) becomes redundant.  
- The simultaneous inclusion of all institutional constraint variables into 
equation (5.1) may affect the stability of the estimates obtained in a trade 
barrier alleviation effect analysis due to potential multicollinearity. The first 
step in the analysis is thus the addition of all institutional variables to equation 
(5.1) separately as well as sequentially adding them in a separate set of 
estimations. This allows for an inspection of the institutional variables' 
coefficients' signs and the change therein when grouping them. If 
multicollinearity among the institutional variables is a problem, instability 
could cause negative signs to become positive and vice versa.  
- The inclusion of formal institutional variables into equation (5.1) poses 
problems for the inclusion of importers' GDP per capita as formal institutional 
quality is a strong determinant of economic growth (Rodrik et al., 2004). 
Taking the product of exporter and import GDP per capita to some degree 
alleviates this problem as the formal institutional quality variable in this dataset 
relates to the importer only. Hence, equation (5.1) is adjusted to include the 
product of GDP per capita. It is also adjusted for the product of population 
sizes, which is a common approach in the empirical literature. 
The main analysis concerns the trade barrier alleviating effect of the commercial 
diplomacy proxy. Considering again Hypotheses H3a and H3b, the conjecture is that 
the effect of commercial diplomacy on trade is higher when the informal institutional 
distance between countries is greater, and when the destination country's formal 
institutional quality is lower. The empirical literature deals with the conditionality of 
one variable's effect on another's in two ways. 
The first and simplest way is an analysis of subsamples46. This entails dividing the 
dataset into two or more samples based on one or more cut-off points in a variable, or 
based on subsets of countries. This study will group the dataset based on the individual 
trade barriers; however, there is no rule of thumb to identify the number of groups, nor 
                                                 
46 See, for example, de Groot et al. (2004), Law, Azman-Saini, and Ibrahim (2013), Bojnec and Fertö 
(2009), Huchet‐Bourdon and Cheptea (2011), Cyrus (2015), Bauernschuster, Falck, Heblich, 
Suedekum, and Lameli (2014), Abedini (2015), Bleaney and Neaves (2013), Hornok and Koren (2015), 
and Li and Samsell (2009). 
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how to define them. The second way of dealing with conditionality does not necessitate 
reducing the dataset into smaller groups as it is based on the inclusion of an interaction 
variable47 between, in the case of this dataset, the trade barrier variable and the 
commercial diplomacy variable in the estimations. 
The addition of an interaction term into the analysis and inspection of its sign and the 
marginal effect of the variable of interest is the more common approach of the two. 
The analysis here thus starts off by adding an interaction term into equation (5.1). This 
interaction term is between the commercial diplomacy proxy EmbConij and the 
institutional constraint variables, all of which are continuous. This leads to: 
(5.2) ln(Xij) = β0 + β1EmbConij + β2Instk + β3[EmbConij x Instk] + βzZ + εij 
Here, k is an integer between 1 and 4 to denote the four key institutional variables used, 
Instk is the institutional constraint variable of interest, and the term [EmbConij x Instk] 
is the continuous interaction term. The four institutional constraint variables are: 
- Formal Institutional Quality from the World Governance Indicators (ranging 
between -2.5 and 2.5 where higher values are higher quality formal 
institutions); 
- Internet Use as the percentage of the population that uses the internet from the 
World Development Indicators (ranging between 0 and 100); 
- Linguistic Distance as a measure of the extent to which two countries do not 
share a common language from Melitz and Toubal (2014) (ranging between 0 
and 1, where 1 indicates no linguistic similarity); and 
- Religious Distance from Melitz and Toubal (2014), measured in the same way 
as Linguistic Distance. 
Lastly, vector Z now contains all control variables from equation (5.1) except 
EmbConij. Equation (5.2) is estimated for each institutional constraint variable 
separately depending on the multicollinearity checks described above. Estimation 
proceeds along the basic OLS approach as well as the instrumental variable approach 
from Rose (2007). 
                                                 
47 See, for example, López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez (2010), Schwens, Eiche, and Kabst (2011), 
Moenius and Berkowitz (2011), Borrmann, Busse, and Neuhaus (2006), Yu, Beugelsdijk, and de Haan 
(2015), Arora and Vamvakidis (2005), Freund and Weinhold (2004), and Dutt, Santacreu, and Traca 
(2014). 
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The straightforward inclusion of an interaction term as in equation (5.2) occurs often 
in the literature that assesses the moderating effect of a variable on an institutional 
constraint variable in relation to trade (e.g. Yu et al., 2015; Briant, Combes, & 
Lafourcade, 2014; Söderlund & Tingvall, 2014). The interpretation of this interaction 
term's marginal effects assumes that this interaction is linear. Equation (5.2) thus does 
not account for potential non-monotonic effects that may be caused by either the 
EmbConij or Instk variable, or both. The second step in the main analysis is to follow 
analyses by de Groot et al. (2004), Law et al. (2013) and Söderlund and Tingvall 
(2014) by estimating equation (5.1) for various thresholds of the institutional variables. 
Estimating this requires a set of cut-off points in the analysis based on the specific 
institutional constraint variable of interest along the lines of Söderlund and Tingvall 
(2014). There is no rule of thumb to indicate how to define the cut-off points. As such, 
it is interpreted flexibly with estimations based on terciles and deciles of the 
institutional constraint variables to check for consistency of estimates within the limits 
of the data. 
5.2.3. Robustness 
When it comes to the dependent variable, proliferation of zero trade flows may bias 
log-linear estimation of the gravity model (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). Zero trade 
flows can stand for trade flows that are too small to report which renders them 
economically insignificant relative to the non-zero observations. Second, if 
economically meaningful selection generates zero trade flows; for example, due to 
fixed costs of entry caused by trade barriers (Anderson, 2011). Zero trade flows occur 
in 197 of the 4,320 observed export relations, amounting to 4.6 per cent of all trade 
flows. Additionally, the pattern of diplomatic representation across the dataset is akin 
to that observed in Chapter 4, where diplomatic relations (in the form of a 
representation) exist in only 12.8 per cent of zero trade flows. In this cross-sectional 
dataset, this is even lower; only 13 out of 197 zero trade flows are accompanied by 
diplomatic representation, amounting to less than half a percent in the dataset. As such, 
the low level of zero trade flows in the dataset presents no heteroscedasticity in the 
log-linearisation of export flows that warrants the use of Santos Silva and Tenreyro's 
(2006) Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator. 
The institutional variables mentioned in Section 5.2.1 above are possibly prone to 
measurement error. To check the consistency of the results, robustness checks using 
alternative variables from the Heritage Foundation (for institutional quality) and 
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internet penetration (in the form of broadband subscriptions) take place in Section 
5.3.5. 
Besides endogeneity, an additional problem that relates to the trade flows in this cross-
sectional setting is of selection bias; the exporters in the dataset are largely developed 
countries. Not accounting for the potential systematic absence of trade flows in relation 
to particular countries or country-pairs may bias the commercial diplomacy variable 
upwards as its effect on exports can only be observed when there are nonzero export 
flows. Appendix B addresses this selection bias problem by applying a Heckman 
selection model (Heckman, 1979) to the dataset. It indicates that while there is a slight 
downwards adjustment in the coefficients and significance levels of the commercial 
diplomacy variable, this has no bearing on the results which are discussed next. 
5.3. Results and Discussion 
5.3.1. Descriptive statistics 
The countries in Rose's (2007) dataset consist of 22 exporters and 200 importers; 
almost all countries in the world are included as destination countries. Table 5.1 below 
lists only those countries which appear both as exporters and as importers.  
Table 5.1: List of exporters in dataset 
Australia Italy Spain 
Belgium Japan Sweden 
Brazil Korea Switzerland 
Canada Mexico Turkey 
China (Mainland) Netherlands United Kingdom 
France Poland United States 
Germany Russia 
 
Indonesia India 
 
 
The summary statistics of all variables, including those used to check the robustness 
of the institutional constraints variables, are in Table 5.2. 
Missing values for log of exports are due to the 197 zero trade flows observations 
which disappear when taking the log of the level of exports. Missing values occur for 
the institutional variables as information is not available for all countries. Around half 
of all observations are missing for the broadband subscriptions variable, used for 
robustness. Countries that have no observations on any of the institutional variables 
are removed from the dataset, leaving 182 importers, down from 200. 
Across the dataset the number of diplomatic missions in a partner country is just under 
one, and the median is one. Only from the top 90th percentile does this number increase, 
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with only 76 out of 4,320 observations, less than 2 per cent, involving foreign missions 
with more than 5 personnel. For the institutional variables, both linguistic and religious 
distance indicate that distance is generally large, with 1 being the maximum distance 
in the dataset, and both variables' averages being above 0.84 with low standard 
deviations. Considering the heterogeneity of the importers, this is to be expected.  
Table 5.2: Summary statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Log of Total Exports (US million $) 4,123 3.478 3.065 -11.152 12.327 
Number of Diplomatic Missions 4,320 0.961 1.727 0 43 
Linguistic Distance 3,632 0.843 0.169 0 1 
Religious Distance 3,678 0.847 0.21 0.079 1 
Institutional Quality (WGI) 3,950 -0.091 0.911 -1.942 1.954 
Institutional Quality (Heritage overall 
score) 
3,950 49.674 24.147 0 87.8 
Log of Internet Users (per 100 people) 3,821 1.148 2.035 -7.76 4.371 
Log of Broadband Subscriptions (per 
100 people) 
2,108 -1.957 3.018 -8.502 3.11 
Log of Geographic Distance 4,320 7.998 0.704 4.606 9.157 
Log of Product of GDP per Capita 4,320 17.091 2.079 10.745 21.730 
Log of Product of Population Sizes 4,320 33.257 2.686 23.770 41.752 
Landlocked 4,320 0.24 0.446 0 2 
Islands 4,320 0.374 0.547 0 2 
Log of Product of Areas 4,320 24.767 3.448 12.198 32.769 
RTA 4,320 0.097 0.297 0 1 
Currency 4,320 0.019 0.136 0 1 
Contiguity 4,320 0.024 0.154 0 1 
 
The two proxies for an importer's formal institutional quality exhibit normally 
distributed behaviour. The average of the six WGI indicators is standardised, with 
scores ranging between negative and positive 3. The overall score from the Heritage 
foundation, whose measure focuses on economic institutions, reaches the lowest score 
on the scale in 14 per cent of all observations. The last two indicators, those relating 
to internet infrastructure as a measure of economic institutions as well as of ease of 
communication (Freund & Weinhold, 2004), are log variables. Across all importers, 
internet use varies from 4 100th of a per cent to 79 per cent of the population. Similarly, 
broadband subscriptions range between 2 100th of a percent and 22 per cent. 
The correlation matrix in Table 5.3 is of special interest. Institutional quality is highly 
correlated with the internet infrastructure variables, as well as with the product of GDP 
per capita. Also highly correlated are the two internet infrastructure variables 
themselves, which is neither surprising nor concerning. Whether the multicollinearity 
between GDP per capita, internet infrastructure, and institutional quality poses a 
problem in terms of estimation is considered next. 
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Table 5.3: Correlation matrix 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) Log of Total Exports (US$) 1                 
(2) Number of Diplomatic 
Missions 
0.48 1                
(3) Linguistic distance -0.16 -0.13 1               
(4) Religious distance -0.09 -0.07 0.45 1              
(5) Institutional quality (WGI) 0.39 0.19 -0.20 -0.09 1             
(6) Institutional quality (Heritage 
overall score) 
0.48 0.18 -0.02 -0.07 0.39 1            
(7) Log of Internet Users (per 100 
people) 
0.44 0.21 -0.24 -0.08 0.83 0.31 1           
(8) Log of Broadband 
Subscriptions (per 100 people) 
0.41 0.22 -0.22 -0.14 0.76 0.23 0.84 1          
(9) Log of Geographic Distance -0.34 -0.20 0.22 0.15 -0.19 -0.13 -0.19 -0.14 1         
(10) Log of Product of GDP per 
Capita 
0.45 0.23 -0.30 -0.12 0.62 0.24 0.64 0.58 -0.16 1        
(11) Log of Product of Population 
Sizes 
0.51 0.32 0.19 0.07 -0.14 0.31 -0.07 -0.06 0.04 -0.34 1       
(12) Landlocked -0.20 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.18 -0.01 -0.17 -0.27 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 1.00      
(13) Islands -0.15 -0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.17 -0.14 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.22 -0.32 -0.17 1.00     
(14) Log of Product of Areas 0.28 0.21 0.03 0.02 -0.16 0.27 -0.11 -0.11 0.09 -0.29 0.77 -0.08 -0.35 1.00    
(15) RTA 0.36 0.18 -0.18 -0.14 0.27 0.18 0.25 0.21 -0.57 0.32 -0.10 0.01 -0.11 -0.16 1.00   
(16) Currency 0.25 0.21 -0.15 -0.22 0.21 0.09 0.15 0.16 -0.36 0.23 0.01 -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 0.35 1.00  
(17) Contiguity 0.24 0.26 -0.23 -0.13 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.35 0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.12 0.08 0.22 0.25 1.00 
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5.3.2. Adding the institutional constraint variables 
Before the analysis using interaction variables and subsamples takes place, it is 
necessary to study the behaviour of the institutional variables in this dataset. First, the 
relevant institutional variables are added separately from each other into equation 
(5.1), then the institutional variables are added hierarchically into equation (5.1). 
Separate estimation of institutional variables in equation (5.1) 
Table 5.4 contains the results to equation (5.1). Columns (1) and (6) provide OLS and 
IV estimates with no institutional variable added; these are the benchmark estimations 
that Rose (2007) uses. They differ slightly because of the exclusion of the binary 
common language variable that Rose (2007) uses, and because this study takes the 
product of GDP per capita across two countries as well as of population sizes. The 
results for the commercial diplomacy proxy, the Number of Diplomatic Missions, 
therefore change slightly. In columns (1) and (6), the exports-increasing effect is now 
12 and 8 per cent respectively, whereas in Rose (2007) this is 10 and 6 per cent. The 
sign, coefficient size, and behaviour of the control variables in both columns, as well 
as in all other columns, is fully consistent with the empirical gravity model literature. 
Columns (2) to (5) separately add the institutional variables to equation (5.1). Columns 
(7) to (10) do the same for the instrumental variable estimation. Upon the inclusion of 
each institutional variable, the coefficient of the commercial diplomacy variable 
decreases. This decrease is relatively minor in the OLS estimations when compared 
with the IV estimations, where the inclusion of each individual institutional variable 
decreases the effect of the number of diplomatic missions by about half, and reduces 
its significance from the 1 per cent level to the 5 per cent level. In addition, the addition 
of each institutional variable increases the total variance explained slightly with 
respect to the estimations that do not include institutional variables. 
The signs and coefficients of the institutional variables are all significant at the 1 per 
cent level, and the change in estimates between the OLS and IV specifications hardly 
impacts their estimates. Importantly, the signs and effect sizes are as expected from 
the empirical literature. The effects of Linguistic Distance and Religious Distance are 
negative, and about equal to those in Melitz and Toubal (2014). The result for 
Institutional Quality (WGI) is almost identical in size to the results obtained by studies 
that use the same variable (de Groot et al., 2004; Meon & Sekkat, 2008). The result 
for Log of Internet Use is also consistent with the empirical literature (e.g. Freund & 
Weinhold, 2004; Lin, 2015; Bojnec & Ferto, 2009). 
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Table 5.4: Separate addition of institutional constraint variables into equation (5.1) 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
            
Number of Diplomatic 0.111*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 0.101*** 0.096***  0.076*** 0.044** 0.044** 0.038** 0.034** 
Missions (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020)  (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Linguistic Distance  -1.448***      -1.474***    
  (0.127)      (0.127)    
Religious Distance   -0.404***      -0.416***   
   (0.109)      (0.109)   
Institutional quality (WGI)    0.185***      0.193***  
    (0.035)      (0.036)  
Log of Internet Use     0.094***      0.097*** 
     (0.021)      (0.021) 
Log of Distance -0.666*** -0.626*** -0.700*** -0.665*** -0.644***  -0.671*** -0.631*** -0.706*** -0.673*** -0.653*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)  (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
Log of GDP p/c product 0.856*** 0.833*** 0.871*** 0.811*** 0.800***  0.867*** 0.845*** 0.885*** 0.829*** 0.818*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) 
Log of Population product 0.978*** 0.993*** 0.979*** 0.961*** 0.961***  0.989*** 1.006*** 0.993*** 0.982*** 0.982*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Landlocked -0.709*** -0.767*** -0.777*** -0.721*** -0.715***  -0.709*** -0.766*** -0.776*** -0.720*** -0.715*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.057)  (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) 
Island -0.243*** -0.315*** -0.255*** -0.262*** -0.258***  -0.242*** -0.315*** -0.254*** -0.262*** -0.259*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)  (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) 
Log of Area product -0.148*** -0.174*** -0.156*** -0.146*** -0.154***  -0.149*** -0.175*** -0.157*** -0.147*** -0.155*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
RTA 0.823*** 0.828*** 0.796*** 0.856*** 0.880***  0.833*** 0.835*** 0.804*** 0.870*** 0.894*** 
 (0.079) (0.076) (0.079) (0.079) (0.077)  (0.078) (0.075) (0.079) (0.078) (0.076) 
Currency -0.058 -0.399** -0.475** -0.414** -0.470***  -0.030 -0.367** -0.442** -0.369** -0.425*** 
 (0.206) (0.186) (0.198) (0.186) (0.155)  (0.202) (0.182) (0.194) (0.180) (0.149) 
Contiguity 1.065*** 0.850*** 1.021*** 1.035*** 1.109***  1.128*** 0.920*** 1.101*** 1.153*** 1.226*** 
 (0.156) (0.148) (0.157) (0.153) (0.150)  (0.157) (0.149) (0.159) (0.154) (0.151) 
            
Observations 4,123 3,539 3,560 3,808 3,695  4,123 3,539 3,560 3,808 3,695 
R-squared 0.765 0.793 0.790 0.775 0.774  0.765 0.792 0.790 0.774 0.773 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts included but not recorded. As per Rose (2007), in columns (6) to (10) the Number of Diplomatic Missions variable is instrumented with the log 
of proven oil reserves, the number of Zagat guides, the number of Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations, the number of Lonely Planet guides, and the number of Economist city guides.
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Table 5.5 shows the first-stage regression results for the IV estimations in Table 5.4. 
Three of the five excluded instruments in the second stage regression have strongly 
significant effects on the number of diplomatic missions, the proxy variable for 
commercial diplomacy. The No. Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations and No. Economist 
city guides variables are significant at the 1 per cent level in all estimations, while the 
significance of the Proven Oil Reserves (bbl) variable lies between the 10 and 1 per 
cent levels. The coefficients for these instruments are consistent across the board.  
Table 5.5: First-stage regression results for IV estimations  
Dependent variable: No. of 
Diplomatic Missions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
No. of Zagat's guides 0.052 0.043 0.044 0.041 0.058 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) 
No. of Condé-Nast Top 100 0.247*** 0.238*** 0.242*** 0.256*** 0.233*** 
destinations (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.062) (0.064) 
No. of Lonely Planet guides 0.179* 0.165 0.163 0.152 0.112 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106) (0.108) 
No. of Economist city guides 0.611*** 0.671*** 0.671*** 0.712*** 0.691*** 
 (0.149) (0.159) (0.158) (0.159) 0.160) 
Proven Oil Reserves (bbl) 1.50e-13*** 1.28e-13** 1.18e-13** 9.93e-14* 1.07e-13* 
 (5.33e-14) (5.57e-14) (5.61e-14) (5.43e-14) (5.60e-14)) 
      
Observations 4,123 3,539 3,560 3,808 3,695 
R-squared 0.464 0.465 0.465 0.464 0.460 
Under-identification test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-
statistic 
18.733 17.281 17.535 18.199 14.180 
Over-identification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
Notes:  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Included but not recorded control variables are: Log of 
Distance, Log of GDP p/c product, Log of Population product, Landlocked, Island, Log of Area product, RTA, Currency, 
Contiguity, the institutional variables (Linguistic Distance, Religious Distance, Institutional Quality, Log of Internet Use), and 
the intercept. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic is used rather than the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic due to the inclusion 
of robust standard errors. 
 
Three tests apply to assess the strength of these instruments. First, it is a requirement 
that the equation is identified. Given that there are more excluded instruments than 
endogenous regressors, the significant coefficient for the under-identification test is 
not surprising. Second, the null hypothesis of weak instruments is rejected in all 
estimations; following Stock and Yogo's (2005) rule of thumb, the Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald F-statistic more than satisfies this threshold in all estimations. Lastly, the null 
hypothesis of the Sargan-test is rejected in all estimations, suggesting that the 
equations are over-identified – given the consistent insignificance of two of the 
instruments this is expected. While retaining only the Condé-Nast and Economist city 
guide instruments does yield a non-rejected null hypothesis for the Sargan test, in those 
equations the weak identification test is less strong as well. Because the results in the 
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second stage when using only two instrumental variables are similar in significance 
the larger set of instruments is preferable as they are a stronger set. 
Hierarchical addition of institutional variables in equation (5.1) 
The results for the sequential addition of the institutional variables are in Table 5.6. It 
again uses OLS and IV estimations of equation (5.1) as a baseline in columns (1) and 
(6). In the OLS estimations, column (2) adds linguistic distance, column (3) religious 
distance column (4) formal institutional quality, and column (5) internet use. This same 
pattern applies to the IV estimations in columns (7) to (10). 
The inclusion of both the linguistic and religious distance variables causes religious 
distance to become insignificant, and the effect of linguistic distance to become 
slightly larger. This occurs in the OLS estimation in column (3), and the IV estimation 
in column (8) compared to columns (2) and (7), respectively. At the same time, the 
inclusion of both indicators of informal institutional distance causes the effect of the 
number of diplomatic missions on exports to rise from 0.08 in column (2) to 0.081 in 
column (3). Moreover, in the IV estimations the effect of this variable becomes more 
significant upon the inclusion of both informal institutional distance indicators; in 
column (7) it is significant at the 5 per cent level, and in column (8) it is significant at 
the 1 per cent level. Thus, this is an indication that there is some multicollinearity 
present which destabilises the variable of interest, although not greatly. 
Adding formal institutional quality in column (4) yields a smaller estimate for this 
variable as compared to Table 5.4. Its inclusion also does little to change the linguistic 
distance and commercial diplomacy proxy variables, the effects of which decrease 
slightly compared to column (4). In the IV estimation, however, the inclusion of formal 
institutional quality renders the commercial diplomacy proxy variable to become 
insignificant. Thus, accounting for indicators of both the formal and informal 
institutional environment renders the commercial diplomacy proxy variable to become 
insignificant. This is in line with the expectation that commercial diplomacy is less 
relevant when communication is easier and formal institutions are better, yet does not 
mean that the effect of commercial diplomacy becomes insignificant for any values 
along the linguistic distance and formal institutional quality variables. The extent to 
which this is the case is explored later in this Chapter. 
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Table 5.6: Hierarchical addition of institutional constraint variables into equation (5.1) 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
            
Number of Diplomatic 0.111*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.075***  0.076*** 0.044** 0.044*** 0.025 0.018 
Missions (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Linguistic Distance  -1.448*** -1.477*** -1.450*** -1.412***   -1.474*** -1.501*** -1.484*** -1.447*** 
  (0.127) (0.147) (0.146) (0.150)   (0.127) (0.147) (0.147) (0.151) 
Religious Distance   0.052 0.054 0.022    0.049 0.049 0.015 
   (0.123) (0.122) (0.123)    (0.123) (0.122) (0.123) 
Institutional quality (WGI)    0.112*** 0.202***     0.117*** 0.209*** 
    (0.034) (0.047)     (0.034) (0.047) 
Log of Internet Use     -0.060**      -0.063** 
     (0.026)      (0.026) 
Log of Distance -0.666*** -0.626*** -0.625*** -0.613*** -0.616***  -0.671*** -0.631*** -0.631*** -0.620*** -0.624*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046)  (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) 
Log of GDP p/c product 0.856*** 0.833*** 0.833*** 0.805*** 0.817***  0.867*** 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.821*** 0.835*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) 
Log of Population product 0.978*** 0.993*** 0.992*** 0.987*** 0.997***  0.989*** 1.006*** 1.006*** 1.006*** 1.018*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Landlocked -0.709*** -0.767*** -0.767*** -0.740*** -0.775***  -0.709*** -0.766*** -0.766*** -0.737*** -0.774*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.056)  (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.056) 
Island -0.243*** -0.315*** -0.318*** -0.339*** -0.343***  -0.242*** -0.315*** -0.318*** -0.339*** -0.346*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054)  (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) 
Log of Area product -0.148*** -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.171*** -0.181***  -0.149*** -0.175*** -0.176*** -0.173*** -0.183*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
RTA 0.823*** 0.828*** 0.828*** 0.813*** 0.835***  0.833*** 0.835*** 0.835*** 0.822*** 0.846*** 
 (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)  (0.078) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) 
Currency -0.058 -0.399** -0.390** -0.406** -0.626***  -0.030 -0.367** -0.359* -0.362* -0.582*** 
 (0.206) (0.186) (0.189) (0.189) (0.163)  (0.202) (0.182) (0.185) (0.185) (0.160) 
Contiguity 1.065*** 0.850*** 0.849*** 0.838*** 0.903***  1.128*** 0.920*** 0.919*** 0.939*** 1.011*** 
 (0.156) (0.148) (0.148) (0.147) (0.149)  (0.157) (0.149) (0.149) (0.147) (0.149) 
            
Observations 4,123 3,539 3,539 3,539 3,453  4,123 3,539 3,539 3,539 3,453 
R-squared 0.765 0.793 0.793 0.793 0.791  0.765 0.792 0.792 0.793 0.790 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts included but not recorded. As per Rose (2007), in columns (6) to (10) the Number of Diplomatic Missions variable is instrumented with the log 
of proven oil reserves, the number of Zagat guides, the number of Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations, the number of Lonely Planet guides, and the number of Economist city guides.
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The addition of the internet use variable in the OLS and IV estimations in columns (5) 
and (1) confounds the WGI formal institutional quality variable, the effect of which 
becomes almost twice as large. In addition, the R-square decreases as a result of adding 
the fourth institutional variable. The surest sign of multicollinearity concerns comes in 
the form of a negative and significant sign for the internet variable, where in Table 5.4 
it was positive and significant in accordance with the empirical literature. The 
combination of these events indicates a strong multicollinearity issue between the 
indicators of formal institutional quality. 
Due to the suspected but minor multicollinearity concern between the informal 
institutional variables and the major multicollinearity issues between the formal 
institutional indicators, the main analyses below utilise the institutional constraint 
variables independently. 
One final note on Table 5.4 and Table 5.6 is that replacing the institutional quality 
from the WGI database for the Heritage Foundation's overall index does not change 
the outcomes and conclusions above. However, the other internet infrastructure 
variable, the percentage of broadband subscriptions, is insignificant when used in 
Table 5.4, and significant at the 5 and 10 per cent level in Table 5.6. Its behaviour in 
terms of signs remains the same. The less significant estimates are likely a result of 
this variable having observations for only about half of the importing countries. 
Nevertheless, the robustness of the formal institutional quality variables is satisfying 
enough to now turn to the main analyses. 
5.3.3. Interactions 
The first step in the main analysis is the interaction specification in equation (5.2), in 
which the commercial diplomacy proxy is interacted with variables that represent 
origins of trade barriers. There are four such institutional constraint variables and 
estimation takes place based on OLS as well as IV, yielding the eight columns in Table 
5.7. 
Only the interaction terms are of interest in the Table. The control variables (included 
to demonstrate the consistency of the estimations) behave as expected in a gravity 
model setting. Moreover, including an interaction terms alters the interpretation of the 
variables, thus the coefficients for the commercial diplomacy proxy and institutional 
constraint variables vary substantially from the results in Section 5.3.2. Given that 
linguistic distance and religious distance negatively affect exports, this means that if 
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commercial diplomacy is effective at alleviating trade barriers resulting from linguistic 
and religious distance, the interaction terms should be positive. Meanwhile, the formal 
institutional quality variable as well as the internet infrastructure variable are both 
positively defined; an increase in either variable positively affects exports in Table 5.4. 
As such, if commercial diplomacy is more effective as institutional quality declines, 
the interaction effect between its proxy and the institutional quality variable should be 
negative. 
In the OLS results, the signs and significance levels of the interaction variables are 
such that they provide full support for Hypotheses H3a and H3b. In columns (1) to (4), 
the interaction variables are all significant at the 1 per cent level, as are the variables 
that are interacted. Following these columns, the commercial diplomacy proxy 
suggests that commercial diplomacy is more effective as linguistic distance and 
religious distance increases, and more effective as formal institutional quality 
decreases. The interaction terms constitute linear effects, and the interpretation of the 
marginal effects of the commercial diplomacy on exports given various values of the 
institutional constraint variables leads to some stylised observations. 
- For the linguistic and religious distance indicators, an inspection of the 
marginal effect of commercial diplomacy indicates that it positively affects 
exports if linguistic distance between countries is higher than 0.4748, and if 
religious distance is at least 0.54. However, because the prediction is linear the 
effect of commercial diplomacy on exports becomes negative when linguistic 
distance is less than 0.47 and religious distance is less than 0.54. 
-  A similar pattern occurs when considering formal institutional quality: 
commercial diplomacy positively affects exports up until the point where 
institutional quality is 1.6, becoming negative when it is higher. 
- The effect of the commercial diplomacy proxy is always positive for any value 
of internet use up until a (log) value of 4.46, which is close to the maximum in 
the dataset, and the point at which commercial diplomacy becomes 
insignificant. This translates to an internet use percentage of 86. In the context 
of this dataset, this makes commercial diplomacy ineffective in three of the 200 
importing countries based only on the internet use variable. 
                                                 
48 Which is equivalent to saying that there is at least a 47% chance that two individuals, one from the 
exporter and one from the importer, when chosen randomly do not share a religion, or are not able to 
communicate in the same language. 
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Table 5.7: Estimation of equation (5.2) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS  IV IV IV IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          Number of Diplomatic Missions (DR) -0.158*** -0.185*** 0.295*** 0.410***  -0.097* -0.256** 0.178 0.118 
 (0.043) (0.051) (0.029) (0.047)  (0.055) (0.102) (0.062) (0.113) 
Linguistic Distance (LD) -1.865***     -1.734***    
 (0.149)     (0.164)    
Interaction (DR*LD) 0.336***     0.216***    
 (0.061)     (0.080)    
Religious Distance (RD)  -0.756***     -0.810***   
  (0.145)     (0.182)   
Interaction (DR*RD)  0.341***     0.383***   
  (0.066)     (0.129)   
WGI Institutional Quality (IQ)   0.378***     0.216***  
   (0.044)     (0.059)  
Interaction (DR*IQ)   -0.184***     -0.024*  
   (0.020)     (0.019)  
Log of Internet Use (IU)    0.165***     0.087*** 
    (0.024)     (0.031) 
Interaction (DR*IU)    -0.092***     -0.013* 
    (0.012)     (0.011) 
Log of Distance -0.616*** -0.695*** -0.646*** -0.620***  -0.623*** -0.700*** -0.668*** -0.658*** 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)  (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
Log of GDP p/c product 0.825*** 0.870*** 0.786*** 0.786***  0.836*** 0.882*** 0.821*** 0.823*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024) 
Log of Population product 0.981*** 0.972*** 0.917*** 0.922***  0.993*** 0.984*** 0.971*** 0.990*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.028) 
Landlocked -0.754*** -0.767*** -0.688*** -0.694***  -0.758*** -0.765*** -0.716*** -0.718*** 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.056)  (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.058) 
Island -0.323*** -0.266*** -0.275*** -0.267***  -0.320*** -0.267*** -0.263*** -0.258*** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053)  (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) 
Log of Area product -0.172*** -0.154*** -0.135*** -0.144***  -0.174*** -0.155*** -0.145*** -0.157*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
RTA 0.825*** 0.782*** 0.811*** 0.858***  0.831*** 0.787*** 0.861*** 0.899*** 
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.077) (0.074)  (0.075) (0.078) (0.081) (0.079) 
Currency -0.394** -0.327* -0.207 -0.356**  -0.375** -0.277 -0.353* -0.434*** 
 (0.184) (0.197) (0.171) (0.145)  (0.181) (0.199) (0.183) (0.153) 
Contiguity 0.950*** 1.104*** 0.917*** 1.028***  0.959*** 1.190*** 1.109*** 1.255*** 
 (0.147) (0.153) (0.147) (0.146)  (0.149) (0.159) (0.166) (0.170) 
          Observations 3,539 3,560 3,808 3,695  3,539 3,560 3,808 3,695 
R-squared 0.794 0.791 0.781 0.779  0.794 0.791 0.776 0.771 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts included but not recorded. As per Rose (2007), in columns (5) to (8) the Number of Diplomatic Missions variable is instrumented with the log of 
proven oil reserves, the number of Zagat guides, the number of Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations, the number of Lonely Planet guides, and the number of Economist city guides. 
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The direct applicability of the interaction terms' marginal effects is limited. The 
negative effect of commercial diplomacy on exports given low values of linguistic 
distance and religious proximity, as well as high values of institutional quality, is more 
likely to be a result of the assumption that this interaction effect is linear rather than 
commercial diplomacy being negatively related to exports. The subsample analysis in 
Section 5.3.4 addresses this. 
The pattern of results remains largely the same for the estimations that instrument the 
commercial diplomacy proxy variable in columns (5) to (8). The interaction effects 
with linguistic and religious distance remain at a 1 per cent level of significance, and 
their magnitude changes little. Larger shifts occur in the interactions variables using 
the formal institutional quality and internet use variables. Here, the size of the effect 
becomes six times smaller, and the interaction term is significant only at the 10 per 
cent level. As this is a linear prediction based on means, it is possible that the effect of 
commercial diplomacy is more susceptible to the formal institutional environment at 
values that lie further away from the mean. This is explored in the later subsample 
analysis. Given the significance of these IV-based results, the support for Hypotheses 
H3a and H3b remains. 
In the absence of substantial analyses of trade barrier alleviating effects in the 
empirical literature related to commercial diplomacy, few comparisons can be made. 
The most direct comparison is with to Ciurak and Kinjo (2006), whose limited analysis 
suggests that diplomatic representation is more effective when economic freedom is 
lower. This result is shown more strongly here. The results are also marginally related 
to those obtained by Harding and Javorcik (2011) and Lederman et al. (2010). The 
former paper studies the effect of a national strategy towards investment promotion 
targeting FDI and finds that this is more successful in relation to countries where 
information asymmetries are more prevalent. The latter paper identifies that the effect 
of national export promotion agencies' budgets increases as trade restrictiveness in the 
rest of the world is higher. The results here align with these analyses.  
While the indicators for informal institutional distance in the form of linguistic and 
religious distance yield stable results, the variety of ways that formal institutional 
quality can be specified may affect the conclusions. A robustness check of the results 
obtained above is in Section 5.3.5. 
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5.3.4. Subsamples 
The second step in the main analysis is a subsample analysis using equation (5.1). 
Following de Groot et al. (2004) and Law et al. (2013), this involves the restriction of 
the dataset for threshold values of the institutional constraint variables, and estimating 
equation (5.1) within the subset of the dataset that this creates. This accomplishes two 
things: a robustness check of the results obtained in Table 5.7, and a determination of 
the existence of non-monotonic effects. The dataset can be grouped by terciles, or by 
deciles, the latter of which provides a finer resolution. 
The results are in the two panels of Table 5.8. In this Table, each row-column intersect 
is the coefficient of commercial diplomacy based on a regression within that tercile (in 
panel (a)) or decile (in panel (b)), where the terciles and deciles differ by column as 
they are defined by the values of the institutional constraint variables. In panel (a), the 
bottom tercile includes values of the institutional variable within the lowest third 
percentile group. For the linguistic and religious distance variables, this is the group 
of countries where linguistic distance is low. Because higher values for the institutional 
constraint variables in columns (3) and (4) indicate better institutional quality, the 
bottom tercile includes countries that have low institutional quality. As such, if 
(following Hypotheses H3a and H3b) commercial diplomacy alleviates trade barriers, 
it should be more effective in higher terciles in columns (1) and (2), and it should be 
more effective in lower terciles in columns (3) and (4). The same applies to the decile 
estimations in panel (b). 
Overall, the results in Table 5.8 are supportive of the hypotheses that this Chapter 
addresses. Column (1) in panel (a) indicates that the effectiveness of commercial 
diplomacy increases with linguistic distance, and that the effect flattens out from the 
middle to the top tercile as compared to the change from the bottom to the middle 
tercile. Religious distance also increases as column (2) in panel (a) shows, yet the 
effect is strongest in the middle tercile. The changes between the estimations based on 
terciles of the formal institutional quality variables are more severe. Where Section 
5.3.3 suggests that the effect of commercial diplomacy is more susceptible to the 
formal institutional environment at values that lie further away from the mean, Table 
5.8 confirms this suspicion. For both average institutional quality based on the WGI 
indicators and internet use, the estimate for the commercial diplomacy proxy reduces 
to a third from the bottom terciles to the middle terciles, and almost to a tenth from the 
middle to the bottom terciles. This indicates a nonlinear effect that the interaction 
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estimation based on equation (5.2) cannot pick up, and that the commercial diplomacy 
proxy does not negatively affect exports. 
Table 5.8: Estimation of equation (5.1) for various thresholds of the institutional constraint 
variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Linguistic 
Distance 
Religious 
Distance 
Institutional 
Quality (WGI) 
Internet 
Use 
(Log) 
      (a) Effect of Number of Diplomatic 
Missions on exports by tercile 
    
      Top tercile 0.192*** 0.185*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 
  (0.057) (0.051) (0.009) (0.009) 
      
 Middle tercile 0.167*** 0.224*** 0.240*** 0.288*** 
  (0.039) (0.050) (0.053) (0.066) 
      
 Bottom tercile 0.059*** 0.039*** 0.638*** 0.632*** 
  (0.013) (0.011) (0.066) (0.094) 
      
      (b) Effect of Number of Diplomatic 
Missions on exports by decile 
    
      10th decile (top 10% of values) 0.192*** 0.231*** 0.038*** 0.044 
  (0.062) (0.076) (0.010) (0.052) 
      
 9th decile  0.177*** 0.237*** 0.042** 0.036* 
  (0.064) (0.076) (0.020) (0.033) 
      
 8th decile 0.256** 0.125* 0.064 0.067* 
  (0.116) (0.064) (0.130) (0.056) 
      
 7th decile 0.154** 0.148** 0.075 0.121** 
  (0.074) (0.075) (0.061) (0.051) 
      
 6th decile 0.283*** 0.147** 0.250* 0.407*** 
  (0.091) (0.062) (0.157) (0.102) 
      
 5th decile 0.124** 0.173** 0.241*** 0.492*** 
  (0.051) (0.078) (0.066) (0.124) 
      
 4th decile 0.146* 0.208*** 0.528*** 0.457*** 
  (0.090) (0.075) (0.099) (0.103) 
      
 3rd decile 0.092*** 0.030** 0.646*** 0.776*** 
  (0.029) (0.012) (0.122) (0.171) 
      
 2nd decile 0.051** 0.024 0.529*** 0.672*** 
  (0.023) (0.016) (0.136) (0.132) 
      
 1st decile (bottom 10% of values) 0.033** 0.048 0.984*** 0.944*** 
  (0.015) (0.071) (0.182) (0.195) 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts and control variables included but not 
recorded. Row-column intersects are results to individual regressions for the commercial diplomacy proxy in estimations based 
on the institutional constraint variable in the column. All coefficients are based on IV-estimations. As per Rose (2007), the 
Number of Diplomatic Missions variable is instrumented with the log of proven oil reserves, the number of Zagat guides, the 
number of Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations, the number of Lonely Planet guides, and the number of Economist city guides. 
 
The use of deciles in panel (b) sheds more light on the non-monotonic effect. 
Linguistic and religious distance now both show a cut-off point at around the third 
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decile, where there is a somewhat sharp increase relative to the bottom and subsequent 
steadying of the commercial diplomacy proxy's effect on exports. The formal 
institutional quality indicators in columns (3) and (4) show a strong decrease after the 
first decile, and then follow a more consistent decline where the effect of the 
commercial diplomacy proxy on exports becomes insignificant in the 7th decile for the 
WGI measure, and the 10th decile for the internet use variable. Comparing the cut-off 
points of significance with the marginal effects that arise from Table 5.7, 
approximately the same values appear: commercial diplomacy becomes insignificant 
when average formal institutional quality following the WGI indicators reaches 0.5 or 
higher, and when internet use reaches around 60 per cent. Lastly, the small uptick in 
significance at the top end of formal institutional quality is indicative of the positive 
and reinforcing effect that diplomatic relations can have on exports from the home 
country by means of learning and visibility effects; countries with low quality 
institutions may find that the establishment of diplomatic relations in high institutional 
quality countries can influence imports by that country49. 
Table 5.8 suggests that the trade barrier alleviating effect is larger for trade barriers 
that arise from formal institutions than those that arise from informal institutions. This 
agrees with the idea that commercial diplomacy acts as a network intermediary given 
that low formal institutional quality is often accompanied by high government control 
over economic institutions (Child & Möllering, 2003; Peng & Zhou, 2005); which is 
precisely one of the conditions that Copeland (2007) specifies to justify government 
intervention in trade. 
Overall, the interaction analysis and the subsample analysis provide evidence to 
confirm both H3a and H3b: commercial diplomacy alleviates trade barriers that arise 
from institutional constraints; it is more effective as informal institutional distance 
between countries increases, and it is more effective as a destination country's formal 
institutional quality is lower.  
5.3.5. Robustness to other institutional constraint measures 
The interaction and subsample analyses above include the formal institutional quality 
indicator based on the WGI, and the internet infrastructure variable that denotes 
                                                 
49 These results, and those in the tercile estimations, are robust to a cumulative specification of terciles 
and deciles as in Söderlund and Tingvall (2014). Here, the estimations are performed for the top 10% 
of values, the top 20%, top 30%, etc. 
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internet users as a percentage of the population. Alternative measures for these aspects 
are the Heritage Foundation’s measure of formal institutional quality, and fixed 
broadband subscribers as a percentage of the population. 
The results for the interaction analyses are in Table 5.9, which omits the control 
variables in the interest of brevity as they do not change in a meaningful way when 
compared with Table 5.7. Columns (1) and (2) contain the OLS estimation results, and 
columns (3) and (4) the IV estimation results, and the dependent variable in all cases 
is the log of exports. Across all columns, the results in Table 5.9 follow an identical 
pattern to the results in Table 5.7, the only exception being columns (3) and (4). In 
both cases, the commercial diplomacy variable is now significant where it previously 
was not. As for the marginal effects, the results largely align with those in Section 
5.3.3 as well. Thus, the robustness of the interactions remains, and this lends further 
support for both Hypotheses H3a and H3b. 
Table 5.9: Re-estimation of equation (5.2) with alternative institutional constraint measures 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Number of Diplomatic 0.724*** 0.102***  0.139** 0.086** 
  Missions (DR) (0.092) (0.014)  (0.221) (0.034) 
Heritage Institutional 0.015***   0.009***  
  Quality (HQ) (0.002)   (0.002)  
Interaction (DR*HQ) -0.009***   -0.001*  
 (0.020)   (0.000)  
Log of Broadband   0.050***   0.024 
  Subscriptions (LB)  (0.015)   (0.019) 
Interaction (DR*LB)  -0.043***   -0.019* 
  (0.007)   (0.012) 
      
Observations 3,808 2,060  3,808 2,060 
R-squared 0.781 0.808  0.775 0.806 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts and control variables included but not 
recorded. As per Rose (2007), in columns (3) and (4) the Number of Diplomatic Missions variable is instrumented with the log 
of proven oil reserves, the number of Zagat guides, the number of Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations, the number of Lonely 
Planet guides, and the number of Economist city guides. 
 
The second step in the main analysis is estimation of equation (5.1) for various groups 
of institutional qualities, and internet use percentages. The analysis in Section 5.3.4 
does this by looking at terciles and deciles of the institutional constraint variables; 
Table 5.10 below only considers estimations using terciles as using deciles yields a 
similar pattern of results. As in Table 5.8, the Table is structured such that every cell 
contains the coefficients for the commercial diplomacy proxy for separate estimations, 
and each row is a tercile of the institutional constraint variables. The bottom tercile is 
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where formal institutional quality and the percentage of broadband subscriptions are 
lowest. 
Table 5.10: Re-estimation of Table 5.8 with alternative institutional constraint measures 
 (1) (2) 
 Institutional Quality  
(Heritage) 
Log of Broadband  
Users 
   
Top tercile 0.190*** 0.095 
 (0.052) (0.097) 
   
Middle tercile 0.603*** 0.208 
 (0.175) (0.187) 
   
Bottom tercile 0.713*** 0.377*** 
 (0.096) (0.072) 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts and control variables included but not 
recorded. Row-column intersects are results to individual regressions for the commercial diplomacy proxy in estimations based 
on the tercile of the institutional constraint variable in the column. All coefficients are based on IV-estimations. As per Rose 
(2007), the Number of Diplomatic Missions variable is instrumented with the log of proven oil reserves, the number of Zagat 
guides, the number of Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations, the number of Lonely Planet guides, and the number of Economist city 
guides. 
 
The results in Table 5.10 below do not subvert those found in Table 5.8, though some 
changes in effect sizes occur. Using the Heritage Foundation's measure for formal 
institutional quality shows little change in the pattern of effectiveness of the 
commercial diplomacy proxy: it becomes less effective as formal institutional quality 
increases. Compared with Table 5.8, the decline in effectiveness from the middle to 
the top percentile of institutional quality is more severe. The results for the alternative 
internet infrastructure variable in column (2) now indicate a sharper contrast between 
low internet penetration and high internet penetration: only in the lowest tercile of 
broadband subscriptions is the commercial diplomacy variable effective. These results 
agree with the pattern found in Section 5.3.4, and lend further support to both 
hypotheses. 
5.4. Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this Chapter was to test Hypotheses H3a and H3b. In doing so it has 
addressed gaps in the empirical literature on the trade barrier alleviating effect of 
commercial diplomacy.  
Using both interaction effects and subsample analysis, the results in this Chapter 
indicate that commercial diplomacy has significant scope to alleviate trade barriers 
arising from institutional constraints and that it is more effective when such constraints 
constitute larger barriers to trade. This is consistent with the results in Chapter 4, which 
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shows that commercial diplomacy more strongly affects trade outcomes that result 
from higher trade and search costs.  
The next two Chapters investigate whether commercial diplomacy offices' activities 
and resources positively affect trade, and investigates whether they are effective in 
their intermediary roles. Chapter 6 provides a detailed description of the survey data 
collection and its preparation, and Chapter 7 analyses the data. 
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Chapter 6. 
 
SURVEY DEVELOPMENT AND 
DATA PREPARATION 
6.1. Introduction 
From Chapter 4, commercial diplomacy offices affect export diversification more than 
intensification, and stimulates exports in differentiated goods and reference priced 
goods, but not in homogeneous goods. In other words, they alleviate search and trade 
costs. Chapter 5 then identifies which of the sources of trade costs these offices 
alleviate. First, they alleviate the negative effect of barriers to trade arising from 
linguistic and religious differences. Second, they are more effective as the export 
destination's formal institutional quality is lower. The next step is to address 
Hypothesis H4a to Hypothesis H21b, which relate to office-level resources, 
organisation, and activities, as well as the hypotheses that relate to the trade barrier 
alleviating effect of these offices' activities and relational network characteristics. This 
third study addresses these hypotheses to identify how commercial diplomacy works 
at the office-level. It outlines the factors behind the effectiveness of commercial 
diplomacy, and illustrates how they alleviate trade barriers. 
The literature gaps from Chapter 2 show that few studies empirically assess the effect 
of resources and activities of commercial diplomacy offices on trade and when they 
do, the analyses are limited by the utilisation of broad measures and narrow regional 
datasets. This study contributes to the existing literature by assessing the intermediary 
effect of commercial diplomacy offices for the first time, and by assessing a range of 
resources and activities across a broad range of countries. 
This study’s use of a survey to collect data allows for the study of the commercial 
diplomacy phenomenon on the level of individual offices by means of a structured 
research instrument (Barbour, 2007). Given the scope of the work required to develop 
a survey instrument, collect the data, and prepare it for analysis, the current Chapter 
describes the collection process before Chapter 7 analyses the data. Chapter 7 relies 
on data collected by means of a survey conducted in mid-2015; the objective of the 
data collection in the current Chapter is to collect data for 2014. 
 119 
 
The Chapter first provides an overview of the survey instrument's development in 
Section 6.2. Section 6.3 describes the data collection procedure and Section 6.4 
discusses the preparation of this survey data for analysis. Section 6.5 provides an 
overview of the demographics of the survey respondents, and finally Section 6.6 
provides a summary. 
6.2. Instrument Design 
6.2.1. Instrument design process 
The hypotheses that Chapter 7 tests broadly relate to four distinct elements: 
-  The organisation of the office, comprising its resources and similar 
organisation characteristics (H4a to H5b).  
- The commercial diplomat's characteristics (H6a to H6c).  
- The offices' activities and their client base (H7a to H9b, as well as H11a and 
H11b).  
- The network characteristics of the office (H10a, H10b, H12a, and H12b). 
The item development process consolidates several fields of research. The small 
number of studies that deal directly with commercial diplomacy (Ruël & Busschers, 
2012; Ruël & Zuidema, 2012) is supplemented with studies from the empirical section 
of the literature review relating to office resources, and the studies in Appendix A 
which relate to export promotion. Where relevant, the survey items developed also 
draw on the private intermediary literature, and the literature that discusses firm 
internationalisation and network use. Items adopted and adapted from other studies are 
amended so that the phrasing is appropriate for the current study. 
The variety of concepts that appear in the hypotheses and the items that relate to them 
require nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio measurement. As is common in survey 
instruments, many questions posed to the respondents rely on a Likert (1932) item 
structure. This has the advantage that many survey items can be expressed as Likert-
items, with which respondents will be familiar. This study adopts 7-point items50. 
Table 6.1 provides an overview of all items used in the survey.  
                                                 
50 A seven-point item is regarded as the point where a scale reaches its upper limit of reliability (Allen 
& Seaman, 2007; Krosnick & Presser, 2010; Nunnally, Bernstein, & Berge, 1967), and it is the point 
after which differential meanings between points becomes less clear (Krosnick & Presser, 2010). 
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Table 6.1: Items used in the web-based survey 
Construct Indicator Measurement Hypothesis Hypothesis 
group 
Office location ofloc Country and city location of respondent's office Open-ended - Verification, 
demographics 
Sending country sender Country that the office represents Open-ended - Verification, 
demographics 
Accreditation accred Countries in which the office operates Open-ended - Verification, 
demographics 
Job title title Job title Open-ended - Verification, 
demographics 
Nationality nation1 First nationality Open-ended - Verification, 
demographics 
 nation2 Second nationality (if applicable) Open-ended   
Gender gend Gender Nominal, 2 response options - Demographics 
Education level educ Education level Nominal, 9 response options(4) - Demographics 
Network capacity netcap1 Our office currently has enough contacts in its 
network to service all requests promptly 
7-point Likert scale, extent of 
agreement with statements on the 
left (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree) 
- Verification 
 netcap2 Our office needs more contacts in its network to 
service all requests promptly 
   
Budget budget Annual budget in 2014 excluding salaries Ratio, open-ended H4a Organisation 
Office size ofsize Number of people at respondent's office Ratio, open-ended H4b Organisation 
Locally employed locemp Number of locally employed personnel Ratio, open-ended  Organisation 
Office type oftype Type of office that the respondent works for Nominal, 7 response options(1) H5b Organisation 
Age of office ageoff Year of establishment Ratio, drop-down choice menu H5a Organisation 
Engagement engag1 Commercial affairs Ratio, percentage of time spent on 
each of the items on the left 
H6a Commercial 
diplomat 
 engag2 Broader economic affairs    
 engag3 Political/diplomatic affairs    
 engag4 Other (please specify)    
Approach appr1 Commercial issues are more important than broader 
economic issues 
7-point Likert scale, extent of 
agreement with statements on the 
H6a Commercial 
diplomat 
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Construct Indicator Measurement Hypothesis Hypothesis 
group 
left (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree) 
 appr2 Commercial issues are more important than 
political/diplomatic issues 
   
 appr3 Broad economic issues are more important than 
political/diplomatic issues 
   
Respondent age ageres Respondent's age Nominal, 6 response options(2)  Commercial 
diplomat 
Respondent's 
experience 
exp1 Experience at current post Ratio, open-ended H6b Commercial 
diplomat 
 exp2 Experience at previous posts    
 exp3 Experience in private sector    
Respondent's 
communication 
skills 
lang1 Fluency in host country's language 7-point Likert scale, 1= not at all 
fluent and 7 = completely fluent 
H6c Commercial 
diplomat 
 lang2 Number of languages spoken Ratio, open-ended   
Network activities netact1 Organising meetings with local potential business 
partner for businesses from [home country] 
7-point Likert scale, frequency of 
occurrence (never to all the time) 
H7a, H11a Activities, 
Network 
 netact2 Searching for local potential business partners on 
behalf of businesses from [home country] 
   
 netact3 Increasing the number of readily available business 
contacts 
   
Intelligence 
activities 
intact1 Gathering information regarding the economic 
environment, markets and commercial opportunities 
to provide it to businesses from [home country] 
7-point Likert scale, frequency of 
occurrence (never to all the time) 
H7a, H11a Activities, 
Network 
    intact2 Gathering information regarding cultural aspects and 
societal norms and values to provide it to businesses 
from [home country] 
   
    intact3 Gathering information regarding the political 
environment to provide it to businesses from [home 
country] 
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Construct Indicator Measurement Hypothesis Hypothesis 
group 
   intact4 Gathering information about rules and regulations 
regarding exporting or investing to provide it to 
businesses from [home country] 
   
Image promotion 
activities 
imgact1 Participating in or organising trade fairs 7-point Likert scale, frequency of 
occurrence (never to all the time) 
H7b, H11b Activities, 
Network 
 imgact2 Performing image campaigns for [home country] or 
businesses from [home country] 
   
FDI activities fdiact1 Promotion of foreign direct investment in [home 
country] 
7-point Likert scale, frequency of 
occurrence (never to all the time) 
H7b, H11b Activities, 
Network 
 fdiact2 Supporting overseas direct investment from [home 
country] to [host country] 
 
   
Business support 
activities 
supact1 Business support in the form of assistance in 
negotiations for businesses from [home country] 
7-point Likert scale, frequency of 
occurrence (never to all the time) 
H7c, H11b Activities, 
Network 
 supact2 Business support in the form of coordinating legal 
action for businesses from [home country] 
   
 supact3 Business support in the form of the protection of 
intellectual property rights for businesses from [home 
country] 
   
Industries active in indst Selection of the industries that the office is active in Nominal, 15 response options(3) H8a, H8b Activities 
SME clients smeo Percentage of clients which are SMEs Ratio, open-ended H9a Activities 
SME contacts smed Percentage of contacts in host country which are 
SMEs 
Ratio, open-ended H9b Activities 
Network size (host 
country) 
nsizd Approximate number of contacts in the host country 
engaged in 2014 in relation to the partner search and 
meeting arrangement activities 
Ratio, open-ended H10a Network 
Pre-established 
network contacts 
precon Percentage of firms contacted in 2014 for partner 
search and meeting arrangement activities that 
contact had previously been established with 
Ratio, open-ended H10b Network 
Network size (home 
country) 
nsizo Approximate number of home country firms that the 
office has disseminated information to 
Ratio, open-ended H10c Network 
Tie strength tiestr1 Most people that I contact in [host country] regarding 
commercial affairs are people that I know very well 
7-point Likert scale, extent of 
agreement with statements on the 
H12a Network 
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Construct Indicator Measurement Hypothesis Hypothesis 
group 
left (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree) 
   tiestr2 Most people that I contact in [host country] regarding 
commercial affairs are people that I often talk to 
   
   tiestr3 Most people that I contact in [host country] regarding 
commercial affairs are people that I've known since 
the start of my posting 
   
Network 
communication 
netcom1 Regular post 7-point Likert scale, frequency of 
use in partner search and meeting 
arrangement activities (never to 
all the time) 
H12a Network 
 netcom2 Email    
 netcom3 Phone    
 netcom4 Network events    
 netcom5 Face-to-face but not at network events    
 netcom6 Social media (Facebook, LinkedIn, twitter, etc.)    
Institutional 
Differences 
insdif1 [Host country] is very different from [home country] 
in terms of the cultural aspects of business 
7-point Likert scale, extent of 
agreement with statements on the 
left (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree) 
H12a, H12b Network 
 insdif2 [Host country] is very different from [home country] 
in terms of societal norms and values 
   
 insdif3 [Host country] is very different from [home country] 
in terms of the rules and regulations regarding 
business 
   
 insdif4 [Host country] is very different from [home country] 
in terms of the economic and industrial development 
   
 insdif5 [Host country] is very different from [home country] 
in terms of the political environment 
   
Tie strength (public 
officials) 
tiepub1 To perform commercial activities in [host country], 
my office continually develops new relationships 
with local key public officials 
 
7-point Likert scale, extent of 
agreement with statements on the 
left (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree) 
H12b Network 
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Construct Indicator Measurement Hypothesis Hypothesis 
group 
   tiepub2 To perform commercial activities in [host country], 
my office keeps regular contact with local key public 
officials 
 
   
   tiepub3 Frequency of contact with local key public officials 
in 2014 
7-point Likert scale, frequency of 
occurrence (never to all the time) 
  
Tie strength 
(business contacts) 
tiebus1 To perform commercial activities in [host country], 
my office continually develops new relationships 
with local key business contacts 
 
7-point Likert scale, extent of 
agreement with statements on the 
left (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree) 
H12b Network 
   tiebus2 To perform commercial activities in [host country], 
my office keeps regular contact with local key 
business contacts 
Tiebus3 
   
    Frequency of contact with local key business contacts 
in 2014 
7-point Likert scale, frequency of 
occurrence (never to all the time) 
  
Tie strength 
(innovation 
contacts) 
tieinno1 To perform commercial activities in [host country], 
my office continually develops new relationships 
with local key innovation contacts 
 
7-point Likert scale, extent of 
agreement with statements on the 
left (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree) 
H12b Network 
   tieinno2 To perform commercial activities in [host country], 
my office keeps regular contact with local key 
innovation contacts 
 
   
   tieinno3 Frequency of contact with key innovation contacts in 
2014 
7-point Likert scale, frequency of 
occurrence (never to all the time) 
  
Notes: 
1. The response options are: Embassy/High Commission, consulate, honorary consulate, trade promotion office headed by a person in or from embassy or consulate, trade promotion office that liaises with an 
embassy or consulate, independent trade promotion office, other (please specify) 
2. The response options are: 24 years old or less; 25-34 years old; 35-44 years old; 45-54 years old; 55-64 years old; 65 years or older. 
3. The response options are: High-tech manufacturing, mining, education, other manufacturing, transportation, food & beverage, construction, retail and wholesale, textiles & clothing, financial services, health 
care, information technology, agriculture & forestry & fishing, oil & gas, other (please specify) 
4. The response options are: Less than high school, high school (or equivalent), vocational/technical school, some college (no degree), bachelor's degree, Master's degree, Doctoral degree, professional degree, 
other (please specify) 
The office location (ofloc) and sending country (sender) items identify the host and home countries and allow for the matching of exports data. 
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6.2.2. Office and respondent verification 
Following the definition of commercial diplomacy in the literature review, only those 
offices and respondents that fit the definition can be retained.  
The office type (oftype) item verifies the relevance of the response to the survey. The 
survey targets the public offices that most directly correspond with the publicly 
organised commercial diplomacy office specified in the definition. In the case of 
Finland and Israel, for example, the export promotion agency is separate, yet countries 
have dedicated trade and economic counsellors within their diplomatic 
representations. Office type consists of four eligible types, where a respondent may 
work for: (1) an embassy or high commissions, (2) a consulate, (3) a trade promotion 
office that is headed by someone from an embassy, high commission, or consulate, or 
(4) a trade promotion office that liaises with an embassy, high commission, or 
consulate. The item itself offers seven response options which allow for the application 
of a filter that identifies whether a respondent works for an eligible office. 
The individual respondent needs to be a commercial diplomat. Since “commercial 
diplomat” is not used ubiquitously in practice (Kostecki & Naray, 2007), the job title 
(title) item is useful to assess whether a response comes from a person likely to be a 
commercial diplomat. Responses along the lines of commercial attaché/counsellor, 
head of office, and trade commissioner are expected, as well as diplomatic titles such 
as first or second secretary. The respondent's nationality (nation1 and nation2) is 
important as a commercial diplomat is not locally employed and therefore should hold 
the home country's nationality.  
Three other demographic statistics apply. These are the respondent's age (ageres), 
education level (educ), and gender (gend). These items paint a profile of the 
commercial diplomat which should correspond with the conceptualisations by 
Kostecki and Naray (2007) and the demographic information in Ruël and Zuidema 
(2012). 
The survey includes two network capacity (netcap1 and netcap2) items for the 
purposes of testing the reliability of a survey response. The two questions are reverse 
coded such that a survey participant's response to one item should be opposite to the 
other item. This indicates the reliability of the respondent's answers to other questions, 
which is explored in Section 6.4.7. 
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6.2.3. The office's organisational aspects 
The most apparent office resource is the office's budget (budget). The empirical 
literature review identifies nine studies that deal with the budget for overall export 
promotion programs51, while only Martin (2003) acquires office-specific information 
from a survey. This variable relates to Hypothesis H4a. 
The survey then asks after two variables that relate to Hypothesis H4b: office resources 
in the form of the number of personnel it employs in total (ofsize), and the number of 
locally employed personnel (locemp). The former is a count of the number of people 
working at the office, based on Balabanis (2000), Morisset et al. (2003), and Lim 
(2008). The latter is a count of the number of locally employed personnel and is based 
on Lim (2008). Following Lim (2008), these two items are used to construct the ratio 
of locally employed personnel as a percentage of total personnel. Dividing locemp by 
ofsize then yields a variable named locrat that supplants the use of the locemp item in 
the analysis. 
Lastly, the office itself is a resource and its age may affect trade positively. As such, 
parallel to the firm internationalisation literature (BarNir & Smith, 2002; Magnusson 
et al., 2013; Milanzi, 2012; Musteen et al., 2013), it is necessary to control for the 
Office's Age (ageoff) in this case as per Hypothesis H5a. Operationalising this entails 
taking the year relevant to the study (2014) minus the establishment year. The oftype 
item is used to create a dummy variable that indicates whether a commercial 
diplomat’s office is within an embassy or consulate (1), or without (0). This dummy 
variable facilitates the testing of Hypothesis 5b. 
6.2.4. The commercial diplomat 
The commercial diplomat types in this survey relate to Hypothesis H6a. A set of four 
items, engag1 to engag4, allows for an assessment of the respondent's direct 
engagement in commercial affairs as per Ruël and Visser (2012). A proactor will spend 
most his/her time on commercial affairs (engag1), the non-actor will devote most 
his/her time on diplomatic/political or other affairs (engag4), and the reactors have an 
even spread across the four types of engagements. Another set of items relate a 
respondent's attitude towards the relative importance of these aspects (appr1 to appr3). 
                                                 
51 Armah and Epperson (1997), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Coughlin and Cartwright (1987), Lederman 
et al. (2010), Olarreaga, Sperlich, and Trachsel (2015), Onunkwo and Epperson (2000), 
Rusmevichientong and Kaiser (2009), Wilkinson, Keillor, and d'Amico (2005), and Morisset et al. 
(2003). 
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Following Naray (2008), a business promoter agrees or strongly agrees with appr1 and 
appr2, a generalist disagrees or strongly disagrees with appr1, appr2, and appr3, and 
a civil servant has a neutral attitude. Each dimension yields three categories; however, 
for the purposes of analysis the three categories are collapsed into a dummy variable 
that denotes whether a respondent is (1) or is not (0) a proactor (proac), and a dummy 
variable that denotes whether the respondent is (1) or is not (0) a business promoter 
(busprom). 
Following Hypothesis H6b, the commercial diplomat's experience consists of three 
parts which acknowledge that various forms of previous experience may increase a 
manager's effectiveness in the international environment (Stoian et al., 2011; Musteen 
et al., 2013; Magnusson et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2002). This factor also appears in 
Ruël and Zuidema (2012). In the case of the commercial diplomat, experience relates 
to experience at the current post (exp1), at previous posts (exp2), and in the private 
sector (exp3). The analysis later discusses the extent to which the balance between 
experience in the public and private sector matters. By dividing the sum of experience 
in commercial diplomacy environments (exp1 and exp2) by the sum of all experience 
types, the resulting ratio of commercial diplomat over total experience is denoted by 
pubrat. 
The third and last hypothesis that relates to the commercial diplomat (H6c), and more 
generally to managers in the international environment (Stoian et al., 2011; Musteen 
et al., 2013), is linguistic proficiency. It is the nature of the profession that commercial 
diplomats should be well versed in English. To identify to what extent language skills 
apply to the commercial diplomat's effectiveness, the survey identifies the extent to 
which the respondent is fluent in the host country's official or most widely spoken 
language (lang1). This is supplemented by lang2, adapted from Ruël and Zuidema 
(2012), which is an indicator of general language skills that indicates the number of 
languages that the respondent can read, write, and speak near-fluently or better.  
6.2.5. Activities performed and clients served 
Operationalisation of the activities that Hypotheses H7a, H7b and H7c refer to can 
occur in several different ways. The approach taken by Shamsuddoha et al. (2009) and 
Leonidou et al. (2011) is most relevant to this survey as they identify the extent to 
which firms use a range of activities, and then reduce the data via factor analysis to 
arrive at a small set of activity groups. This corresponds with Seringhaus' (1986) 
definition of a 'narrow global' (p.58) construct.  
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From the above discussion, each broad activity set consists of a minimum of two items, 
and the items are measured on a frequency scale. The variable relating to network 
activities is called netwact and results from netact1 to netact3. Intelligence activities 
are summarised by intelact, and comprise intact1 to intact4. Image promotion 
activities (imagact), consist of imgact1 and imgact2. Similarly, FDI activities (fdivact) 
consist of two items (fdiact1 and fdiact2). Lastly, business support activities (bsupact) 
comprise supact1to supact3.  
This frequency approach is in line with studies on private intermediaries which use 
factor analysis to arrive at a set of broad activity categories based on the frequency 
with which activities are performed (Peng & York, 2001; Balabanis, 2000). 
Hypotheses H8a and H8b relate to the industries an office operates in. Testing the latter 
Hypothesis is a straightforward count of the number of industries that the respondent 
selects in the ind item and yields the total number of industries an office is active in 
(numind). Hypothesis H8a requires that the effect of commercial diplomacy offices is 
compared between total exports and exports in the set of sectors that an office targets; 
it thus involves the dependent variable. However, a large list of industries as in Martin 
(2003) may fatigue the respondent, so a shorter list is offered based on industries 
mentioned on websites such as the U.S. Commercial Service, the Canadian Trade 
Commissioner Service, and the Belgian (Flemish) Trade Commissioner Service. This 
list is supplemented by categories from the SIC database, as this can be corresponded 
with trade data available from the UN Comtrade database. The ind item offers fourteen 
industries52, with an additional option to specifically mention 'other industries'53. These 
industries will be used to adjust the dependent variable, as elaborated on in Chapter 7. 
The last element in this group are the hypotheses that relate to the firms that contact 
the offices (H9a), and the firms that the offices contact (H9b). This study adopts the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics' definition that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
are smaller than 200 employees, a benchmark which is also used in the related 
literature (Álvarez, 2004). Operationalising this for the survey draws on Lederman et 
al. (2010) and Balabanis (2000). The former identifies the share of large clients in the 
                                                 
52 High-tech manufacturing, Other manufacturing, Construction, Financial services, Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing, Mining, Transportation, Retail and wholesale52, Health care, Oil & gas, Education, 
Food & beverage, Textiles & clothing, and Information technology. (The inclusion of the 'Retail and 
wholesale' industry turned out to be necessary during the pre-testing phase.) 
53 Many respondents selected this 'Other' option, all of whom provided more detail. 
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export promotion agency's budget, and the latter asks respondents to indicate the share 
of clients that fall within size categories. To reflect the offices' positions in the host 
countries, this is adapted to smeo, an estimation of the SME percentage of firms from 
the home country that the office is contacted by, and smed, the SME percentage of 
businesses in the office's location that it contacts. 
6.2.6. Structural and relational network characteristics 
Following Hypotheses H9a to H10c, H12a and H12b, the network dimensions of 
interest for the commercial diplomacy offices' networks are size, tie strength within 
the network as a whole, and tie strength with specific sets of actors within the network, 
as well as how the role of tie strength depends on the institutional environment. As 
there is little work on this in the empirical literature relevant to this study, the concept 
and item development process here relies on the firm internationalisation literature. 
While surveys commonly gather network information, this survey is subject to 
constraints in collecting network information. Name-generating surveys are typical, 
and rely on respondents listing names of individuals they have ties with and properties 
of those ties in a dyadic manner (Burt, 1984). This is not feasible as commercial 
diplomacy offices are unlikely to release such detailed information. Moreover, it 
would greatly complicate and extend the duration of the data collection process.  
Two potential concerns are recall, and stability of the measures (Marsden, 1990). The 
accuracy of the self-reported information provided by the respondents cannot be 
compared to a known standard, nor established by means of interviews with alters, nor 
(due to potential attrition and budget constraints) measured over time. The recall error 
problem is mitigated somewhat by the knowledge that recall error is substantially 
lower when the survey seeks after routine ties rather than time-bound ones (Hammer, 
1985), which is the case here. To further reduce the recall error the items are simplified 
and decomposed to the largest extent possible. The stability concern, as Marden (1990) 
outlines, is lessened by test-retest studies that suggest network indicators tend to be 
stable over time. 
The first dimension relevant to the current survey, network size, is 'the number of direct 
ties involving individual units' (Marsden, 1990, p.453). In the international trade 
literature, this is analogous to Rauch and Trindade's (2002) notion of network size as 
being a set of contacts that a firm can utilise to gain information about the destination 
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country's market54. As respondents may not know how many current contacts they 
have in the host country, it is useful to follow Uzzi (1996) who specifies network size 
as the approximate number of contacts that respondents utilised. In this case, 
considering that one of the key activities performed by commercial diplomacy offices 
is providing information regarding markets and potential partners, network size relates 
to an office's network size in terms of the home country network (nsizo) and the host 
country network (nsizd). Contextualising these as relating to specific activities and a 
specific set of actors narrows down the meaning to the respondent to improve data 
quality and consistency across respondents. While these two items address Hypotheses 
H10a and H10c, the variable precon addresses Hypothesis H10b, which uses the extent 
to which the firms contacted in the nsizd dimension were pre-established contacts. As 
such, it is an indication of the extent to which an office is embedded in the host country, 
and the degree to which development of new contacts takes place. To allow for a 
consistent measure of network size comparable across and representative of all offices, 
both nsizo and nsizd are standardised by the size of the office (ofsize). 
The next set of hypotheses that directly relate to network characteristics of commercial 
diplomacy offices' networks are H12a and H12b. These hypotheses consider the 
strength of ties in an office's network as well as the strength of ties with specific groups 
of actors in relation to trade barriers caused by institutional differences. Following 
Marsden (1990), the key elements that matter to tie strength are closeness, duration, 
and frequency. In this light, the overall measure for tie strength (tiestr1 to tiestr3) is 
adapted from Levin and Cross (2004) who have developed one of the most widely 
used scales for tie strength (tiestr). The tiestr variable is constructed through a factor 
analysis of the three items. To acknowledge that a measure of closeness is the best 
indicator of tie strength (Marsden & Campbell, 1984), the survey also includes a set 
of items that denote the level of network communication (netcom) by the office. This 
measure is adapted from Besser and Miller (2011) and relates to intensity with which 
network contacts are engaged by various means (netcom1 to netcom6).  
A third dimension of commercial diplomacy offices' networks, network composition 
relates to the variety of ties within the network (Marsden, 1990). Given the nature of 
                                                 
54 Following the intermediary definition in Chapter 2, a commercial diplomacy offices builds a network 
of individual contacts, in which the firms that are the office's contacts do not necessarily have ties with 
each other. This definition of network size is thus different from that in the graph theory literature 
(Goyal & Vega-Redondo, 2007; Jackson, 2010; Jackson & Watts, 2002), where actors in a network 
often have multilateral ties. 
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the ties that commercial diplomacy offices may develop it is useful to extend Abeson 
and Taku's (2007) local government connection variable where the respondent agrees 
with a statement regarding the strength of relationships with government actors. The 
business networking measure from Luo (2001) is a more extensive version of this and 
asks about the establishment and maintenance of contact with business, innovation, 
and government contacts. Given the close relationship between tie strength and 
network composition, Luo (2001)Luo's (2001) measure is adapted to fit the current 
study. Its measurement is similar to the tie strength measure: items for ties with public 
officials (tiepub) are tiepub1 to tiepub3, ties with business contacts (tiebus) are tiebus1 
to tiebus3, and ties with innovation contacts (tieinno) are tieinno1 to tieinno3. 
Hypotheses H11a to H12b consider trade barriers from formal and informal 
institutional constraints. Data from secondary sources as used in Chapter 5 are 
available to measure these institutional constraints, and this data is complemented with 
a set of items that measure the institutional differences between the offices' home and 
host countries. Following North's definition of (1990) institutional constructs, this 
measurement consists of two items measuring informal institutional distance (infdist) 
by means of insdif1 and insdif2, and formal institutional distance (fordist) by means of 
insdif3, insdif4, and insdif5. Such measures are often used in the firm 
internationalisation literature and are adapted from many such studies, including 
Stoian et al. (2011), Musteen et al. (2013), Magnusson et al. (2013), Griffith et al. 
(2014), Luo (2001), as well as from a related empirical study by Ruël and Zuidema 
(2012). 
6.3. Data Collection Procedure 
6.3.1. A web-based survey 
Compared to paper-based surveys, web-based surveys suffer from disadvantages in 
terms of lower response rates (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2013; Couper & Bosnjak, 2010; 
Evans & Mathur, 2005; Forza, 2002; Nulty, 2008; van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). 
Web-based surveys can also introduce coverage if not all intended respondents have 
internet access (Blair et al., 2013; Evans & Mathur, 2005; Couper & Bosnjak, 2010; 
Forza, 2002). In addition, the nature of the online environment might (1) lead to 
privacy and security concerns, (2) be too impersonal and (3) render the survey to have 
unclear answering instructions because they are self-administered (Evans & Mathur, 
2005; Forza, 2002). To counter these disadvantages, several options are available: 
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- The use of multiple attempts to contact potential respondents through pre-
notifications and reminders may boost response rates (Forza, 2002; Kaplowitz, 
Hadlock, & Levine, 2004; Newby, Watson, & Woodliff, 2003; Nulty, 2008; 
van Selm & Jankowski, 2006) although Evans and Mathur (2005) indicate that 
the number of repeated contacts should be limited. Specifically, Sánchez-
Fernández, Muñoz-Leiva, and Montoro-Ríos (2012) find that sending more 
than three messages can cause a detrimental backlash.  
- The use of incentives (Evans & Mathur, 2005; Helgeson, Voss, & Terpening, 
2002; London & Dommeyer, 1990; van Selm & Jankowski, 2006; VanGeest, 
Johnson, & Welch, 2007), especially a financial incentive (Church, 1993; Fan 
& Yan, 2010; Fox, Crask, & Kim, 1988; Heberlein & Baumgartner, 1978; 
Helgeson et al., 2002; Newby et al., 2003; VanGeest & Johnson, 2011; 
VanGeest et al., 2007). Where a financial incentive is not possible, the option 
to receive a summary of the results is appropriate (Church, 1993; Dillman, 
Smyth, & Christian, 2014; Fan & Yan, 2010; Fox et al., 1988; Heberlein & 
Baumgartner, 1978). 
- The use of personalised invitations (Cook, Heath, & Thompson, 2000; 
Dillman, 2007; Evans & Mathur, 2005; Fan & Yan, 2010; Kelley, Clark, 
Brown, & Sitzia, 2003; R. Kumar, 2014; Newby et al., 2003; Sánchez-
Fernández et al., 2012).  
- An email with a brief statement of the research purpose and an opt-out option 
generally suffices to meet privacy and security concerns. 
- The negative effect of unclear answering instructions can be mitigated by 
means of pre-testing (Evans & Mathur, 2005). 
The problem of coverage bias due to internet access is not applicable in this study as 
the participants are from organisations that require an internet connection to 
communicate with the home country. A web-based survey will cover all potential 
participants and the issue of non-representativeness (Blair et al., 2013) becomes moot 
(Kaplowitz et al., 2004). 
6.3.2. Survey instrument preparation 
This study utilises the Qualtrics website to design and administer the survey. A first 
version of the survey was developed and pre-tested to collect feedback on potential 
issues and uncover improvements in design, structure, and content, as per Fowler 
(2013), Harrison (2010), Krosnick and Presser (2010) and Dillman et al. (2014). The 
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pre-test survey solicited feedback from four academics within Deakin University, and 
from three current and former commercial diplomats. Of the commercial diplomats, 
one was a current Belgian commercial diplomat in Russia, another was a Turkish 
commercial diplomat in Finland, and the last was a former Canadian commercial 
diplomat55. One pre-tester was both an academic and a former commercial diplomat 
for Australia. 
The initial draft of the survey was sent to the pre-test respondents in March and April 
2015. The pre-test respondents provided feedback on the design, length, clarity, and 
sequence of the instrument. The completion time was between 6.5 and 15 minutes and 
this information was included in the email invitations that were eventually sent 
(Appendix C). The pre-testing resulted in minor changes to formatting: the number of 
questions per page was reduced such that respondents did not have to scroll down to 
continue to the next page. In addition, a different colour scheme as well as explanatory 
notes were added to clarify questions. Appendix D shows how the survey instrument 
appeared to respondents. 
The survey is an international monolingual survey (Smith, 2010). It does not apply 
differences in culture or structure to adapt the survey as the respondents constitute a 
homogeneous group. As such, the questions mean the same to all respondents (Fowler, 
2013). The international format of the survey requires strict adherence to Krosnick and 
Presser's (2010) and Forza's (2002) recommendations for survey clarity. This means 
that the survey uses language and syntax that is simple, follows conventional wording 
familiar to the respondents, and avoids the use of negatives. This was confirmed during 
the pre-tests, in which some technical terms were identified and amended. As 
Appendix D shows, the questions are presented in an order that shows topical yet 
relatively easy to answer questions at the start, and progressively displays more 
sensitive questions. 
To bolster response rates and reduce the level of missing data, the survey design 
includes a progress bar, multiple-item pages to display on related items together on 
one screen page, and a minimal number of open-ended questions (Couper, Traugott, 
& Lamias, 2001). Despite recommendations to offer a financial incentive to 
participants to encourage participation, none has been offered as the participants are 
public servants and a monetary incentive to participate would be neither appropriate 
                                                 
55 These contacts were acquaintances from a previous project by the researcher. 
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nor acceptable. Instead, as a token of appreciation (Dillman, 2007) participants were 
provided with the option of indicating whether they would like to receive an overview 
of the results. While such a nonmonetary incentive is generally less effective than a 
monetary one (VanGeest & Johnson, 2007), it is the best available option here. 
6.3.3. Sampling 
The target population for this study is defined as all commercial diplomacy offices. 
Kostecki and Naray (2007) suggest that the total number of commercial diplomats 
employed overseas is no fewer than 20,000, based on a count of ten of the world's 
largest economies' commercial diplomats abroad that is weighted by these economies' 
GDPs. Furthermore, following the number of overseas offices that Kostecki and Naray 
(2007) report for these ten economies, 1411 in total, a weighted extrapolation of this 
number (using GDPs) produces an estimated total of 2400 to 2700 such offices56. 
However, data collected (included in detail in Chapter 6) for this survey points to an 
increase in this number: from the 47 countries for which data on potential respondents 
was collected, a total of 3643 offices were identified, and weighting this by the share 
of world GDPs of the countries combined (76.7 per cent) this becomes around 4750 
offices in total.  
The discrepancy between the number given by Kostecki and Naray (2007) and the one 
found here lies in taking GDP as a predictor of the number of offices abroad: with the 
46 countries that data was collected for, the average number of offices per country is 
around 80, but the standard deviation is 57 and the skewness of the number of offices 
per country lies strongly to the right because many smaller countries do not necessarily 
have a proportionally smaller amount of commercial diplomacy offices overseas. With 
the larger number of countries in this thesis, the estimate of a total of around 4750 
offices is therefore more accurate and serves as the overall target population. Given 
the generally easily accessible contact details of these offices via their government-
maintained websites, the sampling frame is thus all those offices for which contact 
details via their websites are available. 
                                                 
56 Kostecki and Naray (2007) list 12 countries' estimated number of commercial diplomacy offices 
abroad. The total for these 12 countries is 1411 offices. At the same time, they list the countries' 
percentages of world trade, which amounts to 51.5%. These countries' GDPs amount to around 59% of 
world GDP. Extrapolating to the world, the lower bound of the estimation is 1411/0.59, while the upper 
bound is 1411/0.515. 
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The survey sought a single respondent for each office, in which case the respondents 
should be the most informed individuals regarding the survey's topic (N. Kumar, Stern, 
& Anderson, 1993). Single informant surveys can suffer from bias if multiple potential 
respondents within an organisation do not agree on survey items (Bowman & 
Ambrosini, 1997). This bias is less likely to be present in this study for two reasons. 
First, commercial diplomacy offices are generally small and the highest-ranking 
respondent in the office is likely to know of the daily activities performed. Second, the 
objective of the survey is to find information mostly about activities and resources, 
and this is factual rather than attitudinal information, limiting the chance of bias or 
divergent views within an office. 
6.3.4. Recruiting 
This research selected and identified and select participants through office websites, 
and Ministerial websites where possible. To get a representative sample of commercial 
diplomacy around the world, the 50 countries with the highest GDPs (based on 2014 
WTO estimates) were chosen, seeing as they represent all continents (20 from Europe, 
4 from Africa, 1 from Oceania, 5 from South America, 2 from North and Middle 
America, and 17 from Asia) and maintain offices around the world. As compared to 
the total number of countries per continent that send trade representation these 
numbers are a fair representation of global coverage. However, due to information on 
individual offices not being available or current on some websites, several countries 
are omitted57. These countries have been replaced with randomly chosen countries 
from beyond the top 50 countries in terms of GDP58. Ultimately, from the 3,643 offices 
of the 50 countries, a sample of 4,341 eligible participants was constructed. The 
number of eligible participants exceeds the number of offices as some offices have two 
or more potential respondents with the same job title applicable to the survey. 
The sample could be biased towards the inclusion of offices from countries which have 
the resources to invest in high quality websites and high quality offices. This 
possibility is taken into account in the analysis of the survey data in Chapter 7 by 
means of a response bias selection model. Given this, the dataset that ultimately results 
                                                 
57 Germany, Russia, Switzerland, Ireland, Portugal, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Venezuela, Japan, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Algeria. Harding and Javorcik (2011) and Lederman et al. (2010) 
note that some of the most difficult to obtain data is from more developed countries due to either their 
websites not detailing the offices' email addresses, or due to policies to not participate in third party 
surveys. 
58 This selection process was based on a random number generator, which selected thirteen of the 
approximately 150 countries not in the top 50 highest GDP ranking. 
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from the survey suggests that there is a wide representation of countries from all 
continents. 
6.3.5. Response collection 
The selected participants were sent personalised email invitations where direct contact 
information was available. The email contained a link to the survey and explained the 
purpose of the research, why the individual or office was chosen to be contacted, and 
the approximate survey completion time, along with assurances of respondent 
confidentiality. In addition, contact information for the research team, the ethics 
approval from Deakin University, and an opt-out option were added. In doing so, the 
cover letter outlined the main points from Blair et al. (2013): the topic, conduct, 
sponsor, importance, and treatment of results. The emails that were sent to participants 
are in Appendix C, and the ethics approval document linked to is in Appendix E. The 
plain language statement that the respondent can optionally view is included in 
Appendix F. 
The survey was sent in two rounds. The first round consisted of all participants that 
were based in Australia, or worked at Australian embassies, consulates, and trade 
offices abroad (390 in total). The first mailing was sent on 14 April 2015, a reminder 
was sent 2 weeks later (29 April 2015), and a final reminder was sent on 5 May 2015, 
after which the survey remained open for 2 weeks until 19 May 2015. In the second 
round, the survey was sent to all other participants on 20 May 2015, after which 
reminders followed on 4 June 2015 and 18 June 2015. The survey was closed on 2 July 
2015.  
The first round was used to identify any remaining issues not picked up in the pre-
testing phase, as is often the case (Sanchez, 1992); essentially this round functioned as 
a pilot study. This resulted in a small change to questionnaire structure: the budget 
question proved sensitive and caused a large number of early drop-outs, so it was 
moved to the end of the survey. Respondents in the first round also frequently self-
selected industries and these were added to the list of industries in the survey (oil and 
gas, food and beverage, textiles and clothing, IT). Respondents in the first round who 
did not self-report any of these industries were asked whether they were active in them 
in a follow-up email. None indicated that they were thus rendering the industries 
consistent across the two survey rounds. In addition, after the first round, a set of 
questions was added regarding office resources (netcap1 and netcap2). This question 
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consists of two items that ask about the staff sufficiency at the office where one is 
reverse coded to filter out unengaged respondents as evidenced by flat-liners. 
As the rest of the questions not having changed, the two rounds contain information 
that is functionally the same, with the second round containing two additional 
questions. 
6.4. Data Preparation 
6.4.1. Initial data cleaning 
At the end of the data collection process, 4341 invitations were sent of which a total 
of 104 were undeliverable, leaving a total of 4237 emails sent. Of the emails that were 
sent, 2877 (67.9 per cent) were opened. Within this group, 383 (13.3 per cent) people 
went through the survey, which amounts to 9 per cent of the total number of invitations 
sent. This response rate is expected given the high rank of the respondents (Anseel, 
Lievens, Schollaert, & Choragwicka, 2010). 
As a first step in screening, all responses were removed where no home or host country 
was given (n=124). The next step removed responses if there are multiple respondents 
per office. This is in part by design (in some offices there are multiple respondents 
who are part of the target population), and in part because the survey asks the 
respondent to forward the link to all others s/he thinks would be relevant for the survey. 
The responses of the highest-ranking person in the office are retained, and where 
equivalent respondents completed the survey the response with the lowest amount of 
missing data is retained. After checking for consistency within respondents' answers 
where multiple responses per office exist, the number of 14 cases are removed. In the 
remaining 246 responses, there is a small number of respondents who work for offices 
that are not part of the phenomenon under investigation such as Chambers of 
Commerce and independent trade promotion offices59 (n=2), and another 2 
respondents whose offices were established in 2015 (identified by oftype). They were 
removed as the survey asks about activities in 2014. The information on respondents' 
Job Titles (title) does not result in additional exclusions. Thus, 241 usable responses 
remain, an effective response rate of 5.7 per cent. 
                                                 
59 Again, these responses ended up in the survey because respondents could forward the survey link to 
others. 
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6.4.2. Missing data 
Missing data can occur in terms of both variables and cases, and the amount of missing 
data as well as its pattern is of concern (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). If data is missing 
due to the design of the survey, a case by case or item by item assessment of retention 
applies. If not, a minimum cut-off point for response rates within cases applies to clean 
data. At the item-level, systematically missing items may result in biased estimates 
(Allison, 2010; Fox‐Wasylyshyn & El‐Masri, 2005). 
As an initial cut-off point, all cases with completion rates below 50 per cent are deleted. 
This amounts to a total of 39 cases, leaving 202 cases. In the survey, a figure below 50 
per cent indicates that the respondent has not completed the first section of the survey 
which asks about office resources and activities performed. As such, there is a large 
gap between the number of cases that have completion rates below 50 per cent and 
those that lie above the Hertel (1976)-recommended point of 85 per cent. Of the 
remaining 202 responses, 13 lie below 85 per cent completion. Among these, 7 are 
above 70 per cent completion rates, and 6 below. In all these cases, the information 
within the responses is complete for the section of the survey that asks about office 
resources such as personnel, activities performed by the office, and the role of the 
respondent. These cases are retained as they provide information useful at least to parts 
of the analysis. 
For missing values at the item-level, the extent of missing data can pertain to 
unanswered or overlooked questions, privacy or non-disclosure policies regarding 
certain information, or survey design-based omissions. Table 6.2 below provides an 
overview of the number of missing values by item, and the percentage of the total 
number of observations. Taking 15 per cent as a guideline, the first observation is that 
the question about budget is highly sensitive – less than a quarter of all respondents 
answered this question. Secondly, five other items are above the 15 per cent line due 
to the survey's design; these items were added after the first wave of the survey. 
Despite this, they are removed from the survey for analysis, as is the budget. However, 
items netcap1 and netcap2 play a role in the next section which analyses unengaged 
responses and are retained for that purpose.  
Imputing the missing values on the items that are retained as per Fox-Wasylyshyn and 
El-Masri (2005) is not informative in this survey; it would assign values to office 
resources and networking activities and outcomes that potentially do not reflect the 
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actual office's characteristics, therefore in the analysis these missing values remain part 
of the dataset. 
Table 6.2: Missing data by survey item 
  Missing data   Missing data   Missing data 
Item Number 
Percen
t  Item 
Numbe
r 
Percen
t  Item 
Numbe
r 
Percen
t 
ofsize 2 0.99  imgact2 2 0.99  netcom5 11 5.45 
locemp 2 0.99  supact1 3 1.49  netcom6 12 5.94 
exp1 3 1.49  supact2 1 0.50  tiestr1 12 5.94 
exp2 3 1.49  supact3 1 0.50  tiestr2 12 5.94 
exp3 3 1.49  fdiact2 1 0.50  tiestr3 11 5.45 
lang1 1 0.50  ind* 2 0.99  tiepub1 11 5.45 
lang2 3 1.49  smed 5 2.48  tiebus1 10 4.95 
engag1 2 0.99  smeo 5 2.48  
tieiinno
1 11 5.45 
engag2 2 0.99  nsizd 24 11.88  tiepub2 11 5.45 
engag3 2 0.99  precon 17 8.42  tiebus2 10 4.95 
engag4 2 0.99  netcap1 35 17.33  tieinno2 11 5.45 
appr1 3 1.49  netcap2 36 17.82  tiepub3 39 19.31 
appr2 2 0.99  nsizo 29 14.36  tiebus3 39 19.31 
appr3 2 0.99  
netcom
1 10 4.95  tieinno3 40 19.80 
insdif1 1 0.50  
netcom
2 11 5.45  ageoff 22 10.89 
insdif2 1 0.50  
netcom
3 11 5.45  budget 155 76.73 
insdif3 1 0.50  
netcom
4 12 5.94  agrees 13 6.44 
insdif4 1 0.50      gend 13 6.44 
insdif5 1 0.50      educ 14 6.93 
intact4 1 0.50         
Notes:  
ind* reflects the number of respondents who have not selected any industry. 
 
6.4.3. Unengaged respondents 
Unengaged responses might be the result of speeding or flat-lining. In this case, 
respondents likely do not read the question carefully, or their consideration of 
answering options is too brief to assess all options. The data cleaning process applies 
three procedures to check for unengaged responses: 
- A procedural solution, 'reverse items', can be used to filter out unengaged 
responses. If the direction of answers on such items are opposite to their non-
reversed (and worded slightly differently) counterparts, the response can be 
retained. In this study's survey, items netcap1 and netcap2 are the means to do 
this. A comparison of scores on these items reveals that none are close together. 
Thus, the procedural remedy suggests that no unengaged responses feature in 
the survey. 
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- Unengaged responses can be detected through checking the scores on items 
that are presented on a single page. In this case, none of the 202 responses 
exhibits flat-lining behaviour as scores for the activities performed and the 
communication methods employed always vary. 
- Completion times can identify unengaged responses. Responses taking 30 per 
cent to 50 per cent of the median time to complete the survey require manual 
examination, and those below 30 per cent are discarded. In the case of the 
current survey, only 1 response lies below 30 per cent of the median, and this 
response is deleted from the survey. A further 17 responses lie within the 30 
per cent to 50 per cent range of the median response time. Examining the 
missing values in this group of respondents as well as the answers to survey 
items, these responses contain accurate data when compared to similar offices. 
This goes for respondents with large response times as well. 
Only one response was removed from the survey as an unengaged response. The 
remaining 201 responses are examined for different types of bias in the next section.  
6.4.4. Survey-related bias 
Nonresponse bias 
Nonresponse bias may bias the survey results if the set of projected respondents who 
do not participate in the survey possess pertinent information about a particular aspect 
of commercial diplomacy that is not taken into account. To check whether nonresponse 
bias persists the convention is to test the difference between the earliest and the latest 
respondents across a number of survey items (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Sheikh & 
Mattingly, 1981). This assumes that late responders are typically less interested in the 
survey, or less familiar with its content, and hence closely resemble characteristics of 
non-respondents (Rogelberg & Stanton, 2007). If a comparison of items on these two 
groups of respondents indicates that there are significant differences, non-response 
bias exists in the data. 
As the survey relates to activities performed by the office, it is possible that 
respondents who are more involved with commercial diplomacy affairs are more likely 
to answer the survey. To check whether nonresponse bias persists the current study 
follows the convention and tests the difference between the twenty earliest and the 
twenty latest respondents in the survey.  
Four of the items tested for nonresponse bias relate to respondents' experience at the 
current post (exp1), their involvement in commercial (engag1) and other affairs 
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(engag2, engag3, engag4), as well as their attitude towards the importance of the main 
activities performed by commercial diplomats (appr1, appr2, appr3). In addition, this 
analysis also accounts for potential demographic factors that cause nonresponse bias 
(James & Rajan, 2004; Palmquist & Stueve, 1996) by testing for differences in age 
(ageres) and gender (gend). Lastly, it tests whether there is a difference between types 
of offices (oftype); it is possible that those working in trade promotion offices that only 
liaise with embassies or consulates have a greater interest in the survey than 
respondents from embassies or consulates. For each item, the null hypothesis is that 
there is no significant difference between early and late respondents. The means 
comparison test in Table 6.3 indicates that the null hypotheses that there is no 
significant difference on these items between early and late responses is not rejected 
for any variable. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that non-response bias has no 
significant effect on conclusions drawn from analysing this survey. Given that the 
survey was sent in two waves, the nonresponse bias test also indicates that no 
significant differences exist between them. 
Table 6.3: Test for non-response bias 
 t Sig.  Mean SE 95% confidence interval 
  
 (2-
tailed) Early Late Difference  Lower Upper 
gend -0.698 0.490 1.250 1.160 0.090 0.132 -0.359 0.175 
ageres 0.000 1.000 3.350 3.350 0.000 0.304 -0.615 0.615 
oftype 0.057 0.955 3.350 3.381 0.031 0.547 -1.075 1.137 
exp1 -0.061 0.952 2.967 2.900 0.066 1.087 -2.265 2.133 
engag1 0.100 0.921 58.158 58.952 0.794 7.970 -15.341 16.930 
engag2 0.588 0.560 15.789 18.095 2.306 3.924 -5.638 10.250 
engag3 -0.149 0.883 12.632 12.000 0.632 4.251 -9.236 7.973 
engag4 0.427 0.672 13.421 10.952 2.469 5.786 -14.179 9.242 
appr1 0.052 0.959 4.474 4.500 0.026 0.504 -0.996 1.048 
appr2 -0.302 0.764 4.579 4.429 0.150 0.497 -1.157 0.857 
appr3 0.427 0.672 3.947 4.143 0.195 0.458 -0.732 1.123 
Common method bias 
A second source of survey design related bias comes in the form of common method 
bias. This refers to the systematic error variance attributable to the measurement 
method. It is especially likely to arise when both independent and dependent variables 
come from the survey (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; Richardson, 
Simmering, & Sturman, 2009). 
A procedural remedy to counter common method bias is the separate data collection 
of either the independent or dependent variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 
2012) which is the case in this study – the dependent variable is exports and this comes 
from a secondary source.  
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To verify that common method bias does not persist among the independent variables, 
Harman's single factor test is used. Table 6.4 below displays the results of Harman's 
single factor method in terms of a principal component analysis of all items measured 
on a Likert scale in the survey, where only components with eigenvalue greater than 1 
are shown. The table shows that the first factor accounts for less than 20 per cent of 
the variance in the data, and that a total of 13 factors emerge with an eigenvalue greater 
than 1 to account for a total of 72 per cent of all variance. As such, the survey data 
shows no sign of common method bias in terms of the dependent variables. 
Table 6.4: Test for common method bias 
Component Eigenvalue 
Percentage 
of variance 
explained 
Cumulative 
percentage 
1 8.19 19.51 19.51 
2 3.53 8.4 27.9 
3 3.33 7.92 35.83 
4 2.32 5.52 41.35 
5 2.15 5.12 46.47 
6 1.81 4.32 50.79 
7 1.64 3.91 54.69 
8 1.51 3.61 58.3 
9 1.41 3.35 61.65 
10 1.27 3.02 64.67 
11 1.12 2.68 67.35 
12 1.09 2.6 69.94 
13 1.01 2.4 72.34 
6.4.5. Outliers 
The existence of outliers in the data may cause disruptions in the data analysis process, 
unless such outliers can be expected in the population under study (H. Lee, 1995). 
Assessment of outliers takes places univariately by means of median absolute 
deviation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & Licata, 2013 
based on Huber, 1981). Multivariate outliers on survey-items are determined based on 
Mahalanobis distances of the whole set of items. This generally relates to the 
assessment of normality as well, though in the regression analysis here this is less 
relevant as the key assumption lies with the error term's distribution rather than the 
distribution of the independent variables. 
The study assesses univariate outliers with the median absolute deviation (MAD) 
method. This is a more robust method than the use of interquartile distances and z-
scores (Leys et al., 2013 based on Huber, 1981), and mean-based methods are unlikely 
to detect outliers when the sample size is small (Cousineau & Chartier, 2015).  
Outliers are data points that lie more than 3 times the MAD score away from the 
median (Leys et al., 2013). Applying the outlier analysis to the current study, 
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univariate outliers exist mostly in the resource variables as expected (ofsize, nsizo, 
nsixd, locemp, and the experience items), so no observations are deleted. 
In multivariate analysis, the Mahalanobis distance identifies case outliers by assessing 
the distance of each case to the intersection of the means of items and variables in the 
survey. A chi-square test then tests whether a case is significantly different from the 
others. When combining all survey items, no multivariate outliers exist. Additional 
analyses based on individual respondents' characteristics, office resources, activities 
performed, and network variables indicate that no outliers exist within each of these 
groups either. Therefore, no cases are removed in this step. 
6.4.6. Normality 
The construction of composite variables in Section 6.4.7 depends on the distribution 
of the items they are composed of. The distribution of the items must be tested for 
normality60 before they can be adopted into a parametric or nonparametric analysis to 
determine different commercial diplomacy types and tendencies (e.g. tie strength 
tendency).  
In sample sizes approaching or exceeding 200, the optimal statistical method is to 
inspect the absolute values of items' skewness and kurtosis rather than to utilise 
statistical tests for non-normality (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). In this case, a skewness 
of more than 3 indicates non-normality, as does a kurtosis larger than 10. For 
multivariate normality, Mardia's statistic (Mardia, 1985) tests multivariate non-
normality based on skewness and kurtosis. If this statistic has a value less than 3, the 
assumption of multivariate normality holds.  
Inspection of skewness and kurtosis of all items using  
Table 6.5 indicates that the maximum absolute skewness of any item lies around 1, 
and that the maximum absolute kurtosis does not exceed 4.35. These values lie well 
within acceptable ranges and reaffirms that these items are normally distributed.  
                                                 
60 In light of this, the debate on whether or not Likert items can be considered as continuous even though 
they are measured in an ordinal manner is ongoing (Clason & Dormody, 1994). This thesis sides with 
Norman (2010) in assuming Likert items and scales to be continuous, with the support of Rasmussen 
(1989) who shows that the failure of this assumption is negligible when the number of Likert-item 
options exceeds five; this is the case here as the Likert-scale used in the survey is based on 7-point 
items. 
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The Mardia test does not indicate multivariate normality. With the purposive sampling 
technique used to collect responses, this is not surprising as heterogeneity of 
respondents is what matters. 
Table 6.5: Univariate normality of items 
Variable Skewness Kurtosis  Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
netact1 -0.494 2.72  tiepub3 0.409 1.989 
netact2 -1.22 4.294  tiebus1 -0.818 3.734 
netact3 -0.81 3.538  tiebus2 -1.006 4.351 
intact1 -0.431 2.306  tiebus3 -0.129 1.868 
intact2 0.377 3.197  tieinno1 -0.463 2.417 
intact3 -0.466 2.642  tieinno2 -0.514 2.435 
intact4 -0.184 2.382  tieinno3 0.975 3.294 
imgact1 0.069 2.909  netcom1 0.943 3.225 
imgact2 -0.241 2.742  netcom2 -1.023 3.274 
supact1 0.211 2.668  netcom3 -0.421 2.614 
supact2 0.408 3.211  netcom4 -0.288 3.32 
supact3 -0.182 2.271  netcom5 -0.014 2.683 
fdiact1 -0.066 2.653  netcom6 0.33 2.568 
tiestr1 0.398 2.238  insdif1 -0.809 2.841 
tiestr2 0.18 2.207  insdif2 -0.872 2.84 
tiestr3 0.608 2.429  insdif3 -0.855 2.87 
tiepub1 -0.998 3.147  insdif4 -1.198 3.783 
tiepub2 -0.96 3.333  insdif5 -1.274 4.016 
6.4.7. Construction and reliability of composite variables 
The reliability of the Likert-scale based variables (the variables that comprise several 
survey items) that the survey yields is relevant to their inclusion in the analysis; scales 
that are not reliable bias the analysis. The summary scales can be constructed 
according to principal component and factor analysis techniques. Both of these 
techniques allow for test the reliability of the scales. 
The items that represent the activity groups are reduced to a set of principal 
components as the activity groups rely on factual information relating to frequency of 
performance, and the items under each activity group fully represent the activities 
identified in the literature review (Chapter 2). Each activity group comprises 2 to 4 
items and the resulting principal components are in Table 6.6 below.  
Each activity group consists of a single component, where the minimum percentage of 
variance explained for all components is above 60 per cent and all items have a loading 
of 0.4 or higher, except in the case of Intelligence Activities, where the cumulative 
variance explained is 55 per cent. Upon removal of the item with the lowest factor 
loading, the remaining component satisfies the threshold cumulative variance 
explained, with 65.4 per cent explained. The lowest percentage of variance explained 
is for the Business Support activity group and amounts to 63.9 per cent. The 
components' eigenvalues range from 1.323 to 2.08, and none of the items have a 
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loading lower than 0.4. Furthermore, all principal components have significant Bartlett 
tests and a KMO of 0.5 or higher, thus satisfying the requirements for principal 
component analysis61.  
Table 6.6: Principal component analysis results 
Factor 
Bartlett 
test KMO Eigenvalue 
Cumulative 
variance 
explained Item 
Factor 
loading Uniqueness 
Network 0.000*** 0.684 2.08 0.693 netact1 0.577 0.308 
  Activities     netact2 0.603 0.245 
     netact3 0.551 0.368 
Intelligence 0.000*** 0.697 2.199 0.55 intact1 0.546 0.344 
  Activities     intact2 0.493 0.465 
     intact3 0.433 0.588 
     intact4 0.521 0.403 
Image  
Campaigns 
0.000*** 0.5 1.323 0.661 imgact1 0.707 0.339 
     imgact2 0.707 0.339 
Business  
Support 
0.000*** 0.678 1.916 0.639 supact1 0.566 0.386 
     supact2 0.586 0.342 
     supact3 0.580 0.356 
Promotion of 0.000*** 0.5 1.365 0.682 fdiact1 0.707 0.318 
 FDI     fdiact2 0.707 0.318 
        
Intelligence  
(purified) 
  0.925 0.642 intact1 0.619 0.263 
     intact2 0.524 0.492 
     intact4 0.594 0.320 
 
All other variables that result from sets of items are reduced using factor analysis, the 
results of which are in Table 6.7 below62.  
For the institutional differences construct, the instrument design section partitions this 
into Informal Institutional Differences and Formal Institutional Differences, 
consisting of two and three items respectively. The Informal Institutional Differences 
and Formal Institutional Differences variables are constructed through factor analysis. 
                                                 
61 Constructing a principal component from a set of items generally follows a rule of thumb where 
eigenvalues of components need to be greater than 1, known as the Kaiser rule. In addition to the Kaiser 
rule, Jolliffe (2002) also suggests to extract components until the cumulative percentage of variance 
explained reaches at least 60%. On the item-level, an item with a factor loading of less than 0.4 in an 
unrotated principal component should be deleted (Rattray & Jones, 2007). To identify whether the 
resulting components are adequate, Bartlett's sphericity test must be significant (Burton & Mazerolle, 
2011), and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) correlation above 0.5 (Kaiser, 1974; Kaiser & Rice, 1974). 
62 In factor analysis, item loading should be greater than 0.5 (Burton & Mazerolle, 2011), and ideally 
greater than 0.7 (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2011; Osborne & Costello, 2009), although with 
a sample size of around 200 a loading greater than 0.4 has practical significance (Hair, 2010). Two ways 
exist to assess the reliability of the resulting factor. First, if the average item variance extraction in a 
factor is above 0.5, the factor is adequate (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Much more common (Rattray & 
Jones, 2007) is the Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient (Cronbach, 1949, 1951), which should exceed 
0.6 for newly developed measures (Nunnally, 1978; Rattray & Jones, 2007). 
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Given that these variables are defined a priori and are taken from previous literature, 
they only have been adjusted slightly in the current application. 
Table 6.7: Factor analysis results 
Factor 
Cronbach 
α Eigenvalue 
Cumulative 
variance 
explained Item 
Factor 
loading Uniqueness 
Institutional 0.838 2.566 0.962 insdif1 0.693 0.52 
  Differences    insdif2 0.729 0.468 
    insdif3 0.725 0.475 
    insdif4 0.733 0.463 
    insdif5 0.701 0.509 
Tie Strength 0.819 1.802 0.820 tiestr1 0.846 0.285 
    tiestr2 0.86 0.261 
    tiestr3 0.589 0.653 
Network 0.562 1.429 0.742 netcom1 0.168 0.87 
  Communication    netcom2 0.219 0.729 
    netcom3 0.503 0.619 
    netcom4 0.655 0.546 
    netcom5 0.678 0.54 
    netcom6 0.46 0.722 
Network 0.651 1.342 0.928 netcom3 0.503 0.619 
  Communication    netcom4 0.655 0.546 
  (purified)    netcom5 0.678 0.54 
    netcom6 0.473 0.758 
Tie Strength 0.798 1.688 0.788 tiepub1 0.822 0.325 
  (Public Officials)    tiepub2 0.852 0.273 
    tiepub3 0.535 0.714 
Tie Strength 0.652 1.524 0.803 tiebus1 0.773 0.402 
  (Business    tiebus2 0.811 0.342 
  Contacts)    tiebus3 0.517 0.733 
Tie Strength 0.816 1.817 0.706 tieinno1 0.882 0.223 
  (Innovation    tieinno2 0.894 0.205 
  Contacts)    tieinno3 0.495 0.755 
 
Performing this factor analysis indicates that all five items load onto a single factor. 
This factor explains as much as 96.2 per cent of variance and an eigenvalue of 2.566. 
All loadings are higher than 0.7 except for the first item, which is an acceptable 0.69. 
The Cronbach alpha is 0.838, indicating that this measure is highly reliable. As such, 
the factor analysis yields a single variable called Institutional Distance. 
Like the institutional differences variable, the tie strength construct is taken from the 
previous literature, and is specified a priori. It is expected to load onto a single factor, 
which Table 6.7 confirms. Tie Strength is a single factor with an eigenvalue of 1.802, 
amounting to more than 80 per cent of variance explained. Two of the items have 
loadings greater than 0.8, and the third is 0.59 and still above the minimally acceptable 
range of 0.4. The Cronbach alpha is 0.819 and as such, satisfies the requirement for 
pre-established measures. 
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Network Communication, measured in a similar manner to the 7-point Likert scale as 
the activities, also facilitates factor analysis as Besser and Miller (2011) have 
developed this scale and as such, it is defined a priori. Moreover, it is considered as a 
latent variable here, as it is in the study that the scale is adopted from. The six items 
that make up this scale yield a single factor that has a satisfactory eigenvalue and a 
satisfactory cumulative variance explained. However, three of the items have a factor 
loading less than 0.4, and together with a Cronbach alpha of 0.562 this indicates that 
cleansing of this scale is required. Dropping the two items with unsatisfactory loadings 
items yields purified scale, which now has satisfactory factor loadings as well as an 
acceptable Cronbach alpha of 0.651. The two items dropped are email and regular post, 
indicating that the remaining items refer to a face-to-face approach towards network 
communication. 
The Tie Strength variables with the three groups of contacts (public officials, business 
contacts, and innovation contacts) are based on Luo (2001). All three factors yield 
satisfactory results for factor loadings and Cronbach alpha scores; the lowest Cronbach 
alpha is 0.652, while the factor loadings are largely around 0.8. 
6.5. Demographics 
6.5.1. Offices 
Table 6.8 lists the number of responses by home country. Developed countries feature 
more heavily than developing ones. There are 42 individual countries, which combined 
with a response total of 201 means that the survey represents on average 4.8 offices 
per country. However, the median is much lower at 3, and only 16 countries have 
response totals above the mean.  
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Table 6.8: Countries represented by the offices 
Africa   Americas   Asia & Oceania   Europe 
South Africa 2   Canada 8   Australia 13   Italy 21 
Uganda 2   Mexico 8   Turkey 9   U.K. 14 
Morocco 1   U.S.A. 3   Indonesia 7   Greece 13 
Nigeria 1   Chile 2   South Korea 4   Belgium 9 
Tanzania 1   Brazil 1   Bangladesh 3   Netherlands 9 
            Malaysia 2   Finland 8 
            Singapore 2   Czech Rep. 7 
            Thailand 2   Denmark 7 
            Iran 1   Norway 7 
            Israel 1   Spain 6 
            Pakistan 1   Sweden 5 
                  Poland 4 
                  Austria 3 
                  France 3 
                  Latvia 3 
                  Macedonia 3 
                  Belarus 1 
                  Germany 1 
                  Iceland 1 
                  Slovenia 1 
                  Switzerland 1 
Total 7   Total 22   Total 45   Total 127 
 
The offices' locations are more dispersed as Table 6.9 suggests, with the largest 
proportion of offices being situated in Asia and Oceania. Offices are located in 77 
countries, resulting in an average of 2.6 offices per location. While the offices largely 
represent developed countries, the locations of the offices are heterogeneous63.  
Office demographics are in  
Table 6.10. There is an even split between embassies and consulates and trade 
promotion offices. This reflects the variety of ways in which countries arrange their 
commercial diplomacy function (Naray, 2011, 2012). Around three quarters of all 
offices were established in the 1900s, and less than a tenth have been established since 
2010. This attests to the steadiness of diplomatic relations in general, and confirms the 
survey's approach over Chapters 4 and 5: there is little variation in the presence of 
offices, while variation between offices in terms of their resources and activities is 
abundant. The offices often feature a small number of personnel as also observed in 
Kostecki and Naray (2007) and Naray (2008, 2011). Moreover, the offices generally 
rely on a large number of locally employed personnel led by one or a small number of 
commercial diplomats. Thus, demographically, the survey contains offices that fit with 
the definition of commercial diplomacy in Chapter 2. 
                                                 
63 The extent to which the analysis is biased because of potential selection problems that arise from the 
sample is discussed in the next Chapter. 
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Table 6.9: The offices' locations 
Africa 
 
Americas 
 
Asia & Oceania 
 
Europe 
Morocco 5   U.S.A. 13   Australia 13   Bulgaria 6 
South Africa 5   Brazil 5   India 10   France 5 
Ethiopia 2   Canada 5   China 9   Russia 5 
Mozambique 2   Argentina 4   South Korea 4   Sweden 4 
Nigeria 2   Chile 2   Turkey 4   U.K. 4 
Cameroon 1   Colombia 2   Iran 3   Austria 3 
Congo D.R. 1   Uruguay 2   Japan 3   Finland 3 
Mauritius 1   Bolivia 1   Kuwait 3   Germany 3 
Namibia 1   Ecuador 1   Pakistan 3   Italy 3 
Tunisia 1   El Salvador 1   U.A.E. 3   Belgium 2 
      Guatemala 1   Indonesia 2   Georgia 2 
      Guyana 1   Jordan 2   Netherlands 2 
      Mexico 1   Lebanon 2   Portugal 2 
      Peru 1   Malaysia 2   Serbia 2 
      Trinidad & Tobago 1   Philippines 2   Ukraine 2 
      Venezuela 1   Singapore 2   Albania 1 
            Taiwan 2   Croatia 1 
            Thailand 2   Denmark 1 
            Vietnam 2   Hungary 1 
            Burma 1   Latvia 1 
            Hong Kong 1   Macedonia 1 
            New Zealand 1   Norway 1 
            P.N.G. 1   Poland 1 
            Saudi Arabia 1   Romania 1 
            Turkmenistan 1   Spain 1 
                  Switzerland 1 
Total 21   Total 42   Total 79   Total 59 
 
Table 6.10: Office demographics 
 Frequency Per cent   Frequency Per cent 
Organisation type    Total number of staff 
Embassy/High 
  Commission  
74 36.8  1 to 2 69 34.3 
Consulate (-General) 22 10.9  3 to 5 66 32.8 
Trade promotion  
  office1 
36 17.9  6 to 10 40 19.9 
Trade promotion  
  office2 
69 34.3  11 to 20 16 8 
Year of establishment  20 or more 9 4.5 
1925 or earlier 16 8  Missing 1 0.5 
1926-1950 12 6  Percentage locally employed 
1951-1975 39 19.4  0 26 12.9 
1976-2000 63 31.3  More than 0% and  
  less than 25% 
5 0.5 
2001-2010 34 16.9  More than 25% and  
  less than 50% 
53 9.5 
2011-2014 16 8  More than 50% and  
  less than 75% 
41 22.9 
Missing 21 10.4  More than 75% 75 24.9 
    Missing 1 0.5 
Notes:  
(1) Office headed by a person from an embassy/high commission/consulate.  
(2) Office liaises with an embassy/high commission/consulate 
 
Table 6.11 presents a count of the number of industries the respondents selected in the 
survey as well as whether respondents indicated that they operate in other industries 
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(20 per cent did so). The right-hand side presents the consolidated number of industries 
which takes into account the self-selected industries, as well as instances where trade 
data for certain industries is not available. The pattern remains the same, though on 
the right-hand side the majority of respondents is involved with 4 or 5 industries rather 
than 6 to 10. This is a result of a consolidation of industries the respondents selected, 
necessitated by the absence of detailed services data, as well as the inclusion of 
additional industries in the data64. The most frequently occurring number of industries 
being 4 to 5 illustrates that offices generally take a targeted approach toward their 
activities. 
Table 6.11: Number of industries offices indicate to be active in 
 Frequency Per cent   Frequency Per cent 
Number of industries selected in survey  Number of industries (adjusted) 
1 4 2  1 4 2 
2 to 3 37 18.4  2 to 3 50 24.9 
4 to 5 69 34.3  4 to 5 77 38.3 
6 to 10 75 37.3  6 to 10 64 31.3 
More than 10 14 7  More than 10 3 1.5 
Missing 2 1  Missing 3 1.5 
Respondent listed additional industries     
Yes 41 20.4     
No 158 78.6     
Missing 2 1     
 
The food and beverage sector is most commonly occurring industry with 62 per cent 
of offices operating within it. The only other sector that the majority of respondents 
operate in is health care, with 52 per cent. The number of industries that the offices 
operate in combined with the low frequency with which most of the industries are 
selected by offices (less than 50 per cent for all but two industries) suggests that there 
is wide heterogeneity between offices, and that total exports may not be an accurate 
dependent variable. This lends further support to narrow the dependent variable by 
using the industries the respondent has selected. 
With respect to Hypothesis H5b, testing whether the effectiveness of commercial 
diplomacy offices differs by types of offices assumes that there is a difference between 
such offices on a variety of characteristics in the first place. Appendix G investigates 
whether this is the case, and finds that differences are strongest between resource 
allocations and relational network characteristics for the two office types: separate 
                                                 
64 As a result of adding the option for respondents to fill in any additional industries they are active in. 
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offices have larger resources available, yet offices within embassies and consulates 
have stronger ties with contacts. 
6.5.2. Respondents 
The second demographic aspect to the survey is the respondents' profiles, an overview 
of which is in Table 6.12. It provides insight into how the respondents fit within the 
profile of commercial diplomats from the previous literature and the definition in the 
literature review of Chapter 2. 
Table 6.12: Respondent demographics 
 Frequency Percent   Frequency Percent 
Gender    Job title   
Male 140 69.6  Commercial/economic 
  counsellor/attaché1 
50 24.9 
Female 48 23.9  Head/Director of office 51 25.4 
Missing 13 6.5  Trade commissioner 45 22.4 
Age    General diplomatic title2 27 13.4 
25 to 34 21 10.4  Commercial/economic 
  diplomatic title 
9 4.5 
35 to 44 59 29.4  Other3 19 9.5 
45 to 54 69 34.3  Schooling   
55 to 64 37 18.4  Bachelor's degree 31 15.4 
65 or older 2 1  Master's degree 134 66.7 
Missing 13 6.5  Doctoral degree 7 3.5 
Experience (years)  Professional degree 8 4 
Missing 2 1  Other 7 3.5 
Current post    Missing 14 7 
Less than 5 162 81.4  Time spent on commercial affairs 
5 or more 37 17.6  Less than 25% 17 8.5 
Previous posts  From 25 to 50% 30 14.9 
No 93 46.3  From 50 to 75% 82 40.8 
Yes 106 52.7  75% or more 70 34.8 
Private sector  Missing 2 1 
No 68 33.8  Languages spoken (besides English) 
Yes 131 65.2  0 16 8 
    1 58 28.9 
    2 62 30.8 
    3 40 19.9 
    More than 3 23 11.4 
    Missing 2 1 
Notes:  
(1) Many heads of offices are also commercial attaches or trade commissioners.   
(2) Includes such descriptions as e.g. counsellor, (first) secretary, ambassador, and consul.   
(3) Includes descriptions such as senior advisor, senior trade officer, and trade manager. 
 
The survey sample consist of commercial diplomats – those in charge of commercial 
affairs. The respondents' job titles conform to this profile: almost 90 per cent of all 
respondents have a role that corresponds with the commercial diplomat. Diplomatic 
titles are a common occurrence with smaller embassies and consulates, while the group 
of respondents under the 'Other' header falls under trade promotion organisations 
which liaise with embassies and consulates. Table 6.12 presents a profile of a well-
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educated set of respondents and a profession that is male-dominated, as well as an age 
distribution that fits with the higher-level management target demographic. 
More than 80 per cent of respondents have less than five years' experience at the 
current post. Combined with most respondents having experience at previous posts, 
this fits well with the profile of commercial diplomats as outlined in the literature 
review. There are career diplomats as well as respondents who have significant private 
sector experience (almost two thirds in the survey).  
Three quarters of the respondents spend more than half their time on commercial 
affairs. Not shown in the table below is that the most common secondary activity is 
engagement in broader economic affairs, especially for those already involved heavily 
with commercial affairs. Respondents who spend less than half of their time on 
commercial affairs also have a mixed set of other duties, where economic and 
political/diplomatic affairs feature equally. Lastly, and compliant with a long 
international career, around half of all respondents speak two or three languages (not 
including English). 
Overall, the respondents' profiles comply with the general portrait of a commercial 
diplomat as identified in the literature review. Moreover, there is large heterogeneity 
between the respondents which suggests that the survey captured responses from all 
types of commercial diplomats in terms of classifications by Naray (2011) or Ruël and 
Visser (2012). 
A comparison of the classifications by Ruël and Visser (2012) and Naray (2008) is 
relevant here. The former assesses commercial diplomats' level of involvement in 
commercial affairs, while the latter assesses their attitude towards its importance. 
Based on the first classification, the survey respondents fit within the proactor-reactor-
nonactor scheme in a 129-53-17 division, thus indicating that nearly two thirds of the 
respondents fit in Ruël and Visser's (2012) 'proactor' group. Naray's (2008) 
classification, i.e. the attitude towards the importance of commercial affairs versus 
economic or political/diplomatic affairs, yields a different outcome. Here, the division 
is 83-96-20; the group of civil servants is larger than the group of business promoters, 
which is consistent with the positioning of commercial diplomats within the 
environment of diplomatic missions. Table 6.13 below cross-tabulates the two 
classifications and indicates that there is overlap, but that civil servants and generalists 
still spend the majority of their time performing a proactive role. Condensing these 
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classifications to dummy variables that identify whether a respondent is a 
proactor/business promoter or not results in two thirds overlap between observations. 
Table 6.13: Cross-tabulation of the two classifications of commercial diplomats 
Ruël & Visser (2012)  Naray (2008)  
 
  Business 
promoter Civil servant Generalist Total 
Proactor   63 55 11 129 
Reactor   16 30 7 53 
Non-actor   4 11 2 17 
Total   83 96 20 199 
 
The extent to which the data collected in this study reflects the two classifications' 
conceptual underpinnings is unknown due to the little empirical work that has been 
done on the topic so far. Potential divergence between the classifications affects the 
analysis of Hypothesis H6a, in which is embedded the assumption that the 
classifications are equally representative and applicable in an empirical setting. 
Besides the testing of differences between types of offices, Appendix G also performs 
a set of parametric and nonparametric analyses that assess the equivalence of the Ruël 
and Visser (2012) and Naray (2008) classifications. It finds that these differences exist 
on a number of respondent characteristics, and that the classification by Ruël and 
Visser (2012) is better reflected in the data than the Naray (2008) classification. As 
such, in the analysis of Hypothesis H6a only the Ruël and Visser (2012) classification 
is used. 
6.6. Chapter Summary 
This Chapter has developed a survey instrument that collects the data required for the 
remaining hypotheses not covered in Chapters 4 and 5. These hypotheses relate to 
office-level activities, resources, and network characteristics. The survey instrument 
is based on the existing empirical literature as well as the concepts in Chapter 2. This 
Chapter has detailed the procedure by which this data was acquired, and analysed for 
its quality and reliability. The Chapter also provided a demographic view of the sample 
of 201 respondents whose data will be analysed in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7. 
 
COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY, 
OFFICE LEVEL 
CHARACTERISTICS, AND 
EXPORTS 
7.1. Introduction 
This Chapter addresses the hypotheses relating to the effect of office resources 
(including the commercial diplomat), activities, and network characteristics on exports 
(Hypotheses H4a to H10c), and the hypotheses that relate to how commercial 
diplomacy offices alleviate the negative effects of information asymmetry on exports 
(Hypotheses H11a to H12b). However, Hypothesis H4a, on offices' budgets, has been 
excluded as the survey yielded insufficient data.  
This is the third empirical study in this thesis, and is a partner to Chapter 6, which 
collects the data used in the current Chapter. It fits in the broader context of Chapters 
4 and 5 by investigating the characteristics that make commercial diplomacy offices 
successful. Chapter 4 assesses from a broad perspective whether commercial 
diplomacy offices work as intermediaries by looking at trade outcomes. Chapter 5 then 
identifies what trade barriers commercial diplomacy offices alleviate. The current 
Chapter looks at the office-level to add a third layer of understanding as to how 
commercial diplomacy offices function as intermediaries. 
This Chapter investigates the effect of the offices' resources, activities, and structural 
network characteristics on exports, and the interaction between activities and relational 
network characteristics, and trade barriers' effects on exports. It contributes to the 
empirical literature on overseas offices by identifying what factors contribute to their 
effectiveness, and whether, as intermediaries, they alleviate information asymmetry 
barriers. This understanding is missing as the few studies that do exist have focused 
on offices' budgets (Kang, 2011; Martin, 2003), activities to a limited degree 
(Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000; Wilkinson et al., 2011), and in one case on personnel 
resources (Lim, 2008). These studies have in common a narrow focus on an individual 
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country’s efforts, and a narrow set of these offices' characteristics. Moreover, they do 
not consider the intermediary aspect. This Chapter fills these gaps. 
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 discusses the 
estimation strategy and dataset, Section 7.3 displays and discusses the results, and 
Section 7.4 concludes. 
7.2. Empirical Strategy 
7.2.1. Data sources 
Commercial diplomacy 
This study uses data on commercial diplomacy collected as described in Chapter 6. 
This data is available for all but Hypothesis H4a; information on budgets was 
insufficiently available from the survey. Table 7.1 below summarises the variables that 
result from the survey and the hypotheses they relate to. A variable for Hypothesis 
H8b is not included in this table as it involves the dependent variable, discussed below. 
Trade data 
As data on services trade is not available for 2014, the analysis comprises goods trade 
only. As in Chapters 4 and 5, the source for this data is the UN Comtrade database. No 
export data for Iran and Bangladesh is available, so mirrored data is used for exports 
from those two countries. 
The construction of total exports from the source to the destination country consists of 
the aggregation of all six-digit industry codes by country-pair. Where the survey data 
shows that some countries have multiple offices in a particular destination country, the 
export volumes are divided by the number of offices from the same source country in 
the destination country. Multiple offices are located in different cities as the data 
cleaning process ensures no identical offices remain in the data. Overall, there is one 
set of triplicate offices in the survey, and six sets of duplicate offices. This method 
works on the assumption that where duplicate or triplicate office exist, each works 
with an equal share of total exports. An alternative approach towards handling 
duplicate and triplicate offices is averaging these offices' responses. While the main 
analysis works with the division of total exports by offices, in Appendix H the 
alternative approach (averaging offices' responses) is used for a robustness check. 
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Table 7.1: Measurement of variables and relation to hypotheses 
Variable Measurement Shorthand Hypothesis 
Office size (number of personnel) Continuous, bounded by 0 ofsize H4b 
Percentage of locally employed personnel over total Continuous between 0 and 1 locrat H4b 
Age of office Continuous between 1 and 114 ageoff H5a 
Office type (office within an embassy/consulate or without) Binary oftype H5b 
Whether a respondent is a proactor(1) or not Binary proac H6a 
Respondent's experience at current post Continuous, bounded by 0 exp1 H6b 
Respondent's experience at previous posts Continuous, bounded by 0 exp2 H6b 
Respondent's experience in the private sector Continuous, bounded by 0 exp3 H6b 
Ratio of current and previous post experience over total experience Continuous, between 0 and 1 pubrat H6b 
Respondent's communication skills – fluency in destination country's language Ordinal, between 1 and 7 lang1 H6c 
Respondent's communication skills – number of languages spoken Ordinal, bounded by 1 lang2 H6c 
Intensity with which network activities are performed Continuous, between 1 and 7 netwact H7a, H11a 
Intensity with which intelligence activities are performed are performed Continuous, between 1 and 7 intelact H7a, H11a 
Intensity with which image promotion activities are performed Continuous, between 1 and 7 imagact H7b, H11b 
Intensity with which FDI activities are performed Continuous, between 1 and 7 fdivact H7b, H11b 
Intensity with which business support activities are performed Continuous, between 1 and 7 bsupact H7c, H11b 
Number of industries an office is active in Ordinal, between 1 and 27 numind H8a 
Percentage of clients from the home country which are SMEs Continuous, between 0 and 100 smeo H9a 
Percentage of contacts in the destination country which are SMEs Continuous, between 0 and 100 smed H9b 
Approximate number of firm contacts in the destination country standardised by office size Continuous, bounded by 0 nsizd H10a 
Percentage of firms in nsizd which the office has established previous contact with Continuous, between 0 and 100 precon H10b 
Approximate number of clients from the home country standardised by office size Continuous, bounded by 0 nsizo H10c 
Tie strength Continuous, between 1 and 7 tiestr H12a 
Network communication intensity Continuous, between 1 and 7 netcom H12a 
Institutional differences Continuous, between 1 and 7 instdist H12a, H12b 
Tie strength with public officials Continuous, between 1 and 7 tiepub H12b 
Tie strength with business contacts Continuous, between 1 and 7 tiebus H12b 
Tie strength with innovation contacts Continuous, between 1 and 7 tieinno H12b 
Notes:  
(1) This refers to Ruël and Visser's (2012) commercial diplomat classification. For the analysis of hypothesis H6a this classification outperforms the one by Naray (2008) as shown in Appendix G.
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It possible that total exports do not accurately represent an office's field of operations. 
The assumption that they focus on total exports is relaxed significantly when 
accounting for the industries that the survey respondents report to be active in.  
Table 7.2 lists the industries reported in the survey. Industries 1 to 14 are the options 
presented to the respondents. In addition, respondents could indicate any other 
industries they operate in. Industries 15 to 35 consolidate these additional responses. 
The inclusion of these industries in specifying trade totals is motivated by the 
respondents' choice to include them: if a respondent takes time to perform the task of 
writing it down, it will be an integral part of the office's operations. 
Because data on services trade is unavailable, several industries are excluded from the 
analysis as before: financial services (ind4), education (ind11), business services 
(ind24), innovation (ind28), legal services (ind31), and services (ind33). Tourism and 
nation branding (ind35) can comprise services and is also excluded. While information 
on retail and wholesale exports (ind8) is available, it comprises many goods that fit 
into other industries. A consistent list is unavailable; hence this industry is also 
excluded. Finally, while the remaining industries may entail services exports as well 
(such as with IT – ind14), the data is restricted to goods exports. 
Table 7.2: Industries in the survey 
Industries listed in survey  Additional industries identified by respondents 
ind1 High-tech manufacturing  ind15 Aero 
ind2 Other manufacturing  ind16 Automotive 
ind3 Construction  ind17 Defence 
ind4 Financial services  ind18 Energy (renewable), water, and environment 
ind5 Agriculture, forestry and fishing  ind19 Maritime & Shipbuilding  
ind6 Mining  ind20 Metal 
ind7 Transportation  ind21 Creative & entertainment 
ind8 Retail and wholesale  ind22 Agricultural machinery 
ind9 Health care and pharmaceuticals  ind23 Architecture & design 
ind10 Oil and gas  ind24 Business services 
ind11 Education  ind25 Cosmetics 
ind12 Food & beverage  ind26 Electronics 
ind13 Textiles & clothing  ind27 Food processing 
ind14 IT (hardware and software)  ind28 Innovation 
   ind29 Jewellery 
   ind30 Leather clothing 
   ind31 Legal services 
   ind32 Machinery 
   ind33 Services 
   ind34 Sports 
   ind35 Tourism 
Notes:  
For italicised industries no export data is available 
 
For the industry codes that remain, the survey contains data on which industries the 
offices operate in. The set of industries that offices indicate they operate in corresponds 
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directly with Hypothesis H8a, which states that a commercial diplomacy office is more 
effective if it promotes trade in a targeted set of sectors rather than overall exports. 
Thus, calculating the industry-adjusted value of exports is necessary for the analysis. 
Calculating it requires identifying how each of the 5206 six-digit industry codes 
correspond to the industries identified in the survey. Industry reports and previous 
literature exists to inform the classification of 6-digit industries into the broader survey 
industries; Appendix I lists the sources as well as the procedure for the construction of 
the industry-adjusted exports variable. The industry-adjusted exports variable is akin 
to differentiated exports used in Chapter 4; the products that commercial diplomacy 
offices target are those for which information is not available via organised exchanges 
or other reference material. 
Barriers to trade and control variables 
Control and information asymmetry variables included in the analysis of the survey 
data are largely identical to those used in Chapter 5, though updated for the year of the 
survey (2014). Some data management and missing data operations are required before 
using them in the analysis. 
The survey uses only the standard set of gravity model control variables for geographic 
distance, population sizes, and GDP per capita. Data on population size is not available 
from the WDI for Taiwan, and data on GDP per capita is not available for Taiwan, 
Argentina, and Burma. Data on population and GDP per capita is not available for 
Guyana in 2014. Imputation of these variables is possible as data for 2011 to 2013 is 
available and the average growth rate is applied to reach the projected 2014 level. This 
is not possible for Taiwan, Argentina, and Burma due to further restrictions in data 
availability. 
Addressing Hypotheses H11a to H12b requires the same set of variables that Chapter 
5 uses. First is formal institutional quality in the importer country as the average of the 
six indicators in the WGI with the Heritage Foundation's economic freedom index 
overall score used for a robustness check. Internet use comes from the World Bank's 
WDI and is supplemented with fixed broadband subscriptions again for robustness. 
The bilateral linguistic and religious distance variables to denote informal institutional 
distance come from Melitz and Toubal (2014).  
The internet penetration and broadband subscription variables are missing for Taiwan 
only, which constitutes 2 observations in the survey data. For other countries, data for 
2014, where missing, can be imputed from previous years by utilising growth rates. 
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This applies to Canada, Italy, China, El Salvador, Papua New Guinea, Turkmenistan, 
Myanmar, and Guatemala. No data is missing within the WGI or Heritage data for the 
countries in the survey, nor for the religious and linguistic distance variables. 
7.2.2. Estimation strategy 
In devising an estimation strategy for Hypotheses H4b to H12b (H4a has been 
excluded from consideration) it is useful to first briefly summarise some key points in 
the related empirical literature: 
1. Estimator choice: all the related literature uses OLS, with Lederman et al. 
(2010) also accounting for selection and instrumental variable estimation. The 
choice for OLS in a cross-sectional setting follows from this literature. 
2. Multicollinearity: how the independent variables of interest are assessed with 
this OLS framework depends on the degree to which multicollinearity is an 
issue. One study adopts a hierarchical addition approach to account for 
multicollinearity (Wilkinson et al., 2011) and another utilises separate 
regressions for the activities' budgets to account for this multicollinearity issue 
(Morisset et al., 2003). However, most studies regress all variables 
simultaneously (Lederman et al., 2010; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000; Peng & 
York, 2001; Martin, 2003; Kotabe, 1993). In this study, the choice of 
hierarchical versus separate versus simultaneous addition of the variables 
depends on the variance inflation factor. If this lies below the acceptable 
threshold of 10 (O’brien, 2007) the estimation does not suffer from 
multicollinearity.  
3. Variable interactions: the empirical literature offers a guide to the assessment 
of the offices' activities within the context of the institutional environment. 
Wilkinson et al. (2011) do so by adding an interaction term between activities 
and entrepreneurial climate. Similarly, Harding and Javorcik (2011) interact 
their variable of interest with two sets of institutional environment variables to 
identify whether sector targeting is more effective when information 
availability is lower and transaction costs are higher. For the former they use 
proxies for linguistic and cultural distance, and for the latter they use indicators 
for the ease of doing business and the (in)effectiveness of bureaucracy. They 
interact both elements in separate regressions. Interactions terms are also 
utilised in Chapter 5 to identify the effect of the presence of foreign missions 
 160 
 
under varying institutional circumstances, and in the survey data analysis they 
are relevant too for Hypotheses H11a to H12b. 
When assessing which of the resource and activity variables work to increase exports, 
the analysis starts with a standard gravity model of trade which includes exports as the 
dependent variable, and typical gravity model variables as the independent variables. 
So, it follows that: 
(7.1) ln(Xij) = β0 + β1ln(Distij) + β2ln(GDPcapi) + β3ln(GDPcapj) + β4ln(Popi) + 
β5ln(Popj) + εij 
Where i is the export flow's origin country, j is the export flow's destination country, 
Xij stands for exports from i to j, Distij is the geographic distance between i and j, 
GDPcap are the GDP per capita terms, Pop are the population size terms, and ε is the 
error term. This model is the first to be estimated and utilises total exports and industry-
adjusted total exports in two separate estimations to identify whether the general 
gravity model holds when utilising industries the offices operate in. 
The effect of the offices' resources and activities on trade can be determined as follows: 
(7.2) ln(Xij) = β0 + βS[Surveyij] + βZZ + εij 
Where Z is the vector of control variables in equation (7.1). The term [Surveyij] is the 
set of survey variables from Table 7.1. To identify the consistency of the survey 
variables in the face of the standard gravity model variables, the estimation takes place 
twice: once without the Z vector, and once with. In addition, due to multicollinearity 
issues when adopting all relevant survey variables into one model (i.e. a Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) larger than 10) this procedure takes place separately for each of 
the four groups in the instrument design in Chapter 6. In doing so, the relational 
network aspects65 are excluded because they are relevant only when it comes to 
information asymmetry alleviation, which is discussed later. The survey variables 
consist of: office characteristics (ofsize, locrat, ageoff, oftype), the commercial 
diplomat's characteristics (proac, exp1, exp3, exp3, pubrat, lang1, lang2), activity 
characteristics (netwact, intelact, imagact, fdivact, bsupact, numind, smeo, smed), and 
structural network characteristics (nsizo, nsizd, precon). 
                                                 
65 Tie strength, network communication, and the three network composition variables that outline the 
importance of a specific group of contacts (public officials, business contacts, and innovation contacts) 
in the office's network. 
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Estimation of the above equations proceeds in three steps. First is an analysis of the 
control variables' behaviour on total exports, and value of total exports – adjusted for 
the industries that an office operates in – to identify whether the industry-adjusted 
exports are consistent with the gravity model framework. This is done with equation 
(7.1). Second is estimating the effect of the survey variables on exports. This is done 
for both total exports and industry-adjusted exports as per Hypothesis H8a. In addition, 
to account for potential aggregation issues, the four groups of variables are estimated 
separately. This takes place with and without the control variables, and based on 
equation (7.2). The third step analyses whether the offices' activities and networks 
alleviate information asymmetry using interactions between the relevant commercial 
diplomacy office variables and the trade barrier variables. 
To assess the interaction estimation required for Hypotheses H11a to H12b, a 
modification to equation (7.2) is required. The relationships of interest are between the 
information asymmetry variables and the relevant survey variables: activity 
performance, and the relational network variables. Determining this follows the 
analysis in Chapter 5, Wilkinson et al. (2011) and Harding and Javorcik (2011). The 
model includes interaction terms between relevant variables. The inclusion of 
interaction effects in the estimating equation is as follows: 
(7.3) ln(Xij) = β0 + βSI([Surveyij] x [IA]) + βS[Surveyij] + βIA[IA] + βZZ + εij 
Here, the term [Surveyij] x [IA] denotes an interaction between the survey element of 
interest and the information asymmetry variable of interest. The variables within this 
term also enter separately into the equation and appear before the vector of control 
variables Z. Their inclusion is necessary for the correct interpretation of the interaction 
term (Jaccard, Wan, & Turrisi, 1990). 
The four information asymmetry variables that interact are linguistic distance, 
religious distance, institutional quality, and the level of internet use in the host country. 
As in Harding and Javorcik (2011) and the economic literature in general (e.g. 
Moenius & Berkowitz, 2011; Borrmann et al., 2006), each interaction term requires a 
separate estimation of equation (7.3).  
Based on the relevant hypotheses, the survey variables of interest are the five activity 
group variables (netwact, intelact, imagact, fdivact, bsupact), and the variables for the 
relational network characteristics (tiestr, netcom, tiepub, tiebus, tieinno). As such, the 
ten survey variables will each interact with four information asymmetry variables in 
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separate estimations to alleviate the multicollinearity concerns that interacted variables 
face. As a robustness check, additional estimations are done using alternative variables 
for institutional quality and internet use, and the survey variable instdist will be used 
as a robustness check. 
7.2.3. Estimation issues 
Estimating public policy variables is subject to endogeneity issues, to which common 
solutions are panel data techniques (as in Chapter 4), and instrumental variables 
estimation (as in Chapter 5). The empirical literature related to the survey does not use 
such techniques except for Lederman et al. (2010), who instrument their key variable, 
an export promotion agency's overall budget, with the number of years to the next 
election and the number of years since the agency's founding. However, in a 
subsequent analysis of more detailed export promotion agency variables they cannot 
account for endogeneity within the multitude of variables used; this is also the case for 
estimating the survey variables in this study. Estimating the survey variables' effects 
on exports using OLS assumes that the survey variables are exogenous. This implies 
that the causality runs from the survey variables to exports and not vice versa. For most 
of the survey variables this is a reasonable assumption as they relate to office 
characteristics that rely on performance overseas by staff, and on requests by firms for 
activities, rather than on resources allocated by a government. But, the resource 
variables in terms of personnel and ratio of locally employed personnel over total 
personnel are most likely to be endogenous and biased upwards. Morisset et al. (2003) 
note that reverse causality for resource allocation variables is unlikely due to the slow-
moving nature of the political process behind financing decisions relating to such 
offices. Nevertheless, the estimations in the analysis need to be interpreted with 
caution and, as Lederman et al. (2010) suggest, are to be interpreted as conditional 
correlations. According to Morisset et al. (2003), positive and significant coefficients 
do not necessarily imply that the relationship is always positive, but they do indicate 
that the existence of negative effects is unlikely. 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) point out that in the case of a heteroscedastic 
dependent variable, exports in this survey, log-linearisation may lead to inconsistent 
estimates. They develop a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) which is 
consistent in the face of this problem and provides a way to deal with zero trade 
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flows66. Their method has quickly become one of the most cited econometrics papers 
in the last ten years and sees ubiquitous use in the empirical literature. In this analysis, 
PPML will complement the OLS estimates to account for the heterogeneity in the 
outcome variable.  
The survey results are restricted to the offices and respondents who elected to 
participate, which might reflect some innate bias. Using a Heckman selection type 
model (Heckman, 1979) to correct the potential bias in the sample, the inverse Mills 
ratio is calculated from a probit estimation that assesses participation in the survey. 
This ratio is then added to equations (7.2) and (7.3) to account for selection bias. If it 
is not statistically different from zero, there is no bias and if it is, the bias is present 
but accounted for to some degree. The analysis of response propensity takes place in 
Section 7.3.2, before the analysis of the hypotheses commences. The inclusion of the 
inverse Mills ratio (mills) accounts for selection bias in a similar manner to Lederman 
et al. (2010), who find that selection bias in their model cannot be ignored. 
There are two exclusion criteria, variables that matter to the selection equation but not 
the outcome equation (Puhani, 2000), in this selection model. The first is direct 
correspondence with the respondent. This is a strong criterion as it is unrelated to the 
dependent variable in the main equation. The second, common language between host 
and home countries, is a frequently adopted factor that is positively related to exports. 
The English language variable used in the response propensity estimation is only a 
subset of that aspect. In a regression of exports on these two exclusion criterion 
variables, both are statistically insignificant, suggesting that these are valid exclusion 
restrictions. This analysis makes a small contribution on response rate stimulation to 
the literature67, which is undecided as to the effect of personalised emails on survey 
participation (compare e.g. Anseel et al. (2010), VanGeest et al. (2007) and VanGeest 
and Johnson (2011) with Porter and Whitcomb (2003), Fan and Yan (2010) and Fox 
et al. (1988). 
Chapter 6 aggregates the types of offices that respondents work for as 
embassies/consulates on the one hand, and separate offices on the other. This is one of 
the variables in the analysis in Section 7.3.4. However, this variable may be subject to 
selection bias from country development status: developed countries are more likely 
                                                 
66 The zero trade flow problem is of less importance given the occurrence of only one zero trade flow 
which constitutes less than half a per cent of the number of observations. 
67 Most likely, contributing to the existing division. 
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to have more expansive resource endowments to allocate towards separate offices, 
while developing countries may not have such resources and are potentially only able 
to consolidate their commercial diplomacy efforts within embassies/consulates. Given 
that Appendix G indicates that there are substantial differences between these two 
types of offices, a key step in the estimation is to check whether these differences, and 
the effect of having either an embassy/consulate or separate office on exports, reflect 
country development levels instead.  
To investigate whether the developed versus developing country issue is a problem in 
this study, a propensity score matching analysis applies to identify whether the effect 
of the oftype variable on exports depends on characteristics that determine whether 
oftype takes a unity or zero value or on the oftype variable itself. The propensity score 
matching model compares the effect of the variable of interest between countries that 
do and do not receive the treatment based on propensity score matched pairs of 
observations (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983); it matched treated and untreated 
observations on the estimated probability of receiving treatment. In this study, the 
treatment is the oftype variable, and potential characteristics that determine observing 
or not observing a value of one in the oftype variable are gravity model control 
variables for GDP of the home and host countries, population sizes, geographic 
distance, and dummy variables for trade agreement membership and currency 
agreements. Matching of propensity scores based on nearest neighbour, radius, kernel 
and stratification techniques all point to insignificant differences of the effect of oftype 
on exports between matched pairs, indicating that the developed versus developing 
country resource endowment problem is not a concern in interpreting the results in 
Section 7.3. 
As per the definition by Forza (2002), the unit of analysis is the level of aggregation 
in the data analysis process. More formally, it is the type of item on which statistical 
inferences are drawn (Koepsell, 2005). Cross-level inference problems arise when data 
collection and analysis occur at different levels (Babbie, 2012). While the outcome 
variable of interest is exports, the potential for cross-level inference problems can be 
present if commercial diplomacy offices are not directly related to the outcome 
variable. However, the positive and significant results obtained for offices' budgets 
(Kang, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2011), personnel characteristics (Lim, 2008) suggest 
that they are directly related. Moreover, Hypotheses H11a to H12b allude to indirect 
effects, thus accounting for this possible inference problem. 
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7.3. Results and Discussion 
7.3.1. Descriptive statistics 
The summary statistics for all survey items and variables across all observations are in 
Table 7.3. The principal component analysis of the activities in Chapter 6 (Section 
6.4.7) indicates that for every activity group the item loadings are very close together. 
Therefore, the average across the items is an accurate representation of each scale, and 
they preserve the original variation in the data (DiStefano, Zhu, & Mindrila, 2009). 
Items within the variables based on factor analysis have more heterogeneous item 
factor scores. The variables will be accommodated by multiplying the items by their 
factor scores, and then taking the average. 
Table 7.3: Summary statistics for all survey variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
ofsize 200 6.015 7.647 4 1 70 
locrat 200 60.188 31.201 66.667 0 100 
ageoff 180 35.194 31.082 25.5 0 114 
oftype 201 0.478 0.501 0 0 1 
proac 199 0.648 0.479 1 0 1 
exp1 199 4.009 4.895 2.417 0.167 27.25 
exp2 199 5.383 7.443 3 0 35 
exp3 199 5.277 7.036 3 0 30.75 
pubrat 199 68.889 32.814 80.18 1.695 100 
lang1 200 4.69 2.298 6 1 7 
lang2 199 3.045 1.3 3 1 8 
netwact 201 5.72 0.969 6 2.333 7 
intelact 200 5.092 0.922 5 2.333 7 
imagact 199 4.854 1.006 5 2 7 
fdivact 200 4.558 1.257 4.5 1.5 7 
bsupact 198 3.455 1.091 3.333 1 7 
numind 199 5 2.267 5 0 14 
smeo 196 73.847 21.173 80 2 100 
smed 196 59.98 23.108 61 8 100 
nsizd 177 102.877 182.109 50 0 1666.667 
precon 184 47.109 26.499 50 0 100 
nsizo 172 107.026 226.248 44.583 0 2000 
tiestr 189 2.731 1.035 2.672 0.765 5.355 
netcom 188 2.689 0.488 2.693 1.453 3.955 
instdist 200 3.761 0.838 4.007 0.716 5.013 
tiepub 161 3.52 0.936 3.705 1.294 5.154 
tiebus 162 3.996 0.616 4.03 2.457 4.902 
tieinno 160 3.238 0.966 3.455 0.757 5.299 
 
In the office demographics discussed in Section 6.5.1 it is already noted that offices 
are typically small, and it is then no surprise that the total number of personnel (ofsize) 
has a mean of 6.015 and a median of 4 – indicating that ofsize is skewed to the left. 
Similarly skewed is the offices' age (ageoff) – the median is lower than the mean. This 
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indicates that the offices are newly established and hence different from diplomatic 
representations which often are established for political reasons first.  
Regarding the experience variables, both exp2 and exp3 are larger, on average, than 
exp1. This is to be expected with a rotational system. The average ratio of experience 
in the public sector over total experience (pubrat) is close to 70 per cent, with the 
median being 80 per cent; hence, the respondents' experience is largely public sector 
based. Assessing the normality of the variables constructed from a set of items (locrat, 
pubrat, netwact, intelact, imagact, fdivact, bsupact, tiestr, netcome, instdist, tiepub, 
tiebus and tieinno) indicates that all these variables lie within the acceptable ranges for 
skewness and kurtosis; no variable exceeds a skewness of 3 or a kurtosis of 10. 
Table 7.4 contains the summary statistics for the export and control variables. Total 
exports over all country-pairs in the sample constitute around US$1.01 trillion. A 
further consideration is that the dependent variable for Hypothesis H8a, industry-
adjusted exports, accounts for only the industries that the offices target. Exports in the 
sample across all observations then total US$0.64 trillion, or 63.3 per cent of total 
exports across all observations. 
Table 7.4: Summary statistics for export and control variables 
Variable Shorthand Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total exports (in US$1 
million) 
 201 4994.247 11073.54 0.423 76444.11 
Industry-adjusted exports (in 
US$1 million) 
 200 3159.669 8371.42 0 60509 
Internet use % (host country)  199 61.772 25.321 2.1 96.3 
Broadband subscription % 
(host country) 
 199 18.352 12.867 0.001 45.968 
Linguistic proximity  195 0.889 0.943 0 5.515 
Religious proximity  195 0.141 0.203 0 0.828 
Institutional quality 
   (host country) 
 201 0.410 0.915 -1.540 1.868 
Economic freedom  
  (host country) 
 201 64.95 11.125 36.3 90.1 
Distance (km.) gdist 201 6946.753 4803.437 160.928 17681.75 
GDP per capita  
  (home country) 
gdpcapi 201 32763.85 14232.36 1689.437 78958.09 
GDP per capita  
  (host country) 
gdpcapj 194 26618.7 18433.6 711.52 78958.09 
Population (home country) popi 201 5.20E+07 6.39E+07 327589 3.19E+08 
Population (host country) popj 199 1.90E+08 3.80E+08 763893 1.36E+09 
 
The most well-represented exporter in the sample is Macedonia, for which the sample 
covers 49 per cent of its exports to the world. Australia is also well-represented with 
over 43 per cent. For 10 of the 42 exporters, the survey sample comprises less than 1 
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per cent of their total exports to the world68. Across all 42 exporters, the median 
percentage of export flows to the world represented in the data is 6.82. As for industry-
adjusted exports, the median percentage of industry-adjusted exports over total exports 
for the country-pairs in the survey is 70.03. For 10 of the 193 country-pairs, industry-
adjusted exports constitute more than 90 per cent of total exports between the pairs69. 
This ratio is below 50 per cent for 10 other countries-pairs70, and the lowest of these 
sits at just over 12 per cent (Iran), thus indicating that some countries perform highly 
targeted efforts. Summary statistics for these export variables are in Table 7.4. The 
industry-adjusted total exports variable reaches zero because some offices operate in 
service industries only, for which no data is available. 
The variables for communication, the institutional environment, and the other control 
variables are also summarised in Table 7.4. The higher values for the linguistic and 
religious proximity variables indicate higher linguistic and religious commonality 
across a country-pair. 
7.3.2. Propensity to respond 
This study follows Abraham, Maitland, and Bianchi (2006), Fricker and Tourangeau 
(2010) and Wright, Bowman, Butler, and Eyerman (2005) to predict response 
propensity from which the inverse Mills ratio is derived. In these studies, a binary 
outcome variable that denotes whether or not a projected respondent completed the 
survey is regressed on a set of variables that identify which factors positively and 
negatively affect the likelihood of a response. The definition of the dependent variable 
here, responded, is narrow; it only takes a value of one if the projected participant is 
in the final survey sample of 201. 
To compare the effect of direct correspondence with the projected participant with 
indirect correspondence, a dummy variable is created which equals one if the 
respondent's direct email address is known, and zero otherwise. If this variable’s 
coefficient (personal) is positive and significant, a personalised and direct survey 
invitation increases the likelihood of a response being recorded. 
Several types of offices feature in the survey, the key difference being that they can be 
an office at an embassy or consulate, or an office at a separate location which liaises 
                                                 
68 Belarus, Israel, Morocco, Slovenia, Pakistan, Brazil, Germany, Tanzania, Switzerland, and Thailand. 
69 Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Slovenia, Germany, Tanzania, Brazil, South Korea, Bangladesh, and 
Macedonia. 
70 Iran, Morocco, USA, Poland, Belarus, Greece, Israel, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, and Norway 
 168 
 
with the embassy or consulate. The binary variable oftype denotes this and is used to 
determine whether one type of office is more likely to respond to the survey. If the 
coefficient of this variable is positive and significant, non-separate offices are more 
likely to respond to the survey. If the coefficient is negative, separate offices are more 
likely to respond. 
The tyranny of distance, both communication-wise and geographical, is known to 
influence the likelihood of responding to international surveys (Harzing, Reiche, & 
Pudelko, 2013). This analysis therefore analyses the potential respondent's geographic 
distance from the Australia centroid as measured from the respondent's office's city 
location (ausdistw). If it is negative, this tyranny of distance affects response rates and 
the survey is geographically biased. The geographic distance data is sourced from the 
Cepii database. 
In addition, the analysis includes a variable for communication distance that denotes 
whether the potential respondent's office represents a country that shares a common 
language with Australia (auscomlang). This indicates whether respondents from an 
English-speaking home country are more likely to complete the survey, and is hence a 
measure of cultural bias in responding to the survey. It is a binary variable which is 
one if at least 20 per cent of the population in the respondent's home country can speak 
English as a native language. If it is positive, respondents from countries with high 
populations of native English speakers tend to disproportionately respond to the survey 
and there may be cultural bias in the survey result. The language data is from the Cepii 
database. 
To determine whether respondents from richer countries are more likely to participate 
in the survey, this analysis includes (log) GDP per capita of the respondent's home 
country (gdppc_o). To understand the difference between the respondents’ home and 
host countries, (log) GDP per capita of the respondent's host country (gdppc_d) is also 
included. If gdppc_o and gdppc_d are positive and significant, the survey is biased 
towards respondents that represent more developed countries, and towards more 
developed host countries. Since it is possible that the ease of contacting projected 
respondents, and their ease of responding to the survey, is affected by the degree to 
which internet is available, (log) internet use in the host country is utilised (inetuser). 
inetuser is positive if the survey is biased towards respondents who have easier access 
to the internet. 
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To estimate the relationship between the propensity to respond to the survey and the 
variables outlined above two estimations are applicable. Logit and probit estimations 
are both suited to estimate the relationship between the propensity to respond to the 
survey and the variables outlined above. Both deal with binary dependent variable 
models, where logit assumes a cumulative distribution function of the normal 
distribution to define the functional form of the model, and probit uses a cumulative 
distribution of the logistic distribution. Because the inverse Mills ratio must be 
generated from a probit model, the estimation is based on this. 
The total number of observations utilised in this estimation is 3500, which is lower 
than the number of invitations that were sent due to data availability issues regarding 
the variables from the secondary sources, and to the estimation only retaining data on 
the office level, thus removing duplicate potential respondents per office. Descriptive 
statistics are in Table 7.5, which indicate that for a minority of respondents the personal 
email addresses were available, while the majority of offices are embassies and 
consulates rather than separate offices. 
Table 7.5: Descriptive statistics for the response propensity analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
responded 3,500 0.052 0.223 0 1 
personal 3,500 0.412 0.492 0 1 
embhc 3,500 0.669 0.471 0 1 
ausdist 3,500 12237.64 4380.06 1 17640.58 
auscomlang 3,500 0.315 0.464 0 1 
gdppc_o 3,500 28208.93 21845.75 255.045 97518.6 
gdppc_d 3,500 24579.89 22641.53 255.045 97518.6 
inetuser 3,500 60.875 26.182 0.99 98.16 
 
Table 7.6 below shows the results of the probit model. Column (1) contains the 
coefficients, and column (2) the marginal effects. The results support Anseel et al. 
(2010) and VanGeest and Johnson (2011) rather than Porter and Whitcomb (2003), 
Fan and Yan (2010) and Fox et al. (1988): targeted emails increase the likelihood of a 
potential respondent completing the survey. It is likely that this result is at least in part 
due of the intervention of gatekeepers, therefore highlighting the importance of getting 
a detailed list of individual contacts when dealing with high level respondents. The 
results indicate that no discernible bias exists regarding the different types of offices 
that were approached, and that trade sections within embassies and consulates are as 
likely to respond as trade sections that liaise or are affiliated with embassies and 
consulates. 
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Both GDP per capita in the host country and the number of internet users are 
insignificant. This indicates that the set of destination countries represents countries in 
all stages of development, and that internet access is no obstacle. Geographic distance 
from Australia is a weakly significant factor which negatively affects the propensity 
to respond. The evidence that offices closer to Australia are more likely to respond is 
thus weak, and its significance could be an indication of the respondents' familiarity 
with the researcher's university. As a measure of cultural distance, linguistic similarity 
with Australia is negatively related to the propensity to respond, meaning that 
respondents are more likely to participate if English is not their first language; thus 
confirming that the survey respondents represent a global sample. Lastly, GDP per 
capita in the home country is positively related to response propensity. As such, the 
sample is biased towards offices that operate on behalf of developed countries. The 
inclusion of the inverse Mills (mills) ratio into equations (7.2) and (7.3) partly 
alleviates this bias. 
Table 7.6: Response propensity analysis results 
 (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.: Responded Probit Marginal effects 
   
personal 0.332** 0.018** 
 (0.160) (0.009) 
embhc -0.059 -0.002 
 (0.154) (0.008) 
ausdist (log) -0.067** -0.003** 
 (0.033) (0.002) 
auscomlang -0.324* -0.016** 
 (0.175) (0.008) 
gdppc_o (log) 0.352*** 0.017*** 
 (0.080) (0.004) 
gdppc_d (log) -0.070 -0.003 
 (0.109) (0.006) 
inetuser_d (log) 0.107 0.005 
 (0.202) (0.001) 
Constant -5.489***  
 (1.073)  
   
Observations 3,500  
R-square 0.026  
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
7.3.3. Assessing the dependent variable 
In Table 7.7 below, the four columns display the results for the OLS and PPML 
estimations of the effects of the standard gravity model variables on total exports and 
industry-adjusted exports. The first two columns contain the OLS results, and the last 
two columns the PPML results. Columns (1) and (3) utilise total exports, and columns 
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(2) and (4) industry-adjusted exports. In all four estimations, the number of 
observations is lower than the number of observations in the survey due to data 
availability. The R-squared indicates a good fit in all four cases.  
There is consistency across all four estimations for each independent variable. 
Geographic distance hovers around negative one, GDP per capita sits between 0.8 and 
1.3, and population size between 0.6 and 0.8. Comparing the total exports columns, 
(1) and (3), the OLS and PPML estimates lie close together when it comes to total 
exports. The differences between the industry-adjusted exports columns, (2) and (4), 
show a similar pattern. Comparing total exports to industry-adjusted exports, there are 
minor changes in coefficients but not in significance levels or signs. The change in 
coefficients from (1) to (2) and from (3) to (4) shows a similar pattern. 
Table 7.7: Results for total exports and industry-adjusted exports in a gravity model setting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS PPML PPML 
 Total 
Exports 
Industry-
adjusted 
Exports 
Total 
Exports 
Industry-
adjusted 
Exports 
     
gdist (log) -1.009*** -1.054*** -0.890*** -0.987*** 
 (0.083) (0.115) (0.090) (0.088) 
gdpcapi (log) 1.353*** 1.037*** 1.361*** 0.831*** 
 (0.127) (0.174) (0.165) (0.193) 
gdpcapj (log) 1.066*** 1.156*** 1.098*** 1.294*** 
 (0.086) (0.117) (0.114) (0.187) 
popi (log) 0.872*** 0.870*** 0.752*** 0.688*** 
 (0.069) (0.094) (0.065) (0.075) 
popj (log) 0.697*** 0.746*** 0.723*** 0.828*** 
 (0.048) (0.066) (0.085) (0.116) 
     
Observations 194 193 194 194 
R-squared 0.736 0.601 0.628 0.510 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept included but not recorded. 
 
As such, the estimates are consistent with the related empirical literature on the effect 
of the presence of diplomatic missions on exports (e.g. Rose, 2007; Yakop & van 
Bergeijk, 2011), with the one study that utilises these control variables in a study of 
offices' resources (Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000), and with the international trade 
literature in general. Thus, using industry-adjusted exports to study the effect of the 
survey variables on exports is appropriate. 
7.3.4. Survey variables' effect on exports 
The survey variables are estimated group by group, starting with the office 
characteristics for office type, size, percentage of locally employed personnel, and age. 
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Table 7.8 displays the results for estimating the effect of these variables on total 
exports in columns (1) to (4), and industry-adjusted exports in columns (5) to (8). OLS 
and PPML specifications are indicated in the table. Estimations in even numbered 
columns include gravity model control variables, and those in odd numbered columns 
do not71, 72. 
Overall, the results are stronger for industry-adjusted variables than for total exports, 
supporting Hypothesis H8a.  
Comparing the OLS results for total exports versus industry-adjusted exports, the 
result with gravity model controls variables (column (1)) is less significant total 
exports that the comparable industry-adjusted result (column (5)). The result without 
gravity model control variables is insignificant for total exports (column (2)) compared 
to industry-adjusted exports (column (6)).  
The number of personnel (ofsize) follows this same pattern. It is less significant on 
total exports than it is on industry-adjusted exports when not taking into account 
control variables (compare columns (1) and (3) with columns (5) and (7)). It is 
insignificant when adding control variables and looking at total exports (columns (2) 
and (4)), while it remains significant in the industry-adjusted exports estimations that 
account for control variables (columns (6) and (8)). No changes between total and 
industry-adjusted exports occur for the variable that assesses the percentage of locally 
employed personnel (locrat). 
The changes in the age of an office (ageoff) consist of a lower estimate on total exports 
(column (1)) compared with industry-adjusted exports (column (5)), and a less 
significant result for total exports when taking into account control variables (column 
(2)) than when doing the same for industry-adjusted exports (column (6)). In addition, 
the inverse Mills ratio is significant only in the OLS specifications using total exports 
(columns (1) and (2)), indicating that selection bias based on the country that the office 
represents is present only for total exports. 
                                                 
71 Note that in all Tables in this Chapter, the behaviour of the control variables is consistent with gravity 
model expectations. Only GDP per capita in country i becomes insignificant or weakly significant when 
using industry-adjusted exports. This is potentially due to the homogeneity of the home countries, an 
element to which the response propensity in Section 7.3.2 points to as well. 
72 Following the discussion in Section 7.2.1 the current Section divides total exports by the number of 
offices between a country pair in case the survey features responses from multiple different offices per 
country-pair (there are six duplicate offices, and one triplicate office). Appendix H takes a different 
approach and averages duplicate and triplicate offices' survey responses rather than total exports. As the 
Appendix shows, this does not lead to different results. 
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Table 7.8: The effect of office characteristics on exports 
 Total exports  Industry-adjusted exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS PPML PPML  OLS OLS PPML PPML 
          
oftype -0.661** -0.197 -0.325 -0.297  -0.907*** -0.443* -0.360 -0.250 
 (0.298) (0.185) (0.293) (0.189)  (0.336) (0.251) (0.365) (0.212) 
ofsize 0.657*** 0.140 0.749*** 0.102  0.786*** 0.308** 0.845*** 0.382* 
 (0.170) (0.109) (0.157) (0.154)  (0.192) (0.148) (0.183) (0.204) 
locrat 0.005 -0.001 0.004 -0.003  0.005 0.001 0.008 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
ageoff 0.294** 0.219** 0.154 0.115  0.359** 0.342*** 0.169 0.179 
 (0.145) (0.091) (0.129) (0.075)  (0.163) (0.124) (0.157) (0.125) 
mills -1.763** -1.576* -0.985 -0.093  -0.582 -1.804 -0.462 -0.435 
 (0.784) (0.905) (0.600) (0.973)  (0.884) (1.230) (0.767) (1.421) 
gdist (log)  -0.924***  -0.888***   -0.946***  -0.934*** 
  (0.091)  (0.092)   (0.123)  (0.111) 
gdpcapi (log)  0.824***  1.266***   0.284  0.172 
  (0.231)  (0.284)   (0.314)  (0.266) 
gdpcapj (log)  1.042***  1.011***   1.110***  1.105*** 
  (0.095)  (0.140)   (0.129)  (0.208) 
popi (log)  0.828***  0.725***   0.751***  0.482*** 
  (0.083)  (0.100)   (0.113)  (0.136) 
popj (log)  0.644***  0.719***   0.653***  0.770*** 
  (0.053)  (0.074)   (0.073)  (0.112) 
          
Observations 172 166 172 166  172 166 172 166 
R-squared 0.254 0.758 0.246 0.668  0.245 0.645 0.203 0.597 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept included but not recorded.
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Focusing solely on industry-adjusted exports rather than total exports, the OLS 
specifications indicate that regardless of the inclusion of control variables, separate 
offices (oftype) are more effective than embassies/consulates at increasing exports, an 
office's size positively affects exports, and older offices have a larger positive effect 
on trade (columns (5) and (6)). All these variables are significant at the 5 or 1 per cent 
level except for office type, which is significant at the 10 per cent level upon the 
inclusion of the control variables. In the PPML specifications, however, only the 
positive effect of an office's size on exports remains as significant (columns (7) and 
(8)). In no specification does the ratio of locally employed personnel yield a significant 
result.  
To identify whether the effect of an office's size is nonlinear, the OLS estimations in 
columns (5) and (6) are re-run with the square of office size included. The point at 
which office size starts to have diminishing returns is 51 in the estimation based on 
column (5), and 37 based on column (6). With 198 offices, out of 201, being smaller 
than 37, this limit is not reached often. The results indicate strong support for 
Hypothesis H4b for total staff having a positive impact on trade, but not for more 
locally employed personnel positively impacting trade. Similarly, Hypothesis H5a is 
supported: the longer a commercial diplomacy office is located in a country, the larger 
its effect on trade. However, Hypothesis H5b is rejected: an office which is separate 
from a diplomatic representation is more effective than an office within a diplomatic 
representation. 
A comparison can be drawn between the results here and those obtained by Lim's 
(2008) study of investment promotion offices' age, size, and locally employed 
personnel. While in his study these variables all positively contribute to FDI 
investment, exports appear to be affected most of all by the number of staff. 
Nevertheless, the OLS results do provide some evidence of a positive effect of an 
office's age on exports, though this evidence is not as strong as it is for size. The 
parallel with studies of offices' budgets by Kotabe (1993), Kang (2011) and Wilkinson 
(2006) is that size matters in terms of plain resources. Moreover, while Martin (2003) 
suggests that the strength of these offices lies in their presence more than anything, the 
results here indicate that in terms of internal organisation, presence alone is not 
sufficient to positively impact trade; an office’s resources need to be developed and 
utilised. 
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Moving to the commercial diplomat's characteristics, potential aggregation issues arise 
between personal characteristics such as experience, and market-characteristics such 
as GDP per capita and population size. For this reason, Table 7.9 only displays the 
results from OLS and PPML specifications that do not include these control variables. 
Like Table 7.8 it features estimations for total exports in columns (1) and (2), and 
industry-adjusted exports in columns (3) and (4). Note that in Table 7.9 the inverse 
Mills ratio (mills) is significant, suggesting that the selection bias applies to the 
respondents themselves, and not the offices (where it was insignificant). With the 
knowledge that this bias is at least in part accounted for by the inclusion of this 
variable, the table presents robust results for the respondents' characteristics.  
Table 7.9: The effect of commercial diplomat characteristics on exports 
 Total exports  Industry-adjusted exports 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 OLS PPML  OLS PPML 
      
proac 1.322*** 1.111***  1.446*** 1.232*** 
 (0.283) (0.295)  (0.327) (0.402) 
exp1 -0.049 -0.029  -0.071** -0.066** 
 (0.030) (0.027)  (0.035) (0.032) 
exp2 0.017 0.042***  0.025 0.042*** 
 (0.020) (0.013)  (0.023) (0.015) 
exp3 -0.002 -0.060*  -0.000 -0.064** 
 (0.032) (0.031)  (0.037) (0.030) 
pubrat 0.013* -0.004  0.014* -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.011) 
lang1 0.054 0.116**  0.064 0.203*** 
 (0.063) (0.051)  (0.072) (0.066) 
lang2 -0.201* -0.236**  -0.243** -0.345** 
 (0.106) (0.113)  (0.122) (0.150) 
mills -3.735*** -2.306***  -2.820*** -2.078** 
 (0.881) (0.626)  (1.015) (0.840) 
      
Observations 196 196  195 196 
R-squared 0.191 0.108  0.160 0.113 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept included but not recorded. 
 
A comparison between the results for total exports and industry-adjusted exports again 
reveals support for Hypothesis H8a. Since the results for variables are less significant, 
and have lower estimates, for total exports (columns (1) and (2)), than for industry-
adjusted exports (columns (3) and (4)) the discussion will focus on the results for 
industry-adjusted exports.  
The dummy variable (proac) that indicates whether a commercial diplomat is a 
proactor, per the Ruël and Visser (2012) classification, is positive and significant at 
the 1 per cent level in both estimations. This differs from Ruël and Zuidema's study 
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(2012) in which they find that business promoters are not, per se, more effective than 
other types of commercial diplomats for a self-assessed service quality measure. Here, 
the results indicate that for exports rather than a self-assessed measure of service 
quality, more actively engaged commercial diplomats are significantly associated with 
higher exports. 
The measures for experience at the current post (curpos), previous posts (prepos), and 
the private sector (prvpos) are all significant in the PPML specification at the 5 or 1 
per cent levels. Experience at the current position is also significant in the OLS 
specification at the 5 per cent level. Meanwhile, the ratio of experience in commercial 
diplomacy posts over total experience (pubrat) is only significant at the 10 per cent 
level (column (3)). The sign for experience at the current position is negative, as is the 
sign for experience in the private sector. On the other hand, experience at previous 
posts has a positive sign.  
To identify whether the curpos variable's effect is always negative or whether there is 
a nonlinear effect, its square is included in a separate regression. The marginal effect 
with respect to exports suggests that experience at the current position follows a U-
shape. The turning point on this slope is after the first year – in the specifications the 
estimate of the marginal effect varies between 1.1 and 1.7 years - suggesting that there 
is an adjustment period after which the commercial diplomat is settled in (the effects 
of other types of experience notwithstanding). The same procedure for prvpos also 
yields a U-shape effect, where the positive effect of private sector experience 
commences after 3.9 years suggesting that commercial diplomats should have a 
minimum of four years' experience in the private sector. Lastly, the variable that 
denotes experience at previous posts has an inverted U shape upon including its square 
and estimating columns (3) and (4). Its marginal effect with respect to exports indicates 
that after around 30 to 32 years of experience at previous posts diminishing returns 
start to set in. 
The last two rows in Table 7.9 outline the effects of commercial diplomats' languages 
skills. Here, fluency in the host country's language (lang1) is as expected: positive and 
significant in the PPML specification in column (4) and helps to acquire foreign 
market knowledge (Musteen et al., 2013). However, the number of languages spoken 
(lang2) is negative and significant in both columns (3) and (4). This is tied in with the 
rotational aspect of commercial diplomacy roles and the effects of experience: the 
number of languages a commercial diplomat can speak is likely to be a function of the 
 177 
 
number of posts s/he has been posted at, and with each new post the positive effects 
of experience do not come into effect for some time. Hence, number of languages 
spoken is a reasonable proxy for the rotational aspect associated with experience 
gained. 
Overall, the results in Table 7.9 support Hypothesis H6a: commercial diplomacy 
offices headed by proactors have larger effects on exports than commercial diplomacy 
offices that do not. For experience (Hypothesis H6b), the dynamics between the 
different types of experience are such that overall, they support H6b but that each 
component is associated differently with exports. Similarly, a respondent's knowledge 
of the local language is positively associated with exports (Hypothesis H6c), but total 
number of languages is negative and significant.  
In Peng and York's (2001) study of intermediaries' performance, a factor of (among 
others) managers' export experience and industry experience positively affects sales; 
however, the extension into commercial diplomacy offices yields results that suggest 
that different types of experience matter in different ways. These results do attest to 
Sala and Yalcin's (2015) finding that international experience improves firm 
productivity in international markets. This same effect is visible in the commercial 
diplomats' total years of experience with commercial diplomacy. In addition, as there 
is an adjustment period of 1.1 to 1.7 years for a commercial diplomat to become 
effective at a new post, switching posts frequently might have a detrimental effect and 
a lower number of rotations might be preferable73. This potentially also indicates why 
lang2 (number of languages spoken) is negative: because of the association with 
detrimental effects of the rotational system, a commercial diplomat who works at an 
increasing number of foreign posts in different countries likely expands his/her 
linguistic skills.  
Turning now to the activities performed by the offices and clients served, Table 7.10 
presents the results for the OLS and PPML estimations with excluded and included 
gravity model control variables. Results for total exports are in columns (1) to (4), and 
industry-adjusted exports in columns (5) to (8). Estimations in even numbered 
columns include gravity model control variables, and those in odd numbered columns 
do not. The inclusion of control variables resembles that of Wilkinson and Brouthers 
                                                 
73 Note that the finding that there is an adjustment period for commercial diplomats at new posts is 
consistent with the expatriate literature following Farh et al. (2010). 
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(2000), Wilkinon et al. (2011) and Martin (2003), who all utilise overseas U.S. state 
offices and exports. In their studies, as well as this one, aggregation issues are unlikely 
to arise as the offices operate in and on behalf of countries. Indeed, the estimates seem 
mostly consistent across the estimations upon inclusion of the gravity model control 
variables. 
The results between total exports and industry-adjusted exports continue to support 
Hypothesis H8a. While none of the activities performed are significant for total 
exports, this is not the case for industry-adjusted exports where network and image 
promotion activities (netwact and imagact) are positive and significant when not 
accounting for control variables (columns (7) and (5) respectively), while business 
support activities (bsupact) is negative and significant when accounting for control 
variables (column (6)). 
In addition, the number of industries (indnum) is insignificant throughout the 
estimations that use total exports (columns (1) to (4)), and significant when utilising 
industry-adjusted exports (columns (5) to (8)). This indicates that commercial 
diplomacy offices are more effective when it comes to servicing firms in a smaller 
number of industries than when they adopt a broad focus. The result obtained here 
aligns with what Chapter 4 finds: diplomatic representation positively and 
significantly affects exports in differentiated goods but not in total exports - the result 
for indnum here reflects this same pattern.  
The results for the extent to which an office's client base is comprised of SMEs (smeo) 
show a lower positive impact on total exports than on industry-adjusted exports. 
However, results for SMEs as clients (smed) are more significant for total exports than 
for industry-adjusted exports.  
Looking only at industry-adjusted exports, the first five variables in Table 7.10 are the 
activity groups; they denote the intensity with which a set of activities is performed. 
The first of these, network activities (netwact), relates to network development, partner 
search, and meeting arrangement. It is positively associated with exports in column 
(7), though only at the 10 per cent level. Therefore, there is weak evidence that these 
activities directly contribute to exports. In Wilkinson et al. (2011) the 'network 
development activities' variable is insignificant. The small change here lies potentially 
in the survey sample, which is global here rather than U.S.-based as in Wilkinson et 
al. (2011), and in the different way that the variable is specified here.  
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Table 7.10: The effect of offices' activities, industry focus and client base on exports 
 Total exports  Industry-adjusted exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS PPML PPML  OLS OLS PPML PPML 
          netwact 0.054 0.028 -0.137 -0.005  0.031 0.048 0.274* 0.092 
 (0.180) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106)  (0.203) (0.141) (0.155) (0.163) 
intelact -0.041 0.042 0.030 0.119  -0.013 0.116 -0.021 -0.099 
 (0.192) (0.117) (0.183) (0.114)  (0.217) (0.155) (0.199) (0.192) 
imagact 0.346 0.067 0.233 -0.051  0.505*** 0.189 0.169 0.002 
 (0.369) (0.105) (0.168) (0.093)  (0.191) (0.138) (0.158) (0.125) 
bsupact -0.106 -0.114 -0.017 -0.061  -0.182 -0.194* 0.090 0.041 
 (0.139) (0.082) (0.135) (0.118)  (0.158) (0.108) (0.166) (0.160) 
fdivact -0.089 -0.113 0.015 -0.036  -0.125 -0.141 0.086 0.025 
 (0.132) (0.080) (0.112) (0.071)  (0.149) (0.105) (0.145) (0.105) 
indnum -0.022 -0.011 0.087 0.034  0.164** 0.180*** 0.214** 0.195*** 
 (0.063) (0.039) (0.078) (0.043)  (0.071) (0.051) (0.087) (0.049) 
smeo 0.038*** 0.012** 0.027*** 0.021***  0.042*** 0.015** 0.035*** 0.031*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) 
smed -0.017** 0.001 -0.021*** -0.014**  -0.021*** -0.000 -0.020** -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
mills -1.499* -1.199 -0.987* 0.035  -0.576 -1.994 -0.877 -1.163 
 (0.846) (0.950) (0.544) (0.858)  (0.956) (1.250) (0.613) (1.170) 
gdist (log)  -0.945***  -0.846***   -0.900***  -0.761*** 
  (0.090)  (0.093)   (0.119)  (0.105) 
gdpcapi (log)  0.898***  1.237***   0.404  0.587* 
  (0.237)  (0.233)   (0.311)  (0.309) 
gdpcapj (log)  0.982***  0.997***   1.092***  1.248*** 
  (0.095)  (0.103)   (0.125)  (0.159) 
popi (log)  0.890***  0.861***   0.912***  0.839*** 
  (0.076)  (0.057)   (0.100)  (0.075) 
popj (log)  0.695***  0.712***   0.726***  0.792*** 
  (0.055)  (0.082)   (0.072)  (0.108) 
          Observations 190 183 190 183  190 183 190 183 
R-squared 0.181 0.745 0.065 0.725  0.191 0.652 0.086 0.659 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept included but not recorded.
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In contrast to network activities the set of business support activities (bsupact) - 
negotiation assistance, legal coordination, and IPR protection, is negatively associated 
with exports in column (6). This negative relationship is potentially due to the nature 
of these activities: perhaps, rather than providing services that contribute to 
intelligence or contacts, business support services take away the time available to 
perform more export-oriented activities. The negative sign for this activity group can 
be interpreted as an opportunity cost (Wilkinson et al., 2011). 
The provision of image promotion activities (imagact) is positively associated with 
exports at the 1 per cent level in column (1). This provides support for Wilkinson and 
Brouthers's (2000) study in which trade shows are positively associated with exports, 
and is in line with the trade show literature in general (Head & Ries, 2010). Moreover, 
it is consistent with the suggestion that Martin (2003) puts forth: overseas offices have 
a key role in promoting a country's national image, and this is where their effectiveness 
lies. 
For the final two activity groups, the robust insignificance of intelligence activities 
(intelact) and the FDI development activities (fdivact) suggests that they are not 
negatively associated with exports. Because they in part revolve around the 
dissemination of information and the promotion of the national image, such activities 
may not directly result in exports, but they are also not the diversions away from 
export-creating activities that business support activities constitute. The result for 
intelligence activities is negative and significant in Wilkinson and Brouthers (2000) 
and the difference here potentially lies in the size of the sample in this survey, which 
is four times larger. The results provide weak and partial support for Hypothesis H7a: 
only network activities contribute directly to exports, and only when not accounting 
for control variables. Intelligence activities do not directly contribute to exports. The 
results also partially support Hypothesis H7b: while FDI activities are indeed not 
directly and significantly related with exports, there is some evidence that image 
promotion activities are. Lastly, the results do support Hypothesis H7c: there is 
evidence to suggest that an increase in the performance of business support activities 
negatively affects an office's effect on trade 
The number of industries that an office targets yields less ambiguous results. 
Throughout the estimations, whether OLS or PPML and whether market size control 
variables are included or not, it is significant at the 5 and 1 per cent levels, and its 
significance is strongest when accounting for market size. Given the small size of 
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commercial diplomacy offices (75 per cent consist of 7 or fewer people) it is 
worthwhile to look at whether this variable has a nonlinear effect. Re-running all four 
estimations in Table 7.10 with the addition of the square of the number of industries 
that an office operates in yields an inverse U-shape where the number of industries at 
the optimal level is between 7 and 9, depending on the specification. Considering that 
the mean and median for number of industries served is 5, there is room for additional 
benefits if commercial diplomacy offices targeted more industries. This relatively high 
number of industries is consistent with the results obtained in Chapter 4 which 
provides evidence that offices positively affect export diversification rather than 
intensification. As such, there is support for Hypothesis H8b, though there is a limit to 
the number of sectors in which offices could feasibly operate in. 
The result for client base, the percentage of clients from the home country that are 
SMEs (smeo), is highly consistent across the estimates. In all but three it is significant 
at the 1 per cent level, only in column (6) is it significant at the 5 per cent level. Its 
positive sign implies that commercial diplomacy offices are more effective when their 
clients are mostly SMEs. This is congruent with results obtained earlier and with the 
empirical literature on what types of firms use these offices' services. If a larger 
proportion of an office's clients are SMEs, it serves a larger and likely broader range 
of clients resulting in a larger number of industries served, and a larger network. 
Further, small firms stand to gain the most from the activities that intermediaries 
perform (Ahn et al., 2011; Abel-Koch, 2013). While this is confirmed by the export 
promotion literature as well (Leonidou et al., 2011; Freixanet, 2012; Munch & Schaur, 
2017), the results here are the first time that a study has demonstrated that the focus on 
SMEs as clients is effective in increasing exports. This supports Hypothesis H9a. 
There is evidence of a negative relationship between exports and the proportion of 
SMEs contacted in the host country (smed). In the specifications that do not employ 
the gravity model control variables, this variable is negative and significant at the 1 
per cent level and the 5 per cent level in columns (5) and (7), respectively. In other 
words, having a relatively large proportion of firms that are larger than SMEs as 
contacts in the host country is beneficial to exports. As an intermediary, commercial 
diplomacy offices' improved performance if focusing on larger host country contacts 
is in line with Blum, Claro, and Horstmann's (2010) and Muûls and Pisu's (2009) 
observations that larger importers contribute disproportionally to import flows; 
exporting relations with larger importers has a larger effect on exports than if contacts 
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in the host country are SMEs. Hypothesis H9b is not supported; however, its opposite 
appears to be strongly supported: the effect of commercial diplomacy offices on 
exports increases as it contacts larger firms rather than SMEs in the destination 
country.  
The last group in this estimation process is the set of structural network outcomes – 
network size (nsizo and nsizd), and the extent to which an office's network consists of 
pre-established contacts (precon). The structure of Table 7.11 is identical to that of 
Table 7.8 and Table 7.10. 
Neither the network size in the home country74 nor in the host country are significantly 
associated with exports, for both total and industry-adjusted exports. The one structural 
network aspect that does matter is the variable that denotes the extent to which an 
office's network consists of pre-established contacts. Its significance in columns (4) 
and (8) indicates a robust effect when controlling for standard gravity model variables 
and supports Hypothesis H10b, whereas neither Hypothesis H10a nor H10c are 
supported. While there is some evidence to suggest that a larger proportion of pre-
established network contacts positively impacts a commercial diplomacy office's 
effect on exports, the same cannot be said for either network size in the host country, 
or the number of home country firms serviced. 
The importance of a private intermediary's connections significantly affects private 
intermediaries' performance in Peng and York's (2001) study, as part of a factor that 
consists of eight items in total. This is not the case here, thus the theoretical proposition 
by O'Gorman and Evers (2011) that the success of intermediaries depends on the extent 
of their network is not supported here when it comes to network size. However, the 
significance of precon indicates that it is not necessarily network size which matters, 
but the existence of pre-established contacts. This is an indication that the effect of 
commercial diplomacy offices on exports depends on the relational network aspects to 
which the discussion now turns. 
 
                                                 
74 i.e. The number of firms from the home country that the office has directly disseminated information 
to about specific opportunities standardised by office size. 
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Table 7.11: The effect of offices' structural network characteristics exports 
 Total exports  Industry-adjusted exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS PPML PPML  OLS OLS PPML PPML 
          
nsizd 0.063 -0.042 0.133 0.035  0.124 0.053 0.123 0.098 
 (0.126) (0.074) (0.180) (0.047)  (0.144) (0.100) (0.120) (0.092) 
nsizo 0.092 -0.015 -0.104 -0.116  0.077 -0.052 0.033 -0.069 
 (0.134) (0.078) (0.191) (0.141)  (0.153) (0.107) (0.124) (0.073) 
precon 0.001 0.006 0.010* 0.012***  -0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
mills -2.580*** -1.303 -1.782*** -0.614  -1.628* -1.558 -2.373** -0.846 
 (0.874) (0.967) (0.626) (0.746)  (0.918) (1.661) (1.146) (1.763) 
gdist (log)  -0.992***  -0.953***   -1.043***  -1.057*** 
  (0.099)  (0.058)   (0.136)  (0.105) 
gdpcapi (log)  0.858***  1.132***   0.407  0.640** 
  (0.241)  (0.191)   (0.329)  (0.257) 
gdpcapj (log)  1.082***  1.087***   1.182***  1.258*** 
  (0.094)  (0.106)   (0.128)  (0.179) 
popi (log)  0.797***  0.705***   0.743***  0.632*** 
  (0.084)  (0.062)   (0.114)  (0.089) 
popj (log)  0.690***  0.814***   0.767***  0.978*** 
  (0.053)  (0.093)   (0.073)  (0.138) 
          
Observations 167 161 167 161  168 162 168 162 
R-squared 0.058 0.732 0.030 0.766  0.172 0.276 0.157 0.243 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept included but not recorded. 
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7.3.5. Information asymmetry alleviation 
The final step in analysing the effect of commercial diplomacy offices on exports is 
identifying whether the relational network characteristics and the activities the offices 
perform alleviate trade barriers arising from information asymmetry. As per the 
procedure described in Section 7.2.2, the moderating effect on the information 
asymmetry variables of an office’s relational network characteristics and its activities 
requires the use of interactions, and each interaction requires its own separate 
estimation. Table 7.12 below summarises these estimations by displaying the results 
for the interaction variables only. Each row-column intersect is the coefficient of the 
interaction between the variables displayed in that row and column. 
Increases in the formal institutional quality and internet penetration variables 
positively affect exports, while the linguistic and religious distance variables 
negatively affect exports. To facilitate consistent interpretation of the interaction 
terms, the formal institutional quality and internet penetration variables are reverse-
coded such that they negatively affect exports. In this case, a positive interaction effect 
means that the moderating variable, a survey variable, decreases the negative effect of 
the information asymmetry variables on exports. Similarly, a negative interaction 
effect would suggest that the moderating variable amplifies the negative effect of the 
information asymmetry variables on exports. All interaction terms have positive signs 
indicating that where these interaction terms are significant, they reduce the negative 
effects of the relevant information symmetry variable. The discussion of the interaction 
terms is based on the survey variables, followed by a discussion of patterns identified 
in information asymmetry variables.  
Network activities (netwact) positively and significantly reduce the negative effects of 
low institutional quality; the interaction term in the OLS and PPML specifications is 
significant in columns (1) and (2). Of the other information asymmetry variables, 
network activities only alleviate the negative effects of linguistic distance in the OLS 
specification (column (5)), at the 5 per cent level. This is consistent with results in 
Wilkinson et al. (2011), who obtain a significant interaction term between their 
variables for network development activities and entrepreneurial environment; the 
parallel being the formal institutional environment as a high-quality set of institutions 
being beneficial to entrepreneurial activity (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2012; 
Anokhin & Schulze, 2009; Stenholm, Acs, & Wuebker, 2013). 
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Table 7.12: Summary of interaction analysis results from estimating equation (7.3) 
 Interaction with 
 Institutional quality 
(inverse) 
 
Internet penetration 
(inverse) 
 
Linguistic distance  Religious distance 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 OLS PPML  OLS PPML  OLS PPML  OLS PPML 
            
netwact 0.239** 0.326**  0.096 0.32  0.280** 0.12  0.497 -0.305 
 (0.11) (0.148)  (0.173) (0.289)  (0.114) (0.173)  (0.589) (0.565) 
bsupact 0.033 0.450*  0.083 -0.513  0.205* 0.095  0.331 -0.99 
 (0.116) (0.268)  (0.148) (0.425)  (0.108) (0.151)  (0.535) (0.615) 
fdivact 0.058 0.145  -0.03 0.091  0.184** 0.167***  0.69 0.067 
 (0.088) (0.133)  (0.105) (0.153)  (0.076) (0.055)  (0.435) (0.424) 
intelact 0.345*** 0.008  0.675*** -0.075  0.370*** 0.118*  -0.637 0.830*** 
 (0.117) (0.119)  (0.188) (0.246)  (0.099) (0.065)  (0.668) (0.246) 
imagact 0.236** 0.065  0.02 0.08  0.470*** 0.203**  0.517 -0.195 
 (0.113) (0.141)  (0.159) (0.235)  (0.125) (0.091)  (0.58) (0.547) 
tiestr 0.008 -0.03  0.201 0.011  -0.017 0.213  0.203 0.145 
 (0.114) (0.092)  (0.14) (0.156)  (0.14) (0.129)  (0.565) (0.544) 
netcom 0.418 0.430**  0.451 0.746  0.518* 0.599***  0.933 0.026 
 (0.265) (0.218)  (0.449) (0.488)  (0.264) (0.189)  (1.325) (1.051) 
tiepub 0.15** 0.21***  0.41 0.656**  0.204* 0.149  -0.24 -0.251 
 (0.061) (0.04)  (0.25) (0.272)  (0.118) (0.093)  (0.583) (0.459) 
tiebus 0.275 0.491***  0.39 1.094**  0.298* 0.289***  1.582** 1.231*** 
 (0.214) (0.167)  (0.279) (0.435)  (0.174) (0.086)  (0.777) (0.445) 
tieinno 0.164 0.224*  0.138 0.446*  0.195* 0.129**  0.772 1.356*** 
  (0.145) (0.128)  (0.191) (0.241)  (0.117) (0.052)  (0.745) (0.38) 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept and control variables included but not recorded. Each cell records the coefficient of the interaction between the row- and column-variables.
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There is weak evidence that business support activities alleviate the negative effects 
of low institutional quality and linguistic distance: bsupact is significant at the 10 per 
cent level in the OLS specification in column (2), and in the PPML specification in 
column (5). Given that business support activities comprise negotiation assistance, 
legal assistance, and IPR protection, these associations could reflect the need to 
support contract enforcements in countries with low formal institutional quality, and 
the need for clear communication in overcoming legal and contract issues. 
Activities relating to foreign direct investment (fdivact) alleviate the negative effects 
of linguistic distance only, at the 5 and 1 per cent levels (columns (5) and (6)). The 
link between FDI promotion activities and the effect of linguistic distance on exports 
stems from the effect that bilateral FDI has on exports (Hsiao & Hsiao, 2006; Liu, 
Wang, & Wei, 2001): facilitation of FDI into the home country takes place mainly 
based on the alleviation of linguistic barriers, and inward FDI into the home country 
results in exports. 
The interactions between the set of intelligence activities (intelact) and the information 
asymmetry variables are significant for all information asymmetry variables, though 
not in all specifications. Nevertheless, there is evidence that intelligence activities 
alleviate the negative effects of all information asymmetry variables. Given that the 
range of intelligence activities consists of business environment reports, market 
reports, and cultural information, this result is not surprising, and it verifies that the 
information provided by commercial diplomacy offices targets the correct type of 
information asymmetry. This is supported by the observation that intelact is the only 
variable for which the interaction term with internet penetration is significant. 
The effect of interactions between image promotion activities (imagact) and 
information asymmetry yield significant results when it comes to institutional quality 
(column (1)) and linguistic distance (columns (5) and (6)). Image promotion activities 
alleviate low formal institutional quality and linguistic distance, but they do not 
alleviate the negative effect on exports of low internet penetration or religious distance. 
It appears that the organisation of trade fairs allows for exporters to overcome 
information asymmetry stemming from a low quality formal institutional environment. 
In addition, the facilitation of direct communication between home and host country 
firms by trade show attendance helps to bridge linguistic barriers. 
The interaction terms based on relational network characteristics show a consistent 
pattern across the elements. The effect of tie strength is not significant in any 
 187 
 
specification. Thus, tie strength across the whole network is not enough to alleviate 
information asymmetry. Rather, given the results for the other relational network 
characteristics, what matters is how commercial diplomats communicate with their 
contacts, and who they are in contact with. More intensive communication within the 
network (netcom) reduces the negative effects of low formal institutional quality and 
high linguistic distance on exports; the more a commercial diplomacy office knows 
about potential host-country partners, the more readily it can identify a suitable partner 
following a request from a home country business. 
The extent to which business and innovation contacts form a part of an office's network 
– essentially, the tie strength with each of these groups of actors – positively and 
significantly affects all information asymmetry variables to varying degrees of 
significance. Strong ties with these contacts alleviates barriers arising from low 
institutional quality and low internet penetration, based on the PPML specifications, 
reduces linguistic barriers in all specifications, and also alleviates religious distance 
with the exception of the interaction term with innovation contacts. Hence, the results 
indicate that while the development of strong ties is useful where information 
asymmetry impacts exports, what matters is not the strength of ties across the network 
but the strength of ties with specific groups of actors. It is no surprise that for 
commercial diplomacy offices, business contacts are key, and innovation contacts are 
a close second. Ties with public officials are highly relevant in in reducing information 
asymmetry stemming from low institutional quality. In columns (1) and (2), stronger 
ties with these contacts are significant at the 5 and 1 per cent levels. They are also 
significant in columns (4) and (5), at the 5 and 10 per cent levels. 
Linguistic distance and poor institutional quality stand out as the information 
asymmetry variables that commercial diplomacy offices best address. Commercial 
diplomacy offices' activities and relational network characteristics all target linguistic 
barriers, and low institutional quality is alleviated by four of the five activity groups, 
and three of the five relational network characteristics. Much less frequently alleviated 
are religious distance and low internet penetration. However, linguistic distance and 
religious distance overlap, and poor institutional quality is often associated with low 
internet penetration rates. Hence, religious distance and low internet penetration are 
almost fully compensated for by the other two institutional variables.  
A robustness check, not shown in detail, uses the alternative variables for institutional 
quality and internet penetration to check the consistency of the formal institutional 
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variables. The results follow a similar pattern to those in Table 7.12, indicating that 
the results are robust. To check the robustness of the results for the informal 
institutional distance variables, instdist is used. This variable denotes the respondent's 
perception of institutional differences between countries. It yields the same pattern of 
results as in Table 7.12, indicating robustness of the results. 
The results here underline the intermediary role that commercial diplomacy offices 
can play: the various activities they perform reduce the negative effects of information 
asymmetry variables. This is in accordance with the theoretical underpinnings in 
O'Gorman and Evers (2011), Welch et al. (1998), Peng and Ilinitch (1998) and Ma 
(2006). The finding that increased tie strength with various groups of actors reduces 
these information asymmetry variables' effects is in line with an extension of Danis et 
al.'s (2011) and Peng and Zhou's (2005) models. It is not tie strength with the entire 
network that reduces information asymmetry, but tie strength with specific groups of 
relevant contacts. These findings confirm, in an intermediary setting, what Milanzi 
(2012) finds for managers overcoming trade barriers. It therefore provides a caveat to 
Granovetter's (1973) theory on the strength of ties75 in identifying that weak ties and 
strong ties matter in different institutional contexts. The findings provide some 
evidence for one of the conditions Copeland (2007) specifies for government 
intervention in trade to be justified: ties with public officials are especially relevant 
when government control of institutions is high, which is often the case when formal 
institutional quality is low. In short, commercial diplomacy offices fit within the 
definition of micro-level intermediaries as outlined by Smedlund (2006) and Peng and 
Ilinitch (1998): they function locally to gain knowledge by establishing a network of 
contacts, and the make-up of this network matters more than its size. 
7.4. Chapter Summary 
This Chapter analyses and reports the results from the survey that was developed in 
Chapter 6, testing Hypotheses H4b to H12b. This is the first study that focuses on the 
entire spectrum of characteristics of commercial diplomacy offices, and the first to 
explicitly take into account their functioning as network intermediaries. 
Table 7.13 below lists a summary of results. Support is found for the hypotheses 
relating to the activities and resources that commercial diplomacy offices possess: 
                                                 
75 Where tie strength applies regardless of the institutional environment. 
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network activities positively affect an office's effect on exports, as do several of its 
resources (most notably the number of personnel and its network in the host country). 
As for the hypotheses that relate to commercial diplomacy offices' intermediary role, 
these hypotheses both receive full support. When it comes to activities, most effective 
at this are intelligence, network and image campaign activities. Relational network 
characteristics matter not in terms of tie strength with the network as a whole, but with 
specific groups of contacts, in particular public officials and business contacts. 
Where Chapter 4 outlined whether a network of commercial diplomacy offices affects 
export diversification or intensification, and in which types of products it is most 
effective in stimulating exports, this Chapter has identified the resources, activities and 
structural network characteristics that affect commercial diplomacy offices' effect on 
exports. Furthermore, where Chapter 5 outlined that commercial diplomacy offices are 
more effective when information asymmetry barriers are more prevalent, the current 
Chapter has identified which activities and relational network characteristics of 
commercial diplomacy offices are most effective in reducing the negative effects of 
information asymmetry barriers. 
The next Chapter concludes this thesis by discussing the key findings, contributions, 
limitations, and policy implications from this thesis. 
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Table 7.13: Summary of supported and unsupported hypotheses 
Hypothesis Support 
H4a A larger budget for a commercial diplomacy office positively impacts its effect on trade. Insufficient information available (excluded 
from analysis) 
H4b A commercial diplomacy office's number of staff as well as the percentage of its staff which is locally 
employed both positively contribute to the office's effect on trade. 
Support for number of staff; no support for 
locally employed component 
H5a The longer a commercial diplomacy office is located in a country, the larger its effect on trade. Supported 
H5b There is no difference in the effectiveness of different types of commercial diplomacy offices; an 
office within a diplomatic representation is as effective as an office which is in a separate location. 
Not supported: the findings indicate that 
separate offices are more effective 
H6a Within the frameworks drawn by Naray (2011) and Ruël and Visser (2012), a commercial diplomacy 
office which is headed by a commercial diplomat who is a business promoter or proactor has a larger 
effect on trade than offices headed by commercial diplomats who are not. 
Supported 
H6b The more experience a commercial diplomat has, the larger the commercial diplomacy office's effect 
on trade. 
Supported 
H6c A commercial diplomat who speaks the language of the country in which he/she is posted contributes 
more to an office's effect on trade than a commercial diplomat who does not. 
Supported 
H7a A commercial diplomacy office's positive effect on trade increases as it performs more network and 
intelligence activities. 
Weak support for network activities, no support 
for intelligence activities 
H7b The performance of image campaigns and FDI promotion do not contemporaneously affect the 
effectiveness of a commercial diplomacy office. 
No support for image campaigns (they are 
positively associated with exports), support for 
FDI promotion 
H7c The performance of business support activities negatively affect a commercial diplomacy office's 
effect on trade. 
Supported 
H8a A commercial diplomacy office is more effective in promoting trade within a targeted set of sectors 
than it is in promoting overall trade. 
Supported 
H8b A commercial diplomacy office has a larger effect on trade as it operates in a larger number of 
sectors. 
Supported 
H9a A commercial diplomacy office has a larger effect on trade as the share of its client base which are 
SMEs increases. 
Supported 
H9b A commercial diplomacy office has a larger effect on trade as the share of firms they contact in the 
host country increasingly consists of SMEs. 
Not supported: an opposite relationship was 
found 
H10a A commercial diplomacy office is more effective as its network of business contacts in the host 
country increases. 
Not supported 
H10b The effectiveness of a commercial diplomacy office's network is positively affected by the proportion 
of pre-established contacts it features. 
Supported 
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H10c A commercial diplomacy office is more effective as it services a larger number of firms from the 
home country. 
Not supported 
H11a In countries with less developed formal institutions, and in countries with greater informal 
institutional distance from the home country, the positive effect of a commercial diplomacy office on 
trade increases with the extent to which the office performs network and intelligence activities. 
Supported 
H11b In countries where formal institutional quality is low or informal institutional distance is high, the 
positive effect of a commercial diplomacy office on trade is not related to the extent to which it 
performs image campaigns, business support and FDI promotion  
Not supported: all display positive and 
significant effects under various trade barriers 
H12a In less institutionally developed countries than the home country, and in countries which are distant 
from the home country in terms of informal institutions, the effect of commercial diplomacy offices 
on trade will increase as the offices' networks increasingly feature stronger ties. 
Not supported 
H12b A commercial diplomacy office's effect on trade in countries where entry is more difficult due to trade 
barriers is larger as the strength of ties with public and private actors in its network increases. 
Supported 
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Chapter 8. 
 
CONCLUSION 
8.1. Summary of Findings 
Returning to the three key research questions outlined in Section 1.2, the overall 
pattern of results in the empirical studies indicates that commercial diplomacy offices 
are an effective tool to stimulate exports, and effective in their role as network 
intermediaries. The key differentiating factor is their ability to develop strong ties with 
relevant actors if low formal institutional quality or large informal institutional 
differences are present. The importance of relational network characteristics over 
structural network characteristics indicates that they occupy a different space to private 
intermediaries. This is one of the requirements that Copeland (2007) specifies for a 
rationale behind government intervention in trade. Moreover, the relational network 
characteristics as well as the broader effect that commercial diplomacy offices have in 
Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that commercial diplomacy offices enjoy high visibility, and 
are especially effective where formal institutional quality is low; cases where the 
rationale for government intervention applies too (Copeland, 2007).  
The first study, in Chapter 4, uses a panel dataset that covers 100 countries and features 
5-year interval data on diplomatic representation from 1985-2005 to find that the 
presence of commercial diplomacy offices has a larger effect on the extensive margin 
than on the intensive margin of trade, indicating that it reduces fixed costs of trade that 
arise from trade barriers for exports and imports. The study also finds that for search 
cost alleviation, commercial diplomacy improves exports in differentiated goods and 
reference priced goods, but not in homogeneous goods. For imports the results are in 
favour of reference priced only. These findings are consistent with commercial 
diplomacy's role as an intermediary given that search costs are highest for 
differentiated goods (Rauch, 1999). 
The second empirical study then identifies whether commercial diplomacy offices are 
more effective when information asymmetry (as sources of trade and search costs) is 
larger. This study uses a cross-sectional dataset to find that that commercial diplomacy 
alleviates the negative effect on trade arising from differences between two countries' 
informal institutional constraints, and that it is more effective as these differences are 
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larger. Commercial diplomacy also alleviates the negative effect of trade barriers 
arising from a low-quality formal institutional environment, and is more effective as 
the quality of the importing country's formal institutional quality is lower. 
The third study addresses gaps in the literature that exist at the office-level, where little 
research has taken place so far. The study utilises a survey instrument to collect data 
on a set of worldwide commercial diplomacy offices' characteristics in terms of 
resources, activities performed, and network characteristics. Through the survey data, 
the study identifies how commercial diplomacy offices perform their intermediary role 
at the office level. The findings in this third study highlight that the factors behind 
commercial diplomacy offices' effectiveness relate more to indirect effects from being 
an intermediary than to the direct effects of resource endowments and activities on 
exports. 
8.2. Contributions to the Literature 
8.2.1. Overarching contributions 
This thesis is the most comprehensive and extensive analysis of commercial diplomacy 
yet undertaken, and it contributes empirical studies on the intermediary role of 
commercial diplomacy to the literature. Its integrative empirical analysis addresses 
important overarching gaps identified in the literature, among them: 
- The lack of a comprehensive study of the effect of office-level activities and 
resources on trade (Gillespie & Riddle, 2004; Naray, 2012). 
- Welch et al.'s (1998) assertion that network outcomes of foreign offices should 
be included in these offices' performance assessments.  
- Assessing commercial diplomacy as a network intermediary, extending the 
conceptualisation put forth by O'Gorman and Evers (2011) which has yet seen 
no empirical assessment. 
- Moons and van Bergeijk’s (2016) call for studies that make use of greater 
country coverage. 
- An analysis of commercial diplomacy from a multitude of perspectives rather 
than maintaining a focus on a single aspect, or a single conceptualisation of 
commercial diplomacy (Visser & Ruël, 2014). 
The integrative analysis this thesis presents consists of three studies. The consistent 
results across the three sets of studies performed, each of which motivates the next, 
are a contribution in the sense that through the intermediary perspective, the 
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effectiveness of commercial diplomacy can now be better measured. The contributions 
of the individual studies are outlined below. 
8.2.2. Contributions of the first study 
Chapter 4 presents the first of the empirical studies. It addresses gaps in the empirical 
literature which presents contrasting results as to whether commercial diplomacy 
offices acting as intermediaries aid in promoting trade in goods for which more search 
effort is required, and as to whether they alleviate barriers to trade that give rise to 
fixed costs to entry. 
The study's contributions are fivefold: 
-  It adds to the existing literature by providing a broad country-coverage study 
as is called for by Moons and van Bergeijk (2016). 
- It follows Baier and Bergstrand (2007) by employing a structural gravity model 
using an appropriate set of fixed effects to address the simultaneity bias that 
previous papers suffer from; only Hayakawa et al. (2014) address this, and their 
focus is narrow76. 
- It addresses the debate revolving around types of goods traded, where the 
application of this panel dataset and estimation strategy sheds new light on the 
contradictory findings in the previous literature77.  
- The Chapter extends the empirical literature on the effect of overseas offices 
on the extensive and intensive margins of trade beyond region-specificity. 
Moreover, the panel data estimation accounts for the growth of these margins 
over time. As such, it yields more accurate inferences regarding the role of 
these offices when it comes to trade creation along these margins than the 
extant literature does. It thereby addresses the need for studies focusing on the 
margins of trade as raised by Moons and van Bergeijk (2016).  
- The data used allows for a comparison of the effect of these offices on exports 
and imports. So far, the literature has focused mostly on exports. 
                                                 
76 Their study relates only to Japanese and Korean export promotion offices overseas. 
77 Volpe Martincus, Estevadeordal, et al. (2010) find that diplomatic representation affect homogeneous 
goods most of all, while Moons and van Bergeijk (2016) and Gil-Pareja et al. (2014), both of which do 
not account for endogeneity, find that they affect trade in differentiated goods more than homogeneous 
goods. 
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8.2.3. Contributions of the second study 
The second study, in Chapter 5, investigates a gap in the empirical literature that results 
in lack of clarity as to whether commercial diplomacy affects trade differently in 
varying institutional conditions. 
The contribution of this study lies in providing substantive research on the effect of 
commercial diplomacy on the alleviation of the sources of trade barriers, such research 
being currently absent. Only Harding and Javorcik (2011), Lederman et al. (2010) and 
Ciurak and Kinjo (2006) address this directly. However, the first two studies do so 
from the perspective of national export/investment promotion agencies and do not 
relate to overseas offices. The study that does consider overseas offices (Ciurak & 
Kinjo, 2006) assesses only economic freedom, and does so in a manner that neither 
accounts for reverse causality, nor is it consistent with the assessment of interaction 
variables in the gravity model.  
By means of a cross-sectional model with an instrumental variable approach and an 
extensive set of institutional constraint variables as well as an extensive analysis 
procedure, the results in the Chapter are the first robust estimates that exist on this 
particular topic. 
8.2.4. Contributions of the third study 
The third study, which spans Chapters 6 and 7, contributes to the empirical literature 
on commercial diplomacy by identifying, for the first time, the factors that contribute 
to its effectiveness, and whether, as intermediaries, they alleviate information 
asymmetry barriers.  
This understanding is as yet missing, since the few studies that do exist have focused 
on offices' budgets (Kang, 2011; Martin, 2003), activities to a limited degree 
(Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000; Wilkinson et al., 2011), and in one case, resources in 
terms of personnel (Lim, 2008). These studies have in common a narrow focus on 
individual countries' efforts, and a narrow set of these offices' characteristics. 
Moreover, they do not consider the intermediary aspect. This study has for the first 
time captured the impact on trade of the resources that commercial diplomacy offices 
have, and of the full spectrum of activities they perform and the extent to which they 
perform them. Moreover, this study has for the first time explicitly accounted for and 
assessed the whether these offices are effective at performing an intermediary role, and 
the factors that make it so. 
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While the thesis provides evidence to suggest that commercial diplomacy offices are 
effective intermediaries, a particular contribution is that Chapter 7 provides evidence 
of one of the necessary conditions Copeland (2007) specifies for government 
intervention in trade to be justified; ties with public officials are especially relevant 
when institutional quality is low, i.e. when government control of economic, political 
and judicial institutions is high. Hence, commercial diplomacy offices fit within the 
definition of micro-level intermediaries as outlined by Smedlund (2006) and Peng and 
Ilinitch (1998): they function locally to gain knowledge by establishing a network of 
contacts, and the content of this network matters more than its size. In this sense, 
commercial diplomacy offices occupy a space that private intermediaries which focus 
on the size of a network (Rauch & Watson, 2004) do not, this being another of the 
necessary conditions Copeland (2007) specifies. 
8.2.5. Other contributions 
Chapter 7 also contains two contributions to other areas of research. The first of these 
is that the response propensity analysis used to determine the size of the selection bias 
problem constitutes a small contribution to the literature on response rate stimulation, 
where the results for the effect of using personalised emails on response propensity 
sees contradictory results: where Anseel et al. (2010), VanGeest et al. (2007) and 
VanGeest and Johnson (2011) find positive and significant results, Porter and 
Whitcomb (2003), Fan and Yan (2010) and Fox et al. (1988) do not. The results 
support the former group of studies rather than the latter: targeted emails increase the 
likelihood of a potential respondent completing the survey. The second is that the 
results in Chapter 7 support Milanzi (2012) in that it is not general tie strength within 
a network that matters, but tie strength with specific groups of relevant contacts. This 
provides a caveat to Granovetter's (1973) theory on the strength of ties in identifying 
that weak ties and strong ties matter in different institutional contexts.  
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8.3. Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis has sought to empirically assess the commercial diplomacy concept. This 
assessment hinges principally on the definitions and conceptual studies that are 
currently available in the literature. It is possible that the constraints that these 
conceptual studies face, in the form of limited data and study settings, also extend to 
this thesis. These previous studies have interrogated commercial diplomacy 
arrangements in developed nations (e.g. Potter, 2004; Kostecki & Naray, 2007) and 
the perspective of developing countries remains largely absent. The findings of this 
study assume that the results apply to countries in all levels of development equally 
though this is likely not the case. As commercial diplomacy in developing countries 
could be markedly different to that in developed countries, future research into 
commercial diplomacy will be fruitful, especially the empirical examination of office-
level characteristics. 
Looking at the research methodology holistically, the three studies do contribute to 
each other's findings, yet the scope of commercial diplomacy is limited in Chapters 4 
and 5. Both studies use a proxy for commercial diplomacy; the first is a variable that 
denotes whether a country has a diplomatic representation in another country, and the 
second is the number of diplomatic representations that a country has in another 
country. In either case, the practice of commercial diplomacy as defined in Chapter 2 
is likely not fully represented in these two studies. 
In Chapter 4, the variable used to capture commercial diplomacy is available in five 
year intervals only, which does not necessarily account for fluctuations that may occur 
between these five-year intervals. As such, it is possible that the results in the Chapter 
are susceptible to measurement error. While the results align with the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 2 and with the conceptual and empirical literature in this area, 
further research that uses continuous time intervals using a similarly broad set of 
countries would more definitively assess the relevant hypotheses. In addition, Moons 
and van Bergeijk (2016) assert that research into the presence of overseas offices 
should consider diverging effects of the different types of offices, yet this is not 
possible here due to data restrictions. 
Critically, the survey study only features 201 workable data points and the conclusions 
reached from this set of data, which represents some geographic dispersion, cannot be 
fully generalised to the entire population of commercial diplomacy offices. 
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Generalisation is made more difficult by the nature of the survey data itself, in which 
respondents might not provide fully accurate or even honest answers. Some concepts 
in the survey might be interpreted differently by different respondents. While 
mitigation through pre-testing and reliability analyses has been applied to the fullest 
feasible extent, these problems cannot be entirely discounted. 
Lastly, this thesis does not look at FDI flows. As investment promotion is one of the 
activities commercial diplomacy offices perform, FDI flows could provide a fruitful 
area of research. Any such research needs to consider the amendments to the definition 
of commercial diplomacy provided in Chapter 2 that may apply to FDI, as investment 
promotion offices sometimes exist as a separate entity. 
8.4. Policy Implications 
According to Copeland (2007), a public-sector intermediary is beneficial if it helps 
firms to select private intermediaries, if the services they offer are complementary to 
those offered by private sector intermediaries, and if it operates in a type of market 
where government actors have specific advantages. Taking the results from Chapters 
4, 5 and 7 together, this thesis indicates that commercial diplomacy offices' role as 
public sector intermediaries offers the latter two advantages Copeland (2007) 
mentions, which turn out to be intertwined. 
The key policy implications from this thesis apply to commercial diplomacy offices. 
As such, the largest source of policy implications in this thesis are in Chapter 7.  
Commercial diplomacy offices that exist separately from embassies and consulates 
and only liaise with them or fall under their auspices are more effective in increasing 
exports. This effectiveness is likely due to the larger resource endowments that such 
offices have and office size is a key determinant in an office's effectiveness. But 
commercial diplomacy offices that exist within embassies and consulates develop 
stronger ties with contacts and thus perform a more effective intermediary role when 
institutional constraints are more restrictive. An optimal mix of organisation thus 
depends on the markets that are targeted, and the choice between the separation of 
commercial diplomacy offices from embassies and consulates or their integration 
should not be prescribed without considering the peculiarities of the market that is 
targeted. 
Policy implications extend to the individual commercial diplomat, the actor who 
oversees and takes part in commercial diplomacy activities at an office. Most notably, 
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this thesis questions the benefits of the rotational system by which these individuals 
are allocated to offices every three to seven years (broadly). Given that total experience 
is strongly positively related with exports but that each new posting introduces a 
learning period, it is more effective to assign longer terms, or to abolish the rotational 
system. The thesis also suggests that the usefulness of private sector experience is such 
that recruitment ideally takes place after a potential commercial diplomat has at least 
four years of private sector experience. Implications for the commercial diplomat also 
tie in with the preceding paragraph in terms of the development of a network of 
contacts. Given that strong institutional constraints warrant the development of strong 
ties with relevant actors, there is a need for commercial diplomats who are adept at 
developing such ties in markets where such ties are needed. 
A clear implication from the results is that the activities that offices perform can only 
be as effective as the institutional constraints allow them to be. That is, there is large 
potential for the performance of network and intelligence activities as institutional 
constraints become increasingly burdensome. In addition, performing business support 
activities such as contract negotiation and IPR protection does little but take time away 
from activities that are beneficial such as network development or intelligence 
gathering activities. Offices should therefore focus on those two activities.  
Chapter 7 also indicates that more than 90 per cent of offices in this study have scope 
to expand activities into a small number of additional industries. If offices are to be 
effective, they need to operate in a large enough number of industries to facilitate 
inquiries from firms from the home country. This corresponds with Chapter 4, from 
which it appears that as a policy instrument, commercial diplomacy offices are an 
effective means to promote exports in differentiated goods.  
A larger proportion of SMEs as clients is beneficial to offices' export performance. 
This yields the policy implication that there is much scope for awareness campaigns 
in the home country to draw attention to the existence of commercial diplomacy 
offices. 
However, the decision to install commercial diplomacy offices depends on the extent 
to which firms face institutional constraints in international markets as Chapter 5 
demonstrates. While these offices are effective in almost all circumstances, their 
effectiveness in institutionally constrained environments is such that it is worthwhile 
to focus on markets where these constraints are most restrictive. It is in these cases that 
as a public sector intermediary commercial diplomacy has the status advantage that 
 200 
 
may provide it with access to key contacts, and where it does not interfere with private 
sector intermediaries. 
Within the context of the debate on government intervention in trade, the results 
present commercial diplomacy as a policy tool for alleviating market failure, which 
fits in with the options to governments that Alexander and Warwick (2007) put forth. 
More specifically, commercial diplomacy offices are adept at performing network 
search activities to benefit exports, and to a lesser extent imports, such that a country's 
trade performance increases as a result of having a larger network of offices. 
8.5. Concluding Remarks 
Finally, we return to Jan Baptist Weenix’s painting of the Dutch ambassador's trip to 
Isfahan to stimulate trade in horses and silk. This event, sometime between 1653 and 
1659, was driven by a mercantilist viewpoint. While the core motivations behind trade 
and diplomacy have changed significantly since Weenix’s time, his painting 
nonetheless depicts a key message of this thesis: because of the improved levels of 
access that those with diplomatic status have, they are especially effective at 
maintaining ties, and those ties can make a difference when it comes to exports. At the 
same time, this does not get in the way of private sector intermediaries, alongside 
which commercial diplomacy can coexist if it performs a set of activities in a set of 
sectors where they enjoy access that private intermediaries do not have. The 
information- and network-based activities and benefits that arise from commercial 
diplomacy need to be carefully balanced with the potential of the target market and the 
particularities of the institutional environment. The potential of the Persian market 
around 1655 was such that the Ambassadorial involvement in the events depicted by 
Weenix were surely worth a significant amount of horses and silk. 
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Appendix A: Export Promotion 
Empirical Literature 
This Appendix presents the empirical literature on export promotion from two broad 
perspectives. First are macro-economic evaluations that evaluate the merit of 
maintaining export promotion programs overall. The second perspective is from firm-
level studies in three forms: 
-  Studies on the awareness and use of export promotion programs by firms, 
which will provide insight into the types of firms that use these programs.  
- Studies that assess the outcomes of firms using export promotion programs 
through survey data based on self-assessed outcome measures.  
- Studies that assess the outcomes of firms using export promotion programs, 
but with secondary data. 
This section mostly contains studies that do not clarify whether the export promotion 
takes place in the home country or in the host country, and the assumption is that this 
is in the home country unless otherwise specified. Studies that do address the presence 
of overseas offices, or their activities/resources, are discussed in Chapter 2. This 
Appendix includes studies on investment promotion activities as well because they are 
often part of export promotion programs, and the effectiveness studies take place using 
the same type of techniques. 
A.1. Macro-economic Evaluations 
This Section first discusses studies on the general effectiveness of export promotion 
programs, followed by studies that identify how budget capacity for export promotion 
affects trade outcomes. These studies relate to the home country but are relevant 
because overseas offices and activities performed are generally assessed using metrics 
from these types of studies. This is followed with an expanded assessment of 
Coudounaris' (2012) categorisation of export promotion studies. He identifies studies 
that relate to the awareness and usage of export promotion programs by firms. Next is 
an extension of Freixanet's (2012) review of export promotion programs. Here, the 
papers included relate to survey-based studies of firm export performance and 
internationalisation success. This is supplemented with a relatively recent and rich set 
of studies which assess such programs based on secondary data. Note that in these 
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cases it is again not always clear whether the programs evaluated relate to activities 
performed in the host country. 
A.1.1. Studies on the general effectiveness of export promotion 
programs 
At the broadest level, the global effectiveness of export promotion consists of studies 
that relate to outcomes from implementing such programs in terms their overall effect 
on trade and FDI. This demonstrates how specific investment promotion strategies 
affect FDI (Harding & Javorcik, 2011), and how specific export promotion programs, 
trade missions, affect trade (Head & Ries, 2010). 
Utilising data on 124 national investment promotion agencies (IPAs), Harding and 
Javorcik (2011) employ a difference-in-differences approach to identify whether 
specific sector targeting increases FDI inflows from the USA. Their results indicate 
that in general, such sector targeting leads to higher FDI inflows; moreover, they lead 
to higher FDI inflows in countries where problems of information asymmetries 
(caused by communication differences and navigating bureaucratic procedures) are 
likely to be more severe. Thus, they identify the roles of these offices as information 
asymmetry-reducing and mitigating the extent of bureaucratic procedures. However, 
due to the focus on a national investment promotion strategy rather than individual 
offices, they do not capture the activities performed by the overseas offices that 
implement the sector targeting. 
Head and Ries (2010) investigate the effect of a specific export promotion program on 
bilateral trade, focussing on Canadian trade missions led by the Prime Minister or the 
minister of international trade. They use a panel dataset and employ the gravity model 
wherein, despite the application of a set of fixed effects and time-lagged dependent 
variables, reverse causality may still be present. Contrary to aforementioned studies 
that find positive effects of broadly defined export and investment promotion strategies 
on trade, Head and Ries' (2010) findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of a specific 
but often employed component of export promotion in the form of trade missions. 
A.1.2. The effectiveness of expenditure on export promotion 
A larger subset of macroeconomic evaluations of export promotion programs relates 
to expenditure. The first to perform an analysis of the expenditure on export promotion 
is Pointon (1978). He determines the return on every pound spent on export promotion 
from a survey of 435 U.K. firms. By asking what percentage of their export sales would 
have been lost had the U.K.'s export promotion service not existed and extrapolating 
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this to the universe of British exporting firms, he estimates that the return on every 
pound sterling spent on export promotion results in 21 pounds sterling in benefits to 
firms. However, this extrapolation to all 6,137 exporting firms is prone to firm 
heterogeneity issues, and includes only on those firms which are already exporting. 
Unsurprisingly, a series of studies on U.S. export promotion expenditures on exports 
of pecans (Onunkwo & Epperson, 2000), orange juice (Armah & Epperson, 1997) and 
rice (Rusmevicientong and Kaiser, 2009) arrive at lower figures. These time-series 
models indicate that the return per dollar spent (in terms of increased exports) ranges 
from 3.13 to 7.37.  
In studies that focus on state-level export promotion expenditures and their 
relationship with exports of manufactured goods, Coughlin and Cartwright's (1987) 
cross-sectional study finds an export increase of $432 for every $1 spent. While this 
seems disproportionate to the goods-specific studies outlined earlier, this equates to a 
0.044 per cent increase in exports for every 1 per cent increase in export promotion 
expenditures. This concurs with Wilkinson et al.'s (2005) estimates of state-level 
export promotion expenditures in a dataset which allows them to lag exports by two 
years. However, they also find evidence that export promotion spending may be both 
a cause and an effect of increased exports. With the exception of Armah and Epperson 
(1997), none of these studies detail what the expenditures entail in terms of the 
activities or resources they support. 
Four more detailed analyses of export and investment promotion expenditures cast 
some doubt over the results discussed earlier, though the positive effect of export 
promotion expenditure on exports and investments mostly does not disappear. The 
only study where no relationship exists is that by Bernard and Jensen (2004), who use 
a dataset of 13,550 manufacturing plants over a nine-year period in combination with 
U.S. state-level export promotion expenditures. Controlling more effectively for 
reverse causality than the previous studies, their difference-GMM estimator based on 
Arellano and Bond (1991) indicates that per-plant export promotion expenditure does 
not increase the probability of exporting. This may, however, be a result of their dataset 
consisting of only large plants. 
While Bernard and Jensen (2004) study plant-level effects, Morisset et al. (2003) adopt 
a focus similar to Wilkinson et al. (2005) and Coughlin and Cartwright (1987), but 
with a focus on investment promotion. Their cross-sectional dataset of the overall 
budgets and number of staff of 58 country-level IPAs indicates that a budget increase 
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of 10 per cent increases FDI by 7 per cent, but that the number of staff is not 
significantly related to FDI. Moreover, they divide the overall budget into budgetary 
allocations for four broad activity groups (investment generation, policy advocacy, 
investor servicing, and image building) to find that all are positively and significantly 
related to FDI; however, the possibility of reverse causality is substantial due to the 
absence of strategies to control for it. Thus, while the estimation strategy and data are 
not as rigorous as in Bernard and Jensen's (2004) study, they provide the first detailed 
insight into these agencies' resources and activities. 
A similar cross-sectional study that focuses on 103 national export promotion agencies 
by Lederman et al. (2010) largely follows this same strategy. Using a set of 
instrumental variables related to trade openness to account for the reverse causality of 
export promotion budgets and exports, they find that a budget increase of 10 per cent 
leads to an increase in exports of up to 1 per cent, a figure in line with that found by 
Coughlin and Cartwright (1987). Expanding the set of variables to include export 
promotion agencies' (EPA) budget allocations towards specific activities78 as well as 
a variable to denote whether an EPA79 has a sector-specific strategy, Lederman et al. 
(2010) find that none are significantly related to exports. They then explore whether 
EPAs are more effective when trade barriers are higher, and whether EPAs help firms 
to overcome information asymmetries in relation to product exports. They find that 
EPAs' overall budgets have a larger effect as trade restrictiveness in the rest of the 
world increases, and that EPA budgets have larger effects on products that require 
more search effort. While this is suggestive of an effect of these agencies in relation to 
the types of market failures they are aimed at, the focus on overall EPAs' budgets is 
not informative of how they accomplish this. Moreover, the study focuses on overall 
EPAs rather than individual offices, and thus suggests that EPAs may be an efficient 
way for the economy as a whole to overcome information asymmetry and spill-over 
problems80. 
Thus, while there is evidence to suggest that the relationship between export (or 
investment) promotion expenditure and exports (or FDI) is positive and significant, 
                                                 
78 Country image promotion, marketing, research, and export support services. 
79 An EPA is a cental body that coordinates export promotion. 
80 An expanded but as yet unpublished study of export promotion agencies conducted by Olarreaga et 
al. (2015) uses the data obtained by Lederman et al. (2010) and adds two more cross sections. The key 
points of differentiation between this study and the Lederman et al. (2010) lies in the result that agencies 
that focus on new or inexperienced exporters see higher returns to their budget allocations, yet again is 
unable to identify an effect of focusing on a specific set of activities (related to marketing). 
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the studies conducted focus on the national export (investment) promotion agency 
rather than the individual offices engaged in it. Moreover, they mostly do not identify 
activity-specific effects of such national agencies and this does not preclude that such 
effects do not exist at the level of the individual overseas office. 
A.2. Firm-level Evaluations 
At the firm-level, two types of studies exist. The first type relates to the extent to which 
firms perceive export promotion assistance as useful, and the extent to which firms are 
aware of their existence. The second type identifies what outcomes firms enjoy from 
using such assistance.  
A.2.1. Awareness, usage, and usefulness of export promotion 
The set of studies that discuss the awareness, usage, and usefulness of export 
promotion unvaryingly utilise survey data with generally fewer than 300 observations. 
With one exception, these studies do not make explicit whether or not the export 
promotion program relates to overseas support. These studies are briefly discussed to 
present a complete picture of the export promotion literature, as well as to draw some 
implications for the types of firms that may be aware of and using commercial 
diplomacy. 
Awareness, and perception of usefulness, of export promotion programs varies by 
country. A Malaysian study suggests that both awareness and use of such programs is 
low (Ahmed et al., 2002), while U.S. firms' awareness is high (Vanderleest, 1996). 
This is likely due to the effectiveness of their communication to firms, as reflected in 
Crick and Czinkota (1995), rather than a reflection on the quality of the export 
promotion programs. Studies generally find that firms deem such programs to be 
useful (Cullwick & Mellalieu, 1981; Köksal, 2009). More specifically, awareness and 
perceived usefulness of export promotion depends on the type of activity used 
(Freixanet, 2012; Howard & Herremans, 1988; Seringhaus & Botschen, 1991), the 
characteristics of the firm's executive (Crick & Chaudhry, 1997; Gray, 1997), and most 
importantly, the firm's internationalisation stage and size. Awareness of export 
promotion programs increases with firms' export intensity (Ayob & Freixanet, 2014; 
Moini, 1998) and size (Köksal, 2009; Kumcu, Harcar, & Kumcu, 1995). Smaller firms 
use export promotion less often, partly due to limited in-house resources to seek them 
out (Hauser & Werner, 2015). The usefulness of export promotion depends on these 
two dimensions as well (Crick, 1997; Köksal, 2009; Kotabe & Czinkota, 1992; G. M. 
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Naidu & Rao, 1993; Yannopoulos, 2010): firms in early exporting stages and smaller 
firms require motivational information rather than market-specific information 
(Bruning, 1995; Silverman, Castaldi, & Sengupta, 2002). 
A.2.2. Firm outcomes from export promotion 
The second set of studies covers assessments of export performance from firms using 
export promotion programs. These studies include survey-based research as well as 
research that uses secondary data. 
The survey-based set of studies translates the 'usefulness' criterion (which usually 
relates to the perceived adequacy of specific export promotion activities) to export 
performance or satisfaction with export performance as a result of using such 
activities81. The multitude of ways in which the studies specify export performance 
makes it difficult to differentiate which export promotion activities affect which type 
of performance. Performance relates to building the competency and knowledge to 
engage in exports as well as economic and financial indicators such as the penetration 
of new markets, an increase in sales and profitability, and the introduction of new 
products in new or existing markets.  
Nevertheless, commonalities exist in the studies' findings: results indicate that use of 
most export promotion activities positively affects firms both directly and indirectly. 
Indirect effects manifest themselves in the knowledge and resource outcomes, while 
direct effects relate to economic/financial indicators. Such positive and significant 
relationships with both forms of effects are present in Francis and Collins-Dodd's 
(2004) study, who find that in general, firms using a larger number of export assistance 
programs improve their export performance. The direct and indirect significance of 
firms using export promotion programs on export performance is also present in 
Leonidou et al. (2011) and Shamsuddoha et al. (2009). Similar studies that investigate 
the effect of firms' use of export promotion, however, find only indirect effects related 
to learning (Freixanet, 2012; Gençtürk & Kotabe, 2001). This could be an artefact of 
the countries that offer the services. Nevertheless, the case for indirect effects of export 
promotion programs is stronger than that for direct effects following from studies of 
informational assistance (Faroque & Takahashi, 2015; Singer & Czinkota, 1994) and 
                                                 
81 Because Marandu (1996) finds that export satisfaction from using export promotion services is not 
necessarily related to export performance, the studies discussed here do not include those that rely only 
on export satisfaction (this excludes only Wilkinson and Brouthers (2006)). 
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participation in trade shows and trade missions (Duran & Ubeda, 2001; Seringhaus & 
Mayer, 1988; Seringhaus & Rosson, 1998). Moreover, sporadic exports stand to gain, 
whether directly or indirectly (Francis & Collins-Dodd, 2004; Leonidou et al., 2011), 
although most studies point to indirect effects related to learning and capability 
development (Freixanet, 2012). 
The conclusions drawn by these studies point to the larger effect of export promotion 
programs of any kind on indirect export performance effects rather than direct effects. 
Considering again Seringhaus and Rosson's (1990) definition of export promotion, the 
evaluations of export promotion use on firm export performance indicate that export 
promotion is geared towards capacity building and motivational trade barriers. When 
it comes to commercial diplomacy, which is applicable in the host country 
environment, some similarities nevertheless apply. This is best illustrated by Leonidou 
et al.'s (2011) study, a small part of which addresses firms receiving support from 
offices abroad as part of a factor related to trade mobility. As an indirect indirect export 
outcome, trade mobility is related to capacity and resource building. In other words, 
while direct effects may be more likely, this does not mean that commercial diplomacy 
(in this case, in the form of overseas office support) does not also carry indirect effects. 
Besides the survey data studies outlined above there is a set of studies that uses 
secondary data to assess the effect of using export promotion services on firm 
outcomes. These studies utilise secondary data based on highly disaggregated export 
data, often at the firm-level, on the universe of a country's exporting firms. Because 
they have higher numbers of observations than is feasible with survey collection, a 
more robust analysis of the use of export promotion programs on firm outcomes is 
possible. Thus, rather than identifying whether individual firms have benefited from 
export promotion programs, these studies allow for an assessment of whether using 
export promotion is a factor in export success for the average firm.  
By using selection models that focus on the treatment effect of export promotion 
assistance, these studies are more limited in how they utilise data on export promotion 
activities and generally construct a binary variable that indicates whether a firm has 
used export promotion. The exceptions to this are Schminke and Van Biesebroeck 
(2013), Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010b), Álvarez (2004) and Álvarez and 
Crespi (2000). In these cases, beyond a binary variable that indicates whether a firm 
has used export promotion, they additionally specify two to four activity groups and 
run the analysis with these individual groups as binary variables. 
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Contrary to the few direct effects found by survey data studies discussed earlier, the 
studies using secondary data are almost unanimous in their conclusions that using 
export promotion programs significantly affects firm export outcomes; it positively 
affects the propensity to export (Schminke & van Biesebroeck, 2013; Cruz, 2014), and 
is thus unsurprisingly effective at increasing the number of countries and markets that 
a firm exports to, in addition to increasing the number of products that firms export 
(Álvarez & Crespi, 2000; Volpe Martincus & Carballo, 2010a, 2012), as well as export 
performance and productivity (Munch & Schaur, 2017). The greatest benefit is to 
exports in differentiated products rather than homogeneous products, products that 
require more search effort (Volpe Martincus & Carballo, 2008, 2010b, 2010c). Using 
export promotion also positively affects total exports (Álvarez & Crespi, 2000; van 
Biesebroeck, Yu, & Chen, 2015; Volpe Martincus, Carballo, & Garcia, 2010), as well 
as exports as a proportion of total sales (Álvarez, 2004; Cansino, Lopez-Melendo, 
Pablo-Romero, & Sánchez-Braza, 2013). However, within the context of the studies 
above, Cadot et al. (2015) find that the positive effects related to export growth and 
diversification from using export promotion drop off after three years. While this may 
specifically relate to the Tunisian export promotion program only, it could also 
indicate that in the long term, using export promotion services do not compensate for 
a sustained lack of in-house resources. 
In the studies that find positive effects, it appears that export promotion is more 
effective in reaching faraway destinations (Schminke & Van Biesebroeck, 2013; 
Volpe Martincus & Carballo, 2010c), and that small firms benefit most of all (Cruz, 
2014; Volpe Martincus & Carballo, 2010a; Volpe Martincus et al., 2011; Munch & 
Schaur, 2017). Returning to the studies identifying different types of export promotion 
services, Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010b) suggest that using a combination of 
services simultaneously is more effective than using specific services in isolation. This 
may explain why Alvarez (2004) finds that using trade missions does not affect export 
probability, which can also be a result of the benefits relating to learning effects rather 
than direct export effects as outlined in the survey data studies (Duran & Ubeda, 2001; 
Seringhaus & Mayer, 1988; Seringhaus & Rosson, 1998). 
The secondary data studies are thus largely in accordance with survey data studies of 
firm export performance. Moreover, they reflect favourably on the types of market 
failures that export promotion is meant to resolve. However, because the export 
promotion studies largely do not include overseas office support, the findings from the 
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above studies are illustrative only, and only offer limited information on whether these 
findings apply to commercial diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is tentative evidence that 
commercial diplomacy benefits most from servicing small firms that are past the 
decision-making stage on whether to internationalise, and that it could be a useful tool 
to trade outcomes. 
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Appendix B: Selection Bias in Chapter 
5 
In Section 5.2.3 the selection bias problem from non-random zero trade flows is 
addressed. Even though the zero trade flows make up only 4.6 per cent of the dataset, 
not accounting for this may bias the commercial diplomacy variable upwards as its 
effect on exports can only be observed when there are nonzero export flows. This 
Appendix addresses this selection bias problem by applying a Heckman selection 
model (Heckman, 1979). In the first stage, the exclusion criterion is a variable that 
denotes whether countries have a colonial history. The dependent variable in the first 
stage is whether or not a positive export flow is observed, after which a correction 
term, the inverse Mills ratio, is adopted into the main regression to account for 
selection bias, should there be any. 
Of principal interest in testing the selection bias problem is with Table 5.4 as this 
contains the baseline estimations for the remainder of Chapter 5. As such, the selection 
equation analysis is run on the first five columns of Table 5.4, which yields Table B.1 
below. Results for the control variables remain unchanged in sign and significance, 
while their coefficients do not differ much from those in Table 5.4; the same goes for 
the institutional constraint variables. For the commercial diplomacy proxy variable, 
Number of Diplomatic Missions, changes in significance levels occur in all but column 
(44). The significance level decreases in all other columns from the 1 per cent level in 
Table 5.4 to the 5 per cent level when accounting for selection bias. In addition, the 
coefficients have decreased, though still lie within the range identified by Rose (2007). 
Accounting for selection bias hence causes a small shift in the coefficients, however 
not so much as to alter the interpretation of the results in Chapter 5. 
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Table B.1: Results to a Heckman selection model which re-estimates columns (1) to (5) in Table 
5.4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Number of Diplomatic Missions 0.094** 0.063** 0.069** 0.084*** 0.073** 
 (0.044) (0.027) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) 
Linguistic Distance  -1.401***    
  (0.374)    
Religious Distance   -0.364**   
   (0.186)   
Institutional quality (WGI)    0.297***  
    (0.074)  
Log of Internet Use     0.137*** 
     (0.041) 
Log of Distance -0.598*** -0.597*** -0.670*** -0.633*** -0.622*** 
 (0.113) (0.104) (0.106) (0.088) (0.110) 
Log of GDP p/c product 0.736*** 0.767*** 0.782*** 0.699*** 0.681*** 
 (0.048) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.051) 
Log of Population product 0.856*** 0.949*** 0.908*** 0.892*** 0.883*** 
 (0.051) (0.043) (0.045) (0.037) (0.046) 
Landlocked -0.828*** -0.826*** -0.848*** -0.772*** -0.749*** 
 (0.150) (0.134) (0.138) (0.112) (0.140) 
Island -0.198 -0.324*** -0.264** -0.292*** -0.269** 
 (0.136) (0.125) (0.130) (0.108) (0.135) 
Log of Area product -0.126*** -0.163*** -0.139*** -0.129*** -0.126*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.032) 
RTA 0.733*** 0.808*** 0.770*** 0.815*** 0.835*** 
 (0.263) (0.228) (0.236) (0.201) (0.247) 
Currency 0.287 -0.275 -0.314 -0.304 -0.253 
 (0.512) (0.455) (0.475) (0.392) (0.491) 
Contiguity 1.232*** 0.950** 1.106*** 1.119*** 1.150*** 
 (0.448) (0.401) (0.411) (0.336) (0.420) 
inverse Mills -4.118*** -3.403*** -3.525*** -3.024*** -3.710*** 
 (0.963) (0.950) (0.871) (0.605) (0.781) 
      
Observations 4,123 3,539 3,560 3,808 3,695 
R-squared 0.765 0.793 0.790 0.775 0.774 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts included but not recorded. The Table displays 
the results to a selection regression model, in which the exclusion criterion in the first stage is the existence of a colonial history 
between two countries. From the first stage regression the inverse Mills ratio is calculated and included in the main regression 
to account for a potential selection bias problem. Columns (1) to (5) above replicate Table 5.4. 
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Appendix C: Emails to Participants 
To account for the variation in potential participants' contact details, four categories of 
respondents are used to maximise the extent to which each survey invitation can be 
personalized. The first category of participants consists of those whose names and 
direct email addresses are known (2036), the second category contains those whose 
names are known, but only their offices' email addresses are available (1614), the third 
category comprises offices where no respondent's name can be found although the 
relevant trade section's email is available, and the fourth category consists of those 
offices that state trade to be one of their functions even though no contact information 
of anyone else than the ambassador or consulate-general is available (369). 
C.1. Initial contact  
 
Dear [Mr/Ms] [LastName], 
 
You are invited to participate in a worldwide survey which aims to 
investigate the outcomes of network development within the context of 
overseas trade promotion and business support. As a practitioner in this field, 
your experience is extremely valuable to this research. 
 
The information obtained through this survey will help to shed light on the 
success factors behind overseas trade promotion. As yet, this area has seen 
scarce research. 
 
Please note that only a small number of invitations has been sent out and that 
your feedback is therefore vital to the outcomes of this study. 
 
The survey takes approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete. Completion of 
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the survey is voluntary and your responses will be completely anonymous, 
de-identified and treated with strict confidentiality. 
 
To complete the survey, please click on the link below: 
 
Follow this link to the Survey: 
[SurveyLink?d=Take%20the%20Survey] 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
[//SurveyURL] 
 
Once you click on the link, you will be redirected to a new window with a 
brief summary of the research project and a Plain Language Statement. At the 
bottom of the window, you may choose to either participate in or withdraw 
from the project. Please note that you may withdraw from participation at any 
time. 
 
Upon completion of the survey you can enter your email address to receive a 
summary of the results from this research. 
 
Thank you very much in advance for your time and participation. If you have 
any questions, please direct them to Robin Visser (see contact details below). 
  
Robin Visser 
PhD Candidate 
Deakin University Department of Economics 
70 Elgar Road, Deakin University, Melbourne Burwood Campus, VIC 3125 
Australia 
robin.visser@deakin.edu.au 
+61 3 9244 3003 (work) 
+61 4 1266 8701 (mobile) 
  
Further Information: 
This survey is being administered by Robin Visser – and supervised by Prof. 
Pasquale Sgro, Dr. Xuan Nguyen and Dr. Munirul Nabin – as a part of a PhD at 
the Department of Economics, Deakin University. 
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This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). The ethics aspects of this 
research project have been approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of Deakin University. Ethics ID number for this project is [BL-EC 
63-14]. 
 
Follow this link to opt out of future emails: 
[OptOutLink?d=Click here to unsubscribe] 
 
C.2. First reminder 
 
Dear [Mr/Ms] [LastName], 
 
On 20 May we sent you an invitation to participate in a worldwide Trade 
Promotionsurvey. We have not yet received your response. 
 
This is a follow-up email to once again ask for your kind assistance to 
complete the survey as a crucial part of my doctoral research project. 
 
This research aims to investigate the success factors behind and process of 
trade promotion and is the first to do so in a global context. As a practitioner in 
this field, your inputs to the survey would be greatly appreciated. 
 
The survey takes approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete. Completion of 
the survey is voluntary and your responses will be completely anonymous, 
de-identified and treated with strict confidentiality. 
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Follow this link to the Survey: 
[SurveyLink?d=Take%20the%20Survey] 
 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
[SurveyURL] 
 
Once you click on the link, you will be redirected to a new window with a 
brief summary of the research project and a Plain Language Statement. At the 
bottom of the window, you may choose to either participate in or withdraw 
from the project. Please note that you may withdraw from participation at any 
time. 
 
The above link will stay active for 4 weeks and you can resume your progress at 
any time before expiry. Upon completion of the survey you can enter your 
email address to receive a summary of the results from this research. 
 
Thank you very much in advance for your time and participation. If you have 
any questions, please direct them to Robin Visser (see contact details below). 
 
  
Robin Visser 
PhD Candidate 
Deakin University Department of Economics 
70 Elgar Road, Deakin University, Melbourne Burwood Campus, VIC 3125 
Australia 
robin.visser@deakin.edu.au 
work: +61 3 9244 3003 
mobile: +61 4 1266 8701 
Department of Economics PhD students page 
 
  
Further Information: 
This survey is being administered by Robin Visser – and supervised by Prof. 
Pasquale Sgro, Dr. Xuan Nguyen and Dr. Munirul Nabin – as a part of a PhD at 
the Department of Economics, Deakin University. 
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Prof. Pasquale Sgro's page on the Deakin University website  
Dr. Xuan Nguyen's page on the Deakin University website 
Dr. Munirul Nabin's page on the Deakin University website 
 
 
This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). The ethics aspects of this 
research project have been approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of Deakin University. Ethics ID number for this project is [BL-EC 
63-14]. 
 
Follow this link to opt out of future emails: 
[OptOutLink?d=Click here to unsubscribe] 
 
C.3. Second reminder  
 
Dear [Mr/Ms] [LastName], 
 
On 20 May we sent you an invitation to participate in a worldwide Trade 
Promotionsurvey. This is the final follow-up email to once again ask for your 
kind assistance to complete the survey as a crucial part of my doctoral 
research project. 
 
This research aims to investigate the success factors behind and process of 
trade promotion and is the first to do so in a global context. As a practitioner in 
this field, your inputs to the survey would be greatly appreciated. 
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The survey takes approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete. Completion of 
the survey is voluntary and your responses will be completely anonymous, 
de-identified and treated with strict confidentiality. 
 
Follow this link to the Survey: 
[SurveyLink?d=Take%20the%20Survey] 
 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
[SurveyURL] 
 
Once you click on the link, you will be redirected to a new window with a 
brief summary of the research project and a Plain Language Statement. At the 
bottom of the window, you may choose to either participate in or withdraw 
from the project. Please note that you may withdraw from participation at any 
time. 
 
The above link will stay active for 4 weeks and you can resume your progress at 
any time before expiry. Upon completion of the survey you can enter your 
email address to receive a summary of the results from this research. 
 
Thank you very much in advance for your time and participation. If you have 
any questions, please direct them to Robin Visser (see contact details below). 
 
  
Robin Visser 
PhD Candidate 
Deakin University Department of Economics 
70 Elgar Road, Deakin University, Melbourne Burwood Campus, VIC 3125 
Australia 
robin.visser@deakin.edu.au 
work: +61 3 9244 3003 
mobile: +61 4 1266 8701 
Department of Economics PhD students page 
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Further Information: 
This survey is being administered by Robin Visser – and supervised by Prof. 
Pasquale Sgro, Dr. Xuan Nguyen and Dr. Munirul Nabin – as a part of a PhD at 
the Department of Economics, Deakin University. 
Prof. Pasquale Sgro's page on the Deakin University website  
Dr. Xuan Nguyen's page on the Deakin University website 
Dr. Munirul Nabin's page on the Deakin University website 
 
 
This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). The ethics aspects of this 
research project have been approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of Deakin University. Ethics ID number for this project is [BL-EC 
63-14]. 
 
Follow this link to opt out of future emails: 
[OptOutLink?d=Click here to unsubscribe] 
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Appendix D: The Survey as Sent to 
Participants 
This Appendix displays the survey from the viewpoint of the respondents. The way it 
is presented to respondents is such that a minimum amount of scrolling is required. 
This reduces the chance that a respondent misses a question, and it makes for a more 
aesthetically appealing format. Each individual screenshot below is of a single page. 
Every respondents goes through all 34 pages with three exceptions, which are 
indicated above the applicable survey page. The survey also includes a progress bar at 
the top of the page which is shown in survey page 4, but omitted in all other 
screenshots. 
The first screen contains the welcome message and plain language statement, which a 
respondent can click on. Doing so displays the information that is in Appendix F. 
Survey page 1 
 
Survey page 2 
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Survey page 3 
 
Survey page 4 
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For the purposes of illustration, the remainder of the screenshots continue with the 
survey having selected Honduras as the home country, and Australia as its location. 
Survey page 5 
 
If the respondent answers the question in the survey page displayed below in the 
affirmative, s/he then continues to survey page 7. If not the survey skips to page 8. 
Survey page 6 
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Survey page 7 
 
In the page displayed below, a 'yes' brings the respondent to survey page 9. A 'no' skips 
the survey to page 10. 
Survey page 8 
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Survey page 9 
 
Survey page 10 
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Survey page 11 
 
Survey page 12 
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Survey page 13 
 
Survey page 14 
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Survey page 15 
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Survey page 16 
 
Survey page 17 
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Survey page 18 
 
Survey page 19 
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Survey page 20 
 
Survey page 21 
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Survey page 22 
 
Survey page 23 
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Survey page 24 
 
Survey page 25 
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Survey page 26 
 
Survey page 27 
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Survey page 28 
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A positive answer to the question in survey page 29 below brings the respondent to the 
next page. If not, s/he skips to page 31. 
Survey page 29 
 
 
Survey page 30 
 257 
 
 
Survey page 31 
 
Following the page displayed below, the respondent has the opportunity to enter his or 
her email address in page 33 before the survey finishes. If the respondent opts for the 
'Neither' option, the survey skips to the final screen. 
Survey page 32 
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Survey page 33 
 
Survey page 34 
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Appendix E: Ethics Approval 
Document 
12 December 2014 
      
Dear Robin and Pasquale, 
 
BL-EC 63-14  
Network development and use within the context of commercial diplomacy 
 
Thank you for submitting the above project for consideration by the Faculty Human 
Ethics Advisory Group (HEAG). The HEAG recognised that the project complies with 
the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (2007) and 
has approved it. You may commence the project upon receipt of this communication.  
The approval period is for four years. It is your responsibility to contact the Faculty 
HEAG immediately should any of the following occur: 
 
 Serious or unexpected adverse effects on the participants 
 Any proposed changes in the protocol, including extensions of time 
 Any changes to the research team or changes to contact details 
 Any events which might affect the continuing ethical acceptability of the 
project 
 The project is discontinued before the expected date of completion. 
 
You will be required to submit an annual report giving details of the progress of your 
research. Failure to do so may result in the termination of the project. Once the project 
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is completed, you will be required to submit a final report informing the HEAG of its 
completion. 
 
Please ensure that the Deakin logo is on the Plain Language Statement and Consent 
Forms. You should also ensure that the project ID is inserted in the complaints clause 
on the Plain Language Statement, and be reminded that the project number must 
always be quoted in any communication with the HEAG to avoid delays. All 
communication should be directed to katrina.fleming@deakin.edu.au 
 
The Faculty HEAG and/or Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee 
(HREC) may need to audit this project as part of the requirements for monitoring set 
out in the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans 
(2007). 
 
If you have any queries in the future, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
We wish you well with your research. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
 
Katrina Fleming 
BL-HEAG Secretariat 
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Appendix F: Plain Language 
Statement 
 
 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO: Participant in the Survey  
 
 
Plain Language Statement  
Date:  November 2014 
Full Project Title:   Network development and use within the 
context of commercial diplomacy 
Principal Researcher:  Professor Pasquale Sgro 
Student Researcher:  Mr Robin Visser  
Associate Researcher(s): Dr. Xuan Nguyen, Dr. Munirul Nabin 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
You are kindly invited to take part in a research project that investigates the outcomes 
of network development within the context of business-support performed in the host 
country. The research is being undertaken as a part of the PhD program and is 
supported by Deakin University's Graduate School of Business. 
The results of this study will contribute to the formulation of a model that will lead to 
determining the circumstances under which the support and facilitation provided 
abroad benefit home country businesses the most. 
Being responsible for commercial affairs in your current post, you have been selected 
to participate in this survey. Please note that your participation in this project is 
completely voluntary and if you do not wish to take part you are not obliged to. 
Furthermore, please note that no personally identifiable data of the participant will be 
collected nor published in any format. 
Upon opening the survey link and after reading this Plain Language Statement, you 
will be asked to consent to proceed to answer the questions. At the bottom of the 
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window, you may choose to either participate in or withdraw from the project. Please 
note that you may withdraw from participation at any time during the survey. 
By choosing to participate in the research you will access a set of questions that revolve 
around the characteristics of your office and your activities relating to business 
support. The survey takes up to 10 minutes to complete. When you have completed 
the survey, please click on the “Finish” button in order to submit your responses. 
All the resulting data from the survey will be stored securely on a password-protected 
portable hard drive which will be kept safely in a locked cabinet at Deakin University 
for a period of five years after final thesis publication. After this point all the data will 
be destroyed. 
The findings of this study will be published as a part of a PhD thesis, as well as in 
academic journal articles, and in conference papers. If you are interested in receiving 
a summary of the results that arise from this study, the survey will allow you to indicate 
this and the results will be sent to you accordingly once they are finalised. 
Ethical Guidelines 
This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct 
in Human Research (2007) produced by the National Health and Medical Research 
Council of Australia. This statement has been developed to protect the interests of 
people who agree to participate in human research studies. The ethics aspects of this 
research project have been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of 
Deakin University. 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being 
conducted or any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may 
contact:   
The Manager, Research Integrity, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, 
Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, Facsimile: 9244 6581;  
research-ethics@deakin.edu.au                                 
Please quote project number [BL-EC 63-14]. 
 
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you have 
any problems concerning this project, you can contact the research supervisor.  
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Kind regards, 
 
Professor Pasquale Sgro 
Faculty of Business and Law 
Department of Economics 
Deakin University 
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Appendix G: Differences between 
Office Types, and between Commercial 
Diplomat Types 
This Appendix analysis differences between different types of offices as an initial step 
to determine the merit of the analysis of Hypothesis H5b in Chapter 7. In addition, it 
analyses whether significant differences exist between the classifications of 
commercial diplomats developed by Naray (2008) and Ruël and Visser (2012) in the 
context of Hypothesis H6a. It does so by first outlining summary statistics in terms of 
means and medians across the different groups to inform general patterns in the data, 
after which formal testing using parametric and nonparametric procedures follows.  
The applicable parametric tests are one-tailed two-sample t-tests for variables that 
follow a normal distribution, and Mann-Whitney tests for variables that do not follow 
a normal distribution. For the comparison between the classifications, multiway 
ANOVA tables apply in the parametric cases, and Kruskal-Wallis tests in 
nonparametric cases. For such difference testing to have enough power (i.e. confidence 
at the 95 per cent level), a t-test requires 88 observations in each group and a Mann-
Whitney test 92, a condition with which the data mostly complies. The lowest amount 
of power that can be achieved is with the network composition variables, where 77 
and 83 observations in each group achieve a power of 0.933 for t-tests, and 0.924 for 
Mann-Whitney tests. 
G.1. Summary Statistics by Groups 
Table G.1 presents summary statistics of variables of interest for the two types of 
offices. It shows that separate trade offices have more personnel on average than 
diplomatic offices' commercial departments (6.65 versus 5.52) and the medians (5 
versus 3) confirm this. The same pattern presents itself in the ratio of locally employed 
personnel over total personnel. The diplomatic offices are around twice as old as trade 
promotion offices, whether measured by the mean or the median, attesting to the 
longevity of diplomatic relations. 
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Table G.1: Summary statistics by office type 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.  
Embassies/consulates 
 
Separate offices 
   
Office size 96 5.521 8.608 3 1 70 
 
104 6.471 6.648 5 1 36 
Percentage locally employed 96 53.188 32.353 50 0 100 
 
104 66.65 28.768 75 0 100 
Age of office 86 44.942 35.061 37 0 114 
 
94 26.277 23.828 20 0 114 
Network activities 96 5.368 1.117 5.333 2.333 7 
 
105 6.041 0.669 6 4.333 7 
Meeting organisation 96 5.188 1.19 5 2 7 
 
105 5.819 0.998 6 3 7 
Partner search 96 5.333 1.412 6 2 7 
 
105 6.295 0.733 6 4 7 
Network increase 96 5.583 1.303 6 1 7 
 
105 6.01 0.946 6 4 7 
Intelligence activities 96 5.035 1.015 5 2.333 7 
 
104 5.144 0.828 5.333 3 7 
Market and economic information 96 5.583 1.139 6 3 7 
 
105 5.819 1.045 6 3 7 
Culture information 96 4.313 1.19 4 2 7 
 
105 4.114 1.129 4 1 7 
Business regulations information 96 5.208 1.345 5 2 7 
 
104 5.471 1.088 6 3 7 
Image promotion activities 94 4.739 1.054 4.5 2 7 
 
105 4.957 0.954 5 2.5 7 
Trade fair participation 96 4.833 1.22 5 2 7 
 
105 5.333 1.089 5 3 7 
Image promotion for firm and 
country 
94 4.67 1.355 5 1 7 
 
105 4.581 1.246 4 1 7 
Business support activities 94 3.415 1.061 3.333 1 6.667 
 
104 3.49 1.121 3.5 1 7 
Negotiation assistance 94 4.032 1.492 4 1 7 
 
104 4.298 1.427 4 1 7 
Coordinating legal action 95 3.105 1.25 3 1 6 
 
105 3.105 1.447 3 1 7 
IPR protection 95 3.116 1.279 3 1 7 
 
105 3.038 1.285 3 1 7 
FDI activities 96 4.51 1.254 4.5 1.5 7 
 
104 4.601 1.264 4.5 1.5 7 
Inward FDI promotion 96 4.76 1.485 5 1 7 
 
105 4.857 1.522 5 1 7 
Outward FDI assistance 96 4.26 1.489 4 1 7 
 
104 4.356 1.594 4 1 7 
Industries active in 95 4.842 2.228 4 0 11 
 
104 5.144 2.304 5 1 14 
SME clients percentage 93 69.484 22.692 72 8 100 
 
103 77.786 18.963 81 2 100 
SME contacts percentage 93 59.484 24.451 61 8 100 
 
103 60.427 21.935 69 9 100 
Network size (host country) 81 342 719.694 100 0 4800 
 
97 544.412 794.538 300 4 5000 
Network size (home country) 80 729.075 2599.072 150 0 20000 
 
93 419.409 639.364 150 5 3500 
Pre-established contacts in network 84 46.238 27.832 50 0 100 
 
100 47.84 25.444 50 2 100 
Tie strength 92 2.816 1.041 2.964 0.765 5.355  97 2.651 1.028 2.512 0.765 5.355 
Network composition (public officials) 78 3.688 0.843 3.741 1.294 5.154  83 3.363 0.994 3.526 1.294 5.154 
Network composition (business contacts) 78 3.984 0.615 4.03 2.616 4.902  84 4.007 0.621 4.03 2.457 4.902 
Network composition (innovation contacts) 77 3.418 0.978 3.62 1.349 5.134  83 3.07 0.93 3.29 0.757 5.299 
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For the activities performed, there is an unambiguous order of activity performance 
across both types of offices. Network activities are performed most frequently, 
followed by (in order of frequency): intelligence activities, image promotion, FDI 
promotion, and finally business support activities. In addition, trade promotion offices 
have higher average values for all activities that the offices perform than diplomatic 
offices do. 
Looking at the individual items that make up the activity groups, the importance of 
individual activities differs by office type. Table G.2 details the ranking (from most to 
least frequently performed) for both office types. There is a consistent pattern where 
the top five and bottom five activities feature the same activities across both office 
types. The activity that is performed most often by diplomatic offices is information 
provision on economic and market developments, while for trade promotion offices it 
is searching for partners on behalf of businesses from the home country. 
Another aspect of offices' activities is the number of industries that they are active in, 
or target. Here, there is a small positive difference in favour of trade promotion offices, 
which target a little over five industries as opposed to a little under five for diplomatic 
offices.  
The client base has different means and medians between the types of offices. Trade 
promotion offices have more SMEs as clients from the home country, and as contacts 
in the host country.  
Only the medians matter for total network size due to the high skewness and kurtosis 
in the variables representing this. Trade promotion offices' networks in the host 
country are larger than diplomatic offices' networks, yet when it comes to contacts 
from the home country the network sizes are apparently equal. The network size in the 
host country being larger for trade promotion offices is consistent with the network 
development activity group as well, where these offices have a higher mean than 
diplomatic offices. Despite this, the percentage of pre-established contacts within their 
networks that these offices have differs minimally, with 47.8 and 46.2 being the 
averages and the median in both cases being 50. As for indicators of the compositions 
of the offices' networks, tie strength is higher on average for diplomatic offices than 
for trade promotion offices which complies with the trust that diplomatic 
representations build (Alexander & Warwick, 2007). Network composition with 
public and innovation contacts is higher for diplomatic offices as well, while the 
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importance of business contacts is equal across the two office types in terms of average 
value, and equal in terms of the median. 
Table G.2: Most frequently performed activities by office type 
Rank Activity 
 Diplomatic offices  Trade promotion offices 
1 Information provision: economy and 
markets 
 Searching for local partners 
2 Increasing the network of business 
contacts 
 Increasing the network of business 
contacts 
3 Searching for local partners  Information provision: economy and 
markets 
4 Information provision: business 
regulations 
 Organising meetings with local 
partners 
5 Organising meetings with local 
partners 
 Information provision: business 
regulations 
6 Trade fair participation/organisation  Trade fair participation/organisation 
7 Promotion of FDI into home country  Promotion of FDI into home country 
8 Image/advocacy for home country 
(businesses) 
 Image/advocacy for home country 
(businesses) 
9 Information provision: culture and 
society 
 Supporting FDI in host country 
10 Supporting FDI in host country  Negotiation assistance 
11 Negotiation assistance  Information provision: culture and 
society 
12 IPR protection  Coordination of legal action 
13 Coordination of legal action  IPR protection 
 
Turning now to the Ruël and Visser (2012) and Naray (2008) commercial diplomat 
classifications, Tables G.3 and G.4 highlight summary statistics relating to respondent 
demographics and experience, and to the network development activities that the 
respondents engage in. Section 6.2.4 illustrates how within each classification a binary 
variable is created to denote business promoters and non-business promoters, 
according to Naray (2008), and proactors and non-proactors according to Ruël and 
Visser (2012). 
Starting with the Ruël and Visser (2012) classification, differences between proactors 
and non-proactors on the variables are consistent for their mean and median values. 
Proactors are, on average, slightly older, have more experience in the current position 
as well as in the private sector, and are more adept at speaking the host country's 
language. Moreover, in their networks the business contacts are more important on 
average than for non-proactors. With proactors’ active involvement in commercial 
affairs the higher average for the network communication factor is unsurprising as the 
network communication variable denotes the intensity of personal communication 
with contacts. They also see the institutional distance between the home and host 
countries as being larger than non-proactors do. Consistent with their lower 
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engagement in commercial affairs, non-proactors have more experience in previous 
positions and less experience in the private sector than proactors do. Consequently, 
their overall ratio of public sector over total experience is subsequently higher than for 
proactors. Related to this is the larger average for number of languages spoken by a 
respondent, although the means differ little (3.016 for proactors versus 3.116 for non-
proactors) and the medians are identical (3). Regarding network development, non-
proactors and proactors have almost identical mean values for tie strength (2.708 for 
proactors versus 2.764 for non-proactors), although the medians suggests a more 
distinct higher level of tie strength for non-proactors (2.667 for proactors versus 2.864 
for non-proactors). In addition, non-proactors place greater emphasis on public and 
innovation contacts in their networks relative to proactors (based on the means and 
medians), and the non-proactors’ means for all three types of contacts are closer 
together than is the case with proactors. Most revealing in Table G.3 is the difference 
between the location of proactors and non-proactors. With the diplomatic office 
variable being unity if the respondent works at a diplomatic office, and zero in the case 
of a trade promotion office, non-proactors have a mean of 0.729 on this variables as 
opposed to proactors, for which this value is less than half of that (0.333). 
The Naray (2008) classification in Table G.4 displays the same pattern in almost all 
cases. Where it differs most is that the contrasts from Table G.3 are now smaller. The 
most notable case is the respondents' office types. While the contrast in the Ruël and 
Visser (2012) was very large, it is less so in the Naray (2008) classification. These 
small differences highlight that while these two classifications categorise commercial 
diplomats differently, the outcomes follow much the same pattern. 
G.2. Testing whether Differences are Significant 
While the summary statistics above highlight differences between types of offices and 
types of respondents in terms of averages and medians, this does not reveal whether 
these differences are significant. This section tests for significance. First is a 
comparison of resource, activity, and network variables between the two offices, 
second a comparison of commercial diplomats within the Ruël and Visser (2012) and 
within the Naray (2008) classifications, and third is an assessment of differences 
between the classification schemes. In the first and second steps, one-tailed two-
sample t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests apply. These one-tailed tests hypothesise that 
the direction of difference between offices and between respondent types follows the 
differences in means or medians that Tables G.1, G.3 and G.4 highlight. In the third 
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step ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests are relevant as there are more than two groups. 
In terms of the t-tests, the assumption of equal variance between groups is most likely 
violated based on an eyeball inspection of the summary tables above. Hence, the t-
tests are conducted with an adjustment for unequal variance. 
G.2.1. Offices 
The results of a two-sample one-tailed t-test show that the ratio of locally employed 
over total personnel differs between separate offices and embassies/consulates (t(190) 
= 3.1, p < 0.001) at the 99 per cent confidence level. On average, separate offices have 
a larger ratio of locally employed personnel than embassies/consulates do. Moreover, 
following the results of a Mann-Whitney test, significant differences exist between the 
two types of offices in terms of the number of personnel (z = 2.51, p < 0.006), and the 
network size in the host country (z = 4.566, p < 0.000), both of which are significant 
at the 99 per cent confidence level. Separate offices have more personnel, and have a 
larger network of contacts in the host country. 
In terms of activities performed, separate offices perform network and image activities 
significantly more frequently than embassies/consulates do, at the 5 and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. Results of two-sample one-tailed t-tests indicate 
significant differences for network activities (t(153) = 5.123, p < 0.000) and image 
activities (t(189) = 1.522, p < 0.065). SMEs from the home country know how to target 
separate offices better than embassies/consulates. At the 5 per cent significance level, 
separate offices have a larger percentage of SMEs as clients than embassies/consulates 
do (t(180) = 2.763, p < 0.003). 
According to two-sample one-tailed t-tests, diplomatic offices have significantly 
higher values than separate offices when it comes to the importance of public officials 
in their networks (t(157) = -2.241, p < 0.013), and the same goes for innovation 
contacts (t(156) = -2.302, p < 0.011). This is line with the broader function that an 
embassy or consulate generally plays in the host country. 
In terms of the other variables, no differences exist between the two types of offices, 
neither in t-tests nor Mann-Whitney tests. As such, there is no significant difference 
between office types when it comes to the number of contacts in the home country, 
and the frequency with which intelligence, business support activities, investment 
promotion activities are performed. There is also no statistically significant difference 
between the number of industries that each type of offices serves. Lastly, several 
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network aspects of the offices do not differ significantly: the percentage of SMEs of 
all businesses they contact in the host countries, the percentage of network contacts 
used in 2014 that were pre-established, the relation measures for tie strength, 
communication type, and the importance of business contacts in the offices' networks.  
Overall, the pattern of differences between the two types of offices point to a story 
with three key components. First, the resources that offices possess, such as number 
of personnel, network size, and client base, are almost always significantly higher for 
separate offices than for embassies/consulates. Second, the five activities groups are 
performed mostly with the same frequency apart from network activities, and image 
activities (which separate offices perform more frequently). Third, little difference in 
the content of the network exists across office types. This indicates that while the two 
offices types are equipped differently, this appears to not greatly affect their network 
development and general functioning in the host country. 
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Table G.3: Summary statistics by Ruël and Visser's (2012) commercial diplomat classifications 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.  
Proactors 
   
Non-proactors 
Respondent age 124 3.75 0.925 4 2 6 
 
62 3.516 0.987 3 2 6 
Experience (current post) 129 4.411 5.236 2.833 0.167 27.25 
 
68 3.276 4.175 1.875 0.25 21.167 
Experience (previous posts) 129 5.327 7.772 0 0 35 
 
68 5.485 6.882 3.583 0 32 
Experience (private sector) 129 6.222 7.405 4.25 0 30.75 
 
68 3.197 5.087 1 0 30.75 
Ratio of posts/total experience 129 64.452 33.694 71.154 1.695 100 
 
68 77.651 28.955 89.012 5.882 100 
Fluency in host country's language 129 4.798 2.237 6 1 7 
 
69 4.507 2.386 5 1 7 
Number of languages spoken 128 3.016 1.316 3 1 8 
 
69 3.116 1.29 3 1 8 
Tie strength 122 2.708 1.035 2.667 0.765 5.355 
 
65 2.764 0.976 2.864 1.047 5.355 
Network composition  
  (public officials) 
107 3.414 1.008 3.705 1.294 5.154 
 
53 3.71 0.729 3.777 1.737 4.976 
Network composition  
  (business contacts) 
108 4.039 0.634 4.03 2.457 4.902 
 
53 3.891 0.563 4.03 2.812 4.902 
Network composition  
  (innovation contacts) 
106 3.183 0.945 3.29 0.757 5.299 
 
53 3.312 0.985 3.584 1.349 5.134 
Network communication 121 2.745 0.494 2.703 1.453 3.955 
 
65 2.575 0.457 2.577 1.679 3.955 
Institutional differences 129 3.795 0.842 4.006 0.716 5.013 
 
69 3.67 0.825 3.868 1 4.868 
Embassy/consulate or not 129 0.333 0.473 0 0 1  70 0.729 0.448 1 0 1 
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Table G.4: Summary statistics by Naray's (2008) commercial diplomat classifications 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
 
Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Median Min. Max. 
 
Business promoters 
   
Non business promoters 
Respondent age 80 3.838 0.892 4 2 5 
 
108 3.565 0.979 4 2 6 
Experience (current post) 83 4.444 5.814 2.417 0.5 27.25 
 
116 3.698 4.114 2.5 0.167 20.5 
Experience (previous posts) 83 5.507 7.503 2.5 0 33.167 
 
116 5.295 7.43 3 0 35 
Experience (private sector) 83 6.82 8.198 5 0 30.75 
 
116 4.172 5.862 2 0 29 
Ratio of posts/total experience 83 66.043 32.787 73.469 3.896 100 
 
116 70.925 32.823 84.484 1.695 100 
Fluency in host country's language 83 4.735 2.247 6 1 7 
 
117 4.658 2.342 6 1 7 
Number of languages spoken 82 3.085 1.279 3 1 7 
 
117 3.017 1.32 3 1 8 
Tie strength 80 2.7 1.01 2.667 1.047 5.355 
 
109 2.754 1.057 2.672 0.765 5.355 
Network composition  
  (public officials) 
67 3.24 1.022 3.325 1.294 5.154 
 
94 3.72 0.817 3.8 1.294 5.154 
Network composition  
  (business contacts) 
68 4.007 0.63 4.03 2.457 4.902 
 
94 3.988 0.609 4.03 2.616 4.902 
Network composition  
  (innovation contacts) 
66 3.053 0.897 3.125 0.757 4.804 
 
94 3.368 0.996 3.52 1.349 5.299 
Network communication 79 2.72 0.536 2.647 1.627 3.955 
 
109 2.667 0.452 2.699 1.453 3.955 
Institutional differences 84 3.802 0.867 4.013 1 5.013 
 
116 3.732 0.82 4.005 0.716 5.013 
Embassy/consulate or not 84 0.452 0.501 0 0 1  117 0.496 0.502 0 0 1 
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G.2.2. Commercial diplomats in the Ruël and Visser (2012) 
classification 
Two-sample one-tailed t-tests result in four significant differences between Ruël and 
Visser's (2012) proactors and non-proactors: for the ratio of foreign post over total 
experience, experience at the current post, experience in the private sector, and tie 
strength with business contacts. 
The ratio of experience in the current and previous posts over total experience 
significantly differs between the two groups at the 5 per cent significance level (t(155) 
= 2.871, p < .002), such that on average non-proactors have a larger share of experience 
in previous offices than proactors do. Similarly, there is a significant difference in the 
average values for the importance of public officials in respondents' networks (t(137) 
= 2.119, p < 0.018). At the 95 per cent confidence level, non-proactors attach greater 
importance to public official contacts than proactors do. 
Proactors have significantly higher averages than non-proactors on several variables. 
Business contacts are more important in their networks at the 10 per cent significance 
level, following a two-sample one-tailed t-test (t(115) = -1.509, p < 0.067). Proactors 
have a higher average value for the intensity with which network communication takes 
place at a t-test at the 0.01 level of significance (t(140) = -2.359, p < 0.01). A Mann-
Whitney test indicate that significant differences exist when it comes to experience at 
the current post (z = -2.167, p < 0.015) and in the private sector (z = -3.037, p < .001) 
at the 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels, respectively: proactors have more experience 
in the current post and in the private sector than non-proactors do. 
For the remaining variables, there is no difference between proactors and non-
proactors, or not a significant difference. These variables are: fluency in the host 
country's language, number of languages spoken, tie strength, the importance of 
innovation contacts in the network, the perceived institutional differences between 
home and host countries, and the number of years worked at previous offices. 
Given the differences outlined above, it is not surprising that according to the results 
of a Mann-Whitney test there is a significant difference in where the two types of 
commercial diplomat work, between embassies/consulates or separate offices (z = 
5.32, p < 0.000). At the 5 per cent level of significance, a statistically significantly 
larger proportion of non-proactors work for embassies/consulates than for separate 
offices, while a larger proportion of proactors work at separate offices. The key 
differences that underlie this division lie in the type of experience that a respondent 
 275 
 
has, private versus public sector, the extent to which a respondent maintains strong ties 
with business contacts, and the extent to which a respondent engages in face-to-face 
communication with network contacts. These findings are reflected in the 
classification outlined by Ruël and Visser (2012). 
G.2.3. Commercial diplomats in the Naray (2008) classification 
The results for the Naray (2008) classification differ from the results obtained from 
the Ruël and Visser (2012) classification in several ways, and the changes in 
significance and its direction are of interest here. 
In the Ruël and Visser (2012) classification, respondents significantly differ in terms 
of experience in the public sector over total experience, importance of business 
contacts in the network, communication style, number of years in the current position, 
and whether respondents work at an embassy/consulate or separate office; however, 
these differences are insignificant in the Naray (2008) classification. The one variable 
where the Naray (2008) classification results in a significant difference as opposed to 
Ruël and Visser (2012) is with the importance of innovation contacts in the 
respondent's network at a significance level of 95 per cent (t(148) = 2.089, p < 0.019). 
In all remaining variables, the pattern of results in the Naray (2008) classification is 
the same as in Ruël and Visser (2012). The Naray (2008) classification results in a less 
pronounced set of differences between respondent types which explains why Ruël and 
Zuidema (2012) find few differences between business promoters, civil servants and 
generalists. Following the Naray (2008) classification respondents are largely no 
different when grouped based on their approach, where such differences can 
reasonably be expected in terms of (for example) the amount of experience in the 
public sector in their total experience, and whether they work at embassies/consulates 
as opposed to separate offices. 
G.2.4. Differences between commercial diplomat classifications 
Having identified that the Ruël and Visser (2012) and Naray (2008) classification 
schemes result in several different outcomes when comparing between commercial 
diplomat types, the last step in the difference testing process is assessing whether these 
two classification schemes differ significantly from each other. In this thesis’s survey, 
each respondent is assigned a 1 if s/he is a proactor, and a 0 if not, and another variable 
adopts the Naray (2008) classification by identifying whether they are business 
promoters (1) or not (0). To identify whether there are differences between the 
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classification schemes these two dummy variables are adopted into a categorical 
variable which contains the four possible outcomes. ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests 
on the variables then identify whether there are differences between the four groups 
and hence, between the two classification schemes. 
The one-way ANOVA difference tests reveal that the classification schemes differ in 
two variables: the ratio of public sector experience over total experience (F(3,196) = 
2.7, p < 0.047), and the importance of public sector contacts in the respondents' 
networks (F(3,159) = 3.94, p < 0.01), at the 95 and 99 per cent confidence levels 
respectively. Further post-hoc Games-Howell tests (which account for unequal 
variances) indicate that these differences arise from the grouping of non business-
promoters, suggesting that the Naray (2008) classification understates the importance 
of the ratio of experience in current and previous posts over total experience. This is 
also true for the importance of public officials in the offices' networks. 
The results for nonparametric variables reveal significant differences between the 
classifications in terms of experience at the current position (χ²(3) = 7.35, p < 0.062), 
experience in the private sector (χ²(3) = 11.786, p < 0.008), and whether different 
respondent types work at different types of offices (χ²(3) = 21.598, p < 0.000). Pairwise 
comparisons between groups using a Dunn-test with Bonferroni adjustment (Dunn, 
1961; 1964; Hochberg, 1988) reveal that experience factors are more important in the 
Ruël and Visser (2012) classification than in Naray (2008), and that the Naray (2008) 
classification significantly differs from Ruël and Visser (2012) in identifying whether 
respondents work at embassies/consulate or separate offices. 
As such, the face-value differences between the outcomes from assessing each 
classification scheme, as done earlier largely hold. The Ruël and Visser (2012) 
classification scheme is more effective at differentiation between types of respondents, 
therefore the remainder of the analysis utilises that classification scheme where 
relevant. Given the results here it is not surprising that Ruël and Zuidema (2012) find 
no substantial differences between respondents as they use Naray's (2008) 
methodology. The Ruël and Visser (2012) classification results in stronger differences 
between commercial diplomat types which are grounded mostly in the type of 
experience they possess. This agrees with what Naray (2008) purports, and indicates 
that the key difference is looking at what commercial diplomats are engaged with in 
their daily activities, rather than their attitude towards their role. Following from 
Chapter 2, the Ruël and Visser (2012) classification more strongly shows differences 
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on key characteristics of commercial diplomats, and in the analysis of Hypothesis H6a 
n Chapter 7 only that classification is used. 
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Appendix H: Robustness of the Results 
in Section 7.3.4 
As outlined in Section 7.2.1, the main analysis of the effect of commercial diplomacy 
offices' characteristics on exports divides exports into equal parts for every duplicate 
or triplicate office in the dataset. Given that there are six sets of duplicate offices and 
one set of triplicate offices (where home and host countries are identical but the offices 
are in different cities), it is possible that this assumption may result in an upwards bias 
of the results in Section 7.3.4. This Appendix displays the same Tables that are found 
in the that Section, with the difference that the responses for duplicate and triplicate 
offices have been averaged so that only a single commercial diplomacy presence 
appears in the dataset by country-pair. 
Results are displayed in the four tables below. Their pattern is identical to that in 
Section 7.3.4. Table H.1 displays the results for office characteristics, Table H.2 
displays commercial diplomat characteristics, Table H.3 displays an office's activities, 
industry focus and client base and Table H.4 displays structural network 
characteristics82. The variables remain as before (see Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 for their 
descriptions). To facilitate easy comparison the cells containing different results to the 
identical Table in Section 7.3.4 are identified as follows: 
- The coefficient and standard error are in italics: result has become (more) 
significant (e.g. from not significant to significant at the 10 per cent level, or 
from the 10 per cent level to the 5 per cent level). 
- The coefficient and standard error are underlined: the result has become less 
significant by one significance level (e.g. from the 1 per cent level to the 5 per 
cent level). 
- If the coefficient and standard error are in bold: result is no longer significant. 
- If the coefficient and standard error are outlined: a sign change of a significant 
variables has occurred. 
- None of the above: no change. 
As can be seen in the four tables below, no sign changes occur. Most changes are in 
the significance level, where the coefficient remains significant. In one case only does 
                                                 
82 The equivalent Tables in Section 7.3.4 are Table 7.8 to Table 7.11. 
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a coefficient that was significant at the 10 per cent level in Table 7.9 become 
insignificant: this is the pubrat variable in column (3) of Table H.2. In the opposite 
direction, two variables go from being insignificant to significant. In Table H.1 the 
oftype variable in column (4) becomes significant at the 5 per cent level (compare 
Table 7.8 where it is insignificant), and in Table H.3 the netwact variables becomes 
significant at the 10 per cent level (from being insignificant in Table 7.10). 
Given that the results in this Appendix hardly differ from those obtained in Section 
7.3.4, the results are robust to the two options in treating duplicate and triplicate offices 
in the survey data: averaging the dependent variable by duplicate and triplicate offices 
versus averaging duplicate and triplicate offices' survey responses yields largely the 
same results. 
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Table H.1: The effect of office characteristics on exports (robustness analysis) 
 Total exports  Industry-adjusted exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS PPML PPML  OLS OLS PPML PPML 
          
oftype -0.694** -0.257 -0.456 -0.411**  -0.918*** -0.488* -0.476 -0.353 
 (0.306) (0.190) (0.312) (0.206)  (0.346) (0.259) (0.408) (0.225) 
ofsize 0.666*** 0.133 0.834*** 0.149  0.809*** 0.318** 0.956*** 0.518** 
 (0.180) (0.116) (0.177) (0.182)  (0.203) (0.157) (0.226) (0.230) 
locrat 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.002  0.005 0.001 0.005 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
ageoff 0.284* 0.239** 0.156 0.120  0.342** 0.356*** 0.178 0.129 
 (0.147) (0.092) (0.130) (0.086)  (0.166) (0.125) (0.162) (0.130) 
mills -1.923** -1.727* -0.905 0.447  -0.735 -2.009 -0.379 0.354 
 (0.796) (0.918) (0.652) (1.090)  (0.898) (1.248) (0.825) (1.536) 
gdist (log)  -0.910***  -0.838***   -0.932***  -0.886*** 
  (0.091)  (0.097)   (0.124)  (0.114) 
gdpcapi (log)  0.796***  1.210***   0.241  0.226 
  (0.234)  (0.261)   (0.318)  (0.278) 
gdpcapj (log)  1.055***  1.219***   1.124***  1.349*** 
  (0.098)  (0.139)   (0.133)  (0.188) 
popi (log)  0.831***  0.689***   0.756***  0.444*** 
  (0.084)  (0.106)   (0.114)  (0.136) 
popj (log)  0.664***  0.800***   0.670***  0.852*** 
  (0.055)  (0.071)   (0.075)  (0.107) 
          
Observations 172 166 172 166  166 160 166 160 
R-squared 0.254 0.758 0.246 0.668  0.247 0.647 0.220 0.716 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept included but not recorded. 
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Table H.2: The effect of commercial diplomat characteristics on exports (robustness analysis) 
 Total exports  Industry-adjusted exports 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 OLS PPML  OLS PPML 
      
proac 1.336*** 1.102***  1.440*** 0.999** 
 (0.289) (0.322)  (0.337) (0.416) 
exp1 -0.044 -0.032  -0.066* -0.064** 
 (0.031) (0.029)  (0.036) (0.031) 
exp2 0.016 0.040***  0.023 0.039*** 
 (0.021) (0.012)  (0.024) (0.014) 
exp3 0.007 -0.057*  0.005 -0.065* 
 (0.034) (0.034)  (0.039) (0.034) 
pubrat 0.013* -0.004  0.014 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.010)  (0.009) (0.012) 
lang1 0.036 0.116**  0.049 0.205*** 
 (0.065) (0.055)  (0.076) (0.070) 
lang2 -0.220** -0.236**  -0.254** -0.343** 
 (0.107) (0.120)  (0.125) (0.161) 
mills -3.856*** -2.259***  -2.880*** -2.005** 
 (0.890) (0.653)  (1.035) (0.853) 
      
Observations 189 189  188 189 
R-squared 0.197 0.092  0.156 0.090 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept included but not recorded. 
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Table H.3: The effect of offices' activities, industry focus and client base on exports (robustness analysis) 
 Total exports  Industry-adjusted exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS PPML PPML  OLS OLS PPML PPML 
          netwact 0.068 0.021 0.177* -0.066  0.008 -0.030 0.267* -0.073 
 (0.185) (0.110) (0.107) (0.115)  (0.210) (0.147) (0.145) (0.193) 
intelact -0.006 0.059 -0.006 0.088  0.014 0.124 -0.005 -0.045 
 (0.196) (0.120) (0.188) (0.115)  (0.223) (0.160) (0.187) (0.186) 
imagact 0.354** 0.073 0.248 -0.015  0.511** 0.191 0.176 0.023 
 (0.174) (0.109) (0.174) (0.095)  (0.198) (0.145) (0.159) (0.128) 
bsupact -0.132 -0.108 0.033 -0.009  -0.223 -0.200* 0.101 0.037 
 (0.142) (0.083) (0.142) (0.118)  (0.162) (0.111) (0.166) (0.159) 
fdivact -0.110 -0.112 0.030 -0.020  -0.158 -0.148 0.067 -0.004 
 (0.135) (0.081) (0.112) (0.066)  (0.153) (0.109) (0.132) (0.109) 
indnum -0.027 -0.034 0.077 0.002  0.170** 0.166*** 0.196* 0.142** 
 (0.065) (0.040) (0.088) (0.045)  (0.074) (0.053) (0.105) (0.057) 
smeo 0.037*** 0.012** 0.029*** 0.021***  0.041*** 0.014** 0.035*** 0.028** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) 
smed -0.017** 0.002 -0.023*** -0.014**  -0.020** 0.001 -0.023*** -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
mills -1.681* -1.496 -1.132** 0.253  -0.654 -2.230* -0.959 -0.772 
 (0.858) (0.974) (0.567) (0.835)  (0.975) (1.302) (0.632) (1.215) 
gdist (log)  -0.936***  -0.842***   -0.898***  -0.767*** 
  (0.091)  (0.089)   (0.122)  (0.116) 
gdpcapi (log)  0.848***  1.279***   0.347  0.665** 
  (0.242)  (0.224)   (0.324)  (0.311) 
gdpcapj (log)  0.995***  1.176***   1.104***  1.452*** 
  (0.098)  (0.125)   (0.131)  (0.231) 
popi (log)  0.889***  0.824***   0.910***  0.799*** 
  (0.077)  (0.054)   (0.102)  (0.083) 
popj (log)  0.718***  0.794***   0.739***  0.891*** 
  (0.057)  (0.076)   (0.076)  (0.116) 
          Observations 183 176 183 176  183 176 183 176 
R-squared 0.184 0.747 0.064 0.741  0.191 0.645 0.075 0.620 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept included but not recorded. 
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Table H.4: The effect of offices' structural network characteristics on exports (robustness analysis) 
 Total exports  Industry-adjusted exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS PPML PPML  OLS OLS PPML PPML 
          
nsizd 0.088 -0.030 0.140 -0.013  0.128 0.042 0.095 0.007 
 (0.129) (0.075) (0.180) (0.039)  (0.148) (0.104) (0.123) (0.086) 
nsizo 0.072 -0.008 -0.102 -0.046  0.091 -0.009 0.061 0.038 
 (0.137) (0.080) (0.192) (0.045)  (0.158) (0.110) (0.132) (0.080) 
precon 0.002 0.006* 0.010* 0.012***  0.001 0.007 0.009 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
mills -2.800*** -1.668* -1.880*** -0.448  -1.870* -1.953 -1.666** -0.746 
 (0.885) (0.993) (0.671) (0.788)  (1.017) (1.365) (0.847) (1.132) 
gdist (log)  -0.962***  -0.886***   -1.020***  -0.973*** 
  (0.100)  (0.060)   (0.138)  (0.101) 
gdpcapi (log)  0.782***  1.186***   0.318  0.724*** 
  (0.248)  (0.199)   (0.341)  (0.265) 
gdpcapj (log)  1.100***  1.338***   1.207***  1.545*** 
  (0.097)  (0.130)   (0.134)  (0.222) 
popi (log)  0.794***  0.711***   0.746***  0.669*** 
  (0.085)  (0.057)   (0.117)  (0.094) 
popj (log)  0.710***  0.887***   0.784***  1.040*** 
  (0.055)  (0.091)   (0.075)  (0.136) 
          
Observations 160 154 160 154  160 154 160 154 
R-squared 0.068 0.735 0.029 0.781  0.034 0.607 0.011 0.618 
Note:  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept included but not recorded.
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Appendix I: Sources for Industry – HS 
Code Correspondence 
Table I.1 lists the number of six-digit codes that fit within each survey industry, and 
lists the source of this information. This information is used to construct the industry-
adjusted export totals as used in Chapter 7. 
To construct the industry-adjusted trade totals by respondent, the addition of all HS-
codes for every industry that respondents have selected presents a problem of overlap. 
Duplicate entries at the 6-digit level are removed on a respondent-by-respondent basis, 
after which the addition of 6-digit codes yields the adjusted trade volume by country-
pair. 
While duplicate data on 6-digit HS codes is deleted, there may still be overlap between 
offices if there are multiple offices from the same source country in the same 
destination country. Hence, the procedure above still needs to account for the existence 
of the six occurrences of duplicate offices and the one occurrence of triplicate offices 
in the survey. Doing so on an industry level means that where an industry is selected 
by duplicate offices, the trade volume for each office is halved for this industry. No 
one industry appears in all three responses, though some industry-overlap exists among 
the duplicate offices. 
Two respondents have not selected any industry. In this case, it is possible that they 
overlooked or ignored the question. As such, their adjusted export totals are set to the 
volume of total exports. To investigate whether this has any effect on the results 
analysis will take place with these respondents and without them, for robustness 
checking. In addition, one respondent's only selection was ind4, financial services. 
Because this industry is not available in the goods trade database, this respondent's 
adjusted exports total is set to 0 as this case indicates that the office is not operational 
in any other industry, and there is enough information to not set this office's adjusted 
total exports to total exports as with the other two respondents above.
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Table I.1: Sources used to convert industries in survey to HS 6-digit level industry codes 
Industry 
Number 
of 6-digit 
HS codes HS2012 codes in survey converted from Source 
High-tech manufacturing 302 SITC (Rev. 3) Eurostat (2016a) 
Other manufacturing 3538 SITC (Rev.3) less high-tech industries as defined above Eurostat (2016b) 
Construction 255 SITC (Rev.3) Moody (1996) and Hirakawa (2011) 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 388 ISIC (Rev.3) codes 01, 02 and 05 corresponded to SITC 
(Rev.3) 
UN Comtrade correspondence tables 
Mining 256 SITC Rev.3 WTO (2015) 
Transportation 130 N/A (direct correspondence)  
Health care 234 HS 2007 Delgado, Kyle, and McGahan (2013) 
Oil and gas 43 N/A (direct correspondence)  
Food & beverage 518 SITV Rev.3 minus data for raw material and tobacco UNCTAD (2016a) 
Textiles & clothing 796 N/A (direct correspondence) Nordås (2004) 
IT (hardware and software) 93 SITC Rev.3 UNCTAD (2016a) 
Aero 46 Direct correspondence, refined using TIPS database TIPS database 
Automotive 58 SITC Rev.3 Eurostat (2016c) 
Defence 18 N/A (direct correspondence)  
Energy (renewable) 87 HS2002 APEC (2012) and UNCTAD (2014) 
Maritime & Shipbuilding  18 N/A (direct correspondence)  
Metal 563 N/A (direct correspondence)  
Creative & entertainment 196 HS2007 UNCTAD (2016b) 
Agricultural machinery 33 HS2007 UNFAO (2011) 
Architecture & design 3 N/A (direct correspondence)  
Cosmetics 31 N/A (direct correspondence)  
Electronics 276 SITC Rev.3 Wood and Mayer (2011) 
Food processing 38 SITC Rev.3  
Jewellery 53 N/A (direct correspondence)  
Leather clothing 20 N/A (direct correspondence)  
Machinery 1112 HS2007 Ando and Kimura (2005) 
Sports  43 HS2007 Eurostat (2016c) 
 
